CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 25, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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To Secret
~lational 1 ntel 1 i~ence
bulletin
Top Secret
N? 648
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1974
FRANCE: President Giscard yesterday called for a
meeting of oil exporters and importers for discus-
. lions on energy matters. (Page 1)
USSR: Soviets buy more grain. (Page 3}
CHINA: Grain imports for 1974 cut. (Page 4)
VENEZUELA: US iron ore concessions to be national-
i ze --~P age 5 )
OAS: Quito meeting. (Page 7)
ARAB SUMMIT MEETING: Arab foreign ministers meeting
i.n Rabat last night reached a stalemate on reconcil-
ing Jordanian and PLO negotiating positions, (Page 8)
ISRAEL: Rabin to meet today with National Religious
Party i.n hopes of expanding coalition government.
(Page 9 )
LEBANON: Relative unknown asked to try to form gov-
ernment. (Page 9)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Cabinet officers ousted in effort to
temper political criticism. (Page 11)
CAMBODIA: Military situation. (Page 13)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 17)
ANNEX: Arab Summit Meeting (Page 19)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1974
French President Giscard d'Estaing tailed during a
press conference yesterday for representatives of the
principal oil exporters and importers among industrial-
ized and developing nations to meet early next year to
discuss energy matters. He suggested that the confer-
ence be limited to 10 or 12 nations,
Giscard reiterated his hope that the EC will speak
with a single voice on energy matters and said France
will not join the US-sponsored Energy Coordinating Group.
He added, however, that France would not obstruct efforts
to create a new international energy agency within the
OECD. Despite Giscard's denial, his call for a "re-
stricted" energy conference early next year is intended
to steal a march on the more deliberate strategy behind
the Energy Coordinating Group's activity.
Giscard proposed that his conference consider guar-
antees of the income of oil exporters, "which might con-
sist of pegging the level of oil prices to the level of
economic development and set up the threshold at which
the guarantees would be applied." It is not Glear how
the French intend such a system to function. Paris
clearly hopes that it will appeal to both the oil im-
porters--looking for lower prices--and the producers--
who have spoken of linking their prices to inflation.
An inducement for EC support of the conference is
contained in Giscard`s suggestion that the Nine could
have a single representative speak for the Community.
France's boycott of the. energy group within the OECD
assures that the EC as such cannot be represented in
that body .
Giscard also called on his EC partners to join him
at a summit meeting in late November ar early December
to discuss "medium-range" planning for the EC's future.
He has been known to want such a meeting before France's
term as EC president expires at the end of the year.
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National lntelligren~ce Beal~+etin October 25, 1974
The French President also discussed the situation
in the Middle East. He said the world community should
recognize the Palestinians` right to a home land and
added that international negotiations should work toward
that goal, as well as "recognized and secure. frontiers"
for Israel.
France supported the UN resolution to allow the PLO
to speak during the General Assembly debate on the Pal-
estinian issue, but it has not recognized any group as
sole spokesman for the Palestinians. Foreign Minister
Sauvagnargues has just returned from Jordan and Lebanon--
where he met with FLO leader Arafat--and will soon visit
Israel.
Turning to domestic matters, Giscard said he plans
to meet soon with leaders from all hues of the French
political spectrum to discuss his coming summit meetings
with his EC part d Soviet art
chief Brezhnev.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1974
Moscow has made a cash purchase of 1 million tons
of Australian wheat, worth for deliver
ust of next yea
During the past mon , e ovie s ave
been active in the international grain market; confirmed
new contracts for fiscal 1975 now stand at about 2.5 mil-
lion tons of wheat and 1.5 million tons of corn.
The Soviets began this new round of buying in Argen-
tina in mid-September with the purchase of about 500,000
tons of corn and 250,000 tons of wheat. In early October,
they bought 3.2 million tons of US grain; the amount was
reduced to 2.2 million tons after Treasury
C i mr~r~ tri c i ~o~ Mnc nnG7 ~ a C'I- WPP~C' _ .Ci l_Y1C2 the
no actual sales have been reporte .
The buying began just as the Soviet harvest was
ending. The Soviet press reported that harvesting was
slowed by poor weather and that the corn crop was less
than expected.. An official estimate of the grain har-
vest has not yet been published; unofficial Soviet
estimat have ran ed from 190 million to 210 million
tons.
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Natifln~al Int~lligen~e Bulletin October 25, 1974
CHINA
The Chinese have sharply reduced their grain import
schedule for 1974, with most of the. impact falling on US
shipments. China will prbbably import some 7.6 million
tons of grain in 1974 and 7.1 million tons in 1975.
A contract for 600,000 tons of US soybeans has been
canceled. Three contracts for US wheat have been deferred
until next year. Shipment of 500,000 tons of Canadian
wheat will also be deferred until 1975. The overall
result is a reduction of about 1.6 million tons from
earlier US estimates of .Chinese grain imports this year.
Contaminated cargoes and dock strikes in Canada
contributed to the reductions. The Chinese also seem
to have raised their estimate of the 1974 crop. The
minister of agriculture and forestry now claims that
grain production this year will surpass the 1973 level
of 250 million tons..
Growing conditions for the important fall crop,
now beginning to be harvested, have been good and may
be the main reason for Chinese optimism. Erratic weather
early in the year probably led the Chinese to overbuy
grain at mid ear when wheat ricer a eared to be sof-
tening.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 259 1974
L1S iron are concessions will. be nati,ona.lized by
December 9~;~but the government plans a one~year transi-~
tion period before the take-over is complete.
President Perez seems eager to mark the 150th an~-
niversary of the Battle of Ayacucho9 which ended the
wars of independence in Spanish South America9 with a
triumphant.. statement that he has achieved the nationaliza-
ti.on of one of the country"s two major export industries,
Such. a move would be extremely popular in Venezuela,
where nationalistic fervor is high and where there is
concern over the degree of foreign economic control, The
strong support that. already exists for Perez and his
na~aonalis~k.ic policies would be strengthened even further.
Most of the iron ore produced ~n Venezue a, a ou
25 mi.l.lion tons a year, is exported to the U5. This
amounts to one third of US .iron ore imports and 11 per-
cent of US consumption..
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I~ati~nat Intelligences Bu~l~#~ti October 2s, 1974
I~lthough the precise relationship between Venezuela
and the US companies has not been worked out, the present
concessionaires probably will retain same marketing f unc-
tions. In addition, Caracas needs foreign technology
and managerial experience for the expansion of its steel
industry, and has suggested a junior partner relationship
for the US companies in the construction of rocessin
lants and other roduetion facilities.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1974
Despite careful groundwork by the sponsors of the
resolution to lift the OAS sanctions against Cuba, the
OAS meeting in Quito next month is unlikely to be-the
peaceful, pro forma affair they tried to arrange.
The Cuban issue remains contentious, even though
the drafters of the motion used language designed to
accommodate all the differing views toward the Castro
regime. The. sponsors .have emph.asi.zed that a vote to
rescind the 10-year-old sanctions merely serves to free
members to associate with Guba or not, as they choose.
Some of the countries are unwilling to go along
with what they regard. as an evasion of the real issue.
Uruguay charged before the OAS permanent council this
week that Havana is still training terrorists and harbor-
ing Tupamaro cells in Cuba, and the Uruguayans plan to
offer further., more sensitive allegations in private
sessions at Quito. Chile is also insisting on a serious
analysis of whether Castro has abandoned his policy of
subversion and will offer its own brief against Cuba.
Neither government expects its view to prevail at the
meeting, but each is determined to place its opinion on
record.
This may provoke Cuba's advocates to raise the
question of US intervention in Latin America. At the
moment, this is not a strong likelihood, but publicity
about clandestine activities in Chile, combined with
disagreements over resource policies, has created an
uncomfortable atmosphere. for US - Latin American rela-
tions. Some of the ministers will also be offended by
Secretary Kissinger's absence. Colombia's foreign min-
ister has already publicly criticized the Secretary's
decisi o the Latin Ameri-
cans.
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National fn#+eflig+en~ce f3uffetin
October 25, 1974
Arab foreign ministers meeting in Rabat in prepara-
tion for the Arab summit conference beginning Saturday
(see Annex) reached a stalemate last night in discus-
sions on reconciling the differing negotiating positions
of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
A PLO spokesman charged at a news conference that
the foreign ministers had met all PLO demands with op-
position or "total silence." In response to a leading
question, he said a walkout by the PLO is a possibility.
The PLO has been demanding that its status as "sole
legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people be
reaffirmed. Jordan and some of the other Arab states
are objecting to this, claiming that it poses an impedi-
ment to Jordan's right to negotiate for the frlest Bank.
According to an Egyptian news service, the foreign min-
isters, themselves having failed to resolve the impasse,
are now inclined to leave it for their leaders to work
out at the summit.
A PLO walkout is, in fact, unlikely. The threat,
and the fact that the organization aired the deadlock
in public, may simply be tactical moves designed to
dramatize the organization's position and to wring as
many concessions as passible from the other Arab states.
Although the publicity could limit PLO Chairman
Yasir Arafat's options, he may prove a more tractable
negotiator than his deputies. Moreover, the leaders
of the states most directly involved--Jordan, Egypt,
and Syria--are themselves somewhat mare flexible than
their foreign ministers and. ma be mare willin o at-
tempt an accommodation.
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Natianal Intelligence Bulletin
October 25, 1974
Prime P~Zinister Rabin will meet with National Reli-
gious Party negotiators today in a session .that both
sides hope will bring their coalition talks to a suc-
cessful conclusion. Prospects improved considerably
when .the Religious Party's Central Committee voted late
yesterday, by a margin of three to two, to approve a re-
turn to the cabinet. If all goes well, Rabin may be
able to present a new, expanded cabinet to the Knesset
next week.
The remaining question apparently is whether the
Religious Party will obtain three or four cabinet seats.
Rabin's present coalition partners are reluctant to
give the Religious Party the fourth portfolio it seeks
unless-their own overnment re resentation is increased.
LEBANON
Lebanese President Franjiyah has asked Rashid al-
Sulh, a relative unknown, to form a new government.
Since Saib Salam abandoned his efforts earlier this week
to form a cabinet, Franjiyah has been looking for a can-
didate both pliable and acceptable to the various con-
fessional and political blocs in parliament.
Lebanon has .been without a government for almost a
month. It will take weeks for the premier-designate to
put together a slate satisfactory to the various parlia-
mentary factions--if, indeed, he can do it at all.
Sulh is said to have connections
who has strong ties with the fedayeen
Jumblatt's support could eliminate a m
with Kamal Jumblatt,
and Syrians.
a'or source of the
opposition encountered by Saib Salam.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
October 25, 1974
President Thieu's decision to replace four of his
cabinet ministers .represents an effort by the government
to temper rising political criticism.
The mast controversial member of the group is
Thieu's nephew .and minister for information, Hoang Duc
Nha. As the government's chief censor, he has come
under sharp attack by .Saigon's newspaper publishers
for his heavy--handed enforcement of the government's
press code. T.he publishers' demand for Nha's removal
undoubtedly contributed to Thieu`s decision, but the
real pressure- came. from advisers inside the presidential
palace.
Prime Minister Khiem, to whom Thieu gave the job of
reshuffling .the .cabinet, and others close. to the Pres-
ident have long disliked Nha because of his close per-
sonal relationship with -the President and his ability
to bypass them in dealing with Thieu. Also, Khiem has
been concerned about.Nha~s anti--American bias, and the
Prime Minister may have argued with Thieu that the US
would be more forth.aoming in its support without Nha in
the cabinet.
Two of the other dismiss als apparently also resulted
from adverse publicity. Minister of commerce and in-
dustry Nguyen Duc Cuong was recently charged in the
National Assembly with :illegally profiting from the sale
of government fertilizer, and agriculture minister Ton
That Trinh drew sharp criticism for his recent statement
that Vietnam could soon begin exporting rice. It is
possible that the fourth member replaced, finance min-
i.ster Chau Kim Nhan, will get another cabinet position.
The effects of these changes will not be felt until
Thieu appoints new minl.s_ters and announces whatever re-
forms he plans for the various ministries. Khiem would
like to consolidate -the economic ministries into a
super-cabinet post, but he concedes. that it is difficult
to find someone willin and ualifed to take it.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October z5, 1974
The see-saw fighting which has characterized the
contest for control of Route 5 northwest of Kompong
Chhnang is continuing.
The communists retain a sufficiently large force
in the area to interdict Route 5 almost at will for
short periods of time, and they seem intent on disrupting
the use of the Route 5 - Tonle Sap supply link to the
rice producing northwest
a o ion army units wi pro ably
e a e o c ear t o interdictions as they occur. This
will make the use of the road in this area a day-to-day
proposition.
In the capital region, communist troops launched
strong attacks against the government's new defense line
in the upper Bassac corridor early in the week,-but they
were repulsed. Tactical air support has been a key
factor in the fighting, and all government positions are
holding. The extension of the government's perimeter in
this area has limited the effectiveness of communist
rocket attacks ~n the capital, but further communist
counterattacks are likely.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1974
Israel: Work on civilian construction projects
has fallen sharply in Israel since summer, when the gov-
ernment introduced new austerity measures to slow infla-
tion and redress the country?s trade imbalance. Work
at almost all. public construction projects has stopped,
and a government committee has been set up to determine
which projects will be allowed to continue. Private
sector activities apparently will also require commit-
tee approval. The construction cutback is geared to
nonessential activities. Military and other needed
civilian construction, such as immigrant housin and
development of new areas, is proceeding apace?
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Na#i~nal tntellig~en~~e ~~uite#~r~
Qctober 25, 1974
Yugoslavia-Denmarkz Belgrade announced yesterday
that Yugoslav President Tito will go to Denmark next
Tuesday for a three-day state visit.. The announcement
of the trip, Tito's first outside the country since his
visit to West Germany last June, is another Indic-anon
hat he currentl is in reasonabl ood health.
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Na#1011e~~ X1'1#@IflC~ellC@ Bl.1~f@#11'1 October 25, 1974
ARAB SUMMIT MEETING
The Arab summit meeting scheduled to convene in
Rabat on Saturday will play a critical part in deter-
mining the next Arab step in peace negotiations.
The question of how to accommodate both Jordan and
the Palestine Liberation Organization in negotiations
will occupy the major portion of the delegates' atten-
tion. The principal Arab leaders may also discuss the
relative merits of proceeding on a step-by-step basis
versus moving immediately to a resumption of plenary
sessions of the Geneva conference.
On either question, a hard-line stance by the more
radical elements could tie the hands of the moderates
and seriously hamper further progress toward a peace
settlement.
.The Palestinians and Jordan
President Sadat, who has been in the forefront of
the attempt ?to reconcile Jordanian-PLO differences, will
take the lead on this issue during the summit. In es-
sence, Sadat wants Arab recognition of Jordan"s role as
negotiator for the West Bank. At the same time, he is
seeking an elevated status for the PLO that will put it
on an almost equal footing with the front-line states
and provide at least a long-range hope of obtaining
Palestinian satisfaction from the negotiating process.
The mechanics of winning Arab acceptance of Jordan's
role will be delicate and will probably involve maneu-
vering with words. It is doubtful that the PLO, al-
though satisfied with a UN resolution designating it
merely "the representative" of the Palestinian people,
would accept a similar limited designation from an Arab
forum. It might, however, be satisfied with a resolution
that avoided spelling out whom it represents. This could
be accomplished by simply referring to last year's Algiers
summit resolution on the PLO, without specifying that this
was the resolution that initially raised the troublesome
adjectives "sole legitimate." The PLO's opening speech
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Nations! lnt+elligence 8ulleti~
October 25, 1974
at the preliminary meeting of foreign ministers on Tuesday
suggested that this formula might be acceptable to the
organization.
The PLO and its supporters among the Arab sta-tes could
interpret this as reaffirming the uniqueness of its rep-
resentative role. At the same time, Jordan and Egypt
would not be encumbered by a commitment to the limiting
adjectives, and Jordan could proceed with an implicit
Arab commitment not to oppose its right to negotiate.
Sadat"s strategy is endangered less by the possibil-
ity that the PLO itself will remain rigid in opposing a
role for Jordan. than by the chance that its supporters--
Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, and even Syria--will play on each
other's sympathy for the Palestinians to outdo the PLO
in accommodating its needs. Algerian President Boumediene
in particular could lead a stampede in favor of the PLO
and against King Husayn, encouraging the PLO to press for
its maximum position. This would wreck Sadat"s balancing
act and with it his h~apes of fielding a united Arab nego-
tiating team in the next round with the Israelis and
eventually at Geneva.
The Pace of Negotiations
On the questions of whether to proceed with nego-
tiations by stages and of what those stages should be,
Egypt will probably try for a vaguely worded formulation
in the resolution or skirt the issue entirely. Some of
the other Arabs, particularly Syria, may nonetheless be
unwilling to Iet the issue ride in this way.
Sadat will probably be able to finesse the question
of Geneva by agreeing to a noncommittal pledge to return
to the plenary conference "as soon as possible." If
President Asad, however, forces the issue of which front
to treat first in staged negotiations, Sadat is unlikely
to gain much Arab support for second-stage Sinai talks
not tied to similar negotiations on other fronts, If
Arad wanted to tie Sadat's hands in negotiations, he
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1974
could probably win support for a summit resolution re-
quiring that any progress on the Egyptian front be ac-
companied by simultaneous progress on the Golan or West
Bank fronts.
The Politics of Economics
The Arabs' key position in international economic
affairs and the various political ramifications of this
role will undoub tedly be a chief topic of discussion.
No decisions are likely on the. substance of oil policies.
Oil producers make up no more than a quarter of the mem-
bership of t:he Arab League, and they will not readily
submit the essentials of their policies--pricing, the
specific political uses of oil, or the use of capital--
to discussion by their numerous less affluent colleagues?
Indeed, if the Saudis have their way, the entire question
will be given short shrift.
Resolutions issued by the Arab leaders will prob-
ably no more than affirm the Arabs' right to use oil
and money as political weapons when necessary, denounce
"Zionist propagandists" for instigating an exaggerated
and one-sided attack on Arab producers while attempting
to justify present oil policies, and criticize the
industrialized states for failure to control inflation.
The resolution will probably also emphasize Arab "reason-
ableness" and readiness to cooperate in the effort to
avoid international economic disruption.
One specific area of cooperation will be discussed.
The Arabs have been under considerable pressure from
African states .since the war to relieve the effects of
high oil prices in return for the Africans' severance of
relations with Israel last year. The Arabs have so far
been notably unresponsive. Although both the OAU secre-
tary general and Uganda's Idi Amin have been invited to
lobby at the summit on Africa's behalf, little more
relief is likely to result from this year's session than
from last year's, when a relatively small assistance
fund was established.
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hJationa~ In#eilig~ence ~ultetin October ~~, 1974
Spanish Sahara
Spanish Sahara is unlikely to be on the summit
agenda, but it might be raised in corridor discussions.
Morocco has raised the issue in the UI~I General Assembly
and called on that body to request an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice on its claims
to the Spanish territory, Mauritania has agreed to
support the Moroccan proposal, provided the court also
rules an its claim to the area. Both countries seem
willing to keep the issue in the UN forum for the
present.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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