NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026800010020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 29, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
29 July 1974
N? 631
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 29, 1974
CONTENTS
CYPRUS: Ankara rejects proposal for Cyprus settle-
ment. (Page 1)
GREECE: Inclusion of representatives of political
left strengthens Karamanlis government. (Page 3)
USSR-CYPRUS: Moscow wants to preserve an independ-
ent Cyprus, as well as to stake out a role for it-
self in negotiations over the island's future.
(Page 5)
PORTUGAL: Negotiations with rebel groups in Africa
may have bogged down. (Page 7)
MOROCCO-SPAIN: Moroccan armed forces placed on
alert. (Page 9)
USSR: Soviets accelerate efforts behind the scenes
to organize world conference of Communist parties.
(Page 10)
LAOS: Non-Communists in coalition make progress in
resolving organizational problems. (Page 11)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 29, 1974
The Cyprus peace talks in Geneva appeared close to
a successful conclusion early today, but agreement was
not reached when Ankara would not accept wording about
troop presence on the island. The talks in Geneva are
continuing this morning.
The Turkish cabinet met for almost three hours this
morning to consider the proposed agreement but adjourned
without comment. A government spokesman said the minis-
ters would meet again later "if necessary."
The Turks have been insisting on a conference com-
munique that not only would settle cease-fire arrange-
ments, but also would point to a longer term political
solution. Specifically, the Turks want agreement on a
federation consisting of two autonomous "administrations"
coordinated by a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish
Cypriot vice president. They also insist on "real secu-
rity" for the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara apparently in-
tends to maintain military pressure on Cyprus until
there is at least a general agreement in Geneva on the
outlines of a political settlement.
Prime Minister Ecevit set forth Turkish demands in
a press conference yesterday morning. He insisted on
Ankara's right to continue sending reinforcements to
Cyprus, and he said that right cannot be questioned un-
til the final and legitimate status of the island is
decided in a way satisfactory to Ankara and the Turkish
Cypriots. Ecevit conceded that there had not been much
progress in the talks up to the present, and warned
that unless all its demands were met, Ankara would not
sign a cease-fire agreement. Later in the day he an-
nounced that Athens had until last night to accept Tur-
key's conditions or the Turkish delegation would walk
out.
The Cypriot government has been concerned over
what it describes as Athens' lack of understanding and
support. The Cypriot foreign minister said yesterday
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
that Prime Minister Karamanlis is so overwhelmed by his
responsibilities that he is unable or unwilling to focus
on Cyprus' needs. He said the Royal Air Force had
agreed to fly him and President Clerides to Athens on
Saturday, but Karamanlis had said he was far too busy
to see them.
During the most intense phase of the Geneva negoti-
ations last evening, Athens called for a meeting of the
UN Security Council and for a NATO foreign ministers
meeting. After the Turks' midnight deadline had passed,
the Greeks withdrew their request for a special session
of the Security Council. The prospect of a summit meet-
ing between Greek and Turkish prime ministers was men-
tioned in dispatches from Ankara and Athens, and cabi-
nets in both capitals may decide today whether a summit
is (desirable. f)
NATO Secretary General buns has called for a meet-
ing today of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,
Luns has asked the member states to be represented by
their foreign ministers, if possible.
Limited military activity by Turkish forces on Cy-
prus continues. President Clerides protested the landing
of more Turkish troops and equipment in the Kyrenia area
yesterday
the movement of Turkish tanks along the northern coast,
but he admitted that the Turkish action was carried out
in response to the National Guard's reoccupation of
towns taken earlier by the Turks and then abandoned,
Clerides also proteste
UN forces on the island report minor incidents,
mostly in the Kythrea area, east of Nicosia. Such inci-
dents probably will continue as the Turks consolidate
their positions and as Greek Cypriot forces reorganize
their defenses.
25X1
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
Prime Minister Karamanlis' inclusion in his cabinet
of some representatives of the political left has strength-
ened his government, although it will undoubtedly irritate
some elements of the military.
The appointment last Friday of some former Center
Union deputies who represent the left--although not the
extreme left of the party--and several apolitical lib-
erals will make the government more palatable to Greece's
left-of-center constituency. It will probably be viewed
as tokenism by the extreme left, one of whose principal
spokesmen--Andreas Papandreou--plans to return to Greece
on Wednesday, according to the press. Papandreou has
already denounced the new government as a tool of NATO
and the US. Karamanlis' aim is reportedly to create as
broadly representative a government as possible to handle
the Cyprus crisis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
Moscow yesterday demonstrated its interest in pre-
serving an independent Cyprus and in staking out a role
for itself in the negotiations over the island's future.
In a strongly worded government statement, the USSR
said developments over the past week threaten the inde-
pendence of the island. In an apparent allusion to the
US, Moscow expressed its suspicion that "certain circles"
in NATO are seeking to exploit the situation in order
to consolidate their military and strategic position in
the eastern Mediterranean. The statement is Moscow's
first authoritative pronouncement since the assumption of
power by Clerides and the cease-fire.
In order to underline its concern that London, Athens,
and Ankara may agree to change the island's political
status, Moscow told the three participants that it was
dispatching an observer to Geneva. The government state-
ment said that Moscow was also firmly behind the partic-
ipation of the "legitimate" Cypriot government in the
Geneva talks. The Soviets last night called at a meeting
of the UN Security Council for full implementation of
the Council's resolution of July 20.
The Soviets also have drafted a resolution that
would have the Security Council send a special mission
to Cyprus immediately "to verify on the spot" the imple-
mentation of the UN resolution. The mission would be
made up of an unspecified number of Council members; the
USSR merely indicated that it would be willing to be a
participant. The text was not formally circulated prior
to the adjournment of the Security Council meeting last
night, and the Soviets apparently are having difficulty
securing a nonaligned member of the Council to serve as
the official sponsor of the draft.
As long as the Geneva talks continue, a proposal
for a special mission will probably not be put to a vote
in the Council, which is to resume its deliberations
this afternoon.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
The Soviet statement did not directly condemn Ankara
for its role in the current situation, nor did it directly
respond to Clerides' call last week for Moscow to exert
pressure to get Turkey to stop violating the cease-fire.
These omissions are consistent with Moscow's other ef-
forts during the crisis to cast itself as being sympa-
thetic to the Turks.
The Soviets appear to remain in fairly close touch
with Ankara; yesterday the Soviet ambassador met with
the Turkish defense minister.
Despite its opposition to enosis or partition, Moscow
apparently has a flexible attitude toward an eventual
settlement on the island. The Soviet government state-
ment said that "both Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks"
should decide the future of their "common motherland."
The Soviets may hope Ankara will receive favorably this
hint that Moscow would find acceptable some type of fed-
eral system within the framework of an independent Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the Soviets are seeking to sort out their
attitudes toward Makarios and Clerides. 25X1
Despite their suspicions about Clerides, the Soviets
have avoided direct public criticism of him, and their
support for Makarios seems increasingly pro forma.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
PORTUGAL
President Spinola's failure to spell out how or when
Portugal's overseas territories would make the transition
to independence suggests that negotiations with the rebel
groups in Africa have bogged down. His recognition in a
speech last weekend of the right to independence of the
territories, however, is a significant retreat from his
earlier insistence on a referendum and seems to spell an
end to his hopes for a confederation.
Spinola stated that Portugal is open to any initia-
tives for the planning and execution of the decoloniza-
tion process. This should encourage several moderate
African leaders who are attempting to mediate between the
rebels and the Portuguese--particularly presidents Senghor
of Senegal, Kaunda of Zambia, and Nyerere of Tanzania--
to come up with suggestions.
Spinola said that Lisbon could begin transfer of
power now to Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique.
His omission of the Cape Verde Islands may have signaled
Lisbon's hope to retain these strategic islands, or at
least to delay consideration of their status.
Spinola sought to reassure the white settlers in
Portuguese Africa that they need not fear for their
security, as he believed the authorities of the new coun-
tries would be guided by a sense of justice. The Portu-
guese appear to believe that elimination of the referen-
dum requirement and acceptance of independence as the
final goal will prove sufficient inducements to the rebel
liberation movements to end the fighting and will facil-
itate negotiations over the means and timing of the
transfer of power.
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MOROCCO
Marrakech
MAURITANIA
ALGERIA
ITALY
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 29, 1974
Morocco has placed its armed forces on alert and
has recalled at least some reservists.
a general
state ot alert was declared on July 25, all leaves were
canceled, and reservists were ordered mobilized. F
The US defense attache in Rabat also has reported that
some of Morocco's F-5 fighter aircraft were recently
transferred from Meknes to Marrakech.
The military moves apparently are part of a policy
of intimidation designed to gain advantage in Morocco's
dispute with Spain over the future of Spanish Sahara.
King Hassan's campaign to "recover" Spanish Sahara ap-
pears to be the first phase of a strategy to use Moroccan
nationalist and irredentist aspirations to achieve in-
ternal unity. The US embassy in Rabat, however, believes
that the King is pursuing a high-risk policy that could
result in the use of limited military or paramilitary
action against Spanish forces. In pursuing this course,
Hassan may find it difficult to back down unless Spain
modifies its plans to grant greater autonomy to its
Saharan province.
The King considers Spain the adversary until colo-
nial rule is ended in the area, but the embassy thinks
that if Madrid decided to withdraw, the King would make
concessions in order to obtain Spanish cooperation in
opposing the territorial claims of Mauritania, which
are backed by Algeria.
All Arab states will support Morocco's demand that
Spain vacate the Spanish Sahara, but support from other
Arabs for Morocco's claims to the area is much weaker.
Most Arab states would be reluctant to take sides in a
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 29, 1974
quarrel, especially at this time when they are anxious
not to weaken Arab unity on the far more important issue
of a Middle East peace settlement.
munist parties
the-scenes efforts to organize a world conference of
Brezhnev on July 20 issued Moscow's first authorita-
tive call for a conference of European Communist parties.
Brezhnev did not explicitly assert that such a conference
should precede a world conclave, but it appears the Soviets
are thinking in these terms.
Moscow still faces resistance from some important
parties that fear the Soviets will use a world conference
to condemn China and limit Communist diversity. The
Soviets apparently will seek to discuss the China problem
do this without further damaging Communist unity.
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The Soviets apparently are accelerating their behind-
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 29, 1974
LAOS
Non-Communists in the coalition structure have made
some progress in resolving organizational problems.
After several weeks of acrimonious wrangling, leaders
of the recently established conservative political front
have agreed that Deputy Prime Minister Leuam Insisiengmay
will formally head the front?s Central Committee, while
Defense Minister Sisouk will act as secretary general.
The committee intends to report to and consult with Prime
Minister Souvanna on its activities. If necessary, it may
also seek advice on pressing problems from representatives
of political parties and clubs.
The limited make-up of the committee--it consists
only of cabinet ministers and other conservative repre-
sentatives within the coalition--is a victory for Leuam.
Over the objections of almost all of his political col-
leagues, he had argued against giving the committee a
broad political base.
Minister Ngon Sananikone.
within the front probably will be Sisouk and Finance
It seems likely that Leuam actually will play a
secondary role in the front. Apparently the primary
reason for picking him to head the organization was that
he is the oldest non-Communist minister. His indeci-
siveness and reluctance to stand up to the Pathet Lao
on key issues before the cabinet have further eroded his
already limited political popularity. The real powers
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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