NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027200010046-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: December 14, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel l igence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N?_ 654
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lelational Intelligence Bulletin
December 14, 1974
ISRAEL-EGYPT: Rabin uses television interview to reit-
erate negotiating position; draws official reaction from
Fahmi. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Military situation. (Page 5)
VIETNAM: Civilian resettlement programs reportedly con-
tinue to be a major problem for the Communists. (Page 6)
BURMA: Government continues tough stand; however, eco-
nomic situation could spark trouble in the future.
(Page 7)
USSR: Gorshkov on official visit to South Yemen and
Somalia. (Page 9)
OPEC: Oil ministers agree to single unified price sys-
tem and to raise prices 3,$ cents per barrel. (Page 10)
NORWAY: Government survives confidence vote. (Page 12)
VENEZUELA: Re-establishment of relations with Cuba re-
portedly imminent. (Page 13)
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National Intelligence Bailletin
ISRAELI-EGYPT
December 14, 1974
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, in an interview broad-
cast on British television on December 12, again talked
about Israel's negotiating strategy.
Israel, he said, is prepared to make peace with
Egypt and return the Abu Rudays oil fields and the Sinai
mountain passes, but it will not return all the territory
captured from Egypt in the 1967 war. He said that he
'thought Egypt is still the key Arab country which will
determine whether there will be another Middle East war.
However, as more time passes, he said, Caira is losing
this key role. The Soviets, he claimed, are building up
Syria and Iraq as a political and military counterweight
to Egypt in the Arab struggle against Israel. Rabin
again did not discuss negotiations with Syria.
As for Jordan, Rabin expressed the hope that it
would still be possible some day to reach a settlement
with King Husayn regarding the West Bank. He thinks it
will take a year or two before the Arabs realize their
strong stand at the Arab summit supporting the Palestine
Liberation Organization is fruitless and again allow
Husayn to play a role in the negotiations.
Rab.~n acknowledged that there can be no just and
durable peace without a solution to the Palestine issue,
but strongly defended Israel's refusal to negotiate with
the PLO, even if it indicated a readiness to accept the
existence of Israel. One of the '?greatest mistakes
Israel could make," he said, would be to talk with the
PLO and thereby "practically recognize" it as legitimate.
The Prime Minister suggested that neither the Arabs
nor Israel will be able to force a Middle East settlement
by war. Israel can reduce the Arab military threat and
gain time by going to war. It is clear. to him, however,
that the big powers, or at least one of them, will not
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National I noel Iig~BncEp bulletin December 14 , 19 7 4
allow Israel to score the type of victory that would
enable it to dictate the terms of a settlement. The
Arabs, too, he thought, do not really believe that they
can inflict a defeat on Israel that would give them what
they want.
He repeated the standard Tsraeli line that Israel
.would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into
the Middle East, but added that it could not permit it-
self to be the second either.
a a.n s s a emen is o
firmest official affirmations that Israel has or could
quickly obtain s11ch weapons. Rabin cautioned the Arabs
about using long-range rockets against Israeli popula-
tion centers. Israel, he said, can hit Arab cities ten
times harder, even using only conventional weapons.
Egypt?s Foreign Minister Fahmi issued a sharp of-
ficial response yesterday to recent remarks by Israeli
Prime Minister :Rabin., The response looks like a tough-
ening of Egypt';s negotiating position. The Egyptians
produced a list of ostentatiously uncompromising condi-
tions for a "full and final settlement" that included:
--full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab
territories back to international borders;
--Israel?s recognition of the PL? as the sole le-
gitimate representative of the Palestinian people
and recognition of Palestinian national rights;
--either the creation of a democratic state in which
Jews, Muslims and Christians live on an equal foot-
ing, or ap;~lication of the United Nations Palestine
partition plan;
--a pledge by Israel to renounce its expansionist
policy and a pledge ghat it will not accept any
more Jewish immigrants during the next 50 years;
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 14, 1974
--Israeli compensation to the Palestinians who have
lost their property and to the Arab states for dam-
ages they suffered during all previous wars.
Described by the Egyptian news agency as an official
statement, Fahmi's remarks are a major departure from
Cairo's usual tack of avoiding the issue of a final set?
tlement and concentrating instead on interim steps in
the negotiations. His call for either the creation of
a democratic secular state--an Arab catch phrase used
to deny Israel's right to exist--or, alternatively, the
imposition of the 1947 partition plan is the kind of
rhetoric usually voiced only by Arab radicals.
Fahmi's statement was described as a comment on an
interview by Rabin published the same day in which the
Prime Minister amplified an earlier interview that, in
effect, called for Egyptiap acquiescence in an Israeli
strategy to delay a final peace settlement for years.
Cairo had withheld comment after the first interviews
,but apparently felt that it could no longer allow the
impression of possible Israeli-Egyptian complicity
created by Rabin to go unrefuted.
Fahmi's statement, though a not unexpected response
to Rabin's candid airing of an Israeli strategy to avoid
a final settlement, is so extreme a statement of Egyptian
requirements as to suggest that Swat intends it to sig-
nal a major change in Egypt's attitude toward negotia-
tions with Israel. While he has never been willing to
contemplate establishing diplomatic relations with
Israel, Sadat has implicitly acknowledged Israel's right
to exist within its 1967 borders and is on record as
being willing to sign a peace agreement on those terms.
If Fah;ni's statement represents a fundamental shift
in Egyptian negotiating strategy, Sadat himself can be
expected to follow up with a public restatement of th~
position carryinq his personal stamp of authority.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
December 14, 1974
The Communist dry-season campaign, now in its sec-
ond week, is producing scattered but intense fighting
in the southern half of South Vietnam.
The initial action began on December 6 in the south-
ern delta provinces and consisted largely of widespread
shellings and small-scale ground attacks against the
more remote government positions with strong emphasis on
cutting major highways. By last weekend, similar activ-
ity spread to the northern delta provinces and into
widely scattered areas closer to Saigon, most notably in
Tay Ninh Province.
Nearly all the action has been initiated by Commu-
nist local forces, but as the fighting developed some
North Vietnamese mainforce units have become involved.
This is particularly true in the northern delta where
scattered local Viet Cong attacks were designed to mask
the infiltration of the Communist 5th Division from
Cambodia into Military Region 4. Government reaction
forces later moved in to block the incursion and heavy
fighting is now under way..
Government casualties sharply increased during this
first week of the campaign. South Vietnamese forces
claim Communist losses have also been high. The govern-
ment's territorial forces have absorbed the brunt of the
initial Communist attacks.
In a few areas, particularly in Military Region 3,
these provincial forces have done well enough to allow
government commanders to save their regular units for
the heavier action expected later. In many areas of the
delta, however, the provincial forces have lost outposts
and defensive positions near some populated areas. This
has forced the government to commit some of its regular
units to the fighting.
The campaign also appears to be hurting the govern-
ment's pacification program in some areas, particularly
in the delta. The Communists have forced the relocation
of a large number of civilians and interrupted the rice
harvest as well as the flow of farm goods to the markets.
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National IntE~lligence bulletin
December 14, 1974
Although Communist plans called for increased mil-
itary action in the central provinces as well, govern-
ment operations and troop deployments have probably
forced the Communists to delay these plans. Government
gains in the northern provinces, including the recapture
of important highground positions south of Hue, may pro-
voke Communist counteraction. Nevertheless, no major
initiatives are expected soon because of poor weather,
although terrorist incidents and sapper attacks are
likely to increase.
Several ralliers and escapees have indicated that
the Communists are continuing to have major difficulties
in establishing effective resettlement programs for civil-
ians captured during military advances.
In one province some 15,000 civilians were captured;
after interrogation and classification they were moved
to 5,000-man resettlement camps. However, little planning
was made for providing food., shelter, or health care.
Neither housing nor sanitary facilities were available,
and there was nothing in the way of construction materials.
When food ran out, the Communists cadre allowed one member
from each family to return to his native village to harvest
whatever might be left of the rice crop. At least 120 of
the villagers, including 100 children, have died from
various diseases, including malaria and dysentery. Most
of the able-bodied men and women were forced to join mili-
tary units leaving only the aged and the very young.
Recently captured documents indicate that a major
aim of Hanoi's planners this year is to seize control
of large parts of the population. The Communists, how-
ever, are either unable, or unwilling, to provide support
to the people being resettled in their areas. This lack
of planning could present a major obstacle to o ulation-
c ntrol o erations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 14, 1974
BURMA
The Burmese government is continuing to take a
tough stand in the wake of the rioting in RangQan this
week .
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Although Rangoon is generally quiet, the government
faces an immediate problem in trying to restore normal
economic activity. During the past week, pxices for
rice and other food have jumped significantly, some as
much as 50 percent. The marginally employed, who live
hand.-to-mouth, have been especially hard hit, and the
US embassy believes that renewed disturbances are pos-
sible unless the economic situation improves quickly.
In the past, the Ne Win government has used force
effectively to put down disorders. The events this
week, however, were the broadest outbreak of discontent
in many years and, according to the embassy, the public
remains bitter and resentful.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 14, 1974
Admiral Gorshkov, deputy minister of defense and
commander in chief of the Soviet navy, arrived in Aden
on December 12 to begin an official visit--his first--
to South Yemen and Somalia? He is scheduled to be in
Mogadiscio from December 16 to 19
This part of the world is of special interest to
the Soviet navy. Ships of the Soviet Indian Ocean con-
tingent receive much of their logistic support and on-
station maintenance in the Gulf of Aden area. Aden?s
port is visited frequently by Soviet auxiliaries for
water, food, and occasionally for fuel. In addition,
Aden?s nearby international airfield may provide naval
units and personnel with transport service to the U5SR.
Soviet combatants also visit Aden, but receive support
mostly from Soviet auxiliaries in a nearby anchorageo
Across the Gulf of Aden at Berbera, Somalia, Soviet
naval personnel have direct control over some facilities.
Most Soviet warships operating in the Indian Ocean
routinely put in to Berbera for resupply, minor repairs,
and short-term crew rest. Repairs are performed along-
side a Soviet bar e that has been docked there since
October 19720
The Soviets' increased diplomatic attention to this
area is in part related to the anticipated reopening of
the Suez Canal. Moscow probably wants to ensure its
access to port services in the Gulf of Aden in the face
of the increased competition for these services that
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National Int~:llic~ence Bulletin
December 14, 1974
will result from the opening. The Soviet interest prob-
ably also reflects an appreciation for the increased
Western dependence on the oil that is transported through
this area and the expanded US and French naval presence.
The oil mi~zisters of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries at their meeting that ended yesterday
in Vienna agreed to abolish the present posted-price
system and to replace it with a single unified price.
The meeting also decided that OPEC oil and foreign min-
isters will meei~ in Algeria on January 24.
Effective ~Tanuary 1, the new average take of OPEC
governments for crude oil will be $10.12--an increase
of 4 percent or 38 cents per barrel. This means that
OPEC as a whole has accepted the price increase made by
.Persian Gulf oi:L producers at a meeting in Abu Dhabi in
November. This is expected to raise the world?s oil
import bill by about $4 bi:Llion next year and the US?
bill by about $f300 million.
Iranian Minister of Interior Amouzegar described
the new price a;~ a "generous gesture" to allow consumers
time to coordinate their positions. He said that the
problem of relai~ing oil prices to Western inflation
would be taken trp later, possibly as part of a producer-
consumer dialogtree
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 14, 1974
Norwegian Pra,me Minister Bratteli's minority Labor
government survi~red a vote of confidence yesterday when
the opposition Cf:nter Party and three splinter parties
voted with the government.
Bratteli de