CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026100050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
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251
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February 1, 1974
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February
1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LIBYA: Rumors of strains in leadership. (Page 3)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Naval. task force to the Spratlys.
(Page 5)
CHINA-USSR: Peking conducting vitriolic propaganda
campaign against Moscow. (Page 6)
USSR: Soviets display pessimistic attitude toward
Iv11:'sFR talks. (Page 8)
.TRANCE: New nuclear air-to-surface missile. (Page 9)
~LPITERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: European cur-
rencies record gains against the dollar. (Page 10)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 11)
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LIBYA: The alleged discovery of.a plot against.
the regime and President Qadhafi's five-day absence
from public view have given rise to rumors of serious
strains within the Libyan leadership. No unusual
military or security activity has been observed in
Tra_poli, and Qadhafi reappeared yesterday--apparently
in firm control.
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The defection of an RCC member would be a serious
jo]~t for Qadhafi and his colleagues. Although Najm
ha:~ never been an important or respected member of
the council and has on occasion withdrawn completely
from political life in Tripoli, the fiction of his
membership in the RCC has always been maintained.
The discovery of the plot and the lack of posi-
tive results from his meeting with Tunisian President
Bourguiba .in Geneva last week apparently caused
Qadhafi to retreat into temporary seclusion. Al-
though Qadhafi emerged yesterday to receive a visit-
ing A~genti.ne delegation, his brief withdrawal may
indicate that another round of his resignation threats
is in. the offing. Qadhafi has been. deeply disappointed
Feb 1, 19 7 4 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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by the course of events in the Middle East struggle, by
the: failure of his Tunisian. merger initiative, and
by his troubles at home. In the past, Qadhafi's
threats to retire have caused a spate of rumors about.
divided loyalties and political differences among the
11 members of the RCC.
Fe:b 1, 19 7 4 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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SOUTH VIETNAM: Saigon has sent a naval task
force to occupy five additional islands in the Spratly
group. The expedition consists of three ships carry-
ing 136 regional force soldiers and assorted equipment.
According to press reports, the South. Vietnamese
Navy b gan to land troops at. dawn today without inci-
dent. The commander of the task force had been told
not to engage military forces that might be in the
area and not to attempt landings on any occupied is-
lands.
This move is an effort to recoup pre.>tige lost
when the Chinese took the Paracels ten days ago.
Saigon also wants to make clear its claim to sover-
eignty over the Spratlys and to oil exploY?ation
rights. Last September the South Vietnamese incor-
porated several of the Spratly Islands--located in
the South China Sea about 300 miles east of Saigon
and about 450 miles south of the Paracels---into the
local administration of Phuoc Tuy ProvincE~. About
that: time, Saigon set up a 64-man force on one is-
land and planted markers on some of the others.
Peking`s claim to the Spratlys, unli}ce the
Paracels, has not been reinforced by a permanent
presence, and the Chinese will find it more diffi-
cult: to contest Saigon's current maneuver with mili-
tary force. To do so, Peking would have to move
naval units into the area and would have ~to operate
beyond the range of its fighter aircraft and at the
outer range of its tactical bombers.
Other countries which claim the Spratlys, such
as the Philippines and Nationalist China, have mili-
tary garrisons on some of them. The Philippines have
reported they have marines on Northeast Cay, one of
the islands Saigon has set out to occupy, but the
othE.r four are believed unoccupied.
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CHINA-USSR: Peking is engaged in a vitriolic
propaganda campaign against Moscow, perhaps in part
for domestic reasons.
In the past several weeks, the Chinese have
stepped up their attacks on the Soviets, accusing
therm of "fascist atrocities," claiming that Moscow
was administering a police state, and asserting that
the USSR was spying on China and attempting to med-
dle in Chinese affairs. The current round of at-
tacks began with a blast on conditions within the
Soviet Union., occasioned by the publication in the
West of Solzhenitsyn's Gula Archipelago. Soon
afterward, the Chinese expelled five Soviet diplo-
mats from Peking on espionage charges, the first
such action since the Cultural Revolution. Peking
drew special attention to this incident by publish-
ing a lurid account of the case and followed this
account with a harshly worded official note protest-
ing Moscow's retaliatory action of "expe:lling" a
Chinese diplomat already on his way home. More re-
cently, Ambassador Tolstikov was involved in a minor
car accident which he--as well as much o:f the diplo-
matic community in Peking--apparently considers a
deliberate provocation.
Running through the Chinese polemics on the
"spying" incident are charges that Moscow not only
is conducting espionage against China, but that
it is attempting to fish in troubled Chinese politi-
cal. waters, as it has in the past by "backing" such
renegade Chinese leaders as Liu Shao-chi and Lin
Piao. In the past ten days, these themes have also
beESn injected into the "anti-Confucius campaign,"
an ongoing political movement in China which had
prE:viously focused primarily on domestic issues and
wha.ch many Chinese as well as foreign observers believe
is connect~.~d to disagreements within the Chinese
leadership.
(continued)
Feb 1, 1974
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This development raises the possibi:Lity that
the current, obviously orchestrated, accusations of
Soviet meddling in Chinese domestic affairs may in
part be designed to discredit elements within the
Chinese political hierarchy. In the past several
years, Chinese officials at all levels have shown
great sensitivity that Moscow might exploit disa-
gre.ements within Peking's leadership for its own
ends, and the regime might at this point be prepar-
ing~ to make specific accusations along these lines.
In this connection, a recent remark by Vice Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua that Peking has "bigger fish
to fry" in relation to the "spying" incident may be
siginificant.
Feb 1, 19 7 4 Central I ntelli~erue Bulletin
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USSR: The Soviets are taking a negative line
on the MBFR talks, probably for tactical. reasons.
Mo;a cow's chief delegate at Vienna, Khlestov, has told
a 1:JS representative that he and his wife will take a
sight--seeing trip during the next few days, Khlestov
ju:atified the excursion by remarking that "in view
of the pace of the negotiations," there was time to
malce the trip. He also raised the question of an
Easter recess and even a summer recess, implying that
the Soviets are anticipating prolonged negotiations.
The Soviets apparently do not feel the need to
malce any conciliatory gesture in the near future,
The Soviets introduced a formal proposal. at the last
session and entered the current round with the atti-
tude that it was up to NATO to make the next move.
To a lesser degree, the Soviets may also be stalling
for time until they can coordinate new positions with
their Warsaw Pact partners.
Khlestov also made a strong pitch for private
US--USSR discussions. He was apparently trying to
convey the impression that the presence of his al-
liE~s would restrict Soviet freedom of maneuver. This
might be one factor behind the Soviet desire for bi-
lalMeral talks, but Moscow's main purpose is probably
to create mistrust and disarray in the NATO camp.
Meanwhile, Brezhnev, in his recent speech in
Havana, questioned the sincerity of some Western
participants in the talks, Although he merely re-
peated the concerns expressed by Soviet MBFR delegates
anti commentators, Brezhnev's remarks were more nega-
tive than his previous public statements on MBFR.
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Moclc-up of the IUlirage G8A at t:he Paris Air Show
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FRANCE: The French have acknowledged publicly
than they are developing a nuclear-tipped, air-to-
surface missile. In making the announcement, Miriis--
ter of the Armed Forces Galley stated that the mis-
sile will be equipped with a 500-kiloton nuclear war-
head, and that it will have a range of 50 to 90 miles.
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Press sources quote Galley as saying that the
first prototype of the new aircraft-?desi_gnated the
G8A?--has been ordered. It is scheduled t:o become
operational toward the end of the 1970s.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS: European
currencies recor ed strong gains against the dollar
in hectic late trading on the London exchange yester-
day. The mark, guilder, and Belgian franc gained
over 1 percent compared with their Wednesday domestic
closings and, at one point, the French franc traded
2.5 percent above its Paris closing rate.
The dollar's decline reflects renewed European
interest in borrowing in the US, following the easing
of US and European capital controls. Continuing
expectations of a decline in the price of oil also
played a role. The franc's particularly strong show-
ing followed Paris' announcement that it would float
a $1.5-billion Eurodollar loan to help ease its
balance-of-payments position.
Because most of the pressure against European
currencies reflects market concern over the balance-
of-payments effects of increased oil prices, continu-
ing indications that these pr-ices will come down will
cause a further strengthening of those currencies
relative to the dollar. Further gains should also
result as more European firms announce they are look-
in~ to the US as a source of long-term capital.
Fek~ 1, 1974
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FOR THE RECORD*
USSR: The Soviets apparently are sending a
Kresta II class guided-missile frigate t:o the Pacific
Fleet for the first time. The newly constructed ship,
the Marshal Voroshilov, left the Baltic Sea on Jan-
uary 21 and is now in the vicinity of the Canary
Islands, accompanied by two auxiliaries.
Sindermann's arrival ties in with earliE~r indica-
tions that a foreign VIP would soon come to Hungary.
Hungary - East Germany: East German Premier
Si:ndermann began a previously unannounced visit to
Budapest on January 31. The composition of his
delegation suggests that the official talks may
well focus on bilateral economic relations.
(continued)
Feb 1, 1974
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Costa Rica: Voters will cast their ballots
February 3 for'~a president, two vice-presidents, all
57 deputies to the legislature, and municipal offi-
cers throughout the country---all t,o serve a four-year
term. Costa Rica has a long record of honest and
orderly elections. Most observers expect that Daniel
Oduber, the presidential candidate of the governing
party, will gain the 40-percent plurality necessary
to ,prevent a runoff in April.
*These items were prepared by CIA without consuZtatzon
with the Departments of State and Defense,
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