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December 15, 2016
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October 6, 2003
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December 20, 1972
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Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A0234SI1et3 25X1 'DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin State Department review completed Secret N2 42 20 December 1972 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/1Il' ;J 1P79T00975A023400080001-3 No. 0304/72 20 December 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS VIETNAM: Communists broadcast propaganda on talks impasse. (Page 1) CHILE: General Prats' activism ruffles both oppo sition and some government politicians. (Page 3) MALTA: Mintoff again threatens British over base issue. (Page 5) INDONESIA: Severe rice shortages producing polit- ical fallout. (Page 7) USSR: Foreign leaders flocking to Moscow for 50th anniversary celebrations. (Page 9) PERU-CUBA: Visit of Peruvian military delegation to Cuba could presage closer relations (Page 10) Approved For Release 2003/10/2$ECAU79T00975A023400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3 SECRET VIETNAM: The Communists have developed some additional propaganda formulations to cope with the impasse in the peace talks. On 18 December, an authoritative Hanoi article denounced President Thieu's proposals of 12 Decem- ber for an expandable holiday cease-fire and the joint release of prisoners of war. According to the article, Thieu attacked all the "basic princi- ples" of the draft peace accord of 20 October when he called for withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and for the creation of a "permanent political" boundary at the DMZ in- stead.of the provisional demarcation line that now exists. The lengthy discourse attempted to demon- strate that Thieu's proposals, both new and old, did not originate with him, but were only made at the instigation of the US as part of an American "plot" to alter the basic content of the "approved" peace agreement. The article's insistence that Thieu is a US "puppet" is designed in part to pin the blame for the impasse on Washington rather than Saigon. In addition, Hanoi probably is trying to head off any gain in Thieu's stature among the South Vietnamese as a result of his independent stance on the nego- tiations. The theme that Thieu is a powerless US puppet exploiting his country for American inter- ests has been a constant part of Hanoi's political line in South Vietnam. Hanoi doubtless hopes thereby to fuel pressures for Thieu's removal fol- lowing a cease-fire. It is likely that the Viet- namese Communist effort to portray Thieu's pro- posals as a manipulation by Washington will be intensified in the weeks to come. The Hanoi article was accompanied by an edi- torial from the Viet Cong's Liberation News Agency on 18 December that attempted to provide additional propaganda justification for Hanoi's refusal to agree explicitly to the withdrawal of North Viet- namese troops from the South. In the course of Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/10/2~Ee1k79T00975A023400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 SECRET denouncing alleged US and South Vietnamese efforts at "trampling on the just and fair content" of the draft cease-fire agreement, the editorial claimed that the bulk of the North Vietnamese in the South were "fighters and sons" of the Vietnamese who had regrouped to the North under the 1954 Geneva Agree- ments. This is the first known instance in which the Vietnamese Communists have admitted obliquely that troops from the North are in the South by asserting that they are really southerners fight- ing in their "own homeland." This line may also become a more prominent theme in the Communist propaganda output in the future. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/1 0/gi f j 1 79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 200 D I1I-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 CHILE: General Prats' assumption of an active political role is causing consternation among op- position and government politicians alike. Prats had been interior minister only a little over three weeks when President Allende left on 30 November for a two-week trip, but showed no hesi- tation in assuming responsibility as chief execu- Ithe UP leaders-- particularly the Communis s--rep tedly expressed consternation over the implications of the gen- eral's aggressive behavior in the usually pro forma role of vice-president. They fear that he intends to identify the armed forces increasingly with the administration in order to enlarge the military role in directing the country. On the other hand, Prats has taken actions that opposition parties criticize as partial to- ward the UP. On 15 December, Christian Democratic Party President Fuentealba accused Prats of a whole litany of misdeeds. The conservative Na- tional Party started criticizing Prats' conduct as pro-UP even earlier, probably stimulated by his reported belief that Chilean industrialists are feeding leftist extremism hhbbey their unrealistic i p~ Po el dstea~ /~2 1CIA-R MT0097 Lp51q fllf Q~ -3 on non 79 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003OR/?.RF RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Prats himself takes the position that his ob- ligations are only to the president and to the army. He apparently believes that only by expanding mili- tary influence in the government can he restore political calm for the March elections. It is in- creasingly apparent, however, that he relishes his new role and may harbor ambitions to become presi- dent himself. There is as yet no indication that President Allende disapproves of his activism, particularly since Prats' attitude shores up pres- idential authority over UP politicians who often fail to defer to him. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Vrr Approved For Release 200?t1'Ot& A-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/1" ]klp-PDP79T00975A023400080001-3 MALTA: Prime Minister Mintoff has threatened to take his disagreement with the British to the UN Security Council. In response to his demand that Britain. and the allies make up Maltese losses caused by the floating of the pound, Mintoff received a letter from British Prime Minister Heath on 18 December indicating that London expects all parties to the base agreement signed last March to observe the agreement. in letter and in spirit. Mintoff's immediate reaction, con- veyed to the UK High Commissioner, was to accuse London of bad faith and of cheating Malta of five million pounds. Before dismissing the British envoy, Mintoff said "If you want to fight, we know how to fight too; don't think you can stay on here for 14 million pounds.." Mintoff subsequently informed the US, West Ger- man, and Italian ambassadors that he interpreted Heath's message as a threat to use force to maintain the British military presence on Malta after his deadline expires on 31 December and that the allies would support London in this move. British forces on the island-are making no obvious preparations for departure--a fact that the Maltese appear to view as a military threat. Mintoff also demanded that the allies submit written notes dissociating them- selves from Heath's position "within 24 hours" or he would instruct his ambassador to the UN to raise the matter with the Security Council. Rome and Washington have already turned down this demand. In order to place this matter before the Council, the Maltese ambassador to the UN would first have to secure nine of the 15 Council votes. During his discussions with the ambassadors, Mintoff talked about other sources of revenue and other "allies." He said that he had "lost the friendship of the Soviet Union" and did not intend to lose any more friends, but that he would do what Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/10/ q&-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/gE(MLW79T00975A023400080001-3 was necessary to protect Malta. Mintoff may be re- ferring to the inability of the USSR and Malta to agree on whether the Soviets should receive permis- sion to establish an embassy in Valletta before they promise to extend economic assistance. The Soviet ambassador in London, who is also accredited to Malta, visited Valletta earlier this month but was unable to resolve this issue. Mintoff did not raise the deadline of 31 De- cember and he has not yet ordered the UK troops to leave the island. He told the US ambassador, how- ever, that when the deadline expires, the British would have only 24 hours to leave. The British es- timate that the withdrawal would take at least 60 days after the plans are drawn up. 20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA- DP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/2 ,aff 79T00975A023400080001-3 INDONESIA: Severe and apparently unexpected rice shortages are producing political fallout in Jakarta. Food prices have skyrocketed and bureaucratic failures and malfeasance in the government's rice distribution system have been spotlighted in ensuing publicity. Indonesian students, quiescent for many months, have staged protests in the past few weeks in several major cities. Opposition members of par- liament, scenting a chance to embarrass the military leadership, have called for an open investigation of alleged corruption in the rice agency. Jakarta's newspapers are keeping the issue alive by giving wide coverage to various anti-government charges. A complicating but not yet publicized aspect of the problem is Mrs. Suharto's influence peddling on be- half of certain rice contractors. The food distribution problems are likely to persist at least into next spring. President Su- harto has attempted to defuse the issue by publicly accepting pro forma responsibility for the emergency. Some regional leaders and protestors, however, are suggesting that the root cause of the problem is economic manipulation by the nation's Chinese minor- ity--who by and large control wholesale rice trans- actions. Widespread acceptance of this allegation could lead to serious anti-Chinese demonstrations, especially if the government decides that the easiest solution to its predicament is to allow the Chinese to become the scapegoat. Although the rice problem may be politically embarrassing for Suharto, it is unlikely to create any immediate serious problems for his regime. A longer range concern for the President, however, is the possibility that rivals within the army will try to use the situation to enhance their own polit- ical power at his expense. Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/10/22cd.JF_1.9T00975A023400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/RDP79T00975A023400080001-3 FOREIGN ATTENDEES Eastern Europe Hungary - Kadar East Germany - Honecker Romania - Ceausescu Poland - Yugoslavia - Vice President Dugonjic Czechoslovakia - Bulgaria - Western Europe San Marino * Denmark * Sweden Italy * U K * Spain * Austria * Ireland * Portugal Luxembourg * Belgium * Greece FRG * Norway - trade union delegation Finland - President Kekkonen Asia Burma - Information Minister Brig. Thaung Dan India - Vice President Pathak Sri Lanka - Shipping and Tourism Minister Kalugalle North Vietnam - Politburo No. 2 member Truong Chinh Australia - Socialist Party leader Clancy Bangladesh - Industries Minister Mustafa Mongolia - Premier Tsedenbal North Korea - Choe Yong-kon, titular head of state Australia* Sri Lanka* Laos* Bangladesh* South Vietnam* Chile - Minister Hernan del Canto Cuba - Premier Fidel Castro Uruguay * Guyana * Puerto Rico El Salvador * Honduras * USA * Argentina * Brazil* Costa Rica Venezuela South Yemen - Premier Ali Hasani Egypt - Deputy Premier Marzaban Iraq - Public Health Minister Mustafa Mauritania - Foreign Minister Mouknass Syria * (& Baathist) Somalia * Turkey ** South Africa * Lebanon * Afghanistan Iran ** Iraq * Algeria ** Israel * *Communist Party delegation **Unspecified government representation Leaders cited are heads of delegations. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023400080001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/10/22,-ffV9T00975A023400080001-3 USSR: Foreign government and Communist party leaders are flocking to Moscow for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the USSR later this week. The level of representation at the ceremonies, scheduled to reach their high-point on 21 and 22 December, varies considerably. Moscow's East Eu- ropean allies will be represented by party chiefs, and a summit meeting will probably be held during their stay. Cuba will be represented by Fidel Castro, and high party figures from North Vietnam and North Korea will be present. Those non-Commu- nist nations of the Middle East and Asia that were invited generally responded by designating middle- level government officials as their representatives. Few governments in Western Europe and Latin America were invited, although a number of Communist party leaders from those countries will be present. The presence of such a heterogeneous group of foreigners will offer limited opportunity for serious substantive discussions. Some of the key figures, however, may be able to review their par- ticular problems with Soviet leaders. The Soviet and East European leaders may use the visit to discuss the CSCE preparatory talks and to consider a position on force reductions in Europe. A joint session of the Soviet party Central Committee and the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets is expected on 21 December. No major business is likely to be transacted, but Brezhnev report- edly will make a major speech, which the foreign guests will probably be invited to attend. The following day apparently is being set aside as the formal anniversary and will likely be marked by a major parade. 20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : WkAP79T00975A023400080001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/2 `: -?P79T00975A023400080001-3 PERU-CUBA: Members of a high-level Peruvian military delegation, which included prime minister - designate Mercado, have returned from two weeks in Cuba full of praise for their hosts. The 30 offi- cers from all services were particularly impressed by the Cubans' favorable attitude toward Peru and the quality of Soviet armaments in the Cuban inven- tory. This lengthy visit could presage closer re- lations between the two countries, and the Cubans may hope that Mercado, on whom they lavished their attentions, will be the instrument to effect this change. More immediately, the impression made by modern Soviet weapons being operated by other Latin Americans could influence Peruvians to opt for pur- chasing Soviet arms--especially at a time when the seizure of a US-owned tuna boat threatens to end prospects for a resumption of US military sales to Peru, 20 Dec 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO23400080001-3