NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 28, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 28, 1974
CONTENTS
THAILAND: Thanom's return could spark public outbursts.
(Page 1)
PHILIPPINES: Marcos seeks negotiations with Muslim in-
surgents. (Page 3)
ETHIOPIA: Army facing serious security situation in As-
mara area. (Page 5)
JAPAN:
ARGENTINA: Military increasing its political activity.
Wage l l )
CANADA: Cancellation of sale of office equipment to
Cuba. (Page 12)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 28, 1974
THAILAND
The unexpected return of former prime minister
Thanom Kittikachorn to Bangkok has presented the care-
taker government of Sanya Thammasak. with a potentially
explosive political problem only a month before it is
scheduled to step down following general elections.
To many Thai, particularly students, Thanom is a
symbol of corrupt military rule. The government, in an
attempt to head off expected public outbursts against
Thanom's return, has placed the former prime minister
under house arrest pending an investigation of his role
in the events leading to the riots that toppled his
regime in October 1973. Law students reportedly have
already filed a complaint with police charging Thanom
with murder and misuse of public funds.
Thanom has returned apparently to visit his dying
father. He had requested permission last month to do
so, but despite earlier approval by the King on humani-
tarian grounds, the cabinet turned down the request in
the face of public opposition. It is possible that
several of Thanom's closest friends, such as former Air
force chief Bunchu, may have encouraged Thanom to return
anyway, and may have assured him that no serious reprisals
would be taken. Thanom reportedly requested that he be
allowed to stay in*Thailand indefinitely.
It is possible,
however, that his arrival was ae l1 erately timed to
coincide with army commander Krit Siwara's absence from
the country. Krit would clearly see Thanom's presence
as a potential threat to his influence over the military,
from which he has been attempting to purge Thanom's
proteges over the past year. Krit, on a five-nation
swing through the region, has been asked by the cabinet
to cut his trip short and return to Bangkok.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 28, 1974
Regardless of how firmly the government handles the
situation, Thanom's return is sure to breathe new life
into the dormant, out-of-favor student movement. Student
posters denouncing the visit have already appeared at
local universities and on buses. Police do not expect
any major protest to materialize for at least another
24 hours, and the announcement of Thanom's house arrest
may buy time for the government to gauge public opinion
before deciding what steps to take next.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 28, 1974
PHILIPPINES
President Marcos apparently is moving to open talks
with a few selected Muslim insurgent leaders. The ground-
work has been laid for a meeting in Jidda in January be-
tween a high-level Philippine government delegation and
leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front, the most
widely known insurgent group.
.Marcos has been under pressure for some time from
the Islamic world to negotiate with the Muslims and to
prove that he sincerely desires a peaceful solution to
the revolt. At a meeting in Kuala Lumpur last June,
the Conference of Islamic Nations publicly called on
Marcos to negotiate with Muslim leaders, specifically
including the Moro National Liberation Front, but the
President initially balked at negotiating with the Front
because he does not want it regarded as the principal
Muslim spokesman. The secretary general of the Islamic
Conference has visited Manila several times in the past
few months to press for a meeting with Front leaders.
Marcos' agreement to a meeting in Jidda was prob-
ably influenced by the visit to Manila this month of
Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Secretary Ibrahim al-Sultan.
Marcos believes he has established rapport with the
Saudis and can count on them to exert a restraining in-
fluence on radical Islamic states, particularly Libya.
A major problem in any negotiations with the rebels
will be to work out some arrangement which satisfies
the Muslims' desire to control their local affairs.
Most Muslim leaders, whether young radicals or old-line
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 28, 1974
politicians, are demanding some form of autonomy .1
Marcos probably hopes that if he can persuade even
a few prominent rebel leaders to lay down their arms
and join the government, this will have a favorable
psychological effect on many others. In any event, he
probably calculates that by dealing with the rebel groups
separately- he can keep them divided and mutually sus-
picious.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ETHIOPIA
December 28, 1974
The Ethiopian army is facing an increasingly serious
security situation in the Asmara area, where the sepa-
ratist Eritrean Liberation Front already controls much
of-the countryside.
On December 26, guerrillas reportedly attacked an
army unit camped six miles west of Asmara; heavy casual-
ties were inflicted on the unit, which had only recently
been sent to Eritrea as a reinforcement. Five soldiers
were reportedly killed in downtown Asmara on the same
evening.
These incidents, which came only a few days after
two grenade attacks on army-frequented cafes in Asmara,
lend credence to an Eritrean exile's claim that the Front
has the arms and the ability to take on the Ethiopian
army in open war. It is more likely, however, that guer-
rilla forces simply have found more favorable opportuni-
ties to strike at the army and that they will continue
to rely on their successful hit-and-run tactics. The
policies of the faction-ridden Front are determined
primarily by leaders in Eritrea, not by exiles.
The ruling military council in Addis Ababa appears
to be having second thoughts about its decision to take
a tough line on Eritrea--a decision which contributed
to its differences with the late General Aman and may
have sparked the intensification of violence around
Asmara. Council leaders, apparently recognizing the
high vulnerability and limited capability of the army
in the province, claim they still hope to settle the
Eritrean question peacefully.
Spokesmen are now playing down reports of violence
and stressing the regime's efforts to end the conflict
through talks. Late last month, in fact, a high-level
Ethiopian delegation visited Sudan and, despite denials,
probably met with Front emissaries.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 28, 1974
Even the top military authorities in Asmara appear
to be trying to exercise restraint, following the army's
violent overreaction to the cafe bombings on Sunday and
its stern warning to the public that its patience was
at an end. Nevertheless, chances of successful negotia-
tions between the military government and the Front are
dim, because most of the leaders of the Front are in-
sisting on full independence.
Prospects for compromise are also endangered by the
bitter nature of the evolving conflict in Eritrea. The
civilian population, whose support for the Front has re-
cently grown, is said to blame the army for the deaths
of a large number of civilians found strangled on Asmara
streets several mornings this week. Some of the dead
were students and known supporters of the Front.
Responsibility for the deaths is still not clear.
The Front itself cannot be ruled out, but it seems more
likely that they are the work of army personnel trained
in counterinsurgency--perhaps acting without the au-
thority of the top military commanders in Eritrea. I
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 28, 1974
Japan's industrial production fell sharply in No-
vember--down 3 percent from the previous month and 13
percent from the previous year, the steepest decline of
any industrial country. Unemployment rose in November,
and the number of bankruptcies reached a new record.
Most other economic indicators point to further
production cuts in the months ahead:
--Inventories of finished goods continued to rise,
increasing nearly 2 percent last month.
--Personal consumption remains weak; department
store sales in November were lower than a year
earlier in real terms.
--Investment, after recovering somewhat during the
summer, declined noticeably in October and November.
Despite pressure for a policy change, Deputy Prime
Minister Pukuda evidently still sees inflation as a
more serious problem than recession. Consumer prices
in recent months have been increasing at an annual rate
of about 25 percent.
Fukuda wants to slow the pace to 15 percent before
wage negotiations begin next spring. Even if tight
monetary policies are maintained, however, Japanese
labor unions will beunwillina to accept much less than
a 25-percent wage hike.
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 28, 1974
ARGENTINA
The armed forces are leaning toward a more active
role as a power broker in Argentine politics. Increas-
ing political activity by some military leaders and the
continuing success of the army-supported counterterrorist
campaign are the major factors behind this new trend.
The military is still smarting-from the unpopularity
that led the Lanusse regime to return the government to
civilians in 1973. While a military coup is unlikely,
the army reportedly is re--evaluating its role in the
government.
President Peron has gradually won the endorsement
of some military leaders, but they are growing increas-
ingly critical of the role of Lopez Rega, minister of
social welfare, who is also Mrs. Peron's private secre-
tary and mentor. Recent actions of Lopez Rega have con-
vinced some officers that he has lost his sanity. The
military now believes that Mrs. Peron can survive without
him, provided she has the active support of the military
and labor.
The terrorists, meanwhile, are clearly on the de-
fensive. In general, the insurgents realize that their
campaign--particularly the assassination of ten army
officers--has significantly reduced their popular sup-
port while encouraging maximum efforts by security
forces.
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The terrorists reportedly believe that over the
next few months, major activity will have little chance
of success, and thus they will concentrate on revital-
izing their organization and infiltrating the labor move-
ment. Nevertheless, isolated acts, such as the attempted
assassination on December 23 of the federal police chief,
are expected to continue.
Ottawa has objected strongly to a US firm's decision
to cancel a contract between its Canadian subsidiary and
Havana because of US regulations prohibiting trade with
Cuba.
Canada apparently sees the cancellation of a $500,000
sale of office equipment as yet another example of foreign
interference in domestic policy. The cancellation will
provide impetus to proposed legislation that would give
Ottawa greater control over multinational corporations
operating in Canada.
Since Washington authorized large sales to Cuba by
US auto subsidiaries in Argentina, several governments
have been exerting pressure on US-owned companies to do
business with Havana. Mexico is presently urging US
firms to participate in its growing trade with Cuba.
Colombia has recently joined the list of OAS members
doing business with Havana and is encouraging subsidi-
aries of multinational corporations to participate in
this trade.
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Laos: There has been no significant change in the
situation at Ban Houei Sai, in remote northwestern Laos.
Dissident forces--a combination of Royal Lao Army and
Pathet Lao troops--remain in control of the provincial
capital as well as most of the Lao bank of the Mekong
River north and south of the town. Some minor looting
and property.damage reportedly have occurred in Ban Houei
Sai, but the small number of Americans and other foreign
personnel in the town are safe. Discussions were held
in Ban Houei Sai, yesterday between rebel forces and a
low-level Pathet Lao - non-communist negotiating team
dispatched by the coalition government. A cabinet-level
delegation reportedly has le from Luang Prabang to
continue the negotiations.
Australia: Defense Minister Barnard has announced
that the government has decided to purchase. Leopard
medium tanks from West Germany. The Leopard was selected
over the US M-60 medium tank "on the basis of technical
performance, project investment, and operating and main-
tenance costs," according to Barnard. Although contract
terms are not yet final, Australia plans to purchase 53
Leopards as initial replacements for the 133 Centurions
held by the army. The decision to buy-West German armor
marks a break in Australia's long-standing reliance on
the UK as the primary source of such equipment
Peru: The Peruvians have proposed that preliminary
discussions on the limitation of South American military
expenditures begin next month in Lima. All Andean Pact
countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile,
and Bolivia) have been invited to attend. Peru will
call for a.moratorium on purchases of offensive weapons.
Chile has agreed to attend, but is seeking to include
Brazil in the talks. Brazil's omission from the meeting
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and Peru's hardware superiority over Chile make it un
likely that much will result from the meeting.
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