NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010052-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: January 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
Thousands of anti-British Cypriots demonstrated vio-
lently in Nicosia this morning to protest the evacuation
of Turkish Cypriot refugees from the British base at
Akrotiri. About 2,000 of them broke into the British
consulate, threw its contents into the street, and set
the building afire.
Demonstrators also attacked the US embassy with
stones and later broke into the compound, setting a
vehicle on fire. Another mob was reported heading for the
offices of the British Council, a semiofficial trade and
cultural group.
Police so far have appeared powerless to control the
mobs and have called for help from the Cypriot National
Guard.
Even while demonstrators were preparing for action
this morning, the first planeload of refugees left
Akrotiri for Turkey. For now, at least, the British ap-
pear to be in control of the road from Episkopi to the
airfield and two more trips are planned for the Turkish
evacuation plane today.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 18, 1975
CONTENTS
CHINA: National People's Congress may be in session.
(Page 1)
CYPRUS: Tensions high around British sovereign base
in southern Cyprus. (Page 5)
FRANCE: Foreign trade deficit of $3.4 billion. (Page 6)
PORTUGAL: Cabinet discussing Communist-sponsored uni-
tary labor law. (Page 7)
ETHIOPIA: Terrorism continues, despite reported truce.
Page 9 )
ARGENTINA: President terminates special session of
Congress to stifle criticism. (Page 13)
CHILE: Government trying to improve'its international
image. (Page 14)
LAOS: Aid agreements with Hanoi may signal a move to
reduce dependence on Thailand. (Page 17)
CHINA-JAPAN: Chou En-lai says Sino-Japanese friendship
treaty could be concluded soon. (Page 18)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 21)
ANNEX: Sihanouk Interview Promotes Cambodian Compromise
Accord. (Page 22)
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
Peking has finally gone public on the imminent con-
vening of a National People's Congress, the first in a
decade. The Chinese reported on January 17 that a plenum
of the party Central. Committee had met from January 8 to
10 to deal with issues connected with the congress.
The congress may now be in session. The delay of a
week in reporting the plenum suggests that the announce-
ment it had taken place coincided with the opening of the
National People's Congress.
meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People on the
night of January 17. It is not yet clear how long the
congress will last, or whether Peking will release docu-
ments connected with its work while the meeting is in
session or will delay such releases until the congress
has concluded its work. Chinese officials have restricted
travel to Peking, but not to other cities, until mid-
February, which suggests that the meeting may be fairly
lengthy.
The communique reporting on the Central Committee
plenum indicated that a new state constitution had been
approved. Controversy over this document had been a
factor in the many postponements of the congress; pre-
sumably these arguments, in particular the one over
whether or not the post of chief of state should be
abolished, have now been resolved. The communique also
reported that the plenum approved a list of state council
appointments. Some of these appointments, especially
those involving the military, were almost certainly also
controversial and factors in previous postponements of
the congress.
Teng Hsiao-ping, a veteran civilian administrator
who had been a major victim of the Cultural Revolution
but had been rehabilitated in April 1,973 and named to the
Politburo in December of that year, was further elevated
at the plenum to the Politburo standing committee. He
press reports indicate that a arge
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
was also named a vice chairman of the party. These ap-
pointments vault Teng over the heads of Chiang Ching and
Yao Wen-yuan, the ranking active members of the full
Politburo who as members of the notorious Cultural Revo-
lution group had helped engineer Teng's purge in 1966.
They also elevate Teng above Li Hsien-nien, with whom he
has been sharing duties in the day-to-day running of the
government since the illness of Premier Chou En-lai.
Teng's new-titles-cement his position as Chou's
de facto successor as head of government; it is possi-
ble that the congress will further confirm this posi-
tion by formally naming him premier. In any event,
Teng's advancement strongly suggests that policies
adopted by the congress will not depart markedly from
those of the past several years and will not be espe-
cially "radical" in flavor.
Mao Tse-tung remained in Changsha, in Hunan Province,
throughout the Central Committee plenum. He still appears
to be in southern China, and it therefore seems likely
that he will miss at least the opening phases of the
congress. Mao does not hold a government post and he is
not obligated to attend a strictly governmental conclave
such as a National People's Congress. He did, however,
attend the last congress as a delegate from Peking. The
Chairman has remained out of the capital since July, about
the time that central directives first indicated'that
active preparations for the congress were under way.
Mao's prolonged absence from Peking while important
events were transpiring there is not easily explainable.
He has met with a steady stream of foreign visitors, which
tends to indicate that health is not a limiting factor on
his movements.
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Akrotiri
UK Sovereign
base area
Territory controlled
by Turkish forces
Kyrenia
.~ : _ I
4kretiri
Wield
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
CYPRUS
Tensions are high around the British sovereign base
of Akrotiri in southern Cyprus following a violent clash
yesterday between Greek Cypriot demonstrators and British
base personnel. More demonstrations are planned this
weekend. The demonstrators are protesting British plans
to begin evacuating several thousand Turkish Cypriot
refugees to Turkey today.
British officials in London state that a group of
about 500 demonstrators clashed with British forces at
the edge of the base yesterday, resulting in injuries
on both sides and the death of a Greek Cypriot youth.
The British are bracing for more violence, particularly
when the funeral for the Greek Cypriot is held, probably
today or tomorrow.
The principal British concern is to keep open the
main road separating the Turkish Cypriot refugees in
Paramali and Episkopi from the evacuation airfield in
the southeast of the base. The two are separated by
some ten miles of open country and the refugees' move-
ment to the air base could be subjected to interference
by Greek Cypriots at many points.
The potential for trouble will increase if Greek
Cypriots prevent the airlift by blockading the Turkish
Cypriots or if intercommunal clashes occur outside the
British base. In case of a blockade, which the British
would be unwilling to break, the Turkish government might
consider a sea-lift of the refugees. Should Turkish
Cypriots outside the base be threatened, Ankara might
well order its forces on the island to move into the
Greek Cypriot sector in a rescue operation.
Anti-British demonstrations in all major Greek Cyp-
riot towns yesterday and Thursday were generally orderly,
but two British properties in Limassol were bombed and
several vehicles burned. More protest marches are
planned for this weekend and, in view of rising tensions,
they are likely to be less orderly.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
Greek Cypriots, many of whom are refugees driven
from their homes in the north, are particularly incensed
that the Turkish Cypriot refugees will eventually be re-
settled on Greek Cypriot properties in the Turkish Cyp-
riot sector of the island.
Foreign trade registered a deficit of $3.4 billion
last year, according to preliminary official figures,
in contrast with a surplus of $1.4 billion in 1973.
December was the only month the French achieved a
seasonally adjusted surplus--$89 million. Exports in
that month rose as sales of machinery and equipment to
oil-exporting countries and elsewhere apparently picked
up. Meanwhile, imports declined, reflecting a slump in
French industrial activity and declines in the prices
of some imported raw materials.
France will run another large deficit in its trade
account this year. Improvement achieved in the final
quarter of 1974, however, makes Paris' objective of hold-
ing this year's deficit below $2.5 billion look more
realistic.
The higher price of imported crude oil was the main
cause of deterioration in the trade balance last year.
Oil imports rose almost $7 billion in value, while fall-
ing nearly 6 percent in volume.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
The cabinet met yesterday to discuss the Communist-
sponsored unitary labor law that has placed severe
strains on the three-party coalition. Results of the
meeting are not yet available.
The non-Communist parties in the government oppose
the law because they believe it will facilitate the
Communist Party's control of the country's entire labor
movement. The Communists already dominate the single
labor confederation inherited from the right-wing regime
that was overthrown last April.
The Armed Forces Movement, which shares power with
the three political parties, has already announced its
support for the law. Some members of the Movement's
leadership may be having second thoughts, however, be-
cause of the heavy opposition the law has encountered.
The Lisbon press yesterday gave heavy coverage to the
proceedings at a Socialist Party rally that denounced
the monolithic labor concept and emphasized the need
to preserve workers' freedom.
Justice Minister Zenha told an enthusiastic audi-
ence at the rally that "the working class is not the
property of any political party, nor of the state."
The leader of the Socialist Party, Foreign Minister
Soares, also made a glowing defense of liberty that
was widely reported in the press.
If the law is not approved, it will be the most
serious defeat the Communists have had since partici-
pating in the government. It could reduce their in-
fluence in an area where they have been strong. Most
of their other setbacks have been in areas where they
were seeking to establish influence.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
ETHIOPIA
The ruling military council is growing impatient
with the continuing acts of terrorism carried out by Eri-
trean rebels, despite the rebels' reported acceptance
earlier this week of a temporary truce.
A government broadcast on January 16 complained that
the separatists had earlier in the week initiated a new
wave of violence, including bombings at the Asmara post
office, kidnapings, and an assassination. The govern-
ment warned that its search for a peaceful solution should
not be taken as a sign of weakness and threatened repris-
als against agitators.
The communique coupled these warnings with a renewed
call for a peaceful solution to the Eritrean insurgency.
It blamed the rebellion on the divisive policies of the
previous regime and on a "few" Eritreans. These state-
ments may be an attempt to keep alive the three-cornered
talks that have been in progress among the council,
Eritrean notables, and rebel leaders inside Eritrea. The
talks, however, appear to be foundering on rebel demands
for independence; the council is only willing to discuss
more autonomy.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
President Maria Estela Peron has stifled legislative
criticism of her administration by abruptly terminating
a special session of congress. This will seriously
damage the chances of continued cooperation between the
government and major opposition parties.
Mrs. Peron attempted to justify her action by
claiming that the most important work on the budget and
related fiscal matters has already been completed.
This explanation failed to satisfy her critics, espe-
cially opposition Radicals, who had intended to debate
controversial executive actions such as the imposition
of the state of siege and recent federal take-overs of
state provincial governments.
Since the death of her husband, President Peron
has met only twice with opposition leaders in carefully
arranged sessions that did not allow for discussion.
In addition, the government recently demonstrated its
hostility to freedom of expression by shutting down
several newspapers.
When the next session of congress convenes on May 1,
opposition leaders may abandon the conciliatory posture
they have maintained thus far. Although leading Radical
spokesman Ricardo Balbin has sought to continue the
"political dialogue" begun by Juan Peron, he will be
under pressure from the left wing of his party to take
a harder line toward Mrs. Peron, particularly if ter-
rorism--on which the entire party supports her--ceases
to be the major focus of attention.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 18, 1975
The military government is trying to improve its
international image by demonstrating "generosity and
goodwill" on human rights issues.
On January 11, the government released and deported
to Romania former foreign and defense minister Clodomiro
Almeyda, former justice and education minister Jorge
Tapia, and three lesser lights of the Allende era. They
had been in custody since the military take-over in Sep-
tember 1973. The day before, Gaston Pascal, father of
Movement of the Revolutionary Left leader Andres Pascal
Allende, was released after a month of imprisonment.
Andres' mother, Laura, sister of the late President Allende,
remains behind bars, but her name is on a list of 200
detainees that the government has offered to fly to exile
in Mexico.
Other recent moves related to human rights include
the drastic reduction of some 30 sentences imposed by
a provincial military court in December 1973. Press
accounts suggest that the military is reviewing sentences
imposed by military tribunals in the hectic weeks after
the coup to rectify any errors that were committed.
The government also appears to be seriously inter-
ested in getting on with the original detainee release
program it launched last September. Willing recipient
countries are being sought for the initial group of 100
eligible prisoners, and another list of 100 has been pre-
pared.
In recent months, Chilean leaders appear to Dave
gained a fuller appreciation of just how low their inter-
national stock had sunk. Unfavorable action by the US
Congress on military aid and sales of equipment undoubt-
edly helped drive the point home, and pressure from within
for improvement in the government's human rights perform-
ance has been building.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 3.8, 1975
ar - ine military and
civilian opposition to an easing of internal security
measures now appears to be weakening, and additional
moves may be in the offing. These are likely to include
declaration of a lower level state of siege that would
make wartime provisions of the military justice code in-
applicable and permit appeals from military tribunals to
civilian courts.
In one area concerning human rights, however, the
government is moving in a different direction. Interna-
tional agencies or commissions no longer will have almost
automatic permission to study and report on the situation.
Any organization desiring to investigate conditions in
Chile henceforth will have to show that it has received
permission to undertake similar missions in the S,nviai-
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
An aid agreement between Hanoi and Vientiane is
being implemented and may signal a Lao move to reduce
its traditional dependence on Thailand for international
commerce. It will also allow the North Vietnamese to
become more openly involved with the coalition govern-
ment of Laos.
Plans call for the goods to enter Laos on trucks
via Nape Pass and to cross the Lao Panhandle to Paksane,
where the merchandise will be turned over to representa-
tives of the coalition and stored in warehouses until it
can be transported to Vientiane. The first shipment was
due to arrive in Paksane on January 15, but was delayed
because of poor road conditions.
Because of high tariffs and freight rates in Thai-
land, the Lao have been seeking an alternative to the
port of Bangkok for some time. The new aid agreement
will link Vientiane with the North Vietnamese port of
Ben Thuy. Bangkok, however, will continue for some time
to be the principal foreign trading center for Laos.
During the initial negotiations with North Vietnam
in late summer of 1974, Hanoi agreed to allow the Lao
to bring in as much as 50,000 tons of goods tax free at
Ben Thuy. Their use of this port;during the dry season
will provide Vientiane with a much shorter overland
route for seaborne imports.
In a related development, Thai and Lao officials
are currently meeting in Bangkok to discuss the importa-
tion and transit problem. Press reports indicate that
the Thais have offered a 20-percent. reduction in transit
charges as a gesture of goodwill.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
Premier Chou En-lai told a visiting Japanese eco-
nomic delegation on January 16 that negotiations for a
Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty could be con-
cluded within three months. Chou also expressed confi-
dence in Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki, whom Chou
characterized as enthusiastic about promoting relations
between Tokyo and Peking.
Preliminary talks on the treaty began in Tokyo on
January 16. According to Japanese press reports, repre-
sentatives on both sides agreed that the treaty should
be signed at the earliest possible date. The Japanese
apparently hope to obtain Diet approval of the pact be-
fore its current session ends in May.
Both sides have already agreed to postpone negotia-
tions on ownership of the Senkaku Islands, a contentious
issue, until after conclusion of the peace treaty. There
appear to be no other issues that could cause major prob-
lems for either side during the treaty talks.
In putting out an optimistic view of the treaty ne-
gotiations, both sides may have had one eye on Moscow,
where Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa visited this
week. Early agreement on a Sino-Japanese peace treaty
would cast into sharp relief Moscow's, lack of progress
in developing closer ties with Tokyo.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
Mexico: Executives of about 35 US-owned corporations
doing business in Mexico meet today with President Eche-
verria for a clarification of his government's position
on foreign investment. Echeverria will try to dispel
uncertainties about the ambiguous investment law Mexico
passed in 1973 by assuring the businessmen that they are
welcome in Mexico. At the same time, the visitors will
doubtless detect a strong whiff of Echeverria's economic
nationalism. Private foreign investment, he will prob-
ably tell the executives, should give top priority to
serving Mexico's development.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
SIHANOUK INTERVIEW PROMOTES CAMBODIAN COMPROMISE ACCORD
In the wake of the UN General Assembly's call for
Cambodian peace talks, the French, Indonesians, Romanians,
and West Germans have all indicated an interest in play-
ing a discreet role in promoting a settlement between the
rival Cambodian sides. Prince Sihanouk's interview with
a Swedish newsman in Peking, broadcast by Stockholm TV
last Tuesday, indicates that he is attempting to encour-
age such foreign mediatory efforts. He may also now see
an opportunity to increase pressure on his Communist com-
patriots to accept a compromise settlement and to encour-
age elements in Phnom Penh to think in terms of a settle-
ment returning him to a position of authority.
The Interview
During the interview,, which actually took place in
mid-December, Sihanouk claimed that Republican Party
strong man Sirik Matak and Cambodian army commander in
chief Sosthene Fernandez had in 1973 indicated a willing-
ness to join his side. These claims--which Sihanouk fur-
ther embroidered in a letter to correspondents in Peking
and added the name of Long Boret--have caused considera-
ble stir in Phnom Penh.
The most significant feature of the interview, how-
ever, was Sihanouk's review of possible solutions to the
current impasse on negotiations. Sihanouk said: "If Lon
Nol and his group want to have reconciliation with me,
they should come to us, join us, in the framework of the
United Front." He elaborated further by saying, "we may
enlarge our government, including some rightists," and
"we are no longer talking of executing" members of the
Lon Nol government. Officials in Phnom Penh who chose
not to participate in the "enlarged government" would be
free either to stay in Cambodia or to leave once the new
"government" came to power. Sihanouk claimed, however,
that negotiation "with the rightists...as equal partners"
was impossible. The Prince said that his "proposal" had
not yet been approved by Khmer Communist leaders who were
insisting that "about six" top Phnom Penh leaders "with-
draw."
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Sihanouk's Purpose
Sihanouk thus appears to have put on public record
what he has long said privately: that he himself would
welcome a compromise settlement--presumably based on some
sort of a coalition arrangement--but his hands have been
tied by the intransigence of Khmer Communist leaders.
There are a variety of reasons why Sihanouk would want
at this time to publicly air the differences between him-
self and the Communists. The most obvious is to demon-
strate to aspiring mediators that there is some flexibil-
ity in his position and that initiatives should be pur-
sued. The Prince may, in fact, believe that time is
running out for him given his progressive loss of author-
ity to the Khmer Communists--a fact dramatized this week
by the formal transfer of most cabinet posts in Sihanouk's
"government" to the Khmer Communists.
If the Communists succeed, through their current
effort to interdict the Mekong River, in forcing the
Phnom Penh government to capitulate or negotiate on the
Communists' surrender terms, Sihanouk's chances for a
comeback could evaporate completely. In the more likely
event that the current Communist dry season campaign once
again ends on an inconclusive note, Sihanouk no doubt
hopes that a discouraged insurgent leadership would be
more willing to consider the option of negotiations.
Thus, Sihanouk's interview, which implicitly puts the onus
for continued warfare on the in-country insurgents, may
have been designed to encourage such an evolution in
Khmer Communist strategy. Whatever the case, the Commu-
nists have not yet taken direct note of the interview
and their official broadcasts continue to take a hard
line toward any "compromises" with the "reactionary
clique" in Phnom Penh.
Sihanouk's interview also seems aimed at softening
his image in Phnom Penh. The Prince surely recognizes
that his past threats of dire consequences should he re-
turn to power must have given second thoughts to those
in Phnom Penh who might otherwise be encouraged to press
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 18, 1975
for a deal to end the war. Ambassador Dean on January
14--several days after local newspapers had given wide
coverage to the Swedish interview--found no less a per-
sonage than Sirik Matak, who played a key role in Siha-
nouk's ouster, singularly relaxed about the possibility
of the Prince's return. Sirik Matak emphasized the need
to end the conflict during 1975, citing the waning sup-
port in the US Congress for Indochina.
Reaction from Phnom Penh
The official reaction in Phnom Penh to the Swedish
interview has been low key, and Prime Minister Long Boret
has indicated that his government will avoid any future
polemics with the Prince. This policy is no doubt the
result of Phnom Penh's own involvement in international
mediatory efforts. The government, for instance, has
recently requested Algerian and Tunisian aid in arrang-
ing meetings with the other side and has shown interest
in the private efforts of a West German official to spark
a dialogue. A semiofficial Phnom Penh newspaper also
applauded French interest in resolving the conflict as
evidenced by President Giscard d'Estaing's comments on
the Martinique communique on December 20. Long-standing
Romanian efforts through Peking to broker peace are also
continuing with the apparent blessings of the Lon Nol
government.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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