CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027400010038-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 14, 1975
N2 638
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
CYPRUS: Greeks react to Turkish Cypriot declaration of
separate state. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: Assessment of threat to Pochentong airfield.
(Page 5)
SOUTH KOREA: Pak obtains expected approval in referen-
dum. (Page 7)
THAILAND: Seni Pramot endorsed as prime minister; he
must now form a government. (Page 10)
SPAIN: Third round of negotiations with the US ended
on a positive note. (Page 11)
TURKEY: Plans to explore for oil in the Aegean tempo-
rarily frustrated. (Page 12)
FRANCE - MALAGASY REPUBLIC: French ships en route to
the African island. (Page 13)
USSR: Nuclear icebreaker may be assigned to the navy.
(Page 16)
FOR THE RECORD : (Page 17)
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
The Turkish Cypriot declaration yesterday establish-
ing a separate state pending agreement on a proposed
Cyprus federation has prompted the Greek and Greek Cyp-
riot governments to refer the issue to the UN Security
Council. President Makarios called the Turkish Cypriot
action a "very severe blow" to the talks.
Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash, who is presi-
dent of the new federal state, conveyed his proposals
for a settlement to Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides
and, requested another session of the intercommunal talks
for February 17. The Turkish Cypriot proposals are cer-
tain to call for a biregional federation with a weak cen-
tral government. The proposed Turkish Cypriot, region's
size and share of the island's resources are likely to be
substantially larger than would be commensurate with the
Turkish Cypriots' share of the population, 18 percent.
Turkish Cypriot actions apparently are a response
to the Greek Cypriot position paper submitted earlier
in the week. It called for a multiregional federation
and a strong central government in which the total area
controlled by Turkish Cypriots would approximate their
percentage of the population. Yesterday's moves by the
Turkish Cypriots may be an attempt to take back the ini-
tiative and place the onus on the Greek side for breaking
off negotiations.
The Greek Cypriot proposals were intended to force
the Turkish Cypriots to deal with the major issues at
stake and provide some clues as to whether a solution
can emerge from the talks. They reflect President Ma-
karios' belief that the Cyprus problem will fade from
the limelight, and that international pressure on the
Turkish side to make concessions will lessen if the talks
drag on inconclusively. Makarios has been pessimistic
about the outcome of the talks for some time and had
threatened to internationalize the issue if no progress
were forthcoming by the end of this month. Proclamation
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 14, 1975
of the separate Turkish Cypriot federal state may con-
vince him to abandon the talks altogether, but the Greek
side will probably want to examine the Turkish Cypriot
position paper closely before making such a move.
In the meantime, Turkish troops in the Nicosia area
were placed on alert in anticipation of a possible Greek
Cypriot reaction to the Turkish Cypriot declaration of
autonomy. While this appears unlikely, demonstrations
could occur within the Greek Cypriot sector and threaten
foreign diplomatic missions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
February 14, 1975
All surface lines of communication to Phnom Penh
are now closed, leaving Pochentong airfield as the gov-
ernment's only reliable point of entry for essential
supplies.
The airfield presents a clearly defined target for
Khmer Communist gunners, and the prospects for increased
attacks against the field will grow as airlift operations
expand. With an expected doubling of contract airlift
sorties from 10 to 20 per day and the projected need for
perhaps as many as 40 to meet minimum essential require-
ments--if the Mekong remains closed--Pochentong will be-
come a more lucrative target. Assuming an increase to
40 sorties per day, there will be a high risk of air-
craft damage, as well as the real possibility of aircrew
casualties.
An estimated 13,000 to 15,000 enemy troops are lo-
cated north, west, and southwest of the airfield.
Communist forces are equipped with 107-mm. and B-40
rockets as well as 60-mm, and 82-mm. mortars. They have
also used 105-mm. howitzers in the past. They are known
to have had at least one 37-mm. AAA weapon in early 1974
and also have a variety of automatic weapons. The Cam-
bodian Communists probably do not have the SA-7 Grail
surface-to-air missile in their inventory.
It is believed Communist forces have the capability
--Intensify 107-mm. rocket fire and possibly initiate
105-mm, howitzer fire against Pochentong.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
?--Mount a coordinated attack against Pochentong if
a favorable attack position can be gained.
--Conduct sapper attacks against the airfield. Al-
though unlikely now, the possibility of such attacks
cannot be discounted.
--Employ automatic weapons against arriving and de-
parting aircraft.
To counter these actions, the Cambodian army has
between 10,000 and 12,000 combat troops within a 25-kilo-
meter radius of Pochentong; and the army's best unit--
the 3rd Division--is located near the airfield. Physical
security within the airfield has been integrated into
the overall ground security plan for Phnom Penh.
The Cambodian 7th Division is northwest of the air-
field, but it has suffered serious losses and is vulner-
able. The effectiveness of tactical air and artillery
support for defense is contingent on the availability
of ammunition. Should the Communists launch a concerted
attack, government forces may be forced to relinquish
ground and tighten their perimeter. If Pochentong air-
field becomes seriously threatened, the government could
withdraw additional units from provincial enclaves to
help in its defense.
If a large-scale airlift into Pochentong airfield
becomes a reality, Communist rocket attacks against the
field should be expected to mount in intensity. A grow-
ing accumulation of aircraft at the terminal as well as
fuel and ammunition along the apron will greatly in-
crease the airfield's vulnerability and its importance
as a target.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
With 73 percent of the ballots in his favor, Presi-
dent Pak won the national vote of confidence for which
the referendum on February 12 was organized. The South
Korean political stage is now set for a series of ini-
tiatives designed to strengthen the government's hand
in coping with its domestic opponents.
It is still unclear exactly how Pak intends to
proceed.
Pak's victory
statement spoke ot a "nonpartisan national political sys-
tem." This appears to be a reference to a rumored con-
version of the party/cabinet system of the past 12 years
into a kind of national front--a nonpartisan coalition
of political and functional groups deemed reliable by
the government.
There have also been reports that Pak might soon
release some political prisoners and authorize a new
government dialogue with the opposition.
If Pak's opponents once again take to the streets,
however, the government hints of a "crackdown." At the
moment, many South Korean officials appear to find this
the more likely contingency.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 14, 1975
Thailand has moved a step closer to the formation
of a new government as a result of a National Assembly
vote endorsing Democrat leader Seni Pramot as prime
minister. Seni's first task will be to put together a
coalition that can win a vote of confidence in the assem-
bly. Such a test could come by early next week.
The voting yesterday suggests that, although Seni
may succeed in forming a government, it could be a minor-
ity one. He received only the minitdum number of votes.
If his efforts to negotiate a coalition bog down once
again, the initiative will shift to the conservative
bloc--many of whose members abstained from yesterday's
voting when it became apparent that Seni would come out
on top.
Seni will have to overcome some significant obsta-
cles if he is to form a stable coalition. Much will de-
pend on whether he can gain the support of the conserva-
tive Thai Nation Party, the Democrats' primary political
rival in the maneuvering to form a government this past
week. There is some evidence, however, that the Thai
Nation Party may yet be amenable to a final overture from
Seni.
Seni's difficulties, including his narrow margin of
victory as front runner in yesterday's assembly voting,
underscore the fragile nature of Thailand's newly adopted
parliamentary system. No personality enjoys sufficient
support to become the obvious choice for prime minister.
If Seni gets in, one of his more significant problems
will be to gain the confidence of the business and mili-
tary elite that has worked hard behind the scenes to
block his effort to form a government. This group, led
by army commander Krit Siwara, remains a powerful polit-
ical force both inside and out of the parliament. Krit,
in particular, is suspicious of Seni, fearing that he
will attempt to slash the military's budget and other-
wise restrict its interests.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
'February 14, 1975
The third round of negotiations between the US and
Spain concluded on a positive note earlier this week,
although little progress was made in reaching agreement
on concrete issues.
For the first time, the head of the Spanish delega-
tion appeared to accept US arguments that a US security
guarantee was not possible, and he agreed to broaden the
discussion beyond this item. Previously, the Spaniards
had said that, without agreement on a guarantee, they
would not go on to other matters of prime interest to the
US, such as the negotiation of base facilities.
The Spaniards showed particular interest in pros-
pects for developing a combined military planning group,
which they may be beginning to view as a substitute for
a security guarantee. They proposed putting US facili-
ties on a new footing based on a defense "partnership,"
including combined planning to meet an agreed threat,
rather than payments in cash and military equipment.
Differences arose over the question of a command function
that the Spaniards want for the proposed planning group;
this will be discussed during the next round in Washing-
ton next month.
The Spaniards did not raise the issue of US support
of Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves on the Moroc-
can Mediterranean coast. The reassurances extended to
the Spaniards last week that the Moroccans would not have
US support may have prevented this issue from clouding
the negotiations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
TURKEY
February 14, 1975
Turkey's plans to explore for oil in the Aegean
have been frustrated for now by the owners of the Norwe-
gian research ship Longva, who have refused to allow it
to operate in disputed areas.
The Turkish government has announced that it has
canceled the Longva's contract because of the owners'
noncompliance with instructions. Energy Minister Isil
told the Turkish senate that the government had previously
ordered seismographic equipment and that if no other for-
eign ship will take the contract to explore in the Aegean,
Turkey will equip one of its own vessels and proceed on
its own.
The Turks are angry over this development, claiming
that the Greek government put intense pressure on the
Norwegians. A Turkish Foreign Ministry official re-
marked that the Greek efforts had been unwise because
the alternative to using the Longva would be to send in
a Turkish naval vessel, which would increase the risk of
an incident.
Turkey does not have a ship equipped to conduct the
type of operations the Longva was scheduled to do, and
it is likely to take some time to outfit one for the job.
Unless the Turks decide to show the flag in the disputed
areas of the Aegean by sending in a ship with only lim-
.ted research capabilities, the delay will give Turkish
and Greek diplomats more time to address the issue. The
foreign ministers of the two countries are expected to
meet on the subject to determine the specific questions
that will be referred to the International Court of Jus-
tice. A date for the meeting has not yet been set.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
Agroup of French warships led by the aircraft car-
rier Clemenceau reportedly was steaming toward the trou-
bled island of Madagascar yesterday. The latest reports
indicate the situation in the capital remains confused,
but that no new outbreak of violence has occurred else-
where on the island.
According to the French minister of cooperation
with African countries, the ships were being sent to.
the island to reassure some 38,000 French citizens liv-
ing there, rather than as a show of force. The French
may want to be in a position to evacuate citizens in
case the situation should deteriorate markedly.
A French naval task force, led by the Clemenceau,
has been in the Indian Ocean since last October. A
detachment of marines, trained in quick intervention
tactics, reportedly is aboard the carrier. These ma-
rines could be used if French citizens or interests are
threatened.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 14, 1975
The Soviet Union's newest nuclear-powered icebreaker,
the Arktika, is the most heavily gun-armed surface ship
built by the Soviets since 1960. Since it does not dis-
play standard merchant stack markings and is heavily
armed, the Arktika will probably be operated by the So-
viet navy. If so, the icebreakerrwill be the first nu-
clear-powered surface ship in the navy.
The 25,000-ton ship is powered by two reactors that
are reported to generate 75,000 shaft horsepower, about
50 percent more than the two-reactor system used by the
Lenin--the Soviets' only other nuclear-powered icebreaker.
Construction of another nuclear-powered icebreaker,
to be named Antarktika, began last year at Leningrad's
Admiralty Yard. Assuming a schedule similar to that of
the Arktika, it could become operational in 1978
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 14, 1975
USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev yesterday made
his fist public appearance since December 24. Last
night, he joined Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister
Gromyko for talks with visiting British Prime Minister
Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan at the Kremlin.
Brezhnev did not welcome Wilson at the airport cere-
monies earlier in the day, but this was not required by
protocol. Despite his 51 days out of public view,
Brezhnev showed no unusual physical problems and acted
as he usually does in such situations for the media.
(continued)
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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