NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027200010018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 27, 1974
CONTENTS
USSR: Brezhnev's speech in Mongolia dealt with both the
US and China. (Page 1)
INDIA: French firm agrees to help Indian space program.
Page 4)
CAMBODIA: UN General Assembly deliberations on the Cam-
bodian aann representation issue may conclude late today.
(Page 5)
PERU:. Lima reassesses relations with Chile. (Page 11)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 27, 1974
Brezhnev's speech in Ulan Bator yesterday was pre-
dictably upbeat on bilateral relations with the US and
negative on the prospects for better relations with
China.
The Soviet leader stated that a "considerable step
forward" had been made in the area of strategic arms
limitations, and that work will be concluded in the com-
ing months on a new agreement. He described the meeting
with President Ford as having taken place in a "good,
constructive spirit," and stated that the course of
US-Soviet relations had been "confirmed." Brezhnev
seemed to be implying that Soviet doubts about the con-
tinuity of US policy under President Ford have now been
assuaged. He also made an unusual reference to the par-
ticipation of Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister
Gromyko, perhaps as a way of both congratulating the
two men and sharing some of the responsibilities for
the Vladivostok decisions with Gromyko, a fellow member
of the Politburo.
Brezhnev included some veiled criticism of the US
in his discussion of the Middle East, but he largely
stuck to Moscow's line regarding the necessity for solv-
ing the problem in the Geneva forum. He balanced his
support for the Palestinians with a reference to guar-
anteeing the security and independence of "all" the coun-
tries in the conflict.
On China, Brezhnev pulled few punches in describing
Peking's call for a prior withdrawal of Soviet troops
from "disputed areas" as "absolutely unacceptable."
He reiterated Moscow's desire for nonaggression and non-
use of force agreements with China.
Perhaps with an eye to the propaganda war with Pe-
king, Brezhnev refrained from making any personal at-
tacks on the Chinese leadership and reiterated Moscow's
hope their "common sense" and considerations of "vital
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National Intelligence Bulletin
November 27, 1974
interests" will :Lead to a real normalization of rela-
tions between the two states. The Soviets frequently
take the more polemical line that the Chinese "people,"
whose interests allegedly would be served by better re-
lations with the USSR, will eventually have an impact
on the course China takes.
In more formal channels, the Soviet government yes-
terday rejected Peking's offer to conclude a nonaggres-
sion treaty tied to withdrawal of Soviet forces from
areas near the border. Moscow, in a brusque message to
Peking, dismissed the Chinese offer of November 6 and
caustically asserted that Peking shows no "real interest"
in an understanding with the USSR.
The Soviets intended by their response and by Brezh-
nev's remarks in Mongolia yesterday to turn the propa-
ganda tables on Peking by making it clear that the Chi-
nese proposal does not constitute a serious effort to
move negotiations ahead. The timing suggests that Mos-
cow saw some advantage in throwing cold water on the
prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations while Sec-
retary Kissinger is in Peking.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 27, 1974
INDIA
A French aerospace firm has agreed to help India de-
velop a launch vehicle for putting up a synchronous satel-
lite. According to a press report, a French firm, the
European Propulsion Company, has granted India a license
to build the Viking booster engine. This engine, orig-
inally developed for the European space launcher, is a
simple, liquid-fueled type that is appropriate for India's
requirements.
The Indians are seeking to develop a launch vehicle
capable of putting a 1,650-pound satellite into synchro-
nous orbit by they mid-1980s. Although the project has
not gone beyond the planning stage, the French assistance
should help the Indians get the program under way. The
launcher is to use the Viking engine in two of its three
stages. Although: no decision has been made regarding
the third-stage engine, the Indians may look to the
French to assist with it as well. If successful, this
project will enable India to put large telecommunications,
meteorological, and earth-resource sensing satellites
into orbit. Such a capability would enhance India's
prestige,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
November 27, 1974
Debate in the UN General Assembly on the Cambodian
representation issue began yesterday, one day late be-
cause of U Thant's death. Assembly President Bouteflika
still plans to conclude deliberations and hold a vote
late today.
The crucial vote will be on whether the Asian-ini-
tiated resolution deferring UN action on the issue will
have priority over the pro-Sihanouk resolution calling
for replacement of Phnom Penh's delegation with one from
Sihanouk's "government." Although this vote will not
technically decide the representation issue, it is being
viewed by all as a test of strength. If the vote on
priority goes against the Lon Nol government, ejection
from the General Assembly is almost a foregone conclu-
sion. Conversely, a favorable vote would in all likeli-
hood mean that Phnom Penh would retain its seat for an-
other year, although this is not guaranteed.
The outcome is still a toss-up. Knowledgeable es-
timators differ slightly, but no one gives either side a
margin of more than two on the priority question. Last-
minute switches are possible. For example, Iceland, which
had earlier indicated it would vote for Phnom Penh on the
priority issue, reportedly decided on Monday to abstain.
A number of delegations are still wavering.
In Cambodia, it has become apparent that a signifi-
cant government shake-up will occur, no matter what the
outcome at the UN. Prime Minister Long Boret hopes to
take advantage of a victory to purge and reorganize his
cabinet, most notably by replacing the defense, interior,
and finance ministers.
These changes would be minor, compared to the polit-
ical upheaval that would result from a government defeat
at the UN. Long Boret has already said he will resign in
the event of a loss, and there are numerous reports that
the military would push for greater participation in a
new government. Finding a new prime minister as capable
as Long Boret and keeping the political fighting within
hniindq would be major challenges to President Lon Nol.
I I
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 27, 1974
Awareness of Chile?s deployment of troops to the
north and other obvious efforts to improve its defensive
capability in the border region are also causing Peru
to doubt its ability to easily defeat Chile now. The
Chileans are trying to convince Peru that a war would
be long and costly.
President Velasco has also been encountering wide-
spread civilian and military disaffection with his regime,
and he may want to focus on internal problems. The re-
cent border meeting between high-ranking Peruvian and
Chilean army officers and an unconfirmed Peruvian offer
of a nonaggression pact are indications that Velasco
would like to ease the tensions with Chile. This ap-
proach should continue at least until he improves his
political position and until the military develops con-
fidence in its ability to defeat Chile quickly.
Peru will continue to purchase new weapons and pro-
ceed with its buildup of military forces in the border
region, So long as this continues, Chilean concern over
Peruvian intentions will not subside significantly. The
Chileans are thus certain to continue their urgent search
for arms to upgrade their weak militar posture and to
strengthen their border areas.
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National Intelligence Bulletin November 27, 1974
Ethiopia: The military council has not yet announced
a replacement for General Aman as head of the provisional
military government, indicating it is having difficulty
finding anyopp- to accept the post. There have been no
disturbances
Una s in the ie are
said to be demanding an explanation of the council's de-
cision to carry out the mass executions last weekend,
but they do not now seem to be preparing military action
against the council.
Israel-Syria: According to the US defense attache
in Tel iv v, the Israelis may have begun to demobilize
some of the reservists called up in mid-November. The
demobilization probably reflects the. Israeli belief that
the Syrians this weekend will renew the UN mandate, which
permits UN forces to be stationed between Israeli and
Syrian troops on the Golan Heights.
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