CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
NI-
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
N2 654
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 7, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Government forces yesterday lost Phuoc
Binh, the capital of Phuoc Long Province. (Page 1)
VENEZUELA-ECUADOR: Caracas and Quito call for a spe-
cial session of the OAS to discuss the US Trade Reform
Act. (Page 3)
ARGENTINA: Lopez Rega's power enhanced; likely to
cause dissension. (Page 5)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 7)
ANGOLA: Liberation groups agree on common negotiating
position for talks with Portugal. (Page 10)
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Military Region 3
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
The South Vietnamese have lost Phuoc Binh, the cap-
ital of Phuoc Long Province, after six days of heavy
fighting. Yesterday morning, North Vietnamese forces,
supported by heavy artillery and armor, apparently forced
the remaining government defenders to retreat. The
garrison was reinforced over the weekend with a 300-man
unit, but the defenders were without artillery and suf-
ficient ammunition to withstand the Communist assault,
An enemy force upward of a division, which included
main-force units, was committed to the fighting. Despite
the heavy support of Communist armor and artillery, the
North Vietnamese did not easily slice through the gov-
ernment's outnumbered local-force defenders. The fight-
ing at Phuoc Binh suggests that, in any direct collision
between opposing regular army forces, South Vietnamese
regular army troops probably will be able to hold their
own. The major difference that may determine the out-
come of future battles is the government's willingness
or ability to match North Vietnamese artillery and armor.
Currently, this appears to be the single most important
question in the minds of many South Vietnamese commanders,
When the Communist campaign began in early December,
South Vietnamese commanders in Military Region 3 decided
that they would not commit main-force units to the coun-
tryside in defense of isolated towns and remote outposts.
In the Phuoc Binh fighting, South Vietnamese commanders
were generally pessimistic about the government's abil-
ity to hold the town without substantial reinforcements.
Territorial units in the city, mostly Montagnards, were
viewed by the South Vietnamese as poor fighters.
After the initial assaults, however, the government's
attitude appears to have changed. The Montagnards held
off the initial attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on
Communist troops and armor. By the third day, government
commanders at Bien Hoa decided to send reinforcements--a
300-man Ranger unit--in at least a token effort to hold
Phuoc Binh and to boost the defenders' morale.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
In addition, the government ordered increased air
strikes in the area, in hopes of taking some of the
pressure off the defenders by destroying North Vietnamese
gu.n emplacements and armor. Air resupply to the town
initially was successful, but North Vietnamese antiair-
craft defenses intensified and forced the South Vietnam-
ese to drop supplies from such high altitudes that most
of them fell outside the town's defenses.
By the sixth day, General Dong, the government com-
mander for the region, apparently decided that the de-
fense of Phuoc Binh was important and requested President
Thieu to send additional reinforcements. Dong proposed
to send in two regiments and artillery and make a major
stand to hold the town. His proposal, however, came too
late, and the loss of Phuoc Binh thus may have been more
of an example of South Vietnamese indecision than North
Vietnamese tenacity. The failure to reinforce Phuoc Binh
more substantially could take its toll on the morale of
other government garrisons in remote areas.
The attacks on Phuoc Binh may set the pattern for
future North Vietnamese operations. The initial assaults
were conducted by local forces supported by heavy artil-
lery. When these proved unsuccessful, later attacks
employed main-force North Vietnamese units supported by
heavy artillery and armor. The number of rounds fired
against Phuoc Binh and its district towns indicates that
future government targets may experience a heavy pound-
ing prior to infantry assaults. The North Vietnamese also
made considerable use of their air defenses, forcing the
South Vietnamese to be cautious in using tactical air
strikes and helicopters to support and reinforce the be-
leaguered garrison.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
Caracas and Quito have called for a special session
of the organization of American States to discuss what
Venezuelan President Perez charges is the economic aggres-
sion and political pressure represented by the US Trade
Reform Act.
Yesterday, Peruvian President Velasco charged the
act had "coercive and discriminatory" terms that threat-
ened Latin American development. He sent notes of sup-
port to his two colleagues.
The call by Venezuela and Ecuador caps several
weeks of angry reaction--particularly in Venezuela--to
those provisions of the act that would deny US tariff
preferences to members of cartels raising prices on vital
commodities. Perez believes such provisions are aimed
specifically at Venezuela and other states in the Organ-
ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
In his New Year's Day address to the nation, Perez
criticized the US for actions that "create a climate of
confrontation." In a public telegram sent to Ecuadorean
President Rodriguez on Saturday, Perez stated that the
"new dialogue" promised by Secretary Kissinger with Latin
America is inconsistent with the signing of the trade
act by President Ford.
Perez supports Rodriguez' decision not to attend
the meeting of OAS foreign ministers scheduled for Buenos
Aires in March, and Venezuela too may boycott the meet-
ing.
Perez is in an emotional frame of mind, which is
being reflected in Venezuela's reaction to the trade
act. It is apparent that he is seeking to unify Latin
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
American countries in the OAS to oppose the act as con-
trary to the interests of all Latin American countries.
At the same time, Perez is trying to strengthen further
his position as a leader in the hemisphere.
The petroleum, finance, and foreign ministers of
the OPEC countries will hold a special session in Al-
giers on January 24 to discuss "worldwide economic
strategy" on matters that will include the US trade act.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
ARGENTINA
Recent changes in President Peron's staff that
strengthen the power of Lopez Rega, the controversial
minister of social welfare, are certain to alarm mili-
tary leaders, opposition parties, and even the Peron-
ist movement.
The ambitious social welfare minister will head a
newly restructured presidential secretariat that will
"coordinate" all of the President's audiences with min-
isters and state secretaries. In addition, the head of
the presidential military household and several of his
key aides have been replaced by officers presumed by
Lopez Rega to be less eager to undercut his influence
with Mrs. Peron.
Cabinet ministers who in the past have voiced resent-
ment over Lopez Rega's interference and overshadowing
position are likely to see his new post as a blatant
maneuver to isolate the President and control govern-
mental decision-making.
The military high command also can be expected to
react negatively and possibly to step up pressure for
Lopez Rega's removal. There are growing signs that army
leaders want him eased out. They apparently are uncer-
tain about how to proceed, however, particularly since
any move against Lopez Rega might cause Mrs. Peron to
resign.
Even before these changes, the papal nuncio in Buenos
Aires had told the US ambassador that Mrs. Peron was no
longer turning to him for spiritual advice and that "she
now is completely under the domination of Lopez Rega."
If the controversial minister continues to gain ground,
political contention is likely to increase and could
lead to serious plotting to force his removal.
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CAMBODIA
Jtun9Pursa
Kompong
Chhnang
Government positions 1~\
under siege
PHNOM
PENH
&AIE DE
KOMPONG SOM
Kampo
Under
Communist
control
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
CAMBODIA
Khmer Communist forces have increased pressure
against government defenses northwest of Phnom Penh, but
government forces appear to have the situation under con-
trol.
The Cambodian army's 7th Division headquarters, some
nine miles northwest of the capital, remains isolated,
and a division command post is encircled and under siege.
A government task force is attacking west from Route 5
to link up with these positions, but it is meeting heavy
resistance; heavy air support is being provided for the
operation.
West of the capital, government forces attacking on
both sides of Route 4 have secured additional territory.
Government operations in this area reportedly have
prompted partial Communist withdrawals and may have pre-
empted insurgent plans to launch supporting attacks be-
tween Routes 3 and 4.
Government troops are also continuing clearing
operations east and northeast of the capital on both
banks of the Mekong River. Except for sporadic rocket
fire against the capital from these areas, Communist
activity has been largely contained.
Farther south along the Mekong River, however, Com-
munist gains have been substantial, and insurgent forces
are continuing efforts to expand and consolidate their
holdings. No government counteraction has yet been ini-
tiated.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
In addition, insurgent forces still hold at least nine
miles of Route 1 north of Neak Luong. As a result of
these gains, the Mekong River convoy scheduled to transit
the river from South Vietnam today has been delayed. Un-
til the situation around Phnom Penh improves sufficiently
for reinforcements and air assets to be committed to re-
establish government control along the Mekong, resupply
convoys will not be able to navigate the river without
serious risk.
Elsewhere, Communist initiatives in the outlying
provinces remain limited
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1975
The three rival liberation groups in Angola have an-
nounced agreement on a common negotiating position for
talks with the Portuguese, tentatively scheduled to begin
in Portugal on January 10.
On Sunday, following talks during the weekend in Mom-
basa, Kenya, leaders of the three groups issued a commu-
niquein which they pledged to work together for an in-
dependent Angola. The communique failed to mention any
arrangement for a division of responsibility among the
liberation groups in a transitional Angolan government.
In the past, they have refused to share power with each
other.
Lisbon has offered the leaders of the three groups
positions as ministers without portfolio. In Lisbon's
view, the leaders would act as an advisory commission
on decolonization.
The apparent willingness of the three groups to agree
to a common position suggests they may be ready to ac-
cept the Portuguese offer--at least as a short-term po-
litical expedient--in order to revitalize the decoloni-
zation effort. Given the personal ambitions of the in-
surgent leaders and the deeply rooted antagonisms among
the groups, however, cooperation could be short-lived.
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