CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A024400030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N?' 0 41
5 May 1973
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No. OIf18/73
5 May 1973
Centr~cl Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
preparations for a b.s~ sprincampaign are almost
totally lacking this y~~.r. ~~ (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Th~~_tradition -f indicators of enemy
LEBANON-FEDAYEEN: Ceasefe seems to be holding
ARGENTINA: Campor unta meetn= fails to satisfy
military on terror sm issue. (Pa~~ 3)
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OUTH VIETNAM: Time is running against the
Co n~,sts! a- f they were planning to use their newly
i.n#iltrated men and materiel for a major offensive
this spx?,..ng. The rainy season will begin to slow
movement on the Ho Chi Minh trail shortly, and
vital combat support from back-country enemy bases
in many areas will be badly impeded.
The traditional indicators of enemy prepara-
tions for a big. campaign--forward deployments, in-
tense reconnaissance--are almost totally lacking at
present. In the north., the Communists have cut back
their combat punch by withdrawing a large part of
three divisions. Dr~;er weather prevails along the
coast in the north for the next three months, how-
ever, and major combat, would be more possible .there
than elsewhere.
There are reports claiming that during May the
Communists will try to intensify the local nibbling
attacks they have been conducting since the cease-
fire. But throughout the summer and the rainy pe-
riod at least, the Communists will more likely put
their major military effort into the rebuilding,
realignment, and consolidation of main forces, the
logistic system., and t;he specialized sapper and ar-
tillery units.
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By emphasizing a rebuilding program and employ-
ing economy-of-force i:actics stressing artillery
harassment and small-scale raids, the Communists
probably believe they can defend most of what they
now control and have a much improved military option
by next fall.
5 May 73
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LEBANQN-FEDAYEEN: The cease-fire seems to be
holding up well as negotiations begin on new arrange-
ments regarding the. fedayeen presence in Lebanon.
In the negotiations, President Franjyah plans to
insist on further restrictions on the. guerrillas'
sphere of action,
The guerrillas' tough pose softened when the
army showed it was determined to restore order and
expected support to the fedayeen from other Arab
states did not materialize. Sma11 numbers of Syrian-
based guerrillas did cross the border, but may al-
ready have returned to Syria.
Beirut is quiet and fedayeen there have with-
drawn from the advance positions they had been using
to fire on the army. The airport, which had been
closed, is now open and traffic has resumed. The
Voice of Palestine radio continues to charge that
the Lebanese were launching air strikes and that the
army continued to shell fedayeen positions in the
south, but the army claimed there was no fighting
there.
The Lebanese believe they are now in a stronger
position to deal with the guerrillas and that they
can exact concessions from them in the current nego-
tiations. The government expects that mediation ef-
forts by the other Arabs should be generally helpful.
Representatives from Egypt, 3ra and Morocco ar-
rived in Beirut yesterday.
5 May 73
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ARGENTINA: The ;meeting between president-elect
Campora an t e ruling military junta failed to re-
solve any of the issues that divide them.
Campora agreed to meet with President Lanusse
ane7,the commanders of the air force and navy to dis-
cuss the upsurge in terrorism that has resulted in
the ,assassa,nation of two high-ranking officers and
?the kidnaping of two others since the March elections.
Despite the. positive attitude displayed by the par-
tici ants following the meeting,
ittle was accomplisne o~h~tYi~.~'
re as o we 1-known basic differences between the
military and. the Peronists.
The Peronists contend that terrorism will sub-
side once a popular government is inaugurated. The
military is convinced it will not, and can point to
statements from Trotskyist terrorists that they will
.continue to attack th.e armed forces after the Peron-
ists take power. To protect their own interests,
the army and navy--th.e primary targets of recent
attacks--are insisting that they retain control of
the counter-terrorism effort. Campora's only words
on the subject so far are that the maintenance of
internal security will be the role of the police,
not the military.
Campor'a's aloof posture and apparent unwilling-
ness to define his policies for the military appear
to be based on his conviction that the armed forces
will not move to block his accession to power. He
counts the air force in his corner and believes
that, in any event, the military will not risk civil
war by moving against, him after his strong showing
at the polls.
Most sensor officers do believe that they are
in no position to act. against the Peronists at the
present time. General Sanchez de Bustamante, co
5 May 7 3 Central Intelligence Bulletia~
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commander in Buenos Aires anal leader of the hard-
e anti-Peronist faction in the army, is kee in
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If additional terrorist
attacks are made on the armed forces and Campos.
continues tcs evade making commitments to the mili-
tary, hard-line anti-Peronists in the army and nav
could decide t to block Campos .
5 May 73 Central Ir~#eltiger~ce Bulletin 4
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INDZ.A: The petroleum minister has proposed
emergency measures to curb domestic consumption of
petroleum, which is in extremely short supply. Re-
quirements for petroleum used in the production of
thermal power have increased sharply. to meet the
acute electric power shortage. Emergency rail .and
truck shipments of foodgr~ains to food-deficit areas
have put additional strains on petroleum supplies.
New Delhi, which depends on imports for about 65-,
percent of its crude oil consumptions is trying to
obtain mare crude oil. imports and also has invited
foreign oil firms to participate in the search for
domestic petroleum t.o satisfy long-term requirements.
5 MaX 73 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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