CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 9, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
WENIMIMEMM
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
April 9, 1975
N?_ 657
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: No prospects for immediate political solution
or cease-fire. (Page 5)
SYRIA-EGYPT: Sadat's request to reconvene Geneva con-
ference further strains relations between Cairo and Da-
mascus. (Page 7)
GREECE-TURKEY: Athens and Ankara still at loggerheads
over the Aegean. (Page 11)
CYPRUS: Agreement reached which apparently clears the
way for intercommunal talks to resume. (Page 13)
COLOMBIA: Imposition of a state siege under considera-
tion. (Page 16)
JAPAN: Foreign minister arrives in Washington today.
(Page 18)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 19)
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Phnom Penh
Gap in defense line
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I I
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
Cambodian Prime Minister Long Boret returned to
Phnom Penh yesterday and told Ambassador Dean there are
no prospects for an immediate political solution or a
cease-fire.
In Bangkok, Boret met Prince Sihanouk's son,
Norodom Yuvaneath, who said Sihanouk "will not negotiate"
and suggested that his father be invited back to Phnom
Penh, presumably to restore the monarchy. Boret could
not agree to this on his own authority; he instead em-
phasized that his government desired an early political
solution in which Sihanouk would play the key role.
Yuvaneath is en route to Peking to convey the message
to his father.
In Indonesia, Boret obtained Jakarta's help in in-
terceding with Sihanouk through Algerian Foreign Minis-
ter Bouteflika. Boret said Bouteflika had also agreed
to help and that if the slightest encouragement from
Sihanouk were forthcoming, Boret would be available im-
mediately to work out the details.
Sihanouk denied yesterday that any "authorized rep-
resentative" had met Boret in Bangkok. He earlier crit-
icized Indonesian President Suharto for "meddling" with
the Cambodian situation.
In his conversation with Ambassador Dean, Boret
also discussed evacuation plans in the event of a col-
lapse in the defense of Phnom Penh. Two days earlier,
Cambodian President Koy also asked Dean about the evac-
uation of Khmer leaders under such circumstances. The
ambassador told both officials that some space would be
available aboard US aircraft, but that he was not in a
position to determine who or how many could be accomo-
dated.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 9, 1975
Khmer communist forces have launched new attacks
on the east bank of the Mekong opposite Phnom Penh but
have not exploited their gains. Northwest of the cap-
ital, government elements have had little success in
reestablishing control over recently lost positions on
the outer defense line.
Along Route 4, recently established government de-
fensive positions at Ang Snoul have come under insurgent
fire. the recent rains have
forced many insurgents from prepared positions south of
the highway. The government commander in this area be-
lieves that this will aid in defense operations at Ang
Snoul by denying avenues of approach to the insurgents.
Southeast of Phnom Penh, the Cambodian army's high
command has ordered its weakened defenses along Route
1 reinforced to block anticipated communist attacks.
However, this effort probably will not greatly improve
the government's ability to contain a concerted Assault
by the insurgents.
In the outlying areas, government counterattacks at
Prey Veng have apparently halted communist advances.
At Kompong Speu, rice and ammunition deliveries have
improved the government's situation. Cambodian army
troops have been shifted from other areas of the town
to contain insurgent attacks against the eastern de-
fenses, where heavy fighting is expected to continue.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SYRIA-EGYPT
April 9, 1975
Relations between Damascus and Cairo have come under
greater strain following President Sadat's uncoordinated
request for the reconvening of the Geneva peace confer-
ence. Syrian suspicions that Sadat is still trying to
obtain a separate Sinai disengagement agreement have also
been strengthened by Sadat's unilateral extension of the
UN mandate until the end of July and his pledge to re-
open the Suez Canal.
Sa at s tendency to act unilaterally has been
a chronic bone of contention between Damascus and Cairo
and a major source of Syrian distrust and dislike of the
Egyptian President.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
In fact, the Syrians have yet to say anything pub-
licly about Sadat's moves. Instead, they have vented
their frustrations largely on the US. The government
and Baath Party press have attacked US Middle East policy
and expressed strong skepticism that a US policy reassess-
ment will lead to any real change in Washington's approach
to negotiations.
The Syrian press has lately demanded a prior commit-
ment from Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and
recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians before
the Geneva conference is reconvened. One columnist in
the Baath Party paper even hinted that Syria might boycott
the peace talks unless Israel makes such commitments.
,we believe
Asad will continue to advocate more formal Syrian-Pales-
tinian ties simply because he seems to have few other
ways at present of exerting any leverage over Cairo.
Indeed,
Asad probably still sees no alternative to trying to
work with Egypt to obtain his own objectives; this would
account for the.absence of public Syrian attacks on Egyp-
tian policy so far. Therefore, whatever actions Damascus
takes over the next few months are likely to be aimed,
at least in part, at curbing Sadat's independence and
forcing him to coordinate his moves more closely with the
Syrians.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
The Egyptians, for their part, believe they are the
aggrieved party. Sadat feels that he proved his Arab
credentials sufficiently by rejecting Israel's demand
for a non-belligerency pact and thus forfeiting the re-
turn of Egyptian territory. He is clearly resentful
that even this has not stopped Syrian attacks on Egyptian
policy. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's harsh anti-
Egyptian comments at an Arab foreign ministers' meeting
just after the suspension of disengagement negotiations
probably led directly to Sadat's deliberate snub of Asad
a few days later at King Faysal's funeral.
Although Sadat and Asad have usually gotten along
well in personal contacts, Sadat seems deliberately to
have limited occasions for such contacts since the 1973
war in an effort to maintain his freedom of action in
negotiations. The resultant deterioration in relations,
however, has increased rather than decreased Sadat's
problems with Syria and threatens ultimately to place
even more constraints on his ability to maneuver.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
Greece and Turkey are still at loggerheads over the
Aegean, with each side maintaining that its actions are
justified because of a threat from the other.
A high-level Greek Foreign Ministry official has
admitted to the US embassy that Athens has sent troops
to the Dodecanese and other islands in the Aegean in con-
travention of international treaty. The forces include
military aircraft on Limnos. He said the action was
necessary because Turkish leaders had repeatedly made
threatening statements about the islands.
The official said that Athens was exercising re-
straint but could not allow more Turkish overflights of
the islands, which he claimed caused panic among the
civilian population and created uncertainties which had
economic implications throughout Greece, such as bank
withdrawals, hoarding, and discouragement of the tourist
trade.
The Turks, for their part, view Athens' fortifica-
tion of the islands as clear provocation. Turkish For-
eign Minister Caglayangil told the US embassy on Monday
that Ankara simply cannot have "armed aircraft carriers"
so close to its shores. He said that, given the Greek
actions, it was essential for Turkey to monitor the sit-
uation to see what was going on. He said the Turkish
military had told him that its planes were not flying
directly over the islands.
The Turkish government yesterday again denied that
it had violated Greek air space and publicly charged
Greece with a military buildup on the island. It said
that, Turkish aircraft will continue to fly over the
Aegean in accordance with the rights given it by inter-
national law.
. The Greeks believe that the Turks are trying to in-
timidate them, as well as to establish a de facto role
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
for the Turkish armed forces in the Aegean. A Greek
air force officer says that F-5 aircraft sent to Limnos
late last month are to be used to intercept Turkish air-
craft entering Greek air space. The officer claims that
the planes will first try to divert the Turks and, if un-
successful, will shoot the planes down. Athens has so far
fired at the aircraft with 40-mm. antiaircraft guns but
failed to hit them.
The Turkish navy has also established an Aegean task
force command at Izmir which will most likely be subor-
dinated to the Aegean Command. The Fourth Army will serve
as a nucleus to.which units from other commands can be
assigned to bring it to full strength. Divisional units
will not immediately relocate to the Aegean coast.
Forces having the mission of defending the eastern shoul-
der of the Bosporus and the eastern shores of the Sea
of Marmara may also be assigned to the Fourth Army.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CYPRUS
April 9, 1975
The Cyprus intercommunal talks will resume April 28
in Vienna, although sharp differences have arisen over
the Greek Cypriot negotiating strategy.
Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot sector,
announced yesterday that agreement had finally been
reached on the role of the UN Secretary General and the
venue of the talks. Denktash also announced that he
would act as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator in at least
the first sessions. Denktash said that Secretary General
Waldheim would play. no substantive role in the talks, al-
though he could be of assistance on subjects mutually
agreed on by the negotiators.
The talks are reportedly scheduled. to last only until
May 2, providing very little time to reach agreement on
the sensitive issues to be discussed. The talks may con-
tinue at a lower level of representation after May 2,
with Denktash and possibly Clerides returning home, or
the talks themselves could be transferred back to Nicosia.
Clerides' role as the negotiator for the Greek
Cypriots has been clouded in the past week, as a result
of an apparent dispute with Archbishop Makarios over
negotiating strategy. Clerides has come under sharp
attack from pro-Makarios press and political groups as
a result of a speech on April 1 in which he set out the
realities of the Cypriot situation as he saw them.
Clerides argued that a bizonal federation as desired
by the Turks was probably the solution that would pro-
vide the Greek Cypriots with the best opportunity of
regaining some of the territory lost last summer and of
achieving strong guarantees for the future. He also
took issue with the concept of a "long-term struggle,"
a phrase that Makarios has used. Clerides said that only
made sense if the Greek side expected eventually to re-
sort to armed conflict to recoup its losses. Otherwise,
a "long-term struggle" would only result in freezing
the Turkish position.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
These statements drew immediate and heavy fire from
pro-Makarios elements, but Clerides has not backed down
and has repeated the ideas in subsequent speeches.F_
There have, in fact, been several calls in the press
for Clerides' resignation in recent days, and even reports
that he has already resigned. Press reports from Ankara
claim Clerides has denied presenting his resignation.
Clerides, however, is not above using the threat to
resign as a tactic, perhaps in an effort to gain reas-
surances of support that will tie Makarios, and possibly
the Greek government, to the unpopular concessions
Clerides will have to make to obtain a settlement. Re-
ports have already surfaced that Greek Prime Minister
Karamanlis has asked Clerides to stay on.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 9, 1975
The National Security Council and the Council of
Ministers met on April 3 to consider implementing a
state of siege if growing labor problems and student
unrest reach serious proportions in coming weeks.
Security officers are concerned with the recent in-
crease in low-level insurgency by at least two of the
country's three guerrilla groups. The reported recent
meeting of leaders of these groups has led some govern-
ment officials to conclude that the insurgents are test-
ing the Lopez administration's ability to counter sub-
version. In addition, students in a southwestern prov-
ince have been demonstrating in support of peasant
marches against the government's economic policies.
Other peasant disturbances have also been reported in
the western and northern areas of the country.
Despite President Lopez' reluctance to impose a
state of siege, he may soon be forced to do so if
guerrilla activity and demonstrations continue. Security
forces would be capable of effectively containing unrest
should a state of siege be imposed. Such a measure has
been used successfully several times in the past. Fur-
thermore, the government could find a state of siege
useful to avoid demonstrations following an impending
increase in the price of gasoline.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa arrives
in Washington today for talks with Secretary Kissinger,
their first meeting since Miyazawa assumed his post in
December. One purpose of the visit is to lay the ground-
work for a possible visit later this year by Prime Min-
ister Miki, but Miyazawa will be anxious to discuss major
substantive issues as well.
Of greatest importance to Miyazawa, despite the
rush of events in Indochina, are the issues of Middle
Eastern peace and the possibility of another Arab oil
embargo. Miyazawa will be anxious to hear US appraisals
of the military situation and of the prospects for re-
suming talks on an interim agreement between Egypt and
Israel. He will also want to explore the outlook for
reconvening the Geneva conference.
The preliminary conference of oil producers and
consumers, now in session in Paris, is also of prime
concern to Tokyo. With negligible reserves of oil, gas,
and coal, the Japanese have difficulty in accepting US
views on the use of floor prices for imported oil to
encourage development of alternative energy sources.
A second major area of discussion will be Indochina.
Japan has never felt its security directly tied to events
in Indochina and is presently intent mainly on not iden-
tifying with either of the warring parties. Miyazawa,
however, will try to highlight areas of potential US-
Japanese cooperation in Indochina, focusing on humani-
tarian measures.
The foreign minister may also ask the US to reaf-
firm security commitments to Japan--in the context of the
Miki government's long-standing desire to win right-wing
support for ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Linked with the security issue will be the prob-
lem of nuclear weapons on visiting US warships.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 9, 1975
Despite some differences of opinion--on oil and on
Indochina--Miyazawa comes to the US as a long-time friend
and supporter of the US-Japan alliance. Furthermore,
because Miyazawa has been cultivating the ruling party's
right wing in an effort to enhance his acceptability for
a possible future bid for the prime ministership, he
will try to avoid overt controversy with the US. The
Miki government, moreover, is still uncertain of its
political strength and on the eve of important local
elections is determined to avoid any hint of disorder in
relations with a major ally.
South Korea: President Pak issued a new "emergency
decree yesterday to help control persistent student
dissent. The decree permitted authorities to close down
Seoul's Korea University, occupy the campus with troops,
and arrest students without warrant. It also provides
penalties of up to ten years in jail. Three other Seoul
universities have been closed down by school administra-
tors. Both the students and the government have linked
their actions to events in Indochina. The students
charge that the Pak government, because it is corrupt
and unpopular, may become as vulnerable as the Thieu
regime. A government spokesman has asserted that a
communist threat similar to that in Indochina exists in
Korea, making it necessary to maintain a firm hand in
dealing with dissent.
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