CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
April 1, 1975
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 Approved For Relea
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 1, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Communists closing in on remaining coastal
towns in Military Region 2; government forces reportedly
abandon Qui Nhon. (Page 1)
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 3)
USSR-US: Soviets are likely to be more confident negotia-
tors at the joint Commercial Commission meetings next
month. (Page 4)
USSR-PORTUGAL: Moscow seeks to strengthen ties with
Portugal. (Page 5)
TURKEY: Demirel takes over reins of government. (Page 8)
IRAN-IRAQ: Progress made toward implementation of ac-
cord during Hoveyda's visit to Baghdad. (Page 10)
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES: Iron ore exporters' associa-
tion, which will be established this week, unlikely to
C
function as a cartel. (Page 13)
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NORTH
nVJETNAM
CAM BODlA
BINH
UINH
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National Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM
April 1, 1975
The Vietnamese communists are pressing their drive
southward along South Vietnam's central coast.
Qui Nhon reportedly was abandoned by government
forces last night. The South Vietnamese 22nd Division,
which had been defending the city, was all but shattered
in heavy fighting. The government's territorial forces
in the Qui Nhon area appear to have heeded communist
calls for an uprising and joined in attacks on the 22nd
Division.
Near Nha Trang,an airborne brigade also has taken
heavy losses and has been forced to pull back. Govern-
ment units will probably be able to offer little more
than token resistance against further communist advances.
Although about 9,000 members of the marine division are
now at Cam Ranh, it is doubtful whether they can be re-
organized in time to come to the rescue of Nha Trang.
Some troops have deserted from Cam Ranh, taking their
weapons with them to Nha Trang, where they are adding
to the panic and confusion, as armed stragglers did in
Da Nang.
Government forces in Military Region 2 have lost
all twelve 175-mm. guns in the region, all fifty four
M-48 tanks, and well over half of the fifty four 155-mm.
guns. Although some attempts were made to destroy am-
munition and fuel stocks in abandoned bases, large quan-
tities remain intact and are now in communist hands.
Regional commanders in the delta are expecting
strong communist attacks against Can Tho and My Tho
cities to begin at any time. These commanders have been
trying to spur their regular units into preemptive ac-
tion against communist formations moving into place for
the anticipated attacks., but without much success. Other
communist attacks are expected near the Cambodian border
as part of an effort to spread government forces thin.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 1, 1975
Even if major attacks against the cities are slow to
develop, the communists appear to have the major South
Vietnamese units on the defensive, and they are likely
to make territorial gains where government forces are
the weakest.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
April 1, 1975
Cambodian army units have shored up the defense line
north of Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport, reducing the
threat of a communist ground penetration toward the air-
field. In order to do so, however, government commanders
have suspended the operation to retake Tuol Leap and to
eliminate insurgent artillery and rocket sites in the
area.
Nearly 40 rockets struck around Pochentong yester-
day, but the airlift continued at a near record pace.
Several rockets also hit near the US embassy in the
southeastern section of Phnom Penh, but there was no
significant damage. The Japanese and Thai embassies
in Phnom Penh plan to close down later this week, and
the South Vietnamese embassy has asked for space for
its personnel aboard US airlift flights returning to
Saigon.
President Lon Nol departed from Pochentong Air-
port today. Prince Sihanouk told newsmen in Peking
yesterday that Lon Nol's departure would not alter
his or the Khmer communists' opposition to negotia-
tions. Sihanouk reportedly said that Lon Nol was
leaving "under pressure from the US" and that the
move was a "trap" into which neither he nor the com-
munists would fall. The Prince predicted a "100-per-
cent" victory for the insurgents.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 1, 1975
USSR-US
The US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission will meet
in Moscow on April 10 for the first time since the demise
of the 1972 trade agreement at the beginning of this
year. The embassy suggests--and we agree--that the
Soviets will probably be more confident negotiators on
this occasion than previously, acting on the conviction
that their bargaining position vis-a-vis the US has im-
proved considerably in recent months.
Moscow will argue that the US is now the chief ben-
eficiary of bilateral trade, reversing the roles of
earlier sessions in which the Soviets tacitly recognized
that they had more to gain. The embassy points out that
the Soviets see the US as being on the defensive because
it failed to deliver on the terms of the trade agreement.
They expect economic recession in the West to spur the
US to seek Soviet orders and anticipate that competition
for the Soviet market from other Western countries will
also stimulate American trade concessions.
Despite what the Soviets may regard as a stronger
bargaining position, they remain keenly interested in
expanded trade with the US. Politically, Moscow values
bilateral commercial ties for their contribution to
detente with the US; economically, the Soviets continue
to regard the US as the preferred source of most capital
nods and technoloqy.r
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National Intelligence Bulletin
USSR-PORTUGAL
April 1, 1975
Moscow is trying to strengthen its ties with Portu-
guese leaders, even at the risk of arousing West Euro-
pean suspicions of Soviet intentions in Portugal.
The Soviets gave unabashed front-page coverage to
Portuguese Labor Minister Costa Martins, who was in
Moscow last week for what would normally have been a
routine visit. Costa Martins, who is a member of the
ruling Armed Forces Movement, met for three hours with
Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Soviet Premier, speaking "on
behalf of the Soviet leadership," expressed solidarity
with the Portuguese government and the Armed Forces Move-
ment. Costa Martins subsequently told the press that
Kosygin had promised that Soviet aid to Portugal would be
forthcoming. Moscow has been notably reluctant to give
the Portuguese, including Communist leader Cunhal, reason
to believe that large doses of economic aid are a live
possibility.
The aid question was probably one of the topics
raised by Portuguese Communist Party Secretary Pato when
he met with Soviet Party Secretary Katushev in Moscow
last week. Pravda's account of this meeting gave little
hint of how the talks went.
Moscow's public coverage of the abortive March 11
coup and its aftermath suggests that its qualms about
Portugal are ebbing. Against this are reports circulat-
ing in Lisbon and elsewhere that the Soviets are still
fearful that the Portuguese political situation is
changing too quickly and that Moscow is doing what it
can to counsel moderation. These reports help Moscow
deal with expressions of concern it has received from
the West Germans, the Italians, and others regarding
Portugal.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
TURKEY
April 1, 1975
Suleyman Demirel took over the reins of government
from Prime Minister Irmak yesterday. President Koruturk
approved a 30-member coalition cabinet drawn from four
rightist parties.
Demirel now has a maximum of one week to prepare
a program for his government and to submit it to parlia-
ment for debate and a vote of confidence. Nine deputies
from the Democratic Party announced last Friday that they
would support Demirel, although press reports indicate
that Demirel's chances have been damaged by four inde-
pendent deputies' withdrawal of support. Even if Dem-
irel fails to get a vote of confidence, however, he would
stay on in a caretaker capacity until another government
is formed.
Demirel's government is built on a shaky foundation.
He has to depend on support from outside the coalition
to give him a majority. The coalition is equally fragile,
based primarily on the shared opposition of four rightist
parties to former prime minister Ecevit and, his left-of-
center Republican People's Party.
The cabinet includes the leaders of the other three
coalition parties. This includes National Salvation
Party leader Erbakan, whose
behavior as Ecevit's coalition partner brought down t e
government last September, and Alparslan Turkes, leader
of the extreme right-wing National Action Party, which
claims to have 100,000 "commandos" at its disposal.
The participation of these two parties poses serious
problems for Demirel. Their inclusion in the government
is likely to contribute to further political polariza-
tion in Turkey and raises the possibility of increased
violence. The military,. which forced Demirel out of
office in 1971, when political violence threatened to get
out of hand, will keep a close watch on developments.
No sharp turns are likely in Turkish policy, although
there will be pressure on Demirel to harden the govern-
ment's stance toward a Cyprus settlement. Demirel will
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 1, 1975
have the support of Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil
and Defense Minister Ferit Melen, both of whom have
served in these positions in previous governments.
Demirel has already announced that the "only solu-
tion on Cyprus is a two-zone federal system." He has
called for an early resumption of US military assistance
to Turkey.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
IRAN-IRAQ
.April 1, 1975
Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda's three-day visit
to Baghdad last week apparently went well. The final
communique expressed mutual satisfaction with progress
toward implementation of the Iranian-Iraqi accord signed
in Algiers on March 6 and pledged both sides to work for
closer cooperation ih all areas.
According to an interview with Iraqi strongman
Saddam Husayn Tikriti in a Tehran newspaper, cooperation
may even extend to a collective security arrangement in
the Persian Gulf. In the interview, published the day
Hoveyda's visit ended, Saddam Husayn purportedly said
that the Algiers agreement "foresaw" such a development.
The communique issued in both capitals, however,
said only that the two sides "affirm that the region
should be spared all foreign interference." This theme
initially appeared in the Iranian press shortly after
the accord was signed. There has been no official Ira-
nian statement on the subject or comment on Saddam Husayn's
alleged remarks.
The Shah has frequently indicated his desire to
arrange closer security cooperation among Gulf countries,
arguing that area security should be the responsibility
of the littoral states. Up to now, he has excluded Bagh-
dad from those with whom he has sought to cooperate.
The Shah has supported US naval activity in the
Persian Gulf as a counter to Soviet naval access to
Iraqi facilities. He considers Soviet influence in Iraq
to be a threat to Iranian and Gulf security, and reduc-
ing that influence has been a principal foreign policy
.goal. The Shah may feel, however, that he has to make
gestures to demonstrate that Iran is not a spokesman
for US policy in the region if he intends to put pres-
sure on Baghdad to reduce its ties to Moscow.
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April 1, 1975
Tehran and Baghdad, meanwhile, have concluded joint
preparations to seal their border upon the expiration to-
day of the cease-fire between Iraq and the Kurdish rebels
announced on March 13.
Beginning today, Iraqi Kurds--both
civilians an ighting men--will no longer be allowed
to take refuge in Iran.
Baghdad has, however, extended until April 30 the
amnesty it has offered to Kurdish refugees in Iran who
return to Iraq. Most of the refugees, believed to number
some 160,000 following the heavy inflow last month, fear
harsh treatment at the hands of the Iraqis; few are ex-
pected to take advantage of the amnesty.
The Iraqi army is expected to waste no time in re-
suming its offensive against pockets of remainin rebels
that was halted when the cease-fire took effect.
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Share of Prospective Association Members in World Iron Ore Production and Exports
Percent
Production Exports
Total
38.8
74.2
LDCs
19.8
39.4
Brazil
5.3
9.1
India
4.2
6.9
Liberia
2.8
6.3
Venezuela
2.4
5.4
Peru
1.6
2.8
Chile
1.i
2.8
Mauritania
1.1
2.8
Algeria
Q.4
0.9
Swaziland
0.4
0.9
Philippines
0.2
0.6
Sierra Leone
0.2
0.6
Tunisia
0.1
0.3
Developed countries
19.0
34.8
Australia
9.3
16.8
Canada
5.4
9.5
Sweden
4.3
8.5
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 1, 1975
An association of iron ore exporters will be estab-
lished at a ministerial-level meeting that opens today
in Geneva. The organization will have no authority to
establish prices or production quotas, but most of its
developing country members will try to push it in that
direction.
Their chances of transforming the association into
an effective cartel are slim. Canada has already de-
cided not to join the association. Australia, Sweden,
and Brazil, other prospective members, also oppose the
formation of a cartel. Together, these four countries
account for 44 percent of world iron ore exports.
The objectives of the association, agreed upon at
a preparatory meeting last January in New Delhi, are to:
--promote close cooperation among iron ore export-
ing countries and ensure orderly growth of the ex-
port trade in iron ore;
--assist member countries to improve their iron ore
export earnings;
--encourage domestic processing of iron ore, in-
cluding production of iron and steel;
.-provide a forum for the exchange of information.
The association probably will be based in London,
have a permanent board and a secretariat, and arrange
periodic ministerial-level meetings. Besides the ini
tial 15 invitees, membership will be open to other na-
tions that export iron ore or hold substantial ore re-
serves. Observer status apparently will not be per-
mitted. The organization will be financed by equal con-
tributions from member nations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 1, 1975
Earlier efforts by India, Algeria, and Venezuela
to set up a producers' cartel failed, largely because
of the opposition of Australia and, to a lesser extent,
that of Canada and Sweden. Brazil, the largest iron ore
exporter among the developing countries, has been invest-
ing heavily to expand iron ore exports 60 percent by
1980 and does not want to be constrained by production
quotas. The other 11 members do not have much market
power, because they account for only 14 percent of iron
ore output and 30 percent of iron ore exports.
Imports account for about 35 percent of US iron ore
consumption, but no supply problems for the US are
likely to result from establishment of the exporters'
group. Canada supplies almost one half of US imports:
Venezuela, 32 percent; and Brazil, 14 percent. Vene-
zuela nationalized US-owned mines in January, but has
assured the US of supplies; Caracas wishes, however
boost prices by renegotiating long-term contracts
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Top Secret
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