CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A024200040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 40
10 April 1973
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No. 0086/73
10 April 1973
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Sihanouk's political position strength-
ened by trip to "liberated zones." (Page 1)
BURMA: Insurgent activity along Sino-Burmese border
drops to unusually low level. (Page 3)
ARGENTINA: Peronists concerned over new round of
political violence. (Page 5)
CYPRUS: Violent incidents reach new high. (Page 6)
PAKISTAN: Opposition rejects Bhutto's latest con-.
sti t t nal proposals (Page 7)
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: Differences
of opinion on speculative capital movements (Page 7)
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CAMBODIA: Sihanouk's political position has
been strengthened as a result of his alleged trip
to the Communist "liberated zone" in Cambodia. It
is being used by the Communists to reinforce Si-
hanouk's claim as Cambodia's "legitimate" chief of
state. The attention Sihanouk is now receiving in
Hanoi is the clearest indication to date that the
North Vietnamese are willing to support Sihanouk's
restoration to a position of power in Cambodia.
There are signs that Hanoi may be bringing
the Khmer Communists, whose ranks contain a sizable
anti-Sihanouk faction, around to a more tolerant
attitude toward their "commander in chief." The
radio of the "National United Front of Cambodia,"
which is controlled by the North Vietnamese, noted
that the three ostensible leaders of the insurgency
all paid their respects to Sihanouk on his arrival
and escorted him on his travels. Sihanouk himself
claims that his relations with the insurgents have
improved. He told a French journalist in Hanoi
on 8 April that the Cambodian "resistance" was now
united, following his discussions with insurgent
leaders.
Sihanouk also quoted Premier Chou En-lai as
saying that no new military equipment would be
turned over to the Khmer Communists, because the
Paris Agreement bans such deliveries. According
to Sihanouk, Chou said that it would be up to the
insurgents to "multiply" the military "capital"
already received from China. Even without more
aid from Peking, the Communists can still sustain
the fighting provided Hanoi continues logistic
support.
Sihanouk repeated his opposition to negotia-
tions or compromise with the Lon Nol government,
but played down the possibility of a direct Commu-
nist assault on Phnom Penh. Sihanouk claimed that,
in view of US air support, it would be better to
wait in the expectation that the Lon Not govern-
ment will collapse from within.
10 Apr 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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BURMA: Communist insurgent activity along
the Sino-Burmese border has dropped to an unusually
low level.
From the evidence available, the Communists
appear to be concentrating on strengthening their
political control in ways that do not challenge the
Burmese Army directly. They have begun to build
a political apparatus at the village level and to
recruit and train new forces in regions they hold
securely. At the same time, the Communists are
quietly expanding their activity southward toward
Kengtung, into an area traditionally under only
tenuous government control. Local officials claim
that all the villages in an area 60 miles east of
Kengtung have fallen under Burmese Communist influ-
ence.
The insurgents' efforts at consolidation and
expansion are aided by Rangoon's failure to con-
test the Communists for control of territory east
of the Salween River. The town of Kunlong, which
was under Communist siege in late 1971, is the
only important population center in the region
still in government hands. The insurgents have
chosen not to renew the siege, but the government
garrison there remains in a defensive stance. In
the Kengtung area farther south, the government
is preparing to abandon its few outposts if the
insurgents apply military pressure.
The lower level of insurgent military opera-
tions this year may also reflect P in 's current
olicy.
Peking m
o a
t
__
s
the insurgen
that would alarm the Burmese. The insurgents, who
10 Apr 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
ay have persuaueu
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now number about 4-5,000 men, are armed and sup-
plied by the Chinese and, at least in some in-
stances, directed by Chinese military personnel.
Prime Minister Ne
end following his trip
there has be
Win
to
hoped this support would
China in August 1971, but
en no sign
of
a slackening
,
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oug the se Government appears
resigned to the loss of remote border territory to
the insurgents, Peking's continuing support role
is causing anxiety in Rangoon. This anxiety has
been one reason for Rangoon's current effort to
improve ties with other governme s in Southeast
Asia.
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I
ARGENTINA: Peronists are showing increasing
concern that political violence will cause serious
problems for the newly elected Campora government
or possibly even obstruct the peaceful transfer of
power. President-elect Campora has called on ter-
rorists to observe a truce that will let him prove
he "is on the right path." He claimed that no
"true Peronist" was involved in the wave of terrorism
since the election. Campora apparently still hopes
to attract the cooperation of radical-leftist youth
and continues to speak-of amnesty for political
prisoners.
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While Campora was asking or supp arc
dio another foreign businessman
ra
,
over nat~.onw a
was being kidnaped. The British national was seized
only one day after a US business executive was re-
leased for more than a million dollars ransom.
There is still no ransom demand for the retired
Argentine admiral who was kidnaped last week.
Armed forces leaders have reiterated their
pledge to turn over power to Hector Campora on
25 May, but they are likely to use the latest
round of terrorist violence to strengthen their
hand in talks with the Peronists. The Peronists
had argued that terrorism would subside if they
won the election, but with evidence to the con-
trary the military will press hard for a continued
major role in maintaining domestic order and se-
curity.
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CYPRUS: Greek Cypriot violence reached a
new high over the weekend and President Makarios
may have to invoke emergency measures to restore
order.
Thecurrent round began last Thursday with
the assassination of a Makarios supporter. On
Sunday, pro-Makarios forces retaliated by setting
off 33 explosions against property controlled by
Grivas elements. Makarios subsequently is-sued
his strongest condemnation so far of the violence.
According to press reports, he intends to speed
up the formation of his auxiliary police force
and reimpose a 1971 emergency law. Ignoring the
archbishop's statement, Grivas' raiders attacked
three police stations yesterday, wounding three
policemen and suffering one casualty.
This violence has affected the intercommunal -
talks, where disarray among the Greeks is encour-
aging the Turks to resist Greek offers. The nego-
tiators recessed last Friday and will resume meeting
on 17 April, but prospects for an early settlement
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PAKISTAN: The opposition has rejected Pres-
ident Bhutto's latest constitutional proposals and
is continuing its boycott of the National Assembly.
Bhutto offered little to his opponents, who were
demanding major changes in the constitution. In
spite of the boycott, Bhutto apparently intends to
hold to his schedule calling for a new constitution
by 21 April. His followers in the assembly have
approved some controversial provisions--such as
one obviating the need for early elections--that
had been deferred during the attempt to reach a
compromise with the opposition.
* * * *
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: Pre-
liminary discussions of ways to deal with the ad-
verse impact of speculative capital movements on
currency markets have underscored differences of
opinion between the European Community and other
nations. At a meeting last week of a subgroup of
the Committee of Twenty, the body set up by the
International Monetary Fund to develop monetary
reform proposals, many nations expressed skep-
ticism regarding the effectiveness of existing
European controls, primarily because of leads and
lags in trade transactions. Some representatives
stressed a preference for stand-by rather than
continuous controls. European advocacy of tighter
controls over the Eurocurrency market brought
strong opposition from officials of the developing
to pro-
el
i
y
v
countries who use that market extens
tect and increase the return on their reserve
holdings. The Europeans are mainly concerned
about stabilizing the joint float. Unless some
provision is made to control the massive funds
available for speculation, a successful attack on
the joint float would seem likely.
10 Apr 73
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Secret
Secret
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