CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026400080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret 25X1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
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C "~-~~
May 4~ 1974 25X1
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May 4, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: No challenge to junta after one week in
power. (Page 1)
CANADA: Ottawa becoming significant exporter of nu-
clear~reactors . (Page 4 )
INDIA: Government's arrest of labor union leaders
provokes strikes and violence. (Page 6)
USSR-INDIA: Relations have cooled since Brezhnev
visit last November. (Page 7)
CHINA: Alleged victim of current political campaign
appears at May Day celebration. (Page 9)
POR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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PORTUGAL: There has-been no serious challenge
to thee J~aTs authority after one week in power. In
the coming weeks, however, it will have to face up to
the activities and demands of the far leftists and
produce an African policy statement acceptable to a
wide political range.
The liberalization measures announced this week
have encouraged leftists of all colorations to move
on various fronts. They have taken over 'key unions
and forced out the managements of the government air-
line and some of the news media. Particularly during
the first few days after the coup, the left appeared
to control radio and television broadcasts. Since
then, the junta has acted to restore some balance,
and this week the media have cax?ried interviews with
a dozen or so political figures, mostly from the
center of the political spectrum.
The power grabs by leftist activists have had
the effect of keeping the junta reacting to, rather
than shaping, events and of largely overshadowing
the center forces. The US Embassy in Lisbon reports,
however., that moderates and various liberal groups
are expected to announce the formation of a new
political party soon. The embassy also anticipates
that after the provisional government is formed--
probably soon--the more conservative forces also will
again emerge.
Socialist Party leader Mario Soarer' current
trip to various European capitals may enhance his
status and improve his chances of being named to an
important cabinet post in the provisional government.
He told one European leader that. he would accept
only the prime ministerial post. He reportedly fears
competition from the Communists and he is seeking
financial support from European socialists. While
in London he met, with Prime Minister Wilson and
Labor Party officials who plan to offer Soarer'
party organizational and technical help. He may
also meet with African liberation movement leaders to
learn their thoughts on future negotiations.
continued)
May 4 , ].9 7 4 Central Itvtel~igere~ce Bvelletin
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General Spinola has made it clear that he hopes
the question of the future of Portuguese Africa could
be kept on the back burner while this political re-
grouping within Portugal is going on. How he chooses
to handle this question, however, will have an impor-
tant impact on his future relations with the left..
The measured approach to self-determination for the
overseas territories is incompatible with the demands
on the left for a cease-fire and immediate independ-
ence.
May 4 , 19 7 4 Central In~telx~gere~ce Btilletdn
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CANADA: Ottawa's exports of nuclear power reac-
tors are becoming significant after a long and exten-
sive marketing effort.. Canada. has sold two of its
CANDU nuclear reactors ~to Ind:ia, one to Pakistan, and
one to Argentina; a second one will probably be sold
to Argentina. South Korea has signed a letter of in-
tent to purchase the reactor with an option to buy a
second. Romania, Denmark, Iran, Taiwan, and the UK
also have indicated an interest in the system. The
CANDU reactor has recently been the focus of attention
because it is fueled by natural uranium and uses
deuterium oxide or "heavy water" as a coolant and to
s-low the neutrons in the reactor.
The majority of nuclear :reactors sold up to now
have been of US design and manufacture. These are
fueled with slightly enriched uranium and use "light"
or ordinary water as a ~.oolant and to slow the neutrons.
The U5 has also been the principal supplier of enriched
uranium to other countries, but many countries are
now considering alternatives .for reactor fuel, such
as that offered by Canada.
The capital cost o:E a CANDU reactor is slightly
higher than a light-water rea~~tor of similar size, but
over its lifetime the reduced cost of fuel would make
up this difference. The CANDID reactors will be even
more competitive as the price of enriched uranium in-
creases. A major problem at this time is the shortage
of heavy water for these reactors. Canada has had
some problems in the past meeting commitments because
of poor performance by its heavy water production
plants .
The CANDU system proved :itse.lf in 1973 by the
performance of Canada's Pickering nuclear station.
The four reactors at this station, each with a capac-
ity of 540 megawatts of electricity, operated at about
85 percent of their possible capacity, producing a
total of 14 billion kilowatt ]tours of electricity.
The main reason for this high productivity is that the
CANDU system can be refueled while still producing
electricity. US reactors must be shut down during
this operation.
May 4, 1974
Central Intell~genee Bulletin
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*INDIA: The government's arrest. of 700 labor un-
ion leaders on Thursday in an effort to avoid a na-
tionwide railroad strike has provoked an angry reac-
tion from labor. Strikes and violence have followed,
and the next several days will probably bring more
walkouts, demonstrations, and perhaps greater violence.
Railway unions across the country have begun wild-
cat strikes. Some have led to violent clashes with
the police. Yesterday, trade unions protesting the
mass arrests--including socialist leader George Fer-
nandes--joined leftist parties in a 24-hour general
strike that brought New Delhi to a standstill and
spread to Bombay. Anticipating further violence, the
government has placed security forces on alert through-
out the country.
Before the arrests, negotiations had reached an
impasse over rail workers' demands for almost a dou-
bling of wages plus a bonus payment. The government
claimed it could not possibly meet these demands.
The labor situation is becoming a major test of
strengtri for Prime Minister Gandhi, who is seeking
to deal with a deteriorating economic situation and
prevent a further erosion of support for her govern-
ment. A protracted rail strike would not only para-
lyze the economy but could also lead to widespread
rioting if, as is likely, they flow of vitally needed
food to deficit areas were cLirtailed.
Mrs. Gandhi's decision t:o go ahead with the ar-
rests at the risk of losing a political ally--the
pro-Moscow Communist Party ofd India--and alienating
organized labor is probably ~~ signal to all groups
that she is determined to take forceful action.
May 4, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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U5SR-INDIA: The warm pub:Lic atmosphere in
Soviet-Indian relations-generated by Brezhnev's visit
to India last November has dis:~ipated and the two
countries are again sniping at each other.
New Delhi is .upset about Moscow's response to
its present economic difficult:~es. Since Brezhnev's
visit, only one new ecanomic agreement advantageous
to India .has been signed--a contract for 1 million
tons of kerosene and 100,000 tons of diesel fuel.
The Soviets are concerned that they may be made
the scapegoat for some of India's current economic
difficulties. A Soviet offici~~.1 in New Delhi recently
took the unusual step of calling a press conference
to criticize India's performance in meeting its com-
mitments for the Bhilai and Bo}:aro steel plants.
These are two of the USSR's largest aid ventures in
India, and neither is proceeding as rapidly as plan-
ned. Part of the fault rests with New Delhi, and
the Soviets want to make sure they are not blamed
for the delays.
On the political side,.thE~ Soviets are probably
unhappy about the improvement in US-Indian relations,
Mrs. Gandhi's domestic moves to the right, and the
Indian Defense Ministry's desi~?e to diminish India's
arms dependence on the USSR. ~'or their part, the
Indians also probably find fau:Lt with Moscow's lack
of response to their request for help in restraining
naval competition of the great powers in the Indian
Ocean and the USSR's persistence in pressing for
special military privileges in India.
The Soviets reacted to an erroneous press re-
port in mid-March that India had concluded a naval
aid agreement with the Fx?ench k>y quickly inviting
the Indians to send a military delegation to Moscow.
(continued)
May 4, 1974
Central Ind~elligence Bulletin
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New Delhi, however, does not expect much to be ac-
complished because of Soviet reluctance to give
India the kinds of assistance ~t needs to build up
its own armament industry.
Such bilateral problems a:~ these are not unusual,
particularly in the economic sphere where the-USSR
has long been unwilling to provide India with the
kind. of assistance it thinks it needs. They only
surface when the situation on the subcontinent is
relatively calm and the Indian: have no pressing
need to curry favor with the USSR. The present dif-
ficulties could become mare serious, however, if
India continues to move closer to the US or there
are indications of an im rovement in Sino-Indian
relations.
May 4 , 19 7 4 Central Indelligence Bulletln
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CHINA: The May Day celebrations produced no evi-
dence that the anti-Confucius campaign has yet claimed
a victim at the Politburo level. The celebration in
Peking featured an indoor rally attended by most top
party leaders, while the provincial rallies were high-
lighted by the reappearance of a party vice chairman
who has been heavily criticized.
Admittance to the high-level celebration in Peking
.was carefully controlled, suggesting that security for
party leaders has been tightened. Mao Tse-tung again
-did not appear; he has not made a public appearance
since 1971.
Li Te-sheng, who has been attacked by name in
political wall posters in several areas and was re-
ported to have been arrested, made his first public
appearance since January 21. He was identified in
radio broadcasts both as vice chairman of the party
and as commander of the Shenyang Military Region.
Li's reappearance does not, however, mean that his
political survival is assured.
All other active members of the Politburo, in-
cluding the two other military region commanders on
that body, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien, also appeared
at rallies. Four of the eight regional commanders
transferred in late December are not known to have
appeared at all, but the provinces in which they are
now stationed did not report detailed lists of who
appeared at local celebrations. One who has been un-
der heavy fire appeared in Shantung but was listed
second, after the civilian second secretary. This is
a further indication that the rotated commanders will
not be named provincial first secretaries in their
new bailiwicks, although the M.ay Day lists failed to
identify any new civilian appointees to those positions.
While the May Day rallies did not identify any
victims in the anti-Confucius campaign, they did re-
flect the unsettled nature of leadership in the prov-
inces. All provinces reported. celebrations, but the
May 4, 1974
Central intelligence Bullettn
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CAMBODIA: Phnom .Penh Area
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majority did not provide name lists. What i.s dear
is that.. the campaign is far f~?om over and that, it. ma.y
still lead to the fall of high-level military and
party figures, probably including some at the Polit-
buro level. The picture that emerges suggests a se-
rious deadlock over major domestic policies and per-
sonnel issues at the top and continuing factional
strife in the provinces.
May 4, 1974
Central Irutelligence Bulletan
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USSR-Cuba: Two Soviet destroyers and a diesel-
powere al istic-missile submarine have remained
moored in Havana since arriving on April 30. Accord-
ing to the Cuban press, the skiips will leave Havana
next Monday to visit other Cuban ports. They may con-
duct exercises with Cuban ships before leaving the
Chile: Junta efforts to ease the burden of
rapidly rising prices on the poor are continuing.
The wage hike on May 1 nearly restores real wages for
lower paid workers to January 1 levels, while in-
creases for middle- and upper-scale wage earners are
proportionally smaller. These wage hikes will tend
to add to inflationary pressures as increased labor
costs are passed on to consumers.
(continued)
May 4 , 19 7 4 Central Intelligence 8ulletsn
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West Germany: Bonn yesterday reported a record
first-quarter trade surplus of $4.9 billion--about
22 percent above the previous high mark recorded in
the last quarter of 1973. A continued surge in German
exports-and slackening import demand more than offset
the higher cost of imported oil. Some special factors,
such as diversion of export orders to Germany from
Britain and Italy as a result of strikes in those
countries, contributed to the surplus. These factors,
however, were less influential toward the end of the
quarter and the March surplus fell slightly below the
February level.
May 4 , 19 7 4 Central Ir~d~elligeruce Bulletin
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