CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
21
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 14, 2007
Sequence Number: 
37
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Publication Date: 
June 5, 1974
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Top Secret DOE review completed. State Dept. review completed 14ational Intelligence Top Secret June 5, 1974 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 I I National Intelligence Bulletin LATE ITEM (0345 EDT) Bolivia June 5, 1974 Late press reports from La Paz indicate that some dissident military units may have revolted against the Banter government. A presidential spokesman is reported to have said that the palace guard has been ordered to vacate the premises within the hour. President Banter, meanwhile, is in Sucre some 360 miles southeast of the capital. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 CONTENTS GREECE-TURKEY: Turkish ship leaves contested area. Page 1) CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh calm in wake of student vio- lence. (Page 2) MOZAMBIQUE: Talks between insurgents and Lisbon be- gin today in Lusaka. (Page 3) CANADA: Ottawa debates usefulness of nuclear safe- guards. (Page 6) PERU: Split between army and navy widens. (Page 9) USSR-JAPAN: Both parties seek to still controversy caused by Soviet oil minister's remarks. (Page 11) THAILAND: Leadership crisis spurs interest in early elections. (Page 12) SOUTH VIETNAM: Air force reacts to Communist at- tacks. (Page 13) EGYPT-USSR: Cairo has signed technical assistance agree- ment with Moscow. (Page 15) 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 I I .National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 Ankara's withdrawal of its "research" ship from the contested areas of the Aegean Sea has further diminished chances of a confrontation. A Turkish foreign ministry official announced publicly yesterday that the ship has "completed its mission" and is returning to Turkish waters with its naval escort. The official said that Ankara would soon respond to the Greek note of May 25 in which Athens stopped short of agreeing to negotiate the seabeds issue, but suggested that some basis for discussion might be possible. The Turkish official added that Ankara would seek to resolve problems in a spirit of "mutual understanding," but would defend its rights to the "bitter end." Athens is resting its stand on the rules of inter- national law, which from its viewpoint endorse the Greek position on the contested median line. A Greek minister noted in a public speech on June 1 that Greece understands the need to cooperate with Turkey but would not permit threats to its territorial integrity. The US consul in Thessaloniki reported on June 3 that military movements were continuing in northern Greece, but observed that the alert was being eased. Turkish forces also are presumed to be in an advanced stage of readiness, but somewhat relaxed from the alert levels set late last week. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin CAMBODIA June 5, 1974 Phnom Penh is calm in the wake of violence trig- gered by student agitators. The police have imposed an extended curfew and have managed to disperse without '..ncident crowds at the high school where the minister of education and a presidential aide were killed by stu- dents yesterday. In a further attempt to defuse the =situation, Prime Minister Long Boret announced that schools will suspend classes for three days starting today. Many students have been arrested, but a few apparently are still holed up in the high school. At Last six students have been killed or wounded. The students who seized the two government officials at the Ministry of Education planned to exchange them or nine students and teachers recently detained by police on grounds of subversive activity. It now appears !hat the officials were shot by their captors when police stormed the high school. The bloodshed yesterday has its roots in the stu- dents' and teachers' long-standing discontent with the `3overnment's performance. During the past year, teach- ers have staged strikes, public protests, and a work slowdown to dramatize their demands for higher wages. The teachers were joined on occasion by students protest- ~fig such familiar grievances as the government's failure 1'o reduce corruption and inflation. The confrontation on June 4 was preceded by several days of small-scale and orderly student demonstrations. The students' use of such unprecedented extreme measures may generate public sympathy for the government. At the same time, however, the killings may inspire (Jpportunistic critics within Lon Nol's dominant Socio- ~epublican Party to increase their attacks on Prime Min- ;ster Long Boret for failing to curb the unrest sooner. If the government overreacts, more violence may .3sult. The government thus far has tended to use re- :traint when possible in dealing with student-teacher unrest. Lon Not, in particular, has been concerned about 'jetting into any confrontations with the students and "oachers that could lead to massive disorders. In the _ong run, however, the government probably will still not be able to do much about redressing the grievances _hat generated the bloodshed. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin MOZAMBIQUE June 5, 1974 Talks between the Portuguese and leaders of the in- surgent movement in Mozambique open today in Lusaka, Zambia. Both sides will probably concentrate on setting forth basic positions in preparation for more detailed discussions at a later date. The insurgent leaders are likely to take a tough stance. In a press conference in Dar es Salaam on June 2, Samora Machel, president of the Front for the Libera- tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO), stated that his organiza- tion will insist that the talks concentrate on the means of transferring political power "to the Mozambican people, under the leadership of FRELIMO." The insurgents consist- ently have argued that independence is a right of the people in the territory, and is not subject to negotia- tion. Lisbon continues to hold out for a popular refer- endum that would determine whether the people desire in- dependence or federation with Portugal. In recent weeks, however, it has become apparent to the Portuguese that the latter alternative is increasingly unrealistic. The insurgents are in a good bargaining position, largely because of their strong military situation. Since the first of the year, they have extended their operations into central Mozambique, an area of heavy white settler concentration. The settlers have protested inadequate government security measures and fear that Lisbon intends to pull out its troops and turn the area over to the in- surgents. In recent weeks, unrest among whites has also spread to the capital of Lourenco Marques, an area that has not been touched by the insurgency. The situation there has been aggravated by labor agitation, signs of growing sup- port for the insurgents among the African population, and Lisbon's long delay in appointing a new governor gen- eral for the territory. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 Lisbon is likely to hold out for gradual political change in the territory. The Portuguese, however, may be forced to meet the front's demands for early recognition of an independent Mozambique or risk intensified insurgency. The insurgents seem to realize they have a better chance of achieving their demands through negotiation rather than in a popular referendum. Because they have concentrated on military activity for more than a decade, they have virtually no political organization and few politically or technically experienced people capable of mounting a political campaign. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin CANADA June 5, 1974 Canada's disillusionment with its involvement in India's nuclear program is causing some rethinking in Ottawa about the usefulness of nuclear safeguards. In light of India's recent atomic explosion, some Canadian officials concerned with industry, trade, and atomic energy are arguing that "safeguards are an ex- ercise in futility whether conducted bilaterally or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." This group also asserts that commercial considerations should be paramount in decisions regarding nuclear cooperation. A more influential group, including the External Affairs Ministry and some officials of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board, on the other hand, continues to believe that safeguards are imperative, despite the Indian development. The Canadian government believes that the plutonium used in the Indian test device came from the Cirus re- search reactor Canada provided India under a 1956 agree- ment. Although the agreement was concluded before the international safeguards system was established, sub- sequent efforts by the Canadians to bring this facility under IAEA controls were rejected by New Delhi. Some Canadian experts believe that even safeguarded Indian reactors probably contributed to the production of the weapons-grade fissionable material required for the explosion. Although this view may be erroneous, it strengthens the contention of critics of safeguards that an effective detection program cannot be assured be- cause of staffing and technical inadequacies, even when safeguards are in force. Canada has reacted sharply to the Indian test and has taken a number of initiatives to translate into ac- tion its dismay over the effect of the test on nuclear proliferation. The Canadians last year ruled out new contracts to ship fissionable materials to India. They Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin rune 5, 1974 have now canceled all such shipments. They have also called on the committee of nuclear exporting countries, when it reconvenes in Geneva, to consider how best to minimize damage to the Non--Prol_Lferation Treaty and to discourage other states from following the Indian example. The Canadians continue to question the "muted" US response to the Indian test. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 25X1 2 I'D A 'I Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 25X1 National Intelligence Bulletin rune 5, 1974 The split between 'the army and the navy, occasioned by the forced resignation last week of Navy Minister Vargas, has widened with the resignation of two more cabinet- level admirals. President Velasco remains secure, how- ever, with all important army troop commands apparently still loyal to him. The split between the services and between the so-called moderates and radicals in the cab- inet is likely to have important long-range effects on the style and pace of the six-year-old, military-led revo- lution Yesterday, the housing minister and the director of the national integration office resigned, apparently in protest against Vargas" retirement. Admirals have al- ready been named to replace them, avoiding a more seri- ous split that could have arisen had Velasco ,placed army 25X1 generals in either slot. Radical army generals, some of whom reportedly urged Velasco to take strong measures against his crit- ics, have gained at least a temporary increase in influ- ence Although Velasco has apparently determined that military unity is no Longer crucial to the success of the revolution, any decisions by top-level moderate army officers to disassociate themselves from the President could precipitate an important shift in Velasco?s strat-- 25X1 eqy. If this were to happen wand if Velasco were to accept their departure, the regime probably would shift leftward and become much more authoritarian. It appears, however, that the mod- erates will await further developments and assess how much power the radicals have gained before deciding on a course of action. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 I I National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 An unknown element at this time is Prime Minister Mercado, with whom Velasco has deep personal and politi- cal differences. Velasco's successful power play against Vargas sets an important precedent for ousting the Prime Minister. Mercado---who is scheduled to retire next Janu- ary--may now feel that he must make a move against Velasco soon or risk being permanently shut out. A further prob- lem for Velasco lies in the fact that the new navy minis- ter, Vice Admiral Arce, appears ready to challenge the President's more radical policies, as did his predecessor. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 25X1 I I National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 USSR-JAPAN Moscow and Tokyo are trying to still some of the con- troversy touched off :last week by press reports on Soviet Oil Minister Shashin's remarks on foreign participation in developing Siberian resources. Moscow, in particular, has hailed the signing on June 3 of a coking coal develop- ment agreement as the beginning of large-scale and long- term economic cooperation. The accord will eventually provide Tokyo with an opportunity to purchase $8 billion of coking coal in return for $450 million in credits for Soviet purchases of Japanese steel and machinery. Several Western newspapers gave the impression that Shashin had ruled out further Western and Japanese par- ticipation in the development of Siberian gas and oil re- sources. The Soviet ambassador in Tokyo immediately stated, however, that Moscow's attitude toward Siberian develop- ment projects had not changed. Tass then issued a state- ment reaffirming development talks with all countries-- particularly Japan. The Japanese press also declared that Shashin's statements were not accurately interpreted, and that the Soviets may be prepared to sell more--and not less--oil to Japan. It appears, therefore, that neither Moscow nor Tokyo has lost interest in the exploration of offshore oil deposits along the Sakhalin Island continen- tal shelf. Nevertheless, Shashin's comments are another indica- tion that the Tyumen oil development project is dead, and that certain Soviet circles believe it is necessary to take a tough line in dealing with the Japanese on other Siberian projects. The Japanese have been losing interest in the Tyumen deal as the estimates for the oil to be made available to Japan went down and the price per barrel in- creased. The Soviet suggestion several months ago that Japan help finance an expensive second Siberian railroad to carry the oil--rather than transport it by pipeline-- dampened any remaining Japanese enthusiasm for the project. Shashin's remarks appear to reflect an argument that has appeared prominently in the USSR, that Siberian re- sources--particularly oil--should be developed to satisfy 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin. June 5, 1974 growing domestic demand rather than for export. Shashin reiterated the recent Soviet line that exports of oil, in -tny event, would not be increased during the 1970s. THAILAND The leadership crisis last month has spurred high- I-evel moves to speed up the process of holding elections, currently awaiting promulgation of a new constitution. Concern is mounting that further drifts under a caretaker =government in the face of serious economic and social problems will bring recurring political turmoil. King Phumiphon reportedly favors setting the elec- Lion process in motion by shelving the draft constitu- .ion currently under review in the National Assembly and adopting one of the earlier constitutions. Army chief Krit Siwara, the chief power broker behind the scene, has come out publicly for such a scheme. The Bangkok caress has also gone on record with editorials urging rapid promulgation of the draft constitution so that t-,l.ections can take place this fall. In response to this pressure, Prime Minister Sanya has set a rough timetable which holds that the draft now before the assembly can be completed as early as August and that elections can be held in September or October. By Sanya's timetable, an elected government could take office no later than December. Besides promulgating a constitution, several impor- tant measures must be adopted before the election pro- cess can begin in earnest. The assembly has yet to pass a bill authorizing political parties; a military decree 1)anninq such activity is still on the books. The as- sembly must also decide how the prime minister will be ti;o_>lected, although most Thai currently favor some form of parliamentary system. National Assembly speaker Khukrit Pramot remains the current frontrunner to suc- Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 I I National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 During the past three months of increased Communist ground operations throughout South Vietnam, South Viet- namese air force (VNAF') tactical missions have increased from 50-100 percent in response to these initiatives. VNAF air strikes against Communist supply routes in the western highlands in early 1974 had some success. F While the above activity was generally occurring in MR 1 and MR 2, the South Vietnamese air force was support- ing ground operations reacting to Communist initiatives in MRs 2 and 3. Between March 28 and May 2, for example, over 3,000 tactical air sorties were conducted near the Cambodian border in the Parrot's Beak area, resulting in over 250 troops reportedly killed, 51 secondary explosions, and numerous artillery sites claimed to have been destroyed. Although VNAF operations have increased in response to Communist initiatives, several problems are impairing their effectiveness. Ever-present Communist air defense regiments comprising an SA-2 regiment in MR 1 and 22 anti- aircraft regiments throughout the country continued to pose a threat, and their presence kept certain areas free of VNAF overflights. A recent development has been the increased effectiveness of the SA-7 missile against close support aircraft. During the past 18 months, the Communists have maintained an effective SA-7 fire-to-kill ratio-- only five missiles to one shootdown--with the high per- centage of firing incidents taking place in the area west- northwest of Saigon. These factors have forced attacks 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 from higher altitudes, which reduce the effectiveness of the air force in both bombing and close support roles. This development has caused the South Vietnamese field commanders in MRs 1, 2, and 3 to criticize air force sup- port of their ground units. Recent cuts in the US proposed military aid to South Vietnam, coupled with shortages of spare parts for specific aircraft and the increased cost of aviation fuel, have all imposed restraints upon air division commanders' abili- ties to respond to air support requests. F Morale of air units, like that of other South Viet- namese forces, has also been adversely affected by the country's economic conditions. Air commanders continue to cite inflation, specifically spiraling food prices, as seriously lowering morale. They note that when pilots and aircraft maintenance personnel are deployed to air bases away from their families, the out-of-pocket costs to these servicemen for daily sustenance doubles. As a result, pilots and aircrews attempt, when possible, to "moonlight" during their off-duty hours. One positive note is the recent introduction of a bombing system which relies on a ground-placed beacon to assist aircraft in locating targets and bombing from safer altitudes, curtailing combat losses. Although this system cannot be used effectively in close support missions, it should to some extent nullify the effec- tiveness of the SA-7 missile against VNAF aircraft in area bombing missions. Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975A026600010037-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 National Intelligence Bulletin June 5, 1974 EGYPT-USSR The Egyptian minister of electricity has signed an agreement in Moscow calling for Soviet technical assist- ance in developing a high dam electric power station, the reopening of the Suez power station and the electrifying of barges on the Nile River The agreement shows Moscow's willingness to con- tinue its economic aid program in Egypt, despite prob- lems between the two countries over military assistance. No new Soviet credits were reported but some financing could develop if the new projects are implemented. Mos- cow's last credits to Cairo, extended in 1971, were for $195 million. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Iq Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/11/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO26600010037-6