CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022900100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

'Rap
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 041
10 October 1972
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No. 0243/72
10 October 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Sharp fighting continues north of Saigon.
Page 1)
EGYPT-USSR: Anti-Soviet recriminations resumed.
Page 3)
PANAMA: New phase for the Torrijos government.
Page 5)
JAPAN: Possible new trade program (Page 7)
COSTA RICA - COMMON MARKET: Step toward crisis
resolution (Page 7)
LAOS: Enemy air attack'in the north (Page 9)
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Saigon and Capital Special Zone
QUANG TRI--
Lai Khe
Ben Cat
SAIGON
E r*my attack
CHAU DOCK
I V-
B
BIEN HOA
7g n
ThuDuc
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VIETNAM: Sporadic sharp skirmishing continues
nortif'oof SSa gon in Binh Duong Province. Government
defense forces have clashed repeatedly with small
enemy units near the provincial capital of Phu Cuong.
The Communists hold a village on Route 13 between
the town and a major government military base at Lai
Khe, and are also reported to be in control of sev-
eral hamlets near Phu Cuong.
numerous North Vietnamese troops have
in: i t ra e amlets east and south of Phu Cuong and,
as of 5 October, had installed telephone wires and
prepared positions close to Routes 13 and 1A.
The government has moved two regular battalions
into blocking positions near Bien Hoa while both
ranger and armored units have been deployed along
Route 13. r Jele-
ments of the enem s 9th Division are a so partici-
pating. the current campaign
is designed to demonstrate Saigon's vulnerability to
attack at any time the Communists choose, and to
"put pressure" on the government and the US prior
to the November elections.
The Communists evidently intend to increase the
pace of military activity in several other provinces
around the capital as well as in the delta as part
of the planned October "highpoint." A recently cap-
tured prisoner says the Communists will try to attack
Tay Ninh City and carry out major actions in Hau
Nghia Province. An increase in activity there is
probably related to this plan. Meanwhile, enemy
forces in several northern delta provinces, notably
Long An, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa, also appear ready
for action, particularly along Route 4, the key link
between the delta region and Saigon. Communist at-
tacks already may be under way in several areas, es-
pecially in the western delta province of Chau Dock
(continued)
10 Oct 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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the central highlands province of Kontum,
thre T Iays of sustained Communist shellings as well
as stiff resistance to government clearing opera-
tions near Kontum City have resulted in heavy cas-
ualties to both sides. Fighting has eased for the
moment, however. In the coastal area, South Viet-
namese forces have recaptured several key positions
in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin provinces.
On the Quang Tri battlefront, South Vietnamese
Marines report some progress in a limited offensive
that was launched north of Quang Tri City on 7 Oc-
tober. The Marines have reoccupied the Trieu Phong
District headquarters about three miles north of the
city.
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EGYPT-USSR: Egypt has renewed its recrimina-
tions against the Soviet Union just a week before
Prime Minister Sidgi's scheduled arrival in Moscow.
On 5 October, a Beirut weekly magazine pub-
lished an interview in which President Sadat is
quoted as saying that he had ended the Soviet mil-
itary presence in Egypt because the Soviets would
not fight and had become "a burden to us." Sadat
said the decision was also intended to let the
Kremlin know that Soviet: strategy in the Middle
East could not be fulfilled at Egyptian expense.
The editor of the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar
al-Yawn, whose criticism in late August and early
September riled the Soviets, also renewed his at-
tacks on Moscow over the weekend.. The editor res-
urrected charges that the Soviets had failed to
supply Egypt with necessary arms and said "weapons
that are not sufficient for a state to fight the
war that has been imposed upon it are mere pieces
of jewelry."
The comments are probably designed to put pub-
lic pressure on the Soviets prior to Sidgi's visit
on 16 October. Despite the new Egyptian criticism,
both sides presumably are interested in reconcilia-
tion.
The renewed criticism could also be intended
as a warning to Iraq and Syria of the pitfalls in-
volved in having too close a relationship with the
Soviets.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PANAMA: The inauguration tomorrow of Demetrio
Laka a'~'~`n Arturo Sucre as constitutional president
and vice-president will open a new phase of activity
for the government dominated by General Torrijos
that probably will focus primarily on the stalled
canal treaty negotiations.
Having overcome years of accumulated skepticism
to convince the people of his concern for their well
being, Torrijos is now at a point where he has to
deliver. In the short run Torrijos will probably
try to breathe new life into the faltering agrarian
reform program and develop new links between national
and local government to improve administrative ef-
ficiency. He will probably reshuffle the cabinet
and the Guard command and may impose greater control
over the economy to force business to invest in
socially desirable projects. Nevertheless, under
present conditions Torrijos' commitment to reform
in the domestic arena will considerably exceed his
ability to perform.
Torrijos' style of governing does not allow
for simultaneous handling of a variety of key issues.
Within the next couple of months, therefore, Torrijos
will find it necessary to choose between devoting a
major portion of his time to development tasks or
to the canal issue. Given the intractability of
domestic problems, the greater glamour of interna-
tional politics, the over-riding importance to
Panama of the canal, and the fact that a comprehen-
sive development program would require the addi-
tional revenue that would be available when a new
treaty is adopted, the negotiation of a new treaty
will get major attention.
Torrijos probably approaches the canal problem
with some degree of trepidation. He will be iden-
tified with whatever agreement is reached, and hi
fame and future will depend in large measure on i s)
10 Oct 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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1public acceptance. He already has been in control
of Panama for four years, has been given special
powers for another six years, and probably intends
to assume the presidency formally in 1978 for a
six-year term. Thus, Torrijos cannot afford to lay
himself open to charges that he bargained poorly or
was bought off by the US. Under these circumstances,
he may find it difficult to adopt a statesmanlike
attitude and accept half-a-loaf. It will also be
difficult for Torrijos to satisfy himself that he
has obtained the best possible offer from the US.
Panama has long believed that public tantrums, em-
barrassing to the US, yield results. Torrijos'
experiences in office have undoubtedly reinforced
this view.
Torrijos apparently does not want to aggravate
already strained bilateral relations at this time
and probably does not expect significant progress
on a treaty before the end of this year. Nonethe-
less, he has launched a propaganda effort to gain
the diplomatic support which he hopes to parlay
into bargaining leverage. The assembly earlier
this month passed a resolution calling on Torrijos
to reject US payments for use of the zone. Pana-
manian ambassadors in Spain, Peru, Germany, and
Chile have added their voices to those in Uruguay
and Brazil, trumpeting Panama's claim to sovereignty
over the Canal Zone. Finally, the government is
mounting a major campaign to have the UN Security
Council meet in Panama City next March when Panama
will chair the council. Panama is already claiming
the support of 11 of the 15 council members for the
change of venue and admits that the purpose of the
meeting will be to sell its position on the canal.
to the American public.
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JAPAN: Tokyo may soon announce a new trade
program that it hopes will forestall mounting in-
ternational pressure for another yen revaluation.
The new program will consist of a series of meas-
ures to reduce Japanese import restrictions, in-
cluding easing import quotas, simplifying import
procedures, and reducing tariffs and taxes on im-
ported commodities. Prime Minister Tanaka has
rejected an export surcharge advocated by the
Ministry of Finance aimed at slowing Japanese ex-
port expansion. The government hopes to work out
final details and announce the plan by the end of
the week.
COSTA RICA - COMMON MARKET: Costa Rica's ef-
forts to put its financial house in order may be
an important step toward resolving the Common Market
crisis. The government has agreed on the essentials
of a badly needed stabilization program--something
other Market members have insisted on before trade
with Costa Rica can be normalized. Growing concern
within the Costa Rican business community over the
trade impasse and evidence of domestic economic dis-
location, such as the recent Firestone shutdown,
probably forced President Figueres to move at last
toward formulating decisions on both internal and
Market economic policy. The new stabilization
program implies that Costa Rica is now willing to
discipline its internal monetary and fiscal manage-
ment, and the program should clear the way for a
renewal of negotiations with other Market countries.
The faltering Market is not yet dead, but decisions
reached in the next few weeks will be critical.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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'Luang Prabang
Sala Phou Khoury
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LAOS: The Communists have mounted a small
air "ack against Bouam Long, an isolated govern-
ment stronghold north of the Plaine des Jarres.
two unidentified,
propeller-driven aircraft made two passes over the
government base. E: I
two MIGs may have supported the strike. ere
were no casualties, but a small fuel storage area
was set afire. Later in the day, the North Viet-
namese began shelling Bouam Long. No ground attack
has been reported. Bouam Long, a staging area for
operations against Communist lines of communications
and supply depots north of the Plaine, has been a
thorn in the side of the North Vietnamese for sev-
eral years, The last air attack against a govern-
ment outpost was in January of 1968, and it also
involved propLer-driven aircraft.
10 Oct 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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