NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010042-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: November 12, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO27100'QQ,422ecret
D
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
NO
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02710001 42-4) 4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDIP79T00975AO27100010042-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 12, 1974
CONTENTS
OAS: Foreign ministers remain deadlocked on Cuba sanc-
tions issue. (Page 1)
CHINA: Internal situation. (Page 2)
JAPAN: Cabinet shuffle does not affect power balance.
(Page 5)
NETHERLANDS - WEST GERMANY - NATO: Dutch decide to
purchase non-nuclear US tactical missile system. (Page 6)
GREECE: Communists' chances in the election on Sunday
badly-damaged by court ruling. (Page 7)
FOR THE RECORD : (Page 10)
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
 Approved For Release LOZ103198 - - T00975A027100010042-4
National Intelligence Bulletin November 12, 1974
Frustration and bitterness marked the meeting of
OAS foreign ministers in Quito last night as partici-
pants remained deadlocked over the Cuba sanctions issue.
The foreign ministers canceled efforts to achieve
a compromise solution when it became obvious the attempt
would be futile. Several small countries and Brazil--
the swing votes on the Cuba issue--failed to move from
their neutral positions.
Most of the blame for the indecisive outcome is
falling on the US. The Venezuelan and Costa Rican min-
isters have publicly criticized the absence of Secretary
Kissinger, and others are blaming the US position of neu-
trality for the divisiveness that has surfaced.
A final vote on the issue is scheduled for today,
when the foreign ministers vote on a resolution spon-
sored by Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica asking for
the repeal of sanctions against Cuba. Following the
resolution's expected defeat, a session will be held to
formally adjourn the conference.
Press reports from Quito indicate that Brazil,
fearing the breakup of the OAS, will propose that the
foreign ministers meet in Panama City in three months,
after Latin Am rican countries have had time for new
consultations.
-1-
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 21007/03/28: CIA-RDP79
National Intelligence Bulletin November 12, 1974
The internal political situation is settling down
along relatively pragmatic and order-oriented lines.
Preparations are well under way to convene a Na-
tional People's Congress--the first in a decade. This
meeting, which almost certainly will be preceded by
a plenum of the Central Committee, will probably com-
plete the long-drawn-out process of governmental reor-
ganization and confirm a number of ministerial appoint-
ments, some of which have been filled only on a de facto
basis for years.
The anti-Confucius campaign also appears to be draw-
ing to a close. The campaign has been in low gear since
early summer and now seems likely to be phased out com-
pletely. The campaign began to lag when Chou En-lai
became seriously ill, which suggests both that the Pre-
mier played a large role in it and that Chou's putative
enemies have been unable to take advantage of his inac-
tivity. Editorials and central directives for some time
have been stressing unity and have been warning against
factionalism, which became acute last spring. The cen-
tral directives also have been emphasizing the need to
increase production and fulfill quotas, a theme that is
likely to be reiterated at the congress.
Government and party administrators have long been
concerned that political ferment could seriously inter-
fere with economic activity, and, in fact, the factional-
ism engendered by the campaign has led to slowdowns and
bottlenecks in a number of areas. Emphasis on economic
factors suggests that considerable attention at the upper
levels is being accorded to Chou's longtime lieutenant,
Li Hsien-nien, who oversees economic and financial affairs.
Perhaps the most significant indicator of retrench-
ment and a damping down of political ferment is a state-
ment attributed to Mao himself in a recent central di-
rective to the effect that "eight years of Cultural
Revolution are enough." Criticism of certain Cultural
-2-
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
 Approved For ReleaseL
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 12, 1974
Revolution practices and excesses appeared to underlie
some of the propaganda associated with the early stages
of the anti-Confucius campaign, but a strong "leftist"
countercurrent beginning in late February redefined the
campaign, in formal terms at least, as a defense of the
Cultural Revolution. This change of front does not ap-
pear 'to have been successful, however, and the new state-
ment attributed to Mao is a stronger repudiation. of po-
litical ferment than any issuing from the Chairman in
1968 or 1969 when the Cultural Revolution itself was be-
ing phased out.
The campaign itself seems to be dying without much
visible accomplishment. The military probably has been
further nudged from the political center stage, but thus
far there have been no major purges of important military
figures. Nor has the "left" appreciably increased its
political strength. Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, has been
more active than she was in the period immediately follow-
ing the Tenth Party Congress, frequently greeting and
occasionally shepherding important visitors about the
country. She also has asserted her role as cultural
arbiter, but, except in the area of higher education,
there have been no major departures from the policies
adopted in the early 1970s.
Approved For Release. 90m103i9R ? CIA-RnRZPT00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 007/03/28 : CIA-RDP7 T00975A027100010042-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 12, 1974
Chiang Ching has clearly inspired recent propaganda
suggesting that she would be a logical successor to Mao.
The "rehabilitation" of officials disgraced during
the Cultural Revolution is continuing, despite signs this
process does not sit well with "leftist" elements. Indeed,
the single figure who has profited most in the course of
the anti-Confucius campaign is Teng Hsiao-ping, the very
personification of the "capitalist-roaders" who were
disgraced early in the Cultural Revolution. Other offi-
cials rehabilitated appeared at the National Day celebra-
tions on October 1. Some of these, as well as others
who reappeared earlier, are likely to be assigned to
important posts just before or after the National P 1 's
Congress. F
-4-
Approved For Release, 1007103118 ? ClA_RDP 9T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin November 12, 1974
JAPAN
The shuffle of the Japanese cabinet yesterday nei-
ther changes the balance of factional power in the rul-
ing party nor signals new directions for national policy.
Prime Minister Tanaka's two chief allies--Finance Minis-
ter Ohira and International Trade and Industry Minister
Nakasone--retained their portfolios, as did Foreign Min-
ister Kimura. Sosuke Una, a former vice minster'of
trade and industry, replaced Sadanori Yamanaka as direc-
tor general of the Defense Agency.
Tanaka named a member of his own party faction to
head the Science and Technology Agency and Atomic Energy
Commission, replacing a minister who had opposed ratifi-
cation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
posts.
Tanaka's critics in the party, former finance
minister Fukuda and former deputy prime minister Miki,
did not try to weaken the position of the Prime Minister
by forcing their own factional supporters to resign, and
both factions have retained their full complement of
-5-
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release ~
National Intelligence Bulletin
NETHERLANDS - WEST GERMANY - NATO
November 12, 1974
The Dutch government has decided to purchase the
US-built Lance tactical missile system, despite an
earlier intention not to acquire the system. The Dutch,
however, plan to buy only the non-nuclear version, which
means that their decision will not allay NATO concern
that the Dutch are trying to reduce their nuclear respon-
sibilities to NATO.
The Dutch decision to purchase the conventional
Lance on their own presumably means that they are unwill-
ing to accept a deal suggested by the West Germans. Late
last year, Bonn offered to buy and operate the nuclear
version of the Lance in support of the Dutch forces
stationed in West Germany. Bonn's offer was prompted by
the recommendation of a NATO group that the Dutch pur-
chase the nuclear Lance or find another NATO member to
obtain and operate it for them.
The Lance is designed to provide battlefield nuclear
or conventional fire support at the army and corps level.
NATO plans call for the Lance to replace the Honest John
and Sergeant missiles in the European NATO forces over
the next four years. The US began replacing the older
missiles in its European force with the Lance in late
1973.
-6-
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin November 12, 1974
GREECE
A recent Supreme Court ruling on what constitutes
a political party has badly damaged Communist chances in
the election on November 17.
Of the major political groups in the election, only
the United Left (a grouping of two Communist parties
and a former Communist front group) is classified as
a coalition by the court. The decision will require the
United Left to get 30 percent of the national vote in
order to be eligible to participate in more than one of
the three distributions of parliamentary seats. Most
observers believe that the United Left will not win
more than 17 percent of the vote.
Behind a facade of unity the Communists have been
squabbling over electoral procedures, among other things,
which should further reduce their chances. They have
begun to attack their principal rival on the left, the
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), led by Andreas
Papandreou, whom they dislike more than they dislike
each other. Papandreou, who has been careful to main-
tain some distance from the Communists, stands to profit
from their disunity and from the Supreme Court decision.
As a single party, PASOK needs only 17 percent of the
vote to be eligible for further distributions.
The US consulate in Thessaloniki--Greece's second
largest city--believes that both the United Left and
Papandreou will show considerable strength in Thes-
saloniki; it estimates that Papandreou will win 18 per-
cent of the vote in northern Greece, and the United
Left 10 percent. With perhaps as much as 30 percent
of the nationwide vote the leftist groups could be a
vocal factor in the new parliament.
Papandreou has been drawing smaller crowds than
have either Prime Minister Karamanlis or George Mavros
of the centrist Center Union - New Forces, but his crowds
are better organized and more enthusiastic. He has been
exploiting themes of betrayal in Cyprus, hostility to
NATO, and anti-Americanism to obtain considerable popu-
larity among radicalized youth.
-7-
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 20OZ1 13198 ? CIA-Rnp7T00975AO27100010042-4
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 12, 1974
Papandreou expects to lose the election to the New
Democracy Party led by Prime Minister Karamanlis, but
reportedly believes that he will get 26 percent of the
vote, edging out Mavros' Center Union for second place
in the election. Mavros has some good candidates,
but his leadership and organizational ability are weak;
more important, he is having a hard time distinguishing
his platform from that of Karamanlis and stands to lose
votes on both his right and left.
Papandreou has reportedly been trying to ensure
that his young following behaves in a nonviolent and
disciplined way and is said to be relying on the appeal
of popular slogans. Papandreou, however, is mistrusted
by the farmers and the middle class, as well as by the
establishment, and complicated registration procedures
and the requirement that voters must cast their bal-
lots in their place of origin may limit the turnout of
student voters. Except for some 12 former deputies
and actress Melina Mercouri, Papandreou is running more
political unknowns than any other party. He is also
running candidates in only 38 out of 56 electoral dis-
tricts, trying to concentrate his efforts in areas
where he anticipates the greatest voter appeal.
Although a Karamanlis victory seems assured, the
size of his victory and the showing the left makes
will determine how flexible the new government can be
on Cyprus, NATO and relations with the US.
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
F_ I 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
 Approved For Release 9T00975AO27100010042-4
National Intelligence Bulletin November 12, 1974
Yugoslavia East Germany: President Tito begins
a four-clay visit to East Germany today.. His talks with
SED party chief Eric Honecker will mark the first top-
level, bilateral exchanges since Walter Ulbricht's
visit to Yugoslavia in 1966.. Economic issues will prob-
ably lead the list of topics discussed.. Both sides
are treating the event as a welcome sign that a legacy
of bitter misunderstandings and sharp polemics is being
supplanted by pragmatic cooperation,
Approved For Relea - 79T00975A027100010042-4
 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27100010042-4