NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027500010048-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
N2
National 1 ~~tel l igence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
To Secret
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National Intallic~ence IBuIletin
March 28, 1975
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: Evacuation airlift from Da Nang continues;
military situation in northern part of country worsens.
(Page 12)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 17)
SAUDI ARABIA: Death of Faysal likely to slow interna-
tional oil developments foxy the next month. (Page 18)
USSR: The number of co:ntirigency declarations of ship
transits through the Turki:ah Straits sigr.~ificantly in-
creased. (Page 20 )
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 22)
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Na#ional Intelligence Bulletin
:~nUTH VIETNAM
March 28, 1975
`~"he evacuation airlift from Da Nana
continuea yesteraay, but civil or er an mi i ary
:1SC1p 1ne in the city has drastically worsened. If
panicky mobs on airport runways cannot be controlled, it
may be impossible to continue the airlift.
:~aigon is hurriedly formulating plans to shift the
four South Vietnamese divisions besieged in the northern
provinces. General Cao Van Vien, the chairman of the
Joint General Staff, does not believe that Da Nang can
die held. He expects to move the marines and the 1st
Division to the Saigon area and move the 2nd and 3rd
fivisions to the central coast.
`_?'he defense of Nha Trang also is in jeopardy. Large
numbers of troops that survived the trek to the city
from the highlands are contributing to a breakdown of
1.aw and order .
l~vacuation flights from Da Nang that have been going
~o Nha Trang will be sent to nearby Cam Ranh Bay as soon
as authorities can move the necessary supporting equip-
~~lent into place. This will, however, have little effect
c~r~ the crumbling military and administrative situation
r, Nha Trang .
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National Intelligences Bulletin March 28, 1975
The collapse of the govE:rnment's forces in the
northern two thirds of South Vietnam has occurred so
fast that the magnitude of the disaster has not yet reg-
istered on the population of Saigon. Suppression of the
worst news has helped to keel? the man-in-the-street only
vaguely aware that the situation is serious. Attention
remains primarily focused on the rising price of rice.
President Thieu has exhorted the people to unite
behind a new government of n~~tional union to face the
common danger. His proposal for a cabinet shuffle is
the sort of measure that might have served to broaden
the base of his government i:n more normal times, but it
falls short of the mark now.
Prime Minister Khiem seems to be proceeding at a
leisurely pace and has ordered a study of names of rep-
resentatives in the National Assembly who might be con-
sidered for the new cabinet.
The announcement by former vice president Ky that
he is coming out of retirement to engage in politics has
apparently been taken seriously by President Thieu. Ky
was pushed out of his posts in the mid-1960s by Thieu,
and the two have been bitter enemies ever since.
The arrest of a number of political figures and the
appearance of charges in the press of coup plotting was
probably intended by Thieu as a warning to coup plotters,
including Ky. It seems unlikely that any of the indi-
viduals arrested would have had the political strength
to prepare a serious .plot:.
There is no evidence of active coup plotting among
those who do have the power--the senior military leaders.
Indeed, there seems to bE; some feeling among them that
this sort of instability at this time could be very dan-
gerous.
Many senior officers, however, are deeply ashamed
at the failure of the armed forces to offer protection
to civilians fleeing the enemy, and they are bitter at
Thieu over the collapse in the north. With this mood
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 28, 1975
growing among the military, it is probably only a matter
of time before an attempt is made to organize a move to
oust Thieu in favor of a senior military leader.
once the news from the north spreads in the south,
moreover, the popular mood could turn ugly and give
impetus to a conspiracy. The communists are beginning
to try to sow seeds of discord; offering amnesty to those
caho do not impede their progress.
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Cambodia : Lower Mekong
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Nati?nal Intelligence B~illetin March 28, 1975
CAMBODIA
Khmer communist gunners az~e continuing t.a fire both
artillery shells and rockets into Phnom Penh's Pochentong
Airport, temporarily closing it: to the LTS airlift. No
US aircraft were at the airport: when the shellings began
early this morning.
25X1 Cambodian army ground
operations to reoccupy the Tuo_ Leap staging area north-
west of the airfield are progressing slowly against heavy
enemy resistance.
Government forces at the :Lsolated lower Mekong
River enclave of Neak Luong have recaptured one of the
three defensive positions nort~ieast of the town that
fell on March 25. There are si:rong indications, however,
that a major communist assault a ainst Neak Luon ma be
25X1 imminent.
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IVa#ional Intell>Igence Bulletin
SATJDIA ARABIA
March 28, 1975
~i'he death of King Faysal will slow developments on
the international oil scene for at least the next month,
but probably will make little difference over the longer
term.
Saudi decisions on important oil policy matters are
likely to be postponed until after the 40-day mourning
period for Faysal. These matters include the Saudi posi-
tions on the producer-consumer conference, the pricing
cf oil in currencies other than the dollar, and the in-
dexing of oil prices to offset inflation. OPEC decisions
on these and other matters are also likely to be delayed,
since the cartel rarely takes a position independent of
~:~ie views of its largest producer.
A basic shift in Saudi oil policy as a result of
Faysal's death is unlikely. Saudi Arabia under King
Khalid will remain a strong supporter of OPEC, although
perhaps not quite as influential a member as before.
With the loss of Faysal?s personal prestige and religious
~~eadership in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia's influence
?~~~a.ll come mainly from its oil production capability and
tzuge financial resources. We expect that, at least ini-
tially, the new Saudi leadership will be more reluctant
than King Faysal was to take on the OPEC majority. Saudi
Arabia's moderating .influence on OPEC policies conse-
quently may be somewhat diminished.
In recent years, Saudi oil policy has been thrashed
taut by the Supreme Petroleum Council under the chairman-
ship of Prince Fahd, the Crown Prince. Fahd is expected
~o hold the preponderance of power in Khalid's adminis-
tration. Since the make-up of the council has not
;hanged, Saudi oil policies promise to continue much as
~?efc~.r..e.
`s'he death of Kinq Faysal will probably reduce the
influence of Oil Minister Yamani and may bring his dis-
missal. Tn the past, Yamani has had differences with
I??^i~?ce Fahd, most notably about holding an oil auction
last summer to drive dawn oil prices. Fahd successfull
n osed the auctio
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The Soviet Union has significantly increased its
contingency declarations of ship transits from the Black
Sea through the Turkish Straits since the first of the
year. In addition, a greater variety of types of ships
are now reflected in these requests to the Turkish gov-
ernment. This action reduces the effect of the restraints
imposed by the Montreux Convention on the Soviet capabil-
ity to augment the numbers and types of ships in its
Mediterranean Squadron within a limited period.
Prior to January 1975, contingency declarations--
notifications given though not necessarily used--were
routinely announced only for cruisers, destroyers, and
submarines. Since the first of the year, however, lists
of units being declared on a regular basis have included
landing ships, fast patrol boats, destroyer escorts, and
probably missile support ships.
During the October 1973 Middle East war, the Soviet
naval buildup in the Mediterranean was severely con-
strained initially by the Montreux Convention, which re-
quires an eight-day advance notification for transits.
The first Soviet amphibious vessels that were sent through
the straits in reaction to the war could not do so before
October 14--eight days after hostilities had begun.
following the war, the only change in declaration
procedures until January of this year occurred during
the Cyprus crisis in July-August 1974. At that time,
landing ship and patrol boat declarations were announced,
in addition to those types routinely declared.
Increased contingency declarations have apparently
become an integral part of Soviet planning for the Medi-
terranean, giving them a much greater flexibility in re-
acting with naval forces to developments in the Middle
East and North Africa. The increased number of contin-
gency declarations also serves to conceal Soviet inten-
tions for southbound transits during a given time period.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 28, 1975
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Angola: The fighting that has been taking place
_n L~~anda this week between the National Front for the
4iberation of Angola and the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Anaola seems to have subsided. Tension
remains high, however, and any new incidents between the
Iwo liberation groups could spark new clashes. Portu-
gal's new foreign minister and the minister for the
overseas territories arrived esterda in An ola to
dry to deal with the problem.
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Toa Secret
Top Secret
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