CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026900010002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 17, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
I I 25X1
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
17 September 4
N2 639
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 17, 1974
CONTENTS
TURKEY: Ecevit to ask party to ratify resignation..
(age 1)
ETHIOPIA: Student demonstrations mark the b(-
.gin--ping of trouble for the military regime. (Page 3)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 7)
CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Relations still strained.
Page 8
DENMARK: Election may be called soon. (Page 9)
FRANCE: Paris to maintain increased naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 12)
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Prime Minister Ecevit will ask his Republican
People's Party today to ratify his decision to resign and
thereby end the coalition with the right-wing National
Salvation Party. Ecevit told a press conference yesterday
that if the party organization supports this move he will
formally submit his resignation to President Koruturk and
seek new elections.
Consultation with his party is largely a formality,
although it does give Ecevit more time to consider his
next move and even to reconsider his resignation if pros-
pects for the formation of a successor government appear
doubtful. Ecevit's break with the National Salvation
Party seems final this time, but he has drawn back from
the brink on at least one other occasion since the fragile
alliance was formed last January.
The final straw apparently came when Deputy Prime
Minister Erbakan, the National Salvation Party leader,
refused to sign a decree making Ecevit an official repre-
sentative of Turkey on his trip to Scandinavia scheduled
for this week. Ecevit had earlier refused to name Erbakan
to head the government in his absence; he planned to turn
the job over to a cabinet member of his own party instead.
The collapse of the coalition will not automatically
bring about elections. In fact, if Ecevit is to take ad-
vantage of his increased popularity resulting from the
Cyprus operation, he will have to find support outside
his own party in parliament for new elections. A major-
ity vote is needed to call elections before those sched-
uled for 1977, and the opposition parties would be reluc-
tant to approve a move that might well cost them seats in
the national assembly.
Ecevit's other options include an effort to form a
minority government or organize another coalition. He
may find it as difficult to obtain support for a vote of
confidence for a minority government as he would for
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 17, 1974
calling elections. In fact, Suleyman Demirel has said
his Justice Party--the major opposition group--would vote
against a minority government. Most speculation in
Ankara indicates that Ecevit will attempt to form a
coalition with the small right-of-center Democratic
Party. Such a coalition would give Ecevit the needed
majority in parliament, but the two parties would have
to overcome significant ideological differences.
The Democratic Party may have already agreed to
join a coalition or to support a move to call elections,
although its leaders recently have sought to play down
these possibilities. It took Ecevit three months to put
together a coalition after the indecisive elections in
October 1973, and there has been no significant political
realignment since then.
If Ecevit's resignation is formalized in the next
few days, the present government will continue to serve
on a temporary basis until a new one is formed. Such
an interim government would assure continuity, but it
would lack the necessary support in parliament to approve
new programs. F77 I
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ETHIOPIA
Student demonstrations yesterday were quelled by
troops without violence, but they may mark the beginning
of trouble for the military regime from volatile youth and
intellectuals.
According to press estimates, 3,000 students assembled
on the university campus to hear student leaders call for
.a freely elected civilian government and castigate the
military regime as scoundrels and unrepresentative of the
Ethiopian people. Although the meeting was in defiance
of a government ban, authorities ignored the demonstra-
tion. Earlier in the day, the police and army used water
cannonp to end a smaller sit-down demonstration on a
street adjacent to the campus and prevented the students
from marching toward the city center. Ethiopia's 18,000-
member teachers' association, which supports the students,
publicly demanded on Sunday that ex-emperor Haile Selassie
be tried and that civilians be given an increased role in
the present government.
Both teachers and students are reported to be opposed
to the military committee's vaguely formulated plan to
send some of the students to the countryside to serve on
literacy and other developmeptal programs and to "educate
the nation on the military committee's oals."
Registration for university
and co liege students is scheduled for September 23-26, and
the military will probably reveal more details of its plans
for the students then.
Regardless of what the military government decides,
it is likely to have further trouble with the students.
If it calls off the program, the university students in
the capital will continue to be a volatile element. If
it goes through with the program, it will tax its limited
administrative capabilities and may face continuing op-
position from the students. Students had few opportuni-
ties to register dissatisfaction under the Haile Selassie
regime and drew little support from the pee le. The ma
now be emboldened by their prominent role.
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PHNOM
Communists PENH
r{an continue arnpong
`." ng pressure SPeu
CAMBODIA
0 Miles 50
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
September 17, 1974
The major government operation southeast of Phnom
Penh has now stalled completely.
Government forces made some initial gains in the
operation--which began on August 22--and succeeded in
pushing insurgent units in this sector out of rocket
range of Phnom Penh. Flooding, caution by government
commanders, and the need to withdraw some units for rest
cost the government the initiative, however, and have
given the Communists time to move units into blocking
positions. Battle lines in the area are now drawn along
the high ground, and there is little prospect for any
break in the stalemate in the near future. The operation
has failed to gain the favorable publicity that govern-
ment leaders hoped would benefit their cause at the U11.
Fighting continues to seesaw in other parts of the
country. Government forces have launched clearing opera-
tions around several widely separated provincial capitals.
The most successful of these efforts have been conducted
in Siem Reap Province, where the government has increased
its territorial holdings significantly, and in Kompong
Chhnang and Pursat provinces, where over 20,000 civilians
have crossed over to the government since early August.
The Communists, for their part, are keeping heavy
pressure on government defenses along Route 4 southwest
of the provincial capital of Kompong Speu. On September
15 and 16, they also hit Kompong Cham City with artillery
fire for the first time in nearly a year. The shellings
against Kompong Cham are probably an effort to keep gov-
ernment units tied down; there is little evidence that
the Communists are lannin any major ground attacks
against the city.
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Relations between Phnom Penh and Saigon remain
strained following last week's squabble over offshore
oil exploration.
The removal over the weekend of a floating oil rig
licensed by Phnom Penh to test drill in waters off the
Cambodian - South Vietnamese coast has eliminated the im-
mediate cause of friction. The two sides have now agreed
to negotiate their overlapping territorial claims. Phnom
Penh, however, is facing a potentially severe domestic
backlash. South Vietnamese heavy-handedness in issuing
an ultimatum for the removal of the rig rankled many
Cambodians, leading to protest demonstrations by students
outside the South Vietnamese embassy late last week.
Fearing that anti-Vietnamese sentiments in the Cambodian
capital could build to a dangerous level, Saigon has
evacuated some dependents of its officials.
To avoid the appearance of giving in completely to
Saigon, Phnom Penh announced yesterday that new oil ex-
plorations have begun in an area north of the former
test site, well within Cambodian waters. Phnom Penh
probably hopes that this will be enough to placate dis-
gruntled students and allow the dispute to be resolved
quickly with no further damage to its relations with
Saigon. The Lon Nol government remains dependent on the
Mekong River supply corridor through South Vietnam. In
addition, a continuation of open quarreling with its
closest Asian ally could only harm Phnom Penh's position
dii-rina the Cambodian credentials battle at the UN.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 17, 1974
DENMARK
An eleventh-hour round of negotiations over Danish
Prime Minister Hartling's economic program broke down on
September 12, increasing the possibility that an election
may be called.
The powerful Social Democrats, whose support is
crucial to maintaining labor-government harmony, continue
to balk at the government's tax reform program. Mean-
while, the non-Socialist parties, who desperately want to
avoid an election at this time, are preparing an offer to
.Hartling that would guarantee enough support for passage
of the tax bill. Parliament will convene on September 17
for further consideration of the program.
The non-Socialist plan amounts to persuading Hartling
either to accept the support of the Progress Party, or to
agree to an abstention on the crucial vote by the Radical
Liberal Party. Hartling has been reluctant to talk to
Progress Party leader Mogens Glistrup and may not agree
to the alternative, which would alienate the Social Demo-
crats and thereby worsen prospects for wage negotiations
next spring.
The special parliamentary consideration of the bill
was called by Hartling to enact the third and final phase
of the government's economic reform program. Disagreement
over earlier phases of the plan nearly toppled the gov-
ernment twice this year.
The latest phase of the program promises a reduction
in personal income taxes, to be offset by cutbacks in so-
cial and educational programs, and a 5-percent increase
in the value-added tax. The Social Democrats, Denmark's
largest party, have insisted that reductions in defense
and agricultural expenditures also be considered.
An election at this time would benefit both Hartling's
Moderate Liberals and the Social Democrats, and would leave
the non-Socialist bloc the principal losers. Latest polls
indicate that Hartling's closest allies, the Center Demo-
crats, along with the Radical Liberals and Conservatives,
would lose heavily. Although the odds that an election
will be called increase with each phase of the controversy,
Hartling may elect to try to muddle through in order to
avoid a general tipping of the political balance toward the
left.
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FRANCE
The French navy is sending another squadron of ships
to the Indian Ocean next month. The aircraft carrier
Clemenceau carrying both planes and helicopters will be
accompanied by a frigate, a destroyer, and two oil tankers.
A detachment of marines reportedly will be included in
the force.
According to news reports, the move reflects a grow-
ing French concern that the Indian Ocean, through which
oil tankers sail to Europe, not be left in sole control
of the US and the USSR. The marine unit is trained in
quick intervention tactics and could be available in the
event of any local uprising threatening oil supplies from
the Persian Gulf.
In late April of this year, Paris sent a squadron
of three ships, led by the guided-missile frigate Duquesne,
to the Indian Ocean for a cruise of about six months.
The carrier-led force apparently will replace the squad-
ron now on patrol, which suggests that Paris intends to
maintain indefinitely an increased naval presence in the
Indian Ocean.
The French navy has one helicopter carrier and two
aircraft carriers in the fleet. The Clemenceau and its
sister ship, the Foch, are assigned to the Atlantic
squadron. French naval forces normally stationed in the
Indian Ocean include a command ship, three destroyer
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some maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
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?Itta: July trade data suggest that the sharp de-
terioration in Italy's trade balance earlier this year
has been checked. The $918-million deficit in July
brought the average monthly trade shortfall in May through
July to $916 million, compared with an average of almost
$1.2 billion in the previous three months. The improve-
ment stems largely from slower import growth, reflecting
in part the impact of the import deposit scheme imple-
mented in early May. Exports have continued to expand,
despite the growth slowdown in industrial countries,
because sales to developing countries and East European
countries have been particularly rapid.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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