CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A026400260001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
24
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 14, 2007
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 25, 1974
Content Type:
REPORT
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Top Secret
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DOE review completed.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
C
May 25, 1974
7/
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May 25, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
GREECE-TURKEY: Athens sending military reinforce-
ments to Aegean islands. (Page 1)
USSR: Soviet official. comments on Chinese treatment
o helicopter crew. (Page 3)
ISRAEL-SYRIA: Fighting flared on Golan Front yester-
day. (Page 5)
PORTUGUESE GUINEA: Rebel leaders meet representatives
of Lisbon government today. (Page 7)
PORTUGAL: Spirit of compromise continues to prevail
in new Lisbon government. (Page 8)
ISRAEL: Some import restrictions reimposed in an
attempt to dampen inflation.. (Page 10)
AUSTRALIA: Narrow parliamentary majority may force
postponement of Whitlam's European trip. (Page 14)
ARGENTINA: Peron government scores first significant
victory in its counterterrorist offensive. (Page 15)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Assessment of Situation in Military
Region 4. (Page 17)
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The United States Intelligence Board has approved
the establishment of a National Intelligence Bulletin
that will replace the Central Intelligence Bulletin.
The first issue of the new publication will appear on
May 29, 1974. The National Intelligence Bulletin will
be produced by the Director of Central Intelligence
in collaboration with member agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board.. Insofar as possible, the
National Intelligence Bulletin, like the CIB, will
present fully coordinated information and judgments,
but it will provide a greater opportunity for the
participating agencies to express differing or dissent-
ing views. The National Intelligence Bulletin will
be addressed to all those who have received the CIB.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Lim.gp
'Careere anrt Turkey dispute oil
exploration rights on the seabed
rr between the`istands of Lirrinos and Chios
l?tanbul
Twkear
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GREECE-TURKEY: Greece is sending military rein-
forcements to several islands in the eastern Aegean
as its dispute with Turkey over oil exploration rights
in the Aegean Sea continues to simmer. This move fol-
lows earlier reports of reinforcement of its forces
along the border with Turkey in. Thrace. These mili-
tary moves have been accompanied by statements by
Greek leaders that Athens will not initiate hostili-
ties, but will as a last resort fight for its rights
to sovereignty in the area.
effort is being made to complete work on all naval
ships undergoing overhaul. by mid-June. Torpedo ships
reportedly are being loaded, and missile boats are
being exercised frequently to ensure a high state of
readiness. Although no alert has been issued, the
Hellenic navy is apparently increasing its readiness
in anticipation of a possible confrontation with Tur-
key.
Although the Greeks appear to
believe that delegates to the conference will lend
support to their position and thus force the Turks
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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to back off, they clearly are preparing contingency
plans for the Aegean area should Ankara infringe on
what Greece considers its vital interests.
Until now Turkey has played the dispute in a
lower key and has asked Athens to discuss the issue.
Nonetheless, both the foreign and defense ministers
this week restated in general terms Ankara's intention
to safeguard its rights in the area. A Turkish paper
has reported that Ankara's naval forces are expected
to assume responsibilit for security in the area from
the gendarme command.
May 25, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR: Moscow seems to be sending the Chinese
another message that it will get tough unless Peking
releases the Soviet helicopter crew.
Mikhail Kapitsa, the foreign ministry's leading
China expert, told the US ambassador that the Chinese
were parading the helicopter crew through Chinese
towns and might give them a public trial. There is
no evidence that the crew is being badly treated,
and Kapitsa offered no supporting evidence. Kapitsa
implied that the Soviets might attempt to get Chi-
nese hostages by referring to the possibility that
the Soviets might find a. Chinese helicopter that
strayed into Soviet territory. This is the first
time the Soviets have threatened to take specific
action against the Chinese
Kapitsa's remarks seem to betray the Soviets'
frustration about their inability to develop a
strategy that will settle the helicopter incident
in a way that will save face without creating a
major Sino-Soviet incident.
Kapitsa's
remarks stand in sharp contrast with the restrained
and almost conciliatory line taken by a long Izvestia
article on Sino-Soviet relations on May 16.
(continued)
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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It is possible that the Soviets will do some-
thing rash as a result of their sense of frustration.
It seems more likely, however, that Moscow realizes
that any direct action against the Chinese would
probably make it less likely that Peking would turn
over the Soviet crew. Moreover, such overreaction
would place the Soviets in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of again violating Chinese sovereignty in what
might be interpreted in the West and elsewhere as a
retaliatory gesture without sufficient provocation.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
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ISRAEL-SYRIA: Fighting flared on the Golan
front yesterday, as both Israeli and Syrian aircraft
were active over the battle area.
Tel Aviv reported that its planes attacked
Syrian targets south of the Israeli-held salient
into Syria. Damascus stated that its aircraft
struck Israeli concentrations in the central sector
of the front.
Ground fighting on the front also picked up
from the low level of the past week. Israeli and
Syrian forces exchanged tank, artillery, and mortar
fire in several sectors of the front, including the
area near Mount Hermon.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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*~v
Dakar
Banjul
GA,( 1
Bissau
CAPE VERDE -
ISLANDS
(Pod)
SIERRA
LEONE
GlJf N-
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PORTUGUESE GUINEA: Talks are scheduled to begin
in London today between representatives of the new
provisional government in Lisbon and leaders of the
insurgent movement in Portuguese Guinea. Although
billed as cease-fire negotiations, the talks will
almost certainly focus on working out a political
settlement that will lead to Lisbon's formal ac-
ceptance of the territory's independence under rebel
control.
Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares arranged the
talks during preliminary contacts he had with rebel
leaders in Dakar, Senegal, last week. Soares will
head the Portuguese delegation in London, and Aris-
tides Pereira, the top rebel leader, will speak for
his side. Pereira does not have a post in the "gov-
ernment" of the "republic of Guinea-Bissau" that the
rebels announced last year, but he is the secretary
general of their political organization, the African
Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape
Verde Islands.
Soares has stated publicly that the talks will
aim at "agreeing on the process leading to self-
determination and independence." Lisbon probably
will insist, however, that the modalities of any
transfer of control to the rebels be carried out in
accord with its promise to hold referenda in the
African territories.
Portuguese officials appear confident that the
talks will result in an early cease-fire. General
Costa Gomes, the number-two man in the junta, told
a US embassy officer this week. that both sides are
tired of the war and anxious to end it.
Although the rebel movement has also claimed
to represent the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese of-
ficials, who consider the islands of strategic im-
portance to Lisbon's international responsibilities,
are taking encouragement from Pereira's failure to
discuss the islands when he met with Soares in Dakar.
The rebels have played down their ties with the Cape
Verdes since they proclaimed their government last
fall, and now refer to themselves solely in terms
of that government.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PORTUGAL: A fragile spirit of compromise con-
tinues to''prevail within Portugal"s fledgling political
structure,
The complaints from the left over the exile to
Brazil of ex-leaders president Thomaz and premier
Caetano have been defused somewhat by the imprison-
mient of the former defense minister and head of the
security service., They presumably will be prosecuted
for the alleged injustices perpetrated by the former
regime. The trials will probably be held quickly to
reduce the possibility that they might become a
rallying point for the far right. Military rather
than civilian courts will try the cases, which will
not only help diminish the atmosphere of vengeance
but remind the populace that the military is the
ultimate authority in Portugal,
'T'he provisional government has also stressed
patience and moderation in its handling of labor
disputes- Without shedding its image as the cham-
pion of the workers, the Portuguese Communist Party
(PCP) is also signaling its preference for orderly
change. In a recent interview, party leader Cunhal
said the workers had the right to protest, but
warned them about those who want to end the demo-
=cratic process in Portugal, In this context, he
Labeled the far left a "fundamental enemy of the
PCP," which could open the door to counterrevolu-
tion.
Minister of Economic Coordination Vierra de
Almeida, formerly a respected banker who is generally
considered a centrist, recently told a group of in-
dustrialists that Portuguese workers have acted with
admirable restraint in view of their many years of
suppression. He assured them that the provisional
government would maintain a favorable climate for
business but added that management would have to
concede to legitimate labor demands,
a2ontinued )
May 25, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The rash of strikes throughout Portugal will
keep the business community nervous, however, par-
ticularly because the community is aware that Com-
munists have assumed key posts in the leadership of
the unions. Yesterday, the Lisbon subway system
was paralyzed by a new strike, but no violence has
been reported in connection with any of the ongoing
labor disputes.
The provisional government has promised to is-
sue a decree soon that will establish a framework
for solving disputes before they reach the strike
stage. Meanwhile, the appointment yesterday of
Francisco Sa Carneiro as deputy prime minister is
another sign that the complexion of the cabinet is
leaning slightly to the right of center. Sa Car-
neiro, who comes from a prominent Portuguese family,
is a former member of the National Assembly and is
currently active in the formation of the Centrist
Popular Democratic Party.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ISRAEL: Tel Aviv has reimposed a compulsory
deposit on some imports in an attempt to dampen in-
flation. While its impact on the balance of payments
will probably not be significant, Tel Aviv will try
to gain popular support by citing the measure as fur-
ther evidence of its efforts to fight Israel's high
and persistent inflation.
Similar in design to measures enacted by Italy
and Denmark earlier this month, the move requires
importers to deposit in non-interest bearing ac-
counts at the central bank for one year 20 percent
of the value of imported goods that carry a duty
of more than 10 percent. The availability of for-
eign exchange is not an immediate problem in Israel
as it was in Italy; the major benefit from this
measure will be in helping to reduce excess pur-
chasing power.
The import deposit scheme is aimed particularly
at luxury and consumer goods. Most consumer goods
imports already are heavily taxed; an imported VW,
for example, currently costs about $7,500 in Israel.
The bulk of Israeli imports--raw and intermediate
goods for re-export, petroleum, investment goods,
and military items--will not be affected. Food
imports will be exempt from the deposit charge.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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AUSTRALIA: The prospect of a razor-thin par-
liamentary majority is already cramping the style of
the Labor government. Prime Minister Whitlam con-
fided to the US ambassador on May 23 that a European
rip he planned for mid-June is up in the air be-
cause of the continuing uncertainty of the May 18
election results. Although eager to make the trip,
Whitlam is loath to stir up the criticism that would
arise if he were away from Canberra at a critical
time for his government.
It still appears that Labor will have a narrow
majority in the House of Representatives, but that
margin will not be known until May 30, after absentee
ballots are counted. A majority of one or three
seats in the 127-man body would make Labor's hold
very tenuous. Even a five-seat margin, the best
that most party officials now expect, would be a
drop from the eiqht-seat edge Labor held in the
previous lower house. Labor's prospects of a strong
parliamentary base are further dimmed by the un-
likelihood that it will capture the Senate. The
tally of votes for the Senate will not be completed
until next month.
May 25, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ARGENTINA: A successful anti-guerrilla sweep
by government security forces in Tucuman Province
that began on May 18 has given the Peron government
its first significant victory in its counterterrorist
offensive.
The large-scale operation, spearheaded by the
federal police, reportedly uncovered a major training
camp used by the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army.
The participation of armed forces units, as
well as provincial and border police, suggests that
Peron's pressure to mount a coordinated drive is
netting results. While a larger role for the mili-
tary could improve the government's chances of
neutralizing the terrorists, the struggle is ex-
pected to be a long one.
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militant -abor unionists to move ainst left-wing
extremists. against
are
under way to identify leftist "targets" and that
actions against them would be "bloody." implementa-
tion of these plans may coincide with Peron's
planned departure for Europe. His absence would
permit him to avoid close identification with re-
pressive measures that are likely to evoke strong
opposition in Argentina.
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Peron is expected to approve plans by
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SOUTH VIETNAM: The Situation in Military Region 4
The 16 southernmost provinces of South Vietnam
that make up Military Region it include the heavily
populated, agriculturally rich flood plains of the
Mekong Delta. The Delta contains 7 million people--
more than a third of the nation's population--and
produces 75 percent of its rice and a good deal of
its livestock, vegetables, and fruit.
Because of the political and economic importance
of the Delta, both sides have fought hard to control
it, and it has experienced relatively little diminu-
tion in the war since the cease-fire in January 1973.
In 1973, for example, 8,388 government troops
were killed in the area and 38,294 were wounded.
Communist losses were correspondingly high. The
same pattern of high casualties has continued during
the first four months of 1974.,
The communists rarely have been able to utilize
large main force units in the Delta's open and watery
terrain. For this reason, the fighting in Military
Region 4 is characterized by a high level of terror-
ism, relatively small-scale at:tacks,and ambushes.
A Shift in Initiative
Immediately after the cease-fire, government
forces were kept busy countering a substantial com-
munist land-grabbing effort. They were successful,
and by mid-year, the initiative began to shift
slowly in the government's favor.
Military Region 4 commander Lieutenant General
Nguyen Vinh Nghi abandoned a strategy pegged to a
chain of heavily defended outposts in favor of an
aggressive and mobile approach which more effectively
utilized the firepower of his forces--three divi-
sions, plus supporting air, armor, and artillery.
Nghi also began to use many of his regional force
troops in a combat role, relying on militia to
provide security for cities and towns.
(continued)
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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As a result, there has been a significant ero-
sion of the communist position in some of their old
Delta strongholds, which have been used as supply
and infiltration routes from Cambodia. General
Nghi's forces have virtually eliminated the long-time
sanctuary in the Seven Mountains area astride the
Cambodian border, and more recently mounted large-
scale operations into a major communist base--known
as Base Area 470 or the Tri Phap Village area--in
western Dinh Tuonq Province and southern Kien Phong
Province.
There are still a number of communist strong-
holds in the Delta, including the U Minh Forest, and
large areas in the southernmost provinces, partic-
ularly along the coast, which the government has
virtually ceased to contest.
The government's tactics have gradually forced
the communists into a more defensive posture. They
had started out in the cease-fire period using com-
bat forces to protect and enlarge their control of
certain populated areas. Since autumn 1973, the
focus has shifted to the protection of threatened
base areas and supply and infiltration corridors.
Communist main force operations are now centered
in large part in Dinh Tuong Province. Here, the aim
is not so much to hold territory as to inflict cas-
ualties, create a climate of insecurity, and also
keep infiltration routes open.
The Balance of Forces
The government has some 97,000 men in the re-
gion. They are arranged in three infantry divisions
and one armored brigade, with supporting artillery
and a large number of regional force battalions.
This total gives Saigon better than a four-to-one
advantage over the communists--nearly double that
of any other military region in the country. These
forces are supported effectively with close air sup-
port in most areas, and by naval units and marine
police who maintain security along the hundreds of
miles of rivers, streams, canals, and coast.
(continued)
May 25, 1974 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Government military officials are concerned,
however, about the morale and combat capability of
their regional forces, particularly in the southern
provinces. In addition, the South Vietnamese 21st
Division, said to be the poorest in the army, has
done little to improve the military situation in
the southern Delta.
Major communist main force combat units in the
Delta number some 22,000 men in 12 infantry and two
artillery regiments and numerous local units. Com-
munist units in the region are understrength and
more than 10,000 would be needed to rebuild these
forces to early 1972 levels.
The commitment of regular North Vietnamese
units in the Delta has historically been small, com-
pared to other areas of the country, and is likely
to remain so.
There has been little significant improvement
in communist firepower since 1972. As elsewhere,
they are trying to improve their antiaircraft capa-
bility, but the development of an effective air
defense system will be relatively difficult in the
open terrain of the Delta.
What's Ahead
Although the balance in the region weighs
heavily in favor of the government, numerical su-
periority does not necessarily give a decisive edge
in combat. By its nature, the war in the Delta
concedes a certain advantage to communist guerrilla
tactics and will continue to tie down a relatively
large number of government troops. Unless North
Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies into
the Delta is substantially increased, the govern-
ment should continue to improve its position as the
communists concentrate on protecting their base
areas and supply lines.
May 25, 1974
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Top Secret
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