CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A026900010046-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
man
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
21 August 1974
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1974
CONTENTS
CYPRUS: New initiatives to resume negotiations.
Page 1)
USSR: Status of manned space program. (Page 3)
PANAMA-CUBA: Diplomatic relations re-established.
(Page 5)
MOZAMBIQUE: Tentative agreement reached on plan for
transfer of power. (Page 7)
SPANISH SAHARA: Madrid plans to relinquish control
of Spanish Sahara. (Page 9)
ETHIOPIA: Government conciliatory effort toward
Eritrea. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD : (Page 13)
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LIBYA
CYPRUS,
'Am
SYRIA
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
GREECE-TURKEY=CYPRUS
The UK is leading initiatives to get the Cyprus dis-
pute back to the negotiating table. Foreign Secretary
Callaghan plans to send invitations to representatives
of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to resume peace talks in
Geneva on August 27 or 28. Yesterday, a Foreign Office
spokesman told the press that the British High Commis-
sioner in Nicosia had already approached Cypriot Presi-
dent Clerides about the possibility of resuming talks.
The Greek and Cypriot governments have said they cannot
accept negotiations based on Turkey's current military
holdings.
day.
No significant fighting occurred on Cyprus
Plans are being made for the Turkish mainland troops
now on Cyprus to winter on the island, The Turks do not,
however, plan to annex the territory they control; their
current political planning is still centered on creating
a federal system for Cyprus. The Turkish deputy prime
minister was quoted yesterday as saying that a Turkish
Cypriot federal state will be established unilaterally
if there is an extended delay in getting peace talks
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
started. He said some state services--postal and pass-
port facilities--should start functioning immediately.
According to the press, an extensive program to aid the
Turkish Cypriots in setting up a self-sufficient state
has already begun.
General Dionysios Arbouzis, the new chief of the
Greek armed forces, has appealed for objectivity and
cooperation from the Greek army, despite what he de-
scribed as bitterness, confusion, damaged honor, and
even hatred caused by the public positions taken by
Greece's traditional allies. In his first speech to his
general staff on August 19, Arbouzis stressed that Greece
was still threatened by Turkish intransigence and might
possibly face further demands. He urged the army to
maintain strict discipline and high professional stand-
ards.
Arbouzis was not an active opponent of either former
President Papadopoulos or General Ioannidis. His appoint-
ment is therefore less likely to stimulate resentment
among remaining supporters of the two men. According to
the US embassy in Athens, the timing of the change in
command clearly reflects Greece's lack of preparedness
for a military showdown with the Turks in Cyprus. Any
changes in command prior to Prime Minister Karamanlis'
acknowledgement on August 15 that Greece did not intend
to fight Turkey would have been dangerously destabiliz-
ing; the movement out of Athens on August 11 of troop
units that could have been used for a military coup was
an essential prerequisite to the changes.
It is widely anticipated that General Ioannidis
will be passed over for promotion, leading to his auto-
matic retirement and his removal from the position of
influence he still maintains.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1974
The Soviet manned spaceflight program is moving in
two directions--continued preparations for the joint
Apollo-Soyuz manned mission scheduled for next July and
the development of a space station with mainly military
applications.
Through mid-1973 the Soviets seemed to be interested
primarily in keeping pace with the US launch schedule
and in trying to minimize the prestige gained by the
US from its successful Apollo and Skylab programs. Com-
petition with the US was evident throughout the 1960s.
For example, in the three years starting in 1967 the
Soviets mounted a crash program to place men around but
not on the surface of the moon. This program was in
direct competition with Apollo, but fell short when the
Soviets were unable to develop the required booster.
The last effort to keep up with the US was made
just prior to the 1973 Skylab mission, when the Soviets
attempted two Salyut missions--their counterpart to
Skylab. Both missions failed indicating that the Soviets
were pushing their spacecraft development too rapidly.
All Salyut missions, in fact, ended in failure until
the recently successful Soyuz-Salyut mission.
The Soviets are planning to conduct a number of
missions between now and next July that are related to
the Apollo-Soyuz test. Last Sunday, the Soviets com-
pleted a six-day unmanned Soyuz flight that probably
was designed to test modifications in equipment and
tracking systems for the joint mission. The Soviets
also feel a need to demonstrate the reliability of
their spacecraft in view of the many difficulties they
have experienced. A similar unmanned Soyuz was launched
in April and was in orbit for ten days.
The Soviets are also expected to conduct two or
three manned Soyuz missions between now and July. Only
two of the Soyuz back-up crews for the joint mission
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National Intelligence Bulletin
August 21, 1974
have experience in space, and the Soviets probably will
attempt t,o orbit several of these crews in the coming
months to acquaint them with the rigors of space flight.
The first suggestion that the Soviets intended to
emphasize military applications came in April 1973 with
the flight of the Salyut-2. Although that mission ended
in failure, enough information was collected to suggest
that military objectives were planned.
The next few years are likely to see a growing
trend by the Soviets toward a multi-purpose use of manned
spacecraft aimed at enhancing both their international
prestige and their military capabilities. There may
also be increased emphasis on potential scientific and
economic payoffs from manned orbital missions, although
this effort is minimal at present.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
PANAMA-CUBA
The Torrijos government announced yesterday that it
will re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba after a
break of 13 years.
Torrijos believes that several other countries are
on the verge of recognizing Castro?s government. He has
apparently concluded that his dedision will not jeopardize
canal negotiations with the US. Castro recognizes that
the Organization of American States itself,. is likely to
lift sanctions against Cuba and open the way to recogni-
tion, but he prefers having the member countries accomplish
this unilaterally because this works toward his goal of
scuttling the Organization of American States.
Panama's trade ties with Cuba are now likely to be
expanded considerably.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares informed. the US
embassy in Lisbon on August 19 that his talks with the
Mozambican rebels in Dar es Salaam last week resulted
in tentative agreement on a plan that could lead to a
transfer'of power to their Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique and to independence for the territory in one
year.
The plan calls for the formation of a provisional
government with "substantial" Front participation.
Soares indicated that the actual degree of rebel par-
ticipation is open to negotiation. The rebels are seek-
ing majority representation. Soares stated that the
provisional government, to be headed by a "high Portu-
guese official," would govern the territory for the
year, after which power would pass to the Front.
The plan is being considered by President Spinola,
who, Soares admitted, still seems committed to a popular
referendum in Mozambique to determine its future. Within
the Portuguese government, such a referendum is now
widely regarded as unrealistic. The rebel leaders are
said to be against any elections prior to independence.
Soares considers a transfer of power to the Front,
which is the sole organization of any consequence in
the territory, to be the only solution regardless of
whether it is truly representative of the majority in
Mozambique. He believes Lisbon must choose between an
orderly transfer to the rebels, which should allow Por-
tugal to retain a measure of goodwill and influence, or
an eventual rebel military takeover resulting in a gov-
ernment hostile to Portugal.
Soares noted that he found rebel leader Samora
Machel "entirely reasonable and realistic" about Mozam-
bique's future relations with South Africa. The Front
has stated in the past that it would be willing to make
compromises in order to maintain Mozambique's profitable
economic relations with South Africa.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
The Foreign Minister also stated that he is con-
vinced Machel has no intention of allowing Mozambique
to fall under communist influence. The Front has re-
ceived heavy military backing over the years from both
China and the Soviet Union.
Soares gave no indication of when he might resume
talks with the rebels.
a final session could take place soon in
Lusaka, Zambia, if the preliminary proposals are accept-
able to both sides.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
SPANISH SAHARA
Madrid may announce very shortly its plans for
relinquishing control in Spanish Sahara.
A unilateral Spanish announcement on holding a
referendum would bring a sharp reaction from Rabat. Bi-
lateral talks in Madrid last week seemed to have laid the
groundwork for further negotiations, but there is no evi-
dence that an agreement on the terms for holding a refer-
endum has been reached. King Hassan would prefer that
the future of Spanish Sahara be resolved by direct nego-
tiations with Madrid instead of by a referendum that might
result in a vote against union with Morocco.
Saharans that it claims live in Morocco are allowed to
vote--a precondition that Spain has rejected in the past.
Rabat would accept a referendum if the 20,000-25,000
Algeria and Mauritania--the other North African
claimants--presumably would support self-determination for
the peoples of the territory. Both oppose an extension of
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
Moroccan sovereignty and would prefer a plebiscite lead-
ing to independence. Mauritania and, to a limited extent,
Algeria could easily produce their own "Saharan nomads"
to neutralize the votes of those from Morocco.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1974
The Ethiopian government is beginning a new, more
conciliatory effort to resolve its problems in Eritrea,
a province that has been troubled by an active revolt
for a decade.
Prime Minister Mikael, Defense Minister Aman, and
Interior Minister Belachew appealed to parliament yes-
terday for support of a new policy. Defense Minister
Aman, who is on good terms with the politically dominant
Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, deplored what he
called the former government's exclusive reliance on
force.
Aman said he would visit Eritrea on August 26 in
preparation for making new policy recommendations for
the cabinet. The Interior Minister pledged the appoint-
ment in Eritrea of officials suited to implement the
new policies and said the government would consider lift-
ing the state of emergency there. He also said the gov-
ernment would review the status of Eritrean prisoners
with an eye to granting amnesty.
The government's conciliatory stance results from
new pressures on this issue. Last week, the entire
Eritrean delegation in parliament resigned in protest
against the government's failure to establish new pro-
grams for the province. On August 19, a committee of
military leaders in Asmara, the Eritrean capital, in-
formed the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee in Addis
Ababa that it would attempt to find its own solution to
the Eritrean problem if Addis Ababa did not do so in
ten days.
The Eritrean Liberation Front is loosely organized
and divided. Younger guerrilla leaders insist on inde-
pendence, but older leaders in exile apparently are more
overn-
Th
e g
willing to negotiate with the government.
ment probably hopes to win the support of the Eritrean
public and the moderate rebel leaders.
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National Intelligence Bulletin August 21, 1.974
tion indicates the AS-30 cannot currently be used in
such a role. It can be used, however, in an air-to-
ground role by Mirage 5 aircraft presently in the Peru-
vian inventory. The missile display may well have been
designed to impress Chile with Peru's military might.
Peru: The missiles exhibited at the Independence
Day parade on July 29 have been identified as AS-30s,
French air-to-ground missiles. Although initially re-
ported as a surface-to-air missile, technical informa-
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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