NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010046-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National 1 r~tel l igence
B~Illetin
DIA review(s) completed.
To Secret
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National I me
Ifigence Bulletin
MarcYr 27, 1975
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Situation ~~round coastal enclaves de-
teriorating; Da Nang's airs?ield is closed. (Page 3)
PORTUGAL: New government will continue to expand its
contro3-over private Indus i:ry . (Page 5 )
ARGENTINA: Labor leaders press for a curb on Lopez
Rega s inf luence , (Page 6 ;I
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: The prospect of an early resump-
tion of t e Geneva talks.. will force both sides to focus
on the issue of Palestinian participation. (Page 7)
IRAN-IRAQ: Kurds flee IracY and their leadership is in
i~sarray. (Page 9)
FRANCE: Paris reportedly a~lans an army reorganization.
(Page 13)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 14)
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Cambodia : Lower Mekong
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CAMBODIA
The Khmer communists have quickly capitalized on
the reoccupation of Tuol Leap by moving artillery back
within range of Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport. Several
105-mm. howitzer rounds landed in the vicinity of the
airfield yesterday, but neitYier this shelling nor the
continuing barrage of rocket fire against the airfield
caused any interruption in U~3 supply airlift operations.
Cambodian army efforts to retake Tuol Leap made only
limited progress.
The insurgents have also increased pressure on
government defenders along tPie east bank of the Mekong
northeast of Phnom Penh by forcing two government bat-
talions to abandon positions opposite the Chrouy Changwar
naval base. Farther north osi the Mekong, the Cambodian
navy evacuated 650 troops anii 250 families from isolated
riverside positions at Prek 7Camerk and Muk Kampul.
Along the lower Mekong :southeast of Phnom Penh, con-
tinued heavy insurgent shelling yesterday knocked out
one of the government's 105-rnm. howitzers defending the
garrison at Neak Luong. Communist ground attacks were
also reported northeast of the town. Neak Luong's 4,400
defenders, along with its la~:ge civilian and refugee
population, continue to ne stxppiiea enLireiy ~y ct.i.ruivY.
National Intelligence Bulletin March 27, 1975
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IVationall Intelligence Bullletin March 27, 1975
SOUTH VIETNAM
The situation around the: coastal enclaves at Da
Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha T:ranc~ continues to deteriorate.
This morning, the airport at Da Nang was closed because
of uncontrollable mobs on the; runways.
The Da Nang police system is breaking down, and so
is discipline among the t:roo~>s that retreated from other
battlefronts and are now congregating in the city.
Shots have been exchanged between the police and sol-
diers, and large numbers of ~aolice are deserting their
posts.
Government, commanders ax:e expect~_ng heavy rocket
attacks against the city 'to k~egin soon, causing panic
among the troops and refugee:. The influx of refugees
reportedly has swelled the c~.ty's poptzlatian from 500,000
to nearly 2,000,000 over the past week. Rocket attacks
on the airfield could inhibii~ the refugee airlift that
began yesterday. Officials ~~re concerned that the com-
munists may also soon be able: to move within mortar and
SA-7 surface-to-air missile ~:ange of the airfield.
There have been several smal_L-scale ground clashes close
to the city over the past feu days.
Some 2,500 marines arrived in the city from Hue and
were immediately deployed along the northern perimeter.
Only the marine division and parts of the South Vietnam-
ese 3rd Division ar.e considered battlewortYry at the
moment. Most of the region'; other regular. combat units
are still in disarray. For example, the lst Division is
fighting its way south from Fiue, and the 2nd Division,
having been driven .from Quanc~ Tin and Quang Ngai prov-
inces, is trying to regroup on islands off the coast.
Two independent North Vietnamese regiments and the
304th Division already pose ~~ direct threat to Da Nang
from the west and could be committed to action in a
matter of_ hours. Two other TJorth Vietnamese divisions--
the 324B and the 325th--are :Ln southern Thua Thien
Province and could move. against the city's defenses in
several days. With the collapse of t17e government's
forces in the provinces just to the south, the North
Vietnamese 2nd Division could be freed to move northward
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PJational Intelligence Bulletin
n Da Nang.
March 27, 1975
':the North Vietnamese 3rd Division began to drive
a~oward Qui Nhon early yesterday with a series of attacks
?~gairist the two regiments of the South Vietnamese 22nd
~~ivision that are defending the city from the west. By
~.ay's end, both regiments were cut off. These units have
=;een fairly steady action along Route 19 and are tired.
e~inh Dinh's regional and popular forces are being rushed
~~own from the outer districts to help defend the city,
?~ut this amounts to abandoning much of the nation's sec-
=_jnc~ ~ctost heavily populated province to the communists.
The situation at Nha Trang is similar. Communist
=orces moving out of the mountains are now in a position
a-_o bypass the airborne units that are tasked with block-
~:ng this coastal drive. Nha Trang's defense now depends
~~n territorial forces, the remnants of a regiment that
~:~.as forced out of the westernmost district earlier this
~r~eek, and 23rd Division stragglers from the highlands.
Security problems are compounded by large numbers of
efuctees .
Press reports today on a coup attempt are false.
~:+he government has arrested ten civilians for "plotting'
.:against the government. They are members of various
=~~bposition factions that have little national prominence
end could pose no serious threat to the Saigon government.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March a~, 1975
Portuguese Prime Minister Goncalves, speaking yes-
terday at the swearing-i.n of the new cabinet, indicated
that the government will. continue to expand its control
over private industry.
Goncalves left no doubt that the major emphasis of
the cabinet will be on Economic matters. He did not
specify what is next in line to be nationalized, but said
that the government's actions will provide "a'clear de-
marcation of the sectors in which private enterprise can
expand." Goncalves addE:d that the government will also
concentrate on consolidating its control of the banks and
insurance companies nationalized earlier this month.
Portuguese leaders, including the relatively moderate
Socialists, are committE:d to a policy aimed at breaking
the economic power of the wealthy.
Goncalves said the government will also launch pro-
grams to counter rising unemployment and to regulate
prices and incomes. He pointed out the need to "estab-
lish a regime of total austerity" because the country
is "living above the means of the Portuguese economy."
A breakdown of the new cabinet according to party
affiliation of the 13 civilian ministers shows that the
posts were allotted equally to the four members of the
coalition--the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the
pro-Communist Democratic Me~vement, and the center-left
Popular Democratic Party. Each received one ministry
without portfolio and one other post.,
Of the remaining five civilian ministers, three are
moderate technocrats, and t.wo are Communist sympathizers.
The latter two are in positions of importance to the Com-
munists--the economic coordination and agriculture posts.
The military apparently was willing to give up its
majority in the cabinet since the newly created all-
military Revolutionary Council has taken over the legis-
lative powers formerly heldl by the cabinet. The cabinet
is still responsible for th.e day-to-day administration
of the government, however, and could regain some o.f its
former influence.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March a~, 1975
President Costa Gomes remarked at the ceremony
yesterday that the Revolutionary Council had been formed
to stimulate the government. He indicated that the
Council's role might be reduced if the cabinet proves
it can take decisive action to enact reforms.
ARGENTINA
Peronist labor leaders are pressing President Peron
to curb the influence of her confidant, Jose Lopez Rega.
They plan to meet with her soon and will probably push
Far his resignation and possibly that of Economic Minis-
ter Gomez Morales.
Most Argentine politicians apparently believe that
there is sufficient opposition to Lopez Rega to force
the issue with Mrs. Peron. During tYie past week, labor
support for her government has significantly eroded.
Although the government claims to have smashed a subver-
sive plot to paralyze key industries, several factories
are still occupied by workers protesting the arrest of
left-wing trade union leaders.
This unrest has been accompanied by growing politi-
cal criticism. For the first time, minority parties
within the coalition that returned the Peronists to power
have attacked Mrs. Peron for her economic policies and
her failure to consult with them on other key issues.
The concerted labor opposition to Lopez Rega in-
creases pressure on i~rs. Peron to get rid of her adviser.
If she gives in, it is doubtful that she can complete her
term without Lopez Rega's support. On the other hand,
if she refuses to make meaningful concessions, she will
facie an increasing number of strikes, continuing terror-
ist violence, and further loss of public support.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ARAB STATES - ISRAEL
March 27, 1975
The prospect of an eaz~ly resumption of the Geneva
conference will force the Fsrabs and Israelis to focus on
the question of Palestinian participation in the talks.
The Egyptians and Syrians knave in the past threatened
that they will not go back to Geneva without the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization; the Israelis have long
maintained that they will riot negotiate with the PLO.
Israel has expressed ~~ willingness to return to
Geneva, but has shown no sign that it will deal with a
PLO delegation. The extreme caution displayed by Tel
Aviv during the recent round of indirect negotiations on
a Sinai withdrawal suggest: that Israel would not recon-
sider its more strongly he:Ld position not: to recognize
or negotiate with the PLO, even in return for major po-
litical concessions from Egypt and Syria. In the present
atmosphere, the Arabs would in any case refuse to make
such concessions.
Cairo and Damascus may/, as an alternative, propose
that the Arabs form a singJLe, joint delegation that
would include representatives of the PLO. Syrian Presi-
dent Asad has already suggested that Syria and the PLO
could form a joint delegation. The Arabs would hope
that these approaches could provide a way to get around
Israel's objections. Israel, the Arabs may point out,
did nat object to the inclusion of several Palestinians
in the .Jordanian delegs.tio:n at the first session of the
Geneva talks in December 1'973.
The Israelis have in fact said that they would not
check too closely the credentials of the Arab delegates
at Geneva. Tel Aviv-may be ready to accept the presence
of PLO members who are integrated into the delegation of
one of the Arab states or into a single Arab delegation.
The Israelis would, of course, balk if the PLO elected
to send a delegate publicly identified with one of the
terrorist groups that make up the organization. In
addition, the Israelis would strongly resist any attempt
to force them explicitly to accept the PLO as the repre-
sentative of the Palestinians.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1975
~'he Israelis and the Arabs may, in the end, come
to view a joint Arab-PLO delegation as the only way to
forestall a total collapse of Middle East negotiations.
Such a step would buy time for all parties, and would
put off--perhaps indefinitely--what even the Arabs con-
sider the undesirable and probably impossible task of dis-
tinguishing the Palestinian and Jordanian roles in ne-
gotiations.
Amman would probably participate in such a delega-
ti=~n, if urged to do so by Egypt and Syria. For the
moment, however, King Husayn is staying on the sidelines,
in the hope that the Arab states will be forced to con-
ce:~e Jordan a major role in negotiating with Israel.
Leaders of the PLO would accept an invitation to
participate in a joint delegation, even though any par-
ti~ipation would alienate radical fedayeen. The Pales-
tinians' prompt approval of President Asad's recent
offer of closer Syrian-Palestinian cooperation suggests
they were sufficiently disillusioned by Egypt's apparent
readiness to proceed without them that they were willing
to sacrifice a measure of their autonomy in return for a
tangible demonstration of Syrian support. PLO leaders
look on the proposed joint command--and would look on
a -joint delegation--as insurance that they will be in-
cluded in any future moves toward a negotiated peace or
in any preparations for renewed hostilities.
Despite their willingness to cooperate closely with
Damascus, however, the Palestinians remain suspicious
of Syria's motives. They are, therefore, pleased that
the step-by-step negotiations have collapsed, as this
allows them to repair their strained relations with
Egypt and look more closely at the Syrian offer. PLO
leaders praised President Sadat's refusal to make greater
concessions to Israel during the recent round of indirect
talks, and sent a high-ranking official to Cairo after
the talks collapsed.
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IRAN-IRAQ
Massive numbers of Irac;i Kurds are trying to leave
the country, following t:he collapse of their armed re-
bellion as a result of t:he withdrawal of Iranian support.
Rebels who stay behind face an onslaught by Iraqi forces
when the cease-fire agreed i;.o two weeks ago expires on
April 1.
The Kurdish leadership is in disarray. Aging rebel
c ief Mulla Mustafa Barzani has in effect stepped down
There is no
one o compara e s a ure o rep ace im and unite the
Kurds.
Barzani, in a recent p~cess interview, indicated that
some 200,000 Kurds are trying to get out of Iraq before
the March 31 deadline set by Tehran for accepting refu-
gees. About 140,000 Iraqi l:~urds had already taken refuge
in Iran before the rebellion collapsed. As of last week-
end, some 4,000 rebel troop;~ in Iraq reportedly had opted
to surrender and take their chances under the amnesty
promised by Tragi authorities.
Once the temporary truce ends--if not before--Bagh-
dad almost certainly will resume the all--out drive
through Kurdistan that it launched immediately of ter the
accord with Iran was signed on March 6. Some Kurdish
units--perhaps as many as 9,000 men---have vowed to con-
tinue the struggle from mountain hideouts, but they have
only a limited capability for resisting Iraqi forces.
Many fleeing Kurds probably will not reach the
border before the deadline. Their progress is hampered
by distance, snow, rough terrain, and lack of transpor-
tation. The Kurds asked Turkish authorities to permit
rebels now isolated in northernmost Kurdistan to transit
Turkey on their way to Iran, but Ankara refused. Tehran
has denied repeated requests from Kurdish leaders to
seek an extension of the cease-fire.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 27, 1975
The Shah clearly is concerned over the possible un-
settling effects of the Kurdish refugees on Iran's own
large Kurdish minority, especially now that Kurdish
fighting men are coming in. Kurdish troops are being
kept in camps separate from those housing civilians; all
refugees may eventually be dispersed to non-Kurdish
areas of Iran.
~2efugees probably will be a main topic of discussion
during the current visit to Baghdad by Iranian Prime
Minister Hoveyda. He is also likely to press for demar-
~cation of the border to be completed quickly on the basis
of the principles agreed to in the accord. The next
meeting of the foreign ministers of Iraq, Iran, and Al-
geria, who are overseeing implementation of the accord,
is scheduled for April 16 in Baghdad.
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National Intelligence Bi.~lletin
March 27, 1975
The US defense attache in Paris reports that the
French plan to reorganize their army in order to increase
their conventional military power in Europe and to en-
hance France's capabilitwy to protect French interests
abroad.
the p ans ca or.:
--The regular army to be reorganized on a regional
basis, and the territorial army to be at least re-
structured, if not abolished outright. The goal
of the reorganization presumably is to provide
greater operational flexibility to the regular army.
--French paratroops will receive greater emphasis,
with a view toward enhancing their intervention
capability. ,
France may
have to fight somewhere other t an on e eastern front
in central Euro e
T e possi~ a assignmen o some o e
territorial forces to the regular army would release
them from their present waY~time role of providing static
defense of home territory t:o more mobile support and re-
inforcement of, the regular army.
During a televised speech on Tuesday, French Presi-
dent Giscard also touched on the theme of increasing the
capabilities of French :Eorc;es to react militarily on a
worldwide scale. At the same time, he reaffirmed that
France will maintain its overall security with an inde-
pendent military force equipped with nuclear arms.
Giscard first expressE;d an interest in an increased
worldwide role last October. During a press conference
on the French defense reviE;w, Giscard noted that all re-
cent conflicts in the Mediterranean have involved con-
ventional forces, and he hinted that France would take
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1975
steps to provide more flexible conventional means for
overseas intervention in pursuit of its national inter-
es is .
The French Intervention Forces now consist of one
~~.irborne division, one independent infantry brigade, and
the Metropolitan France Foreign Legion Group made up of
four battalion-sized units. France also maintains approxi-
~nately 14,000 army and Foreign Legion troops overseas on
a permanent basis, mostly in Africa.
Saudi Arabia: The transition to new leadership in
5aud?_~Ara~ a apparently continues smooth and orderly.
Before the late King Faysal's funeral yesterday, King
Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd received the traditional
1~ledges of allegiance from princes of the royal family,
military commanders, Muslim religious leaders, Bedouin
sheikhs, and ordinary citizens. Khalid began his reign
by promising the nation that he would continue the poli-
~.ies pursued by his older brother. The message of con-
tinuity was undoubtedly intended to reassure the popu-
lace and Saudi allies, but it is probably a genuine ex-
pression of the orientation of both Khalid and Fahd--at
least at this point.
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