CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027300010056-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 56
• Content Type: REPORT

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7/ 4' Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 21, 1975
CONTENTS
CHINA: Chou's report to the NPC repeats familiar themes.
(Page 1)
SYRIA: Syrians express concern to Faysal about their
role in negotiations. (Page 3)
CYPRUS: Demonstrations against US and British. (Page 4)
PORTUGAL: Cabinet accepts principle of a single labor
confederation controlling all unions. (Page 6)
CAMBODIA: Long Boret's cabinet changes designed to im-
prove his position. (Page 7)
VIETNAM: Military situation. (Page 9)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 10)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 21, 1975
CHINA
Premier Chou En-lai's report on the work of the gov-
ernment, delivered to the National People's Congress on
January 13, repeats familiar domestic and foreign policy
themes.
On the domestic side, Chou praised Chairman Mao
Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution, said that the
primary task remained criticism of Lin Piao and Con-
fucius, and made some general economic claims.
The Premier's remarks included some verbal bows to
leftist ideals, but for the most part they constituted a
firm restatement of moderate policies, with an emphasis
on discipline and on the prerogatives of the central
authorities. Economic priorities were clearly spelled
out, for the first time in many years in authoritative
fashion. These priorities--agriculture, light industry,
and heavy industry--suggest that the military's apparent
bid for a greater share of the budgetary pie has been re-
buffed. Chou's speech strongly endorsed the central gov-
ernment's role in overseeing comprehensive economic plan-
ning.
Chou noted that the class struggle would continue
and become acute at times, an apparent reference to the
leadership'struggle of the past year. His current
emphasis, however, was on unity. While stating that
hard blows should be dealt to the handful of class
enemies, Chou pointedly remarked that criticism must be
carried out with "accuracy." This appears to be an im-
plied criticism of some of the charges raised against
various leaders last spring.
Chou reaffirmed in clear terms established Chinese
foreign policy lines and themes. He said that China
should continue to implement Mao's "revolutionary line
in foreign affairs"--a codeword for China's opening to
the West and continued hostility to Moscow.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 21, 1975
Chou said that relations with the US have improved
"to some extent" despite fundamental differences. This
was the same formulation used by Chou during the Tenth
Party Congress in August 1973. He added that relations
will continue to improve as long as the principles of
the Shanghai communique are carried out "in earnest."
Chou came down hard on Moscow. He repeated Peking's
conditions for a border settlement and easier state re-
lations contained in China's message to the USSR last
November, and accused Moscow of violating an understand-
ing that he said he had reached with Kosygin in Septem-
ber 1969 to accept these conditions. Chou said the Sino-
Soviet ideological debate will continue "for a long time."
The Premier reiterated that the US and USSR continue
in a state of deep contention. He repeated a propaganda
theme that has received a good deal of attention in Peking
lately--that intense US-USSR competition, particularly in
Europe, will lead to a world war-but he made it very clear
that the Chinese remain concerned primarily with the So-
viet threat to China. In several passages of his re-
port, he called for continued Chinese preparations for
war. This is a formulation used by Peking when refer-
ring to the Soviet threat.
Chou devoted a good deal of attention to China's
relations with the Third World, which have become a
prominent foreign policy theme in recent months. He
said China should strengthen its relations with Third
World countries and support their efforts to oppose
"superpower control, threats, and bullying." He made
no specific recommendations, however.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 21, 1975
SYRIA
A close adviser to Saudi King Faysal has reported
that during Faysal's visit to Damascus last week the
Syrians stressed their concern about being shut out of
Middle East peace negotiations.
The adviser, Kamal Adham, told US Ambassador Murphy
in Damascus that the Syrians, always suspicious of Egypt,
maintained that the next round of negotiations over fur-
ther Israeli withdrawals in the Sinai and Golan Heights
should occur simultaneously and not in sequence. Signifi-
cantly, the Syrians did not mention reconvening the
Geneva peace talks. Presumably they failed to mention
Geneva because they know the Saudis want to keep the So-
viets, who are actively supporting a resumption of the
conference, as far out of the picture as possible.
The Saudi official made it clear his government be-
lieves the Syrian desire for simultaneous negotiations
is unrealistic. He suggested to Ambassador Murphy, how-
ever, that a formula should be devised that somehow gives
the appearance of yielding to Syrian demands, while in
fact allowing Egypt to negotiate another agreement with
Israel first.
Adham thought Syrian President Asad would be reason-
able on both the timetable of Israeli withdrawal from the
Golan and the Palestinian issue as long as the Iraqi re-
gime did not stir up trouble for Asad. Syrian policy-
makers led Adham to believe they were uneasy about "poten-
tial" criticism from the Iraqis, who have close ties with
those Syrian Baathists most strongly opposed to negotia-
ting with Israel. This sounds like a convenient Syrian
alibi for future bargaining positions, since Iraqi crit-
icism currently is-more of an annoyance than a threat.
On the Palestinian question, Adham asserted that
Syria would accept the existence of Israel within its
June 1967 borders if Israel would accept the establish-
ment of a West Bank - Gaza Palestinian state. No Syrian
official has been willing to go that far, either publicly
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 21, 1975
or privately. Indeed, Asad is likely to withhold such
recognition until all other outstanding differences be-
tween Syria and Israel have been settled.
Demonstrations against US and British installations
subsided late yesterday, but Greek Cypriot resentment
over the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot refugees from the
British base at Akrotiri is still strong.
Tight security measures by government forces and
the personal intervention of President Makarios deterred
one mob estimated at 2,000 persons from seriously damag-
ing the USIS library in Nicosia. Demonstrations held in
three other Greek Cypriot towns yesterday, in connection
with a general work stoppage, were generally peaceful.
Embassy officials are cautiously hopeful that the
Cyprus government is now fully committed to provide
adequate protection for US installations. Police and
National Guard security at the embassy yesterday was
heavy and well organized. The embassy received repeated
assurances from high government officials that the gov-
ernment was determined to prevent a repetition of Satur-
day's assault on the embassy and that if US properties
are threatened, Makarios would again appear on the scene.
In the meantime, the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot
refugees continued yesterday without any major problems.
Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities met again yesterday to continue their talks
on substantive political questions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 21, 1975
PORTUGAL
According to an official communique, the cabinet
yesterday approved the outlines of a law creating a
single confederation to control all trade unions, as
the Communists have been demanding.
The cabinet is to begin discussing the details of
the law today, at which time it may become clearer why
the two non-communist parties in the coalition--the So-
cialists and the Popular Democrats--decided to go along.
They had previously hinted they might leave the govern-
ment unless the Communist proposal was abandoned. If the
non-communists have indeed capitulated on the issue, the
draft law will be sent, following cabinet discussions, to
the 21-member Council of State, where the military's
majority on the body would ensure the law's passage.
If the non-communists decide to fight the proposed
law further, they can take hope from a number of recent
events that their fight will be popular and that, if they
are defeated, this may be costly for the Communists:
--A Socialist slate soundly defeated a list led by
Communists in an election for the leadership of the
bank workers' union of Oporto, long considered to
be Communist controlled.
--A slate of candidates opposed to a single labor
confederation reportedly has an edge in a similar
election in the government postal, telegraph, and
telephone union.
--The Catholic Church, which has kept silent on
political matters, has issued a communique favoring
trade union liberty.
--The Communist Party rejected the suggestion by
the Popular Democrats that a national plebiscite be
held on the labor issue.
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 21, 1975
CAMBODIA
Prime Minister Long Boret continues to make piece-
meal cabinet changes in an effort to strengthen his po-
sition and assure fuller implementation of his policies.
The most recent change--the departure of Interior
Minister Ek Proeung--typifies Long Boret's efforts to
reduce corruption and emphasize fiscal restraint in his
government. Ek Proeung, who reportedly is either on an
official mission or receiving medical treatment abroad,.
is expected to be eased out of the cabinet while he is
gone. Long Boret himself has temporarily assumed the
interior portfolio. Defense Minister Thappana Nginn
resigned in late December, and Long Boret appointed Min-
ister of National Concord Hou Hong to replace him tempo-
rarily. Although no permanent appointments to these
posts have been made, the Prime Minister is expected to
name individuals more sympathetic to his policies.
Meanwhile, President Lon Nol has reportedly post-
poned indefinitely elections for the top posts in the
government party. The President is apparently withhold-
ing support for his controversial younger brother, Lon
Non, in the latter's bid to be elected secretary general
of the party. This latest decision by the President will
further limit Lon Non's ability to influence government
policy.
In lieu of party-elections, a five-man political
bureau within the party has been formed. Lon Non is one
of the members but is expected to be outvoted by Pan
Sothi, the current party secretary general, and the other
three members, who are allies and also oppose Lon Non's
schemes for taking control of the party. Assuming that
the political bureau functions as predicted, and a per-
sonal feud between Long Boret and Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces Sosthene Fernandez continues to be muted,
Lon Non's troublemaking potential will be reduced. The
formation of the political bureau will also strengthen
Lona Boret,.'s ability to obtain party support for his
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MILS
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 21, 1975
VIETNAM
The recent rise in rocket and sabotage attacks in
the Saigon - Gia Dinh area points to increased problems
for Saigon's security forces.
Since the start of the Communist dry-season campaign,
there have been rocket attacks against a Saigon military
training center and radio site and a sabotage incident at
an electric power plant. These incidents probably repre-
sent an attempt to unsettle the urban population, turn
the government's attention to the security of the capital
area, and cover preparations for major military efforts
elsewhere, possibly at Tay Ninh city or other government
strongpoints north of Saigon.
Sporadic rocket attacks against Tay Ninh continue,
while government forces prepare for the next upsurge.
Although the Communists have the ability to increase
sabotage and terrorism, the government recently has taken
a number of steps to counter this activity. Nevertheless,
South Vietnamese army officers have expressed concern over
the disruptive potential of such activity in conjunction
with the expected attacks in northwestern Military Region 3.
could be made as early as mid-February, in conjunction
with the anticipated increase in fighting in the Kontum-
Light contacts have been reported in the northern
provinces, where the South Vietnamese have been success-
ful in retaking a number of high-ground positions over-
looking the coastal plains near Hue. In central South
Vietnam, a recent prisoner has stated that a North Viet-
namese division has been given the task of cutting the
primary land route between the highlands and the coastal
provinces. Government commanders believe such an effort
Pleiku area.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 21, 1975
Cambodia: The Mekong River supply convoy that was
to attempt to reach Phnom Penh yesterday has been tenta-
tively rescheduled for today if security conditions im-
prove. Failure of the government to obtain effective
control of Peam Reang Island and adjacent river banks
prompted the delay. Military commanders are planning
to move additional reinforcements into the area.
Romania-UK: Bucharest is likely to sign a contract
soon to purchase five short-range BAC-111 aircraft from
the UK. Bucharest's decision to purchase the British
aircraft instead of the US Boeing 727 or McDonnell-Douglas
DC-9 was influenced largely by the overall sales package
and not by the merits of the BAC-111 alone. Romania ob-
tained manufacturing rights for some BAC-111 spare parts,
a production agreement with Rolls Royce--manufacturers of
the BAC-111 engines--and an extension of a British-Romanian
manufacturing venture for smaller aircraft. London also
provided excellent financing, which could not be matched
by the US companies.
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