Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 12, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 1, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010002-3.pdf599.88 KB
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Top Secret National Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. review completed Top Secret April 1, 1975 25X1 0 Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975A0276000 0025 7 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Relea National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 CONTENTS VIETNAM: Communists closing in on remaining coastal towns in Military Region 2; government forces reportedly abandon Qui Nhon. (Page 1) CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 3) USSR-US: Soviets are likely to be more confident negotia- tors at the joint Commercial Commission meetings next month. (Page 4) USSR-PORTUGAL: Moscow seeks to strengthen ties with Portugal. (Page 5) TURKEY: Demirel takes over reins of government. (Page 8) IRAN-IRAQ: Progress made toward implementation of ac- cord during Hoveyda's visit to Baghdad. (Page 10) INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES: Iron ore exporters' associa- tion, which will be established this week, unlikely to C function as a cartel. (Page 13) Approved For Release r.!A-RnP7q 00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Release NORTH nVJETNAM CAM BODlA BINH UINH Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Release 2JO7/03/06 - - 975A027600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin VIETNAM April 1, 1975 The Vietnamese communists are pressing their drive southward along South Vietnam's central coast. Qui Nhon reportedly was abandoned by government forces last night. The South Vietnamese 22nd Division, which had been defending the city, was all but shattered in heavy fighting. The government's territorial forces in the Qui Nhon area appear to have heeded communist calls for an uprising and joined in attacks on the 22nd Division. Near Nha Trang,an airborne brigade also has taken heavy losses and has been forced to pull back. Govern- ment units will probably be able to offer little more than token resistance against further communist advances. Although about 9,000 members of the marine division are now at Cam Ranh, it is doubtful whether they can be re- organized in time to come to the rescue of Nha Trang. Some troops have deserted from Cam Ranh, taking their weapons with them to Nha Trang, where they are adding to the panic and confusion, as armed stragglers did in Da Nang. Government forces in Military Region 2 have lost all twelve 175-mm. guns in the region, all fifty four M-48 tanks, and well over half of the fifty four 155-mm. guns. Although some attempts were made to destroy am- munition and fuel stocks in abandoned bases, large quan- tities remain intact and are now in communist hands. Regional commanders in the delta are expecting strong communist attacks against Can Tho and My Tho cities to begin at any time. These commanders have been trying to spur their regular units into preemptive ac- tion against communist formations moving into place for the anticipated attacks., but without much success. Other communist attacks are expected near the Cambodian border as part of an effort to spread government forces thin. Approved For Release - T00975A027600010002-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDR79T00975AO27600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 Even if major attacks against the cities are slow to develop, the communists appear to have the major South Vietnamese units on the defensive, and they are likely to make territorial gains where government forces are the weakest. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Release) 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79FT00975A027600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin CAMBODIA April 1, 1975 Cambodian army units have shored up the defense line north of Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport, reducing the threat of a communist ground penetration toward the air- field. In order to do so, however, government commanders have suspended the operation to retake Tuol Leap and to eliminate insurgent artillery and rocket sites in the area. Nearly 40 rockets struck around Pochentong yester- day, but the airlift continued at a near record pace. Several rockets also hit near the US embassy in the southeastern section of Phnom Penh, but there was no significant damage. The Japanese and Thai embassies in Phnom Penh plan to close down later this week, and the South Vietnamese embassy has asked for space for its personnel aboard US airlift flights returning to Saigon. President Lon Nol departed from Pochentong Air- port today. Prince Sihanouk told newsmen in Peking yesterday that Lon Nol's departure would not alter his or the Khmer communists' opposition to negotia- tions. Sihanouk reportedly said that Lon Nol was leaving "under pressure from the US" and that the move was a "trap" into which neither he nor the com- munists would fall. The Prince predicted a "100-per- cent" victory for the insurgents. -3- Approved For Release T00975A027600010002-3 T Approved For Relea a 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP 9T00975A027600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 USSR-US The US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission will meet in Moscow on April 10 for the first time since the demise of the 1972 trade agreement at the beginning of this year. The embassy suggests--and we agree--that the Soviets will probably be more confident negotiators on this occasion than previously, acting on the conviction that their bargaining position vis-a-vis the US has im- proved considerably in recent months. Moscow will argue that the US is now the chief ben- eficiary of bilateral trade, reversing the roles of earlier sessions in which the Soviets tacitly recognized that they had more to gain. The embassy points out that the Soviets see the US as being on the defensive because it failed to deliver on the terms of the trade agreement. They expect economic recession in the West to spur the US to seek Soviet orders and anticipate that competition for the Soviet market from other Western countries will also stimulate American trade concessions. Despite what the Soviets may regard as a stronger bargaining position, they remain keenly interested in expanded trade with the US. Politically, Moscow values bilateral commercial ties for their contribution to detente with the US; economically, the Soviets continue to regard the US as the preferred source of most capital nods and technoloqy.r Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2 975A027600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin USSR-PORTUGAL April 1, 1975 Moscow is trying to strengthen its ties with Portu- guese leaders, even at the risk of arousing West Euro- pean suspicions of Soviet intentions in Portugal. The Soviets gave unabashed front-page coverage to Portuguese Labor Minister Costa Martins, who was in Moscow last week for what would normally have been a routine visit. Costa Martins, who is a member of the ruling Armed Forces Movement, met for three hours with Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Soviet Premier, speaking "on behalf of the Soviet leadership," expressed solidarity with the Portuguese government and the Armed Forces Move- ment. Costa Martins subsequently told the press that Kosygin had promised that Soviet aid to Portugal would be forthcoming. Moscow has been notably reluctant to give the Portuguese, including Communist leader Cunhal, reason to believe that large doses of economic aid are a live possibility. The aid question was probably one of the topics raised by Portuguese Communist Party Secretary Pato when he met with Soviet Party Secretary Katushev in Moscow last week. Pravda's account of this meeting gave little hint of how the talks went. Moscow's public coverage of the abortive March 11 coup and its aftermath suggests that its qualms about Portugal are ebbing. Against this are reports circulat- ing in Lisbon and elsewhere that the Soviets are still fearful that the Portuguese political situation is changing too quickly and that Moscow is doing what it can to counsel moderation. These reports help Moscow deal with expressions of concern it has received from the West Germans, the Italians, and others regarding Portugal. Approved For Release 200 - 75A027600010002-3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Releaso National Intelligence Bulletin TURKEY April 1, 1975 Suleyman Demirel took over the reins of government from Prime Minister Irmak yesterday. President Koruturk approved a 30-member coalition cabinet drawn from four rightist parties. Demirel now has a maximum of one week to prepare a program for his government and to submit it to parlia- ment for debate and a vote of confidence. Nine deputies from the Democratic Party announced last Friday that they would support Demirel, although press reports indicate that Demirel's chances have been damaged by four inde- pendent deputies' withdrawal of support. Even if Dem- irel fails to get a vote of confidence, however, he would stay on in a caretaker capacity until another government is formed. Demirel's government is built on a shaky foundation. He has to depend on support from outside the coalition to give him a majority. The coalition is equally fragile, based primarily on the shared opposition of four rightist parties to former prime minister Ecevit and, his left-of- center Republican People's Party. The cabinet includes the leaders of the other three coalition parties. This includes National Salvation Party leader Erbakan, whose behavior as Ecevit's coalition partner brought down t e government last September, and Alparslan Turkes, leader of the extreme right-wing National Action Party, which claims to have 100,000 "commandos" at its disposal. The participation of these two parties poses serious problems for Demirel. Their inclusion in the government is likely to contribute to further political polariza- tion in Turkey and raises the possibility of increased violence. The military,. which forced Demirel out of office in 1971, when political violence threatened to get out of hand, will keep a close watch on developments. No sharp turns are likely in Turkish policy, although there will be pressure on Demirel to harden the govern- ment's stance toward a Cyprus settlement. Demirel will 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/03"1: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Release 2 07/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T 0975AO27600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 have the support of Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil and Defense Minister Ferit Melen, both of whom have served in these positions in previous governments. Demirel has already announced that the "only solu- tion on Cyprus is a two-zone federal system." He has called for an early resumption of US military assistance to Turkey. -9- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 25X1 Approved For Release) 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP19T00975AO27600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin IRAN-IRAQ .April 1, 1975 Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda's three-day visit to Baghdad last week apparently went well. The final communique expressed mutual satisfaction with progress toward implementation of the Iranian-Iraqi accord signed in Algiers on March 6 and pledged both sides to work for closer cooperation ih all areas. According to an interview with Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn Tikriti in a Tehran newspaper, cooperation may even extend to a collective security arrangement in the Persian Gulf. In the interview, published the day Hoveyda's visit ended, Saddam Husayn purportedly said that the Algiers agreement "foresaw" such a development. The communique issued in both capitals, however, said only that the two sides "affirm that the region should be spared all foreign interference." This theme initially appeared in the Iranian press shortly after the accord was signed. There has been no official Ira- nian statement on the subject or comment on Saddam Husayn's alleged remarks. The Shah has frequently indicated his desire to arrange closer security cooperation among Gulf countries, arguing that area security should be the responsibility of the littoral states. Up to now, he has excluded Bagh- dad from those with whom he has sought to cooperate. The Shah has supported US naval activity in the Persian Gulf as a counter to Soviet naval access to Iraqi facilities. He considers Soviet influence in Iraq to be a threat to Iranian and Gulf security, and reduc- ing that influence has been a principal foreign policy .goal. The Shah may feel, however, that he has to make gestures to demonstrate that Iran is not a spokesman for US policy in the region if he intends to put pres- sure on Baghdad to reduce its ties to Moscow. -10- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Releaso National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 Tehran and Baghdad, meanwhile, have concluded joint preparations to seal their border upon the expiration to- day of the cease-fire between Iraq and the Kurdish rebels announced on March 13. Beginning today, Iraqi Kurds--both civilians an ighting men--will no longer be allowed to take refuge in Iran. Baghdad has, however, extended until April 30 the amnesty it has offered to Kurdish refugees in Iran who return to Iraq. Most of the refugees, believed to number some 160,000 following the heavy inflow last month, fear harsh treatment at the hands of the Iraqis; few are ex- pected to take advantage of the amnesty. The Iraqi army is expected to waste no time in re- suming its offensive against pockets of remainin rebels that was halted when the cease-fire took effect. -11- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Approved For Releas4 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP7PT00975A027600010002-3 Share of Prospective Association Members in World Iron Ore Production and Exports Percent Production Exports Total 38.8 74.2 LDCs 19.8 39.4 Brazil 5.3 9.1 India 4.2 6.9 Liberia 2.8 6.3 Venezuela 2.4 5.4 Peru 1.6 2.8 Chile 1.i 2.8 Mauritania 1.1 2.8 Algeria Q.4 0.9 Swaziland 0.4 0.9 Philippines 0.2 0.6 Sierra Leone 0.2 0.6 Tunisia 0.1 0.3 Developed countries 19.0 34.8 Australia 9.3 16.8 Canada 5.4 9.5 Sweden 4.3 8.5 557586 4-75 Approved For Release - T 00975AO27600010002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 29 National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 An association of iron ore exporters will be estab- lished at a ministerial-level meeting that opens today in Geneva. The organization will have no authority to establish prices or production quotas, but most of its developing country members will try to push it in that direction. Their chances of transforming the association into an effective cartel are slim. Canada has already de- cided not to join the association. Australia, Sweden, and Brazil, other prospective members, also oppose the formation of a cartel. Together, these four countries account for 44 percent of world iron ore exports. The objectives of the association, agreed upon at a preparatory meeting last January in New Delhi, are to: --promote close cooperation among iron ore export- ing countries and ensure orderly growth of the ex- port trade in iron ore; --assist member countries to improve their iron ore export earnings; --encourage domestic processing of iron ore, in- cluding production of iron and steel; .-provide a forum for the exchange of information. The association probably will be based in London, have a permanent board and a secretariat, and arrange periodic ministerial-level meetings. Besides the ini tial 15 invitees, membership will be open to other na- tions that export iron ore or hold substantial ore re- serves. Observer status apparently will not be per- mitted. The organization will be financed by equal con- tributions from member nations. -13- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010002-3 25X1. Approved For Release - T00975AO27600010002-3 National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975 Earlier efforts by India, Algeria, and Venezuela to set up a producers' cartel failed, largely because of the opposition of Australia and, to a lesser extent, that of Canada and Sweden. Brazil, the largest iron ore exporter among the developing countries, has been invest- ing heavily to expand iron ore exports 60 percent by 1980 and does not want to be constrained by production quotas. The other 11 members do not have much market power, because they account for only 14 percent of iron ore output and 30 percent of iron ore exports. Imports account for about 35 percent of US iron ore consumption, but no supply problems for the US are likely to result from establishment of the exporters' group. Canada supplies almost one half of US imports: Venezuela, 32 percent; and Brazil, 14 percent. Vene- zuela nationalized US-owned mines in January, but has assured the US of supplies; Caracas wishes, however boost prices by renegotiating long-term contracts -14- Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Top S VTd For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3 Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010002-3