NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed.
DIA review
completed.
Top Secret
N2 639
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
National Intelligence Bulletin
October 8, 1974
CONTENTS
time. (Page 1)
ETHIOPIA: Armed Forces Coordinating Committee has used
force against opponents within the military for the first
25X1
USSR: Soviet concern expressed about implications of
new US nuclear policies. (Page 7)
USSR: Expectations that Soviet grain crop would fall
short probably prompted Moscow's recent efforts to im-
UNCODED,fnnrn an(9 wheat_ (Paae 9)
SOUTH KOREA: Government plans to get tough with dissi-
dents. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 12)
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
National Intelligence Bulletin
October 8, 1974
The moderate majority on the ruling Armed Forces
Coordinating Committee has decided to use force to sub-
due its opponents within the military. This marks a
sharp departure from the policy, followed since the
military revolt in February, of avoiding confrontation
between military units and attempting to resolve differ-
ences through debate and negotiation.
Increased tensions within the coordinating commit-
tee in recent weeks, however, have seriously eroded mil-
itary unity. The moderates believe they are now strong
enough to make a show of strength, following the recent
reinforcement of units that support their aims.
The committee yesterday sent troops from the 4th
Division to arrest officers and men of a dissident army
engineer battalion in Addis Ababa. A skirmish broke
out, and four men reportedly were killed and seven
wounded. Addis Ababa radio later announced that offi-
cers and men of the engineer battalion and an army
aviation unit had been arrested for attempting to "dis-
rupt the progress of the revolution."
The chance of a major military con-
frontation hinges ma~-,ly on the reaction of elements of
the lst Division that provide the most potent opposition
to the committee. Most of the 1st Division's dissidents,
however, are found in only one of its four brigades.
The 4th Division in Addis Ababa, which generally
supports the committee, has been reinforced in recent
days by troops and artillery from outlying areas. Some
of the troops have come from the 3rd Division, in east-
ern Ethiopia. The troops in Addis Ababa supporting the
committee are now superior in numbers to dissident lsc
Division forces. The dissidents might pick up support
from other opponents of the cormnittee, however, and
there is a possibility of serious clashes as the arrests
continue.
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
Iq
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
October 8, 1974
Several recent Soviet statements have suggested con-
tinued concern about the military and political implica-
tions of new US policies calling for more flexible and
varied use of nuclear weapons. These policies, as enun-
ciated several times during the past year by Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger, would permit selective and flex-
ible US retaliatory strikes against Soviet targets.
Soviet concerns probably have been brought to a new focus
by the resumption of the strategic arms negotiations.
G. A. Trofimenko, a senior military policy analyst
at Moscow's USA Institute, has been notably outspoken.
At the annual Dartmouth Conference between Soviet and
American arms-control experts in April, Trofimenko claimed
that the US was trying to gain psychological leverage.
He said that targeting could not be verified in any way
and the policy could imply that the US possessed new ad-
vantages in its strategic arsenal.
In a recent conversation with the US defense attache
in Moscow, Trofimenko claimed that a small strike by the
US might still trigger a massive Soviet response. In
addition, he said that such a policy could make US attack
aircraft carriers fair game because they constituted
"very important, discrete military targets that can be
struck without difficulty and surgically, without impact
on nearby population centers."
At a Moscow conference of US and Soviet academic
specialists on East-West affairs in late September, So-
viet spokesmen, including Trofimenko, argued that US
interest in a broad range of options against military
targets meant that US policy was returning to the devel-
opment of a first-strike counterforce capability. When
questioned about the counterforce content of Soviet
military doctrine, one Soviet participant asserted that
in all-out war, Soviet doctrine called for extensive
25X1'
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
National Intelligence Bulletin October 8, 1974
counterforce operations, but that no provisions for
limited use of nuclear weapons existed. The prevailing
theme from these Soviet spokesmen was that new US tar-
geting policies represented an attempt to gain a bargain-
ing advantage over the Soviet Union and were therefore
inimical to detente.
Commentary on US targeting policy from Soviet mili-
tary figures has been somewhat less energetic. In general,
senior Soviet officers have shown less concern with the
strategic implications of the new US policy than with what
they regard as the impropriety of high US officials' pub-
licly discussing this issue in a period of detente.
The Soviets have probably not sorted out the full
implications of the new US policy beyond making it clear
that this is not what they want to hear, at least publicly,
from the US. Much Soviet commentary on this subject, es-
pecially from the institute specialists, may not be backed
by knowledge of Soviet military policy and posture per-
tinent to limited employment of nuclear weapons.
Whether or not so intended, projected improvements
to Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces will en-
hance Soviet capabilities for flexible and selective
nuclear strike options.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
October 8, 1974
The recent effort by Moscow to buy 2.4 million tons
of corn and 1 million tons of wheat probably stemmed
from expectations that the Soviet grain crop will fall
short of requirements and that world grain prices will
rise.
Soviet grain requirements this year will be 200-210
million tons, but the crop will probably reach about 195
million tons because of harvesting difficulties and poor
corn prospects. Cool summer weather has prevented a
substantial part of the corn crop from reaching maturity.
It had seemed likely that the Soviets would reduce
reserves--a record 20-30 million tons--rather than im-
port much grain at today's high prices. They had con-
tracted previously for only about 1.5 million tons for
delivery in FY 1975. Only last month, a high Soviet
trade official claimed the USSR would make no large pur-
chases of US grain in the near future.
The Soviets may well have concluded that using a
large part of their reserves would place them in a pre-
carious position if the harvest next year were poor.
They probably also believe that continuing tight world
grain supplies will drive prices even higher next year.
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
National Intelligence Bulletin October 8, 1974
SOUTH KOREA
President Pak Chong-huiss government has made it
clear in the past several days that it intends to take
a tough line with domestic dissidents between now and
late November, when President Ford visits Seoul.
Earlier reporting had indicated that the government
would attempt to fashion a more conciliatory policy
toward anti-Pak student and Christian groups and the
increasingly aggressive major opposition party, Some
flexibility on the part of the government and a few
conciliatory gestures are not being ruled out, but the
regime is unmistakably in a "get tough" mood.
Pak himself set the tone recently in his speech
on Armed Forces Day. He sharply criticized "idealists"
who, he charged, do not appreciate the seriousness of
the threat from the North and the need for strong na-
tional discipline in the South. Since then, a number
of top leaders, in conversations with US officials,
have confirmed that the government intends to take no
chance that the opposition forces might get out of
hand.
Student and Christian groups have been keeping a
relatively low profile recently, following a limited
resumption of protest meetings and petitioning late
last month. Such groups may have been awaiting a
promised attack on the government in the National As-
sembly by newly elected opposition leader Kim Yong-sam.
Kim issued an aggressive challenge to the govern-
ment yesterday, assailing the "one-man dictatorship"
and "repressive" policies of the Pak government. In
his first major policy speech in the new National As-
sembly session, Kim called for the release of students
and other protesters imprisoned during the summer under
the emergency decrees. Kim warned that if democratic
reforms were not carried out, he might lead an extra-
legal protest movement.
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
National Intelligence Bulletin October 8, 1974
Pak has indicated that he will be reluctant to take
action against the opposition as long as it confines it-
self to debate within the National Assembly. Still, he
is unlikely to let Kim's latest speech pass without a
rebuke. There is also a good chance that other opposi-
tion forces will take Kim's speech as a call for re-
newed action. The prospects have thus increased for con-
frontations between government and opposition in the
Cyprus: Greek Cypriot leader Clerides and Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash resumed their talks on the ex-
change of prisoners and related issues yesterday. The
two leaders reportedly resolved the "practical difficul-
ties" involved in the exchange, which was suspended on
September 26 after 1,946 of 5,298 prisoners had been re-
leased. They also had a private exchange of views on
various political questions. The next meeting is planned
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010036-2
 Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2008/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27000010036-2