CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
February 5, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 5, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Lefti4s and moderates each ?,e/eking to increase
power relative tothe other. (Page 3),
ETHIOPIA: Army suffers setbacks in attempt to dislodge
rebels in outlying lareas of Asmara. 'Page 5)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Reli sous sect re fists government order
to disband self-defenne forces. /(Page 9)
PHILIPPINES: Marcos 1as autho ized another campaign
against Muslim insurgekits. (Pge 10)
PERU: Dispute over civi aviation agreement could lead
to more troubled relatigrfik with US. (Page 12)
ARGENTINA: Showdown Per
averted. (Page 13)
ARAB STATES - 'L -ANON:
opens today. age 17
Arab Defense Council meeting
FOR THE RE6ORD : (Page 19)
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
PORTUGAL
A series of political meetings are under way in
Portugal this week as leftists and moderates each seek
ways to increase their power relative to the other.
The Armed Forces Movement's 20-man Superior Council
has been in session for the past few days working on an
agreement fixing the ground rules for the election cam-
paign, now due to begin on March 4. The agreement is
expected to draw up definitions for Portugal's "plural-
istic democracy" and its "anti-monopolistic nature."
The Superior Council's decisions will be presented
for approval to the-200-member General Assembly of the
Armed Forces, which will meet on Thursday, and to the
cabinet, which meets on Friday. The Assembly has an-
nounced that it is considering "revolutionary" legis-
lation:
--Establishment of the Armed Forces Movement as a
permanent governmental institution.
--Creation of a role for the Movement in the con-
stituent assembly.
--Adoption of the long-awaited economic plan.
Any one of these issues could provoke bitter debate and
raise tensions to the high pitch that was reached during
the recent labor law dispute.
A potentially more damaging effort to alter the
power structure may be taking place outside the prin-
cipal ruling bodies. US embassy sources report that
a draft proposal for amending the constitution has been
submitted to the 21-member Council of State, which
alone is empowered to change the constitution. The pro-
posal would vastly increase the powers of the original
seven-man junta made up of senior military officers.
It would also give the junta--now little more than an
advisory body--power to legislate, to outlaw organiza-
tions that do not support the Armed Forces Movement andr
other "progressive forces," and to punish "reactionary"
individuals.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
draft reportedly was submitted to the Move-
men s predominately leftist Coordinating Committee.
It may be an attempt to circumvent the power of moder-
ate members of the Movement's Superior Council and its
General Assembly. The junta's membership has changed
in recent months and the Coordinating Committee may
feel it now can be more easily influenced.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
ETHIOPIA
The army appears to have suffered setbacks in its
attempt to dislodge insurgents from the outlying areas
of Asmara. Some army units reportedly are withdrawing
into the city.
Asmara was quiet yesterday, but the police directed
residents to stay off the streets, apparently in antici-
pation of more fighting. The situation of the city's
populace is serious because of water and electricity
shortages.
The Eritrean conflict is becoming a test of the
leadership of the ruling council. A serious defeat
would almost certainly trigger a military revolt
against the council. The transfer of large numbers of
troops from Addis Ababa to Eritrea might encourage some
opponents of the council to sta e a cou regardless of
the military situation.
y
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
February 5, 1975
Members of the Hoa Hao--a Buddhist sect principally
located in the western delta area--are resisting a gov-
ernment order to disband their self-defense forces. Ac-
cording to press reports, fighting broke out shortly after
the National Police arrested some of the sect's leaders.
President Thieu will undoubtedly try to initiate further
talks in an effort to defuse the situation, but he may
have to call in the army to disarm the Hoa Hao militia.
Although the catalyst for the present confrontation
is not known, it is probable that the Hoa Hao hoped to
capitalize on the deteriorating military situation in
the delta. Reportedly, members of the sect began evading
the draft last month to join the sect's self-defense
forces. A dangerous precedent would be set if Thieu al-
lowed the Hoa Hao to avoid service with the South Viet-
namese army, especially at a time when the government is
attempting to increase its combat strength. It is also
possible that Thieu may be trying to disarm the self-
defense forces now and thus forestall an effort by the
religious group to negotiate a local agreement with the
Communists, as the Cao Dai sect attempted to do recently
in Tay Ninh.
The Hoa Hao have traditionally been strongly anti-
Communist and have made their area among the most secure
in the country. Attempts by the sect to gain greater
autonomy in military and administrative affairs, however,
are creating problems for the government.
In April 1974, one faction leader, Luong Truong
Tuong, submitted several demands to the government in a
bid to assume the dominant position among the Hoa Hao.
Saigon agreed to some, but refused to approve an inde-
pendent Hoa Hao militia or to grant draft deferments to
monks. Although the sect did not surrender its weapons
as President Thieu had ordered, the government did not
press the issue at._,that time.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
President arcos intends to follow up the rece t
successful peace talks in Jidda with another round of un
full-scale military operations against Muslim insurgents
in the southern Philippines.
Marcos told Ambassador Sullivan on Monday that he
was going to authorize a two-month campaign to reclaim
territory lost to the rebels in recent fighting. He be-
gan laying the groundwork for new military action last
week with a propaganda compaign blaming the failure of
the Jidda talks on the rebel representatives and accusing
the Muslims of bad faith for attacking government forces
while negotiations were in progress. Philippine armed
forces have taken heavy casualties in the recent fight-
ing, which has included a rebel assault on the southern
provincial capital of Cotabato City.
Marcos claims the rebels used the lull in government
operations during the talks to build up their own strength
Marcos has not completely given up on talks with
rebel leaders, if only because he does not want to alienate
the Arab states that helped organize the Jidda meetings.
Both sides have already tentatively agreed to meet again,
probably in Jidda, in April. Jakarta has also reiterated
its willingness to resume mediation efforts.
The experience at Jidda, however, does not bode well
for future discussions. Neither side came prepared for
compromise. Rebel leader Nur Misuari only attended one
session, and he reiterated his demand for rebel autonomy,
which Manila again categorically refused. Marcos appar-
ently believes a major offensive will strengthen the gov-
ernment's bargaining position in the next round of talkc
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3
Nation "I Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
The latest British opinion poll strengthens previous
indications that the government's recommendations will
have a great impact on the outcome of the referendum
this spring on continued membership in the ECo Slightly
more than half of those polled said they would vote to
stay in the EC if new terms of membership were negotiated
and if the government recommends to the electorate that
it is in Britain's interest to remain a part of the ECo
Nevertheless, the replies reveal the continued existence
of a strong undercurrent of anti-EC feeling among the
British public.
The EC Commission, meanwhile, has devised a formula
that appears to meet some of Britain's demands for changes
in the way contributions to the EC budget are reckoned.
A British official recently commented that the UK is
pleased that the Commission has accepted the principle
that rebates can be made to a member whose share of the
EC budget is not in line with its comparative ability to
pay. The British are opposed, however, to certain Com-
mission proposals, including the requirement that a mem-
ber must have a current-account deficit to qualify for a
rebate o
French President Giscard and German Chancellor
Schmidt considered the Commission's proposals at their
semiannual summit meeting in Paris early this week, The
French have reservations about paying back sums from
certain Community funds. It is not known whether Schmidt
persuaded Giscard to soften the French position at this
time.
The British hope that the budget issue can be re-
solved in early March at the EC Council meeting or at
the Dublin summit. The government plans to hold a par-
liamentary debate on the EC membership issue in April and
to introduce legislation that will enbable the referendum
to be held. Details of the government's plan for the
referendum--scheduled for late June--still-pave not been
revealedm
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
)PERU
Negotiations between the US and Peru over the terms
of a civil aviation agreement have bogged down and may
lead to more troubled relations.
The Peruvians already are upset over the general
state of relations between the US and Latin America and
the terms of the recently enacted Trade Reform Act, In
these circumstances, the US embassy warns, there is a
chance that negotiations will break down and that Peru
may go so far as to break diplomatic relations.
The current negotiations involve service by Braniff
Airlines and Aeroperu, the new Peruvian state airline
which last summer began flights between Lima and Miami.
The dispute has centered on flight frequencies, landing
rights, and payments to the Peruvian government by
Braniff. In public, Peruvian officials have character-
ized the dispute as an effort by Washington to subordinate
legitimate Peruvian economic concerns to the interests
/ of private US businesses.
It is a common Peruvian negotiating tactic to por-
tray bilateral disputes in these terms, but there are
members of President Velasco's government who apparently
are determined to press
the
US to the wall on this issue.
Others would rather not
use
these particular negotiations
as a vehicle with which
to
confront the US in broader
terms. The hard-liners
may
prevail, however, and affect
not only US-Peru air traffic but diplomatic relations as
well. In addition to "standing up" to the US, Peruvian
leaders probably hope to
enerate su
ort from other
g
pp
Latin American nations that also oppose the Trade Reform
Act o
The Peruvians do not yet appear to have decided on
a final position. Given the current environment and
Peru's propensity to enunciate extreme positions publicly,
however, Lima might find itself in a corner from which it
would not be able to extricate itself except by appear-
ing to buck e, der to "Yankee pressure;"
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ARGENTINA
February 5, 1975
The various protagonists appear to have drawn back JT
from a showdown over the status of President Peron's ad.
vjser, Lopez Rega.
Government sources now are attempting to play down
Lopez Rega's influence and are lashing out at "rumor-
mongering. Several ministers are denying that there
was any crisis over the issue. Meanwhile, there is no
evidence that the presidential secretary's power or in-
fluence has in fact been curtailed.'
An effort probably was made to clip Lopez Rega's
wings last week while Mrs. Peron was vacationing at an
Atlantic beach resort. It now appears that the military
high command voiced its concern about his activities to
the President and appealed for a lessening of Lopez
Rega's visibility to allay fears that he is running the
country.
It is highly probable that the President will pre-
vail on Interior Minister Rocamora to take a more promi
t the shar
ff
t
i
p
se
o o
rs
nent hand in government affa
criticism of Lopez Rega. She has used this tactic in
the past when sniping at Lopez Rega threatened to under-
mine confidence in her government. The major political
actors, however, are not going to be fooled by cosmetic
changes, and his presence will continue to cause tension
within the country's political system.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
ARAB STATES - LEBANON
The Joint Arab Defense Council meeting that opens
today in Cairo is unlikely to produce any important de-
cision. The session was called last month at the re-
quest of Lebanon in an effort to still public charges of
government inaction in the face of "Israeli aggression"
against southern Lebanon.
The Beirut government apparently will resist any
plan or agreement that could involve it more directly
in any confrontation with the Israelis. A Lebanese
presidential adviser told a US official early last week
that the government planned only to submit a vague, pro
forma case to the Council on Lebanon's need for aid from
Syria and other Arab states to defend against the Is-
raeli attacks.
Domestic criticism of the Lebanese government has
been growing in recent weeks because of its failure to
respond to Israeli punitive attacks on fedayeen in south-
ern Lebanon. Last week, leftist opposition elements led
demonstrations in Beirut and other urban centers to pro-
test what they claimed to be the overnment's failure to
protect the southern Lebanese.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 5, 1975
Spain-Morocco:,
all Spanc~efe . tactical fighter and recon-
naissance aircraft that were sent to the Canary Islands
last summer have returned to their mainland base at Moron.
About a dozen Spanish F-5s were flown from Moron to the
Canaries to be used in support of ground units in the
Spanish Sahara, in the event of clashes along the border.
Tensions have abated for the time being as both Madrid
and Rabat await consideration of the Spanish Sahara prob-
lem by the International Court-f.Justice next month.
DIA
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