NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 24
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 1, 1974
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Costa Gomes, Spinola differ in their views of
Portugal's future prospects. (Page 1)
CYPRUS: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis issues statement
of support for Clerides. (Page 3)
CHINA-PHILIPPINES: Mutual interest in improved relations
demonstrated during Mrs. Marcos' visit. (Page 5)
TURKEY: Demirel to try to form new government. (Page 7)
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES: Warsaw meeting scheduled for
mid-October. (Page 14)
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 1, 1974
Speeches yesterday by newly installed President
Costa Gomes and former president Spinola contrasted
sharply.
In his resignation speech, Spinola bitterly de-
nounced the emergence of a generalized climate of an-
archy. He warned the Portuguese people that they were
threatened with a "new form of servitude under the ban-
ner of false liberty." He declared that he was unable
to carry out the program of the Armed Forces Movement
because its ideals had been set aside.
Costa Gomes, on the other hand, stressed the achieve-
ments that have been made since the April coup and ap-
pealed for unity. The new President reaffirmed his sup-
port for the Armed Forces Movement and seemed to be sig-
naling that he will be more flexible than his predecessor.
He reminded his listeners that in politics "one must not
be tied to rigid and preconceived schemes."
Costa Gomes has long acted as a mediator between
an unyielding Spinola and the leftist elements of the
Armed Forces Movement. Perhaps to assuage discontented
supporters of the popular former president, Costa Gomes
lavishly praised Spinola's dedication to the Movement's
ideals and noted his own efforts to prevent the resig-
nation. Earlier in the afternoon, Costa Gomes visited
a commando unit outside Lisbon which professes loyalty
to Spinola. Presumably the purpose of the visit was to
head off possible unrest.
Costa Gomes promised that Portugal would honor all
of its international obligations, including its associa-
tion with NATO. Foreign Minister Soares had earlier in-
formed the embassy that Lisbon will remain in NATO.
The new President did not discuss the possibility
of governmental changes, but several are rumored. Changes
to be made in the cabinet will involve the replacement of
Spinola's supporters in the ministries of defense and
social communications.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 1, 1974
The size of the military junta has been reduced by
the forced resignation of three Spinola loyalists.
With Spinola's resignation, only three officers remain:
Costa Gomes himself and ?:wo decidedly leftist admirals.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 1, 1974
CYPRUS
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis yesterday called
upon Greek Cypriots to support acting President Clerides
as the only individual who can represent Cyprus. He
qualified his backing, however, by stating that support
for Clerides should be extended as long as the continu-
ing crisis precludes the return of the "elected presi-
dent, Archbishop Makarios."
The announcement by Karamanlis followed a meeting
he had with a member of the Cypriot House of Deputies
who briefed him about the growing disunity within the
Greek Cypriot community. In addition, the deputy may
have delivered a threat from Clerides to resign if Athens
did not give him adequate public support.
Clerides' move was apparently prompted by the ac-
celeration of the campaign for an early return of Ma-
karios, led mainly by leftist forces but also supported
by large segments of other groups. Makarios' supporters
staged a mass rally in Limassol on September 29.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 1, 1974
Clerides, meanwhile, continued his discussions of
humanitarian issues with Denktash yesterday. The two
agreed to resume the exchange of prisoners, which was
suspended last week. The suspension apparently was
caused by a delay in the return to Cyprus of Greeks
held prisoner in Turkey and Turkish reluctance to free
the increasing number of Greek Cypriot prisoners on the
island who are choosing to return to their villages in
the Turkish-occupied sector. In yesterday's talks, the
two men reaffirmed that prisoners would be released to
wherever they wished. Arrangements are also under way
for the return of the Greek Cypriots still :held in Tur-
key.
Nearly 2,000 of the estimated 5,000 Greek and Turk-
ish prisoners have already been exchanged.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CHINA-PHILIPPINES
October 1, 1974
Mutual interest in improving relations was drama-
tized last week as the Chinese gave Philippine first
lady Imelda Marcos an extraordinary reception in Peking.
Mrs. Marcos had well-publicized separate meetings
with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and with hospitalized Premier
Chou En-lai. This was Chou's first appearance in more
than six weeks. Excluding earlier meetings with US of-
ficials, Mrs. Marcos' discussion with Mao marks the
only time in recent years that he has met with an emis-
sary of a government with which Peking has no official
ties.
A joint trade agreement announced during the visit
provides for China to sell an unspecified amount of
petroleum to the Philippines and for Manila to sell
sugar, wood products, and other items to the Chinese.
Details of the pact are to be worked out when a Philip-
pine trade delegation visits China later in the year.
Although Peking clearly would like to see early
recognition, Manila's close relationship with Taiwan
is only one of the problems that the Philippines must
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 1, 1974
deal with prior to diplomatic relations. The Overseas
Chinese community in the Philippines, although much
smaller than Malaysia`s, has a great: deal of economic
influence and is--at least on the surface--largely pro-
Taipei. The Philippines has from time to time publicly
accused Peking of supporting the communist insurgency
in northern Luzon. Also, President. Marcos has often
said that he would recognize the Soviet Union and China
almost simultaneously.
None of these issues, however, presents insurmount-
able problems in Manila. Marcos signaled how he will
probably deal with one of them when he said in a speech
on September 20 that a "distinction" must be made be-
tween communist insurgency at home and the communist
governments which are trying to make a contribution to
"cooperation among nations." It would appear that
Marcos was attempting to play down his government's
charges that China was supporting the insurgents.
By its treatment of Mrs. Marcos, Peking has shown
that it will maintain an unusual amount of pressure
for early recognition. President Marcos may conclude
that, despite his reservations, the time has come to
acceler the ace of developing Sino-Philippine rela-
tions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 1, 1974
Suleyman Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, has
been designated to try to put together a right-of-center
coalition. President Koruturk gave the mandate to Demirel
yesterday after Prime Minister Ecevit informed the Pres-
ident that he had failed in his second attempt to form
a coalition.
The Democratic Party rejected Ecevit's proposal to
join in a coalition, despite the Prime Minister's will-
ingness to drop his insistence on elections this year.
Ecevit will continue as head of a caretaker government
while Demirel negotiates with the leaders of the Demo-
cratic and National Salvation parties. A caretaker
government led by Ecevit will provide some continuity
but will be unable to take any initiatives.
If Demirel can get the Democrats and the Salvation-
ists to go along with his efforts, the three-party co-
alition would have a majority of approximately 15 in
the 450-seat parliament. The Democratic Party, however,
is made up largely of former Justice Party members who
broke with Demirel in 1970, and they remain bitterly
opposed to him. The chances of a rightist coalition
emerging would be much better if Demirel were to step
aside.
Ecevit believes that Demirel will fail in his at-
tempt to organize a new government. The Prime Minister
told the US embassy last week that once it is demon-
strated that a rightist coalition is out of reach, his
own chances of enticing the Democratic Party into a
coalition with his Republican People's Party will be
much improved. Ecevit predicted that Demirel would be
given one week to put together a coalition.
If the rightist political forces succeeded in put-
ting together a coalition, they would be unlikely to
make any radical departures from the policies pursued
by Ecevit on such issues as Cyprus and relations with
t
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the US, including the opium question. A r
alition might find it more difficult than would Ecevit,
however, to make significant concessions to the Greeks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 1, 1974
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
The opening date of the Warsaw preparatory meeting
of European Communist parties has slipped back to mid-
October. The consultative session is supposed to lay
the groundwork for a formal conference of European parties
that, if the Soviets have their way, will be followed by
a world Communist party conference.
Moscow's main purpose is to win the backing of the
other parties in its quarrel with China. Many Western
parties want to stay clear of the Moscow-Peking dispute
and to concentrate on developing a coordinated approach
to the opportunities and problems growing out. of the
West's economic and political difficulties. Among the
topics that may be proposed at Warsaw for the formal
conference agenda are European security, economic inte-
gration and cooperation, lessons learned from Chile
and Cyprus, and ways to strengthen the Portuguese and
Spanish Communist parties.
Although the major European Communist parties have
agreed to attend the preparatory meeting, many still
have reservations about the subsequent conferences. The
Romanians say they will participate in them only if
there are no attacks on the Chinese. They would also
like the preliminary meeting to produce a conference
agenda broad enough to be attractive to "all progressive
parties." The Italians, who have helped organize the
consultative session, want the formal conference to
discuss only what policies the European parties should
follow after the European Security Conference. The
Yugoslavs reportedly will. decide whether they will at-
tend the formal conference after they evaluate the re-
sults of the preliminary meeting.
The Yugoslavs intend to bring up recent "comin-
formist" activities at the Warsaw meeting. This will
be a tough subject for the Soviets, While they also may
not be able to prevent other parties from raising con-
troversial topics, the Soviets certainly will want to
avoid replying to accusations that they have meddled
in Yugoslav affairs.
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