NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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D
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
January 4, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 4, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 1)
RHODESIA: Shaky truce in effect. (Page 3)
IRAN - ARAB STATES: Shah to visit Jordan and Egypt
next week. (Page 5)
SINGAPORE: Government seeks reactions from the US and
the UK to increased Soviet use of restricted ship re-
pair facilities. (Page 9)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 13)
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh Area
\%Kompong
Chhnang
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 4, 1975
Government troops appear to be retaking the initia-
tive in some of the areas attacked in the Communists'
New Year's offensive. Territory on the east bank of the
Mekong above Phnom Penh and along Route 4 southwest of
the capital has been recaptured by counterattacking gov-
ernment forces.
Earlier reports that the government had abandoned
the military fuel depot at Prek Pnou proved to be false.
Cambodian forces
maintained control o the depot and are holding the gar-
rison. Government clearing operations along Route 5
just north of the fuel depot, however, continue to meet
stiff resistance, and the road remains cut in this area.
The government's 7th Division has made some progress in
clearing a. secondary road west of the fuel depot and in
relieving some isolated units.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 4, 1975
Elsewhere in the country, insurgent forces have in-
creased their holdings in the Mekong River corridor along
Route 1 near a choke point about 25 miles southeast of the
capital. Several other positions guarding another nar-
row point in the river 40 miles from Phnom Penh have fal-
len since January 1. The river remains open, but resup-
ply convoys will be vulnerable to heavy harassment unless
government units are able to retake some of the lost ter-
rain. The next convoy to transit the Mekong from South
Vietnam is scheduled for January 7.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 4, 1975
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Prime Minister Smith's truce agreement with the
black insurgent leaders appears to be taking effect
gradually. Prospects are dim, however, for the early
constitutional conference called for in the agreement.
Since Smith announced the truce on December 11,
the Salisbury government has released at least 50 of
some 400 black political detainees. The releases have
occurred despite government claims that the insurgents
are responsible for a number of recent small-scale at-
tacks on security patrols and civilian farmers. I
On December 24, four members of the large South
African police contingent serving in Rhodesia were
killed while attempting to arrange a cease-fire with
a small guerrilla band. A spokesman for the African
National Council, which since early December has in-
cluded the three Rhodesian insurgent organizations,
expressed regrets, explaining that cease-fire orders
had not yet reached some of the more isolated guer-
rilla units. Official South African commentary on
the killings has been so restrained as to discourage
Smith from any retaliatory measures that might fur-
ther disrupt the truce.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 4, 1975
Smith and the black nationalists are still unable to
agree on a site for the projected constitutional confer-
ence. The nationalists are opposed to Smith's plan to
hold it in Salisbury, where they fear he would preside
and play them off against each other.
When British Foreign Secretary Callaghan visited
Zambia this week, President Kaunda reportedly urged him
to convene a constitutional conference in London.
Muzorewa and the principal insurgent leaders also favor
holding the conference in London, but Smith is likely to
resist such an arrangement.
Callaghan will also visit South Africa today
consult with Prime Minister Vorster on Rhodesia.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 4, 1975
IRAN ARAB STATES
Since the late 1960s the Shah has worked to improve
Iran's ties with moderate and conservative Arab coun-
tries. His state visits to Jordan and Egypt next week
will be the latest step in this effort. As a result of
the trip, the Iranian monarch hopes to enhance his own
image as a constructive influence in regional politics,
demonstrate his support for a moderate approach to area
problems, and further the political isolation of radical
regimes such as Iraq's.
During the past several years, the Shah has become
an increasingly important factor in area politics because
of his country's growing military power, his willingness
to commit that power in the Persian Gulf area, and his
key role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries. As the Shah's ties to the Arab states have grown,
he has sharpened his formerly lukewarm political support
for the Arab cause against Israel. Iran, however, main-
tains diplomatic ties, economic exchanges 25X1
25X1 I Iwith Tel Aviv.
The Shah has been most successful in improving re-
lations with Egypt, where he will make his first state
visit from January 8 to 12. Bilateral relations--at
their nadir during the administration of the late pres-
ident Nasir--have warmed steadily since President Sadat
took over in late 1970. The Shah has praised Sadat's
leadership and characterized him as a moderate, respon-
sible for reducing the Soviet presence in Egypt.
Both Sadat and the Shah have sought to identify and
expand areas of mutual interest. Each favors limiting
the influence of radical Arab regimes and professes a
desire to restrict the presence and influence in the
region of outside powers.
Both sides have gained from closer relations. Sadat
has endorsed the Shah's attempts to foster closer eco-
nomic and security cooperation among Indian Ocean coun-
tries and acquiesced in, if not embraced, Iran's growin
role in security affairs in the Persian Gulf. 25X1
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Cairo
_5.
stoo
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 4, 1975
has also generally turned aside Iraqi requests that Egypt
protest Iran's military involvement in the Iraqi-Kurdish
war. Iraqi pressures are continuing, however, and the
subject probably will be raised in Cairo. Sadat has
similarly ignored demands from Arab radicals that Arab
governments condemn Iran's military role in Oman.
Despite the warming trend in relations, the Shah
looks on some of Cairo's recent. efforts in the Arabian
Peninsula with some suspicion. Tehran suspects that
anti-Iranian sentiment played a large part in Egypt's
suspended effort to create a pan-Arab military force
for service in Oman. The Shah also probably views Cairo's
efforts to lessen South Yemen's radicalism and to reduce
its dependence on the Soviet Union as naive and doomed
to failure.
Over the years, the Shah has maintained good rela-
tions with Jordan's King Husayn, whom the Iranian leader
will visit from January 6 to 8. During 1974, Iran pro-
vided Jordan with $15 million in loans.
.-6-
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CAMBODIA
hnom Penh'
1o i Baharu Compaohwealth M A L A Y S IJA
avaI Ba;rn
Causeway t ..'
Seip awang Shipyard
r i
Kepppel Singapore
Shy and
Keppel Harboi(
SOUTH
?Saiggn
Q SUCU
SEA
Kinabalu
dry.
West
Malaysia
Malaysia
and
Singapore
INDONESIA
Ill
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 4, 1975
Following the announcement last month of British
plans for near total withdrawal of their forces, Singa-
pore is again soliciting reactions from the US and the
UK to increased Soviet use of restricted ship repair
facilities.
In a recent conversation with the US naval attache,
Defense Secretary Pang Tee Poh stated that British views
have already been requested and he expected no objection.
Pang is the government director of the restricted Semba-
wang Shipyard. He is believed to be anxious to accept
Soviet ship overhaul contracts because of increasing
competition, continued expansion of Sembawang's facili-
ties, and declining US and UK naval use of the facilities,
which has already prompted the yard to cater increasingly
to commercial repair work. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
probably believes that, with the anticipated British
military departure, security considerations must give
way to economic priorities.
A fairly lucrative repair business is conducted with
the USSR by the government-owned Keppel Shipyard on the
south side of Singapore. Soviet access to Sembawang, on
the northern side of Singapore and near the Commonwealth
Naval Basin, which is also used by US navy ships, has
generally been denied for security reasons under informal
arrangements with the UK. Despite offers of attractive
package deals in exchange for shipyard services, the
USSR has so far failed to gain entrance to the yard. A
Soviet naval oiler is tentatively scheduled to be over-
hauled at Sembawang in mid-February.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 4, 1975
Korea-UN: The Korean issue may come before the UN
Secure Council this month.
Security .ounce consultations
on .the reso u ion---w i.c calls for new armistice arrange-
ments to follow the dissolution of the UN command--are
likely to run into opposition from Peking. The Chinese
strongly.support Pyongyang?s opposition to the resolution
because it does not provide for US troop withdrawals and
because, both contend, the Security Council does not
properly have jurisdiction in the matter,
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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