CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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arrangement
letter dtd
4/11 /08.
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
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National 1 ntel l igence
Bulletin
Top Secret
April 17, 1975
N?_ 657
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National Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA
April 17,.1975
The Cambodian government this morning surrendered
to Khmer communist forces who have apparently taken over
most of Phnom Penh. The initial announcement was made
by .the Cambodian embassy in Bangkok, based on reports
reaching there from government sources in Pkinom Penh.
Few details are available, but a cease-fire is report-
edly in effect, and the capital is described as calm.
The situation in the countryside is unclear
The fate of same 30 westerners, including a number
of U5 journalists, who are holed up in a hotel in the
northern part of the city is not known. Red Cross rep-
resentatives in Geneva esterda declared tYie hotel a
"neutral zone."
Three aircraft carrying nearly 90 officers and depen-
dents landed yesterday, and other air-
craft are expected. So far, there is no word on whether
any senior government officials have escaped. Ambassa-
dor Dean yesterday talked by telepYione with Prime P~inis-
ter Long Boret, who asked about the possibility of hav-
ing helicopters sent to evacuate government leaders and
their dependents.
On the international front, a number o:E nations are
switching or planning to switch diplomatic recognition
to Sihanouk's government. Turkey announced its recogni-
tion of Sihanouk's regime yesterday, and Australia plans
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
to follow suit today. Canberra has also pledged "sub-
stantial" postwar reconstruction aid. The Indonesian
Foreign P~iinistry has ordered its ambassadors in Thai-
land, T~Ialaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines to sound
out their host governments on recognition within a week
after the new Cambodian government assumes power. ~ j
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nlational Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Surrender reported this morning.
VIETNAM: Military and political situation. (Page 1)
THAILAND: Various problems have to be overcome before
formal ties with China can be established. (Page 6)
MBFR: Talks recess today. (Page 7)
US5R: Central Committee satisfied with detente and
peace program." (Page 8)
USSR: Central Committee begins preparations for next
congress in February. (Page 10)
PHILIPPINES: Marcos' recent foreign policy efforts.
Page 11)
ARGENTINA: Escalation of terrorism planned to protest
Secretary Kissinger's visit. (Page 14)
PORTUGAL: New economic measures move Portugal closer to
soda ism. (Page 16 )
THE NETHERLANDS: Labor Party-calls for changes in de-
ense program. (Page 18)
LEBANON: Palestinians and Phalangists agree to cease-
fir~:? (Page 20)
BRAZIL: Brasilia considering support for the Latin
Ameri an Economic System. (Page 21)
RHODESIA: Resumption of talks on a constitutional set-
t ement appears unlikely. (Page 22)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 23)
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CAPITAL
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Phan Thiet
SOUTH VIETNAM
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
April 17, 1975
The arrival of additional combat units north of Sai-
gon, coupled with heavy government losses east of the
capital, is setting the stage for heavy new communist
attacks within the next two weeks along the western,
northern, and eastern approaches to Saigon.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 19'75
Although South Vietnamese forces are still holding
Xuan Loc, their positions around he city and on the
roads west of town are rapidly becoming untenable.
The North Vietnamese launched strong attacks on the
airborne brigade just outside of Xuan Loc yesterday.
Since other government units defending the perimeter of
the city were not attacked, regional officials believe
the communists deliberately attacked the strongest unit,
hoping to inflict a major loss and thereby sap the re-
solve of the remaining defenders.
The communists have been putting heavy pressure on
the junction of routes 1 and 20 west of Xuan Loc and now
control the intersection and much of the surrounding ter-
rain. A series of sharp attacks on a South Vietnamese
regiment forced it to retreat yesterday.
About 300 survivors made their way back to South
Vietnamese lines, but the regiment is no J_onger an ef-
fective fighting force. Furthermore, the eight artil-
lery pieces destroyed were providing good support to
government forces in the area, and the loss of this sup-
port further erodes the government?s overall position in
the Xuan Loc area.
With the rout of the regiment and the fall of. Kiem
Tan district town, the communists now have complete con-
trol of Route 20 and can bring additional combat units
directly to the Xuan Loc area from the southern high-
lands. The communists may decide to leave Xuan Loc iso-
lated and move their force west toward Bien Hoa and Sai-
gon.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
Communist forces, including parts of the North Viet-
namese 3rd Division from Binh Dinh Province, routed the
government's defenders at the coastal enclave of Phan
Rang yesterday.
Remnants of a recently rebuilt 2nd Division regi-
ment, along with the division commander, were apparently
evacuated by sea, but the few survivers of the airborne
and ranger units are believed to be withdrawing overland
toward Phan Thiet to the southwest.
Some regional officials are blaming President Thieu
.for the defeat at Phan Rang because he had personally
ordered the now-shattered forces into this exposed north-
ern enclave. We have no recent reports from Phan Thiet,
but the communists are likely to continue their southward
thrust through Phan Thiet and then follow Route 1 west
toward Saigon.
In the delta, at least two additional North Vietnam-
ese regiments have moved Di h Tuon Province from
the Cambodian border area
the Nart Viet-
namese could have as many as nine in an ry regiments
concentrated in the province, and Saigon could soon lose
control of Route 4.
To counter this new communist. buildup, the commander
of the delta region shifted some forces yesterday. He
assigned both the South Vietnamese 7th and 9th divisions
to the most threatened areas.
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National Intelligence bulletin
.April 17, 1975
Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan is discovering
that hastening the establishment of formal. ties with
China may not be as easy as he had hoped. He now con-
siders it unlikely that relations can be normalized before
the end of the year.
a c ai is apprehensive that
various ranc es o e government opposed to diplomatic
recognition will be brought into the decision-making
process.
One of the most formidable obstacles confronting
Bangkok concerns the legal status of Thailand's sizable
overseas Chinese population. Many of the approximately
800,000 Chinese are citizens of the Nationalist govern-
ment on Taiwan. Large numbers of this group might switch
their citizenship to Peking once Bangkok revered ties with
Taiwan. Many others would probably prefeY~ to apply for
Thai citizenship. Offering Thai citizenship to this
group, whose political loyalties have long been suspect,
is a highly controversial issue within the government.
Chatchai is under pressure from military and police
officials to go slow in normalizing relations, out of
fear that a Chinese embassy in Bangkok might serve as a
center for espionage and subversion. He will also have
to take into consideration the views of the politically
powerful Chinese business community, many of whom have
extensive commercial dealings with Taiwan.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
The fifth round of the force reduction talks in
Vienna ends today. There has been no progress in re-
solving basic differences, and the talks remain stale-
mated. They are scheduled to resume in mid-May.
Both East and West marked time during this round.
The Soviets and their allies offered a revised scenario
for negotiating their proposal of last October that e
called for initial reductions of 20,000 men by both sides
in 1975. They also offered to amend slightly their basic
proposal of November 1973. Eastern representatives com-
mented informally that they did not expect the West to
take these proposals seriously and were not surprised
when the Western delegations rejected them.
Neither East nor West has shown signs during this
round that they are overly disturbed by the lack of
progress in Vienna. The Soviets have never appeared to
be under time pressure during the talks. Various Soviet
officials have implied that there would be no movement
in Vienna until the European security conference in Ge-
neva concludes in a satisfactory manner. In addition,
there have been some indications that Moscow is aware
that the West is considering a modification of its basic
proposals, and the Soviets apparently are content to
await such an initiative.
The West Europeans, who have expressed some concern
about the stalemate in the past, are now waiting for the
US to take the lead on modifying the Western position.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
The resolution issued by yesterday's Central Commit-
tee plenum expressed satisfaction with the fruits of the
four-year-old Soviet "peace program" and endorsed con-
tinuation of a detente policy. The resolution also ob-
served, however, that the successes of Soviet foreign
policy were based on Soviet economic and military strength,
and noted that the forces of war and reaction were still
active. Its tone was reminiscent of the last such reso-
lution in 1973, although it was perhaps a shade more con-
fident about Soviet achievements.
The resolution put the party's stamp of approval on
further progress in the MBFR talks and SALT by holding
that political detente must be accompanied by military
detente, including arms reductions. It also noted the
continuing importance of bilateral and multilateral sum-
mitry in improving international relations.
In light of recent international developments, the
Soviet leadership apparently concluded that this was an
appropriate time for a foreign policy review. Like past
Central Committee resolutions, this one is short on spe-
cifics.
In contrast to the 1973 resolution, however, the
present one makes no reference to China nor to Vietnam.
Omitting the former may reflect Moscow's desires to avoid
the appearance of doing polemical battle with Peking at
a time when the Soviets are trying to prepare the ground-
work for international. communist party conferences. In
leaving out Vietnam, the Soviets may be displaying sen-
sitivity to the implications for detente of: the communist
gains there.
The plenum's emphasis on foreign policy jibes with
reports that Moscow has begun a broad assessment of So-
viet relations with the West in preparation for the
party congress next February.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
--World developments since the last party congress
in 1971 have demonstrated the correctness of Mos-
cow's detente policy, and the policy should be con-
tinued.
--The capitalist powers retain great strength and
resilience and will rebound from their current
economic crisis.
--The economic rewards of detente, especially the
increased imports of Western technology,Rwill not
in thems-elves obviate the need for changes in the
Soviet political and economic structure if the USSR
is to close the technology gap with the West.
This interpretation of Soviet thinking is obviously
subject to change, and other Soviets might be prepared
to argue that the foreign policy line should be adjusted
to take advantage of the changing world situation. None-
theless, it is consistent with other signs of the mood
in Moscow. A recent article in Pravda by the minister
of foreign trade, which highlighted the rapid growth of
trade with the West, took a strongly self-confident
stance, contrasting the strengthened political, economic,
and military posture of the U55R with the troubles of
the West. During Secretary Simon's visit to Moscow last
week, the Soviets made it clear that, while their inter-
est in bilateral trade is still high, it is up to the US
to remave political obstacles to increased trade.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
USSR
The Soviet party Central Committee meeting in Moscow
yesterday signaled the beginning of preparations for the
next party congress and eliminated one of the potential
runners in the long-term race to succeed General Secretary
Brezhnev. The removal of trade unions chief Aleksandr
Shelepin from the Politburo does little to clarify the
succession picture, however, and there could well be ad-
ditional moves within the leadership between now and the
convening of the congress.
Brezhnev was clearly in charge at the plenum, de-
livering a report on plans for the congress, now set for
February 24, 1976. Foreign Minister Gromy:ko delivered
a report on foreign affairs, which is usually given by
Brezhnev. This continues the trend toward greater col-
lectivity in the leadership that has been apparent since
the General Secretary's illness this winter. Since his
return to public view, Brezhnev has been pacing himself
more carefully. As a result, greater public exposure
has been given to his colleagues.
The decision setting the date for the party congress
has come earlier and more smoothly than for the 24th
congress in 1971. This suggests satisfaction on the part
of the leaders with present political conditions and con-
fidence in their ability to set the course of the Soviet
Union over the next five years.
The announcement of the opening date for the congress
should trigger a cycle of party meetings which will begin
in the fall and continue up through the hierarchy, ending
by late January or early February. Personnel shifts will
probably be occurring from now on at all levels within
the party, and final results of these shifts will deter-
mine the relative political strength of the various
Soviet leaders for the next several years. ,
Shelepin has long been regarded warily by some of
his colleagues as a dangerous combination of ability and
ambition, and his departure from the Kremlin removes a
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 197.5
potential element of instability in the leadership. In
1965, he mounted a serious but unsuccessful challenge to
Brezhnev's leadership. When that failed, his career
took a precipitous slide. In 1967, he was removed from
the party Secretariat and given the trade unions post--a
traditionally powerless figurehead position-?-but he still
remained on the Politburo.
Shelepin's visit to England and Scotland last month
was greeted by a tremendous outcry in the British press
against him personally as a former chief of the KGB and.
clearly hurt his prospects for the future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
Recent developments in Indochina are giving President
Marcos an opportunity to intensify his efforts to create
a more independent foreign policy and to erase Manila's
image as an American client state. Despite the current
rhetoric, US-Philippine bilateral arrangements are un-
likely to be radically changed, at least in the near term.
Recent public questioning of the value of the mutual
defense treaty and of the US bases is partly intended to
remind Washington not to take the Philippines for granted.
Marcos has raised these issues before, when he felt the
US was not responding sufficiently to his needs for dip-
lomatic, economic, or military support.
Talks on the future of the bases in fact have been
stalled for some time because Marcos himself has demurred
on scheduling. There are indications, however, that he
wants to establish a definite quid pro quo for the bases,
either as an annual rent or as a long--rangE: military aid
package for modernizing his armed forces, which are
heavily committed against Muslim insurgent: in the south-
ern Philippines. Marcos may well assume that chances of
greater US military assistance will increase, once the
Vietnam war is aver.
Since declaring martial law in 1972, Marcos has been
trying to balance Philippine foreign policy by improving
relations with communist as well as with Third World
states. He has established diplomatic relations with
the East European states, is negotiating a trade agree-
ment with the-USSR, and has held preliminary discussions
with Moscow on the possible establishment of diplomatic
ties. Philippine representatives are currently discuss-
ing diplomatic relations with the Chinese i.n Tokvo
A major impetus to the current pro - Third World
and anti-US rhetoric in the Manila press comes from the
coterie of Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos. Mrs.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
Marcos has made several highly publicized trips to Third
World states, in addition to her excursion to Peking last
fall. She claims to be a vital link in Manila's contacts
with Asian communist leaders. Her actions of late sug-
gest she is trying to make Third World relations her own
foreign policy bailiwick, partly to enhance her status
as an independent political power in the Philippine gov-
ernment.
Despite the approaches to communist powers and Ma-
nila's assertiveness toward the U5, Marcos privately has
often been more cooperative with US interests in the
Philippines since martial law than before. Without op-
position party and with total control over the media,
Marcos will continue to have the luxury of speaking for
the record one way while acting a different way privately.
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National Intelligence ~~lletin
ARGENTINA
April 17, 1975
Leftist guerrilla groups are planning to escalate
terrorism for the next several days to protest the visits
of Chilean President Pinochet and Secretary Kissinger.
Pinochet will meet with President Peron on Friday
in the resort town of Bariloche, and Secretary Kissinger
is scheduled to arrive in Buenos Aires very early the
morning of April 24. He will depart on the morning of
April 25 for Brasilia.
Massive security p
both visitors,
recautions are being arra
During the past few days, terrorists have struck
several military installations throughout the country
and tried, for the second time, to kill the chief of the
Federal Police. These attacks, however, probably are a
result of the growing concern among terrorist leaders
aver the threat posed by right-wing death squads.
The Peron government has scored some success against
the well-organized extremists, but a definite turning
point in the struggle is not yet in sight. The terrorists
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National Intelligence bulletin
April 17, 1975
continue to mount sophisticated and spectacular operations.
Until the security services achieve a significant Intel-
ligence breakthrough--and are able to follow up on it--
the running battle in the streets between right and left
will continue.
Last month, the struggle claimed roughly two victims
per day; this month's toll will go even higher. As many
as 300 people may have been killed in political violence
this ear.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
The Portuguese cabinet announced on Tuesday measures
designed to give a fresh impetus to the economy and to
move Portugal closer to socialism. The measures which
include further nationalization of Portugal's basic in-
dustries, price controls, and a start on agrarian reform
were formulated in response to a directive: from the mili-
tary Revolutionary Council issued last Sat:.urday.
Movement leaders want to increase national economic
independence because they fear a conspiracy to frustrate
their revolution with "economic sabotage." While recog-
nizing Portugal's need for foreign investment and in-
creased foreign trade, Prime Minister Gonsalves warned
last week that Portugal should prepare itself for a pos-
sible international "economic boycott." The Armed Forces
Movement wants not only to reduce Portugal's dependence
on foreign assistance but also to break the grip of the
small number of wealthy families who ran the Portuguese
economy during the Salazar and Gaetano regimes.
The Movement cannot blame all its economic problems
on the oligarchy, however. Dissatisfied workers have
taken over several factories, farm laborers have seized
large estates, strikes have been threatened, and produc-
tion has been decreasing. By appealing to the workers
for increased production, the Movement hopes to involve
them in the economic process.
The government's new economic measures include:
--the immediate nationalization of Portugal's trans-
portation lines, electricity companies, and firms
involved in the petroleum and steel industries;
--a study of applying nationalization measures to
the tobacco, cement, beer, fertilizer, cellulose,
petrochemical, pharmaceutical, ship-k~uilding, and
heavy machinery industries;
--the initiation of a program of agrarian reform
that limits owners of irrigated farmland to 125 acres
and extends credit to small and medium farmers;
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
--the formation of a program of national employment
to create .new jobs within two months;
--the institution of a price control policy that will
fix prices on essential foods until the end of the
year.
As in the nationalization of banks and insurance
companies last month, foreign businesses are largely un-
affected by the latest measures. One of the companies
placed under government control is 25 percent foreign
owned, but the foreign interest will not be affected.
Government officials have repeatedly gone out of their
way to reassure foreign businessmen and to encourage
foreign investment.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
The Labor Party Congress, dominated by young leftist
radicals, adopted on April 12 a number of resolutions
that call for defense reductions, eventual withdrawal
from NATO unless progress on detente is achieved, and a
cheaper replacement for the F-104 than the F-16.
The resolutions are not binding on the five-party
coalition government and Foreign Minister van der Stoel
on April 15 announced that his country's foreign policy
will not be altered. Prime Minister den Cfyl, in a closing
speech at the congress, avoided comment on the resolutions,
but did question how detente could be advanced by under-
mining NATO.
The leftists pressed the congress to call for a
reduction in defense spending to 3 percent of national
income before the end of 1978. There is to be no in-
crease in support to NATO and no new military training
facilities. The resolution also calls on NATO to declare
that it would not initiate a nuclear attack and urges a
considerable reduction in tactical nuclear arms to pave
the way for a nuclear-free Europe. Dutch military per-
sonnel would be relieved of all nuclear weapons assign-
ments, and NATO would be required to remove tactical nu-
clear weapons from the country if it fails to include
them in the MBFR talks prior to 1978.
After a bitter debate, the congress declared that
the F-104 replacement should be a reasonably cheap air-
craft that must not be so technically and qualitatively
advanced as to stimulate the armaments race. It should
perform no nuclear role and be designed only to provide
support to ground forces. The government is expected
to reach a decision on the replacement by the end of
April.
Although the resolutions are not binding, they do
pose problems for Prime Minister den Uyl and other mod-
erate Labor Party leaders who head the key ministries of
defense and finance. The Prime Minister expects the NATO
membership question to be revived prior to the national
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Rlatior~~l lnte!li~ence BulO~tin
April 17, 1975
elections in May 1977. Should he support the anti-NATO
Labor Party resolutions, the Catholic and Antirevolution-
ary parties would likely refuse to join in a future coa-
lition. On the other hand, should den Uy1 fail to sup-
port the Labor platform., he could be dropped as the par-
ty's candidate.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 1975
Palestinian and Phalangist leaders yesterday agreed
to a cease-fire in Beirut. Sporadic firing continued
after the accord was announced, apparently the work of
isolated units from both sides that failed to get the
word.
As announced by Prime Minister Sulh, the agreement
obliges the two groups to withdraw all their farces from
public places. The agreement is to be enforced by the
Lebanese internal security services rather than the army,
which has managed to stay out of the fighting.
The Phalangists accepted the cease-fire agreement
only after suffering heavy property damage and many
casualties. President Franjiyah and othe~? Christian
leaders apparently persuaded Phalanges Party leader
Jumayyil that prolonged fighting would draw in major
fedayeen units, which could defeat the Phalangists.
Leaders of the three most radical fedayeen groups
met with their more moderate colleagues iri Beirut yes-
terday morning and reportedly agreed to go along with
the cease-fire. They presumably were per:~uaded to take
this step by their own heavy losses and doubts that the
larger fedayeen organizations, Fatah and Saiga, would
enter the fighting in force.
The moderates' refusal to become heavily involved
in fighting probably was the result of a calculation
that a major encounter with the Lebanese army during
the uncertainty over Middle East peace negotiations
would only play into the hands of Arab "rejectionists"
and reduce further the likelihood that the Palestine
Liberation Organization would be invited to the Geneva
talks .
Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the Syrian-controlled Saiga
organization, kex~t his followers out of the dispute
~~
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National .Intelligence Bulletin
April 17, 197
Reoent comments by Brazilian officials on the pro-
posed Latin American Economic System (SELA) being pushed
by Mexico and Venezuela suggest that Brasilia is giving
serious thought to eventual support for the group.
The comments were sparked by the visit of Venezuela's
planning secretary to Brasilia, where he held talks with
President Geisel, the heads of seven ministries, and the
chief of the National Development Bank. Despite the lack
of visible, concrete results, the number of top-level
contacts is an indication that Brazil attached consider-
able importance to the visit.
Foreign Minister Silveira told newsmen that Brazil-
ian participation is under study and depends on whether
the group, if formed, proves "operationally effective"
and "able to meet the needs of its members." Other For-
eign Ministry sources stressed that the group should not
be aimed at confrontation with the US and must be better
run than existing hemispheric organizations if Brazil is
to join.
Brazil is wary of attempts by other Latin nations
to establish tYiemselves as competitors for 'regional 'lead-
ership. Until recently, Argentina :had been the main
source of concern. Now, however, Mexico and particularly
Venezuela, which have championed the creation of an ex-
clusively Latin economic system, have emerged as claim-
ants for such a role. By holding open the possibility
of eventual participation, the Brazilians appear to take
seriously the prospects for SELA, especially in view of
the wealth and aggressive political leadership provided
by Venezuela.
For the time being, Brasilia is postponing a com-
mitment, until it can more accurately gauge the appeal
of SELA. The Brazilians genuinely wish to avoid provok-
ing the US, their most important trading partner. At
the same time, however, Brasilia does not wish to remain
outside the group if it holds the promise of attracting
substantial Latin support. If SELA does become viable,
Brazilian membership is a very real possibility. Indeed,
Brazil's active participation would enhance SE d in-
duce other undecided nations to join as well.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 17, 1975
RHODESIA
Talks between Rhodesian Prime Minster Smith and the
African National Council on a cons titutiona:l settlement
appear unlikely to~reopen soon. Although the decision of
Rhodesian nationalist leader Ndabaningi Sithole earlier
this week not to return to Salisbury from Tanzania re-
moves one obstacle to resuming the talks, recent state-
ments by council leaders strongly suggest tYiey are not
ready to deal with Smith. Smith himself put a new obsta-
cle in the way of further talks by arresting 18 other
nationalists earlier this month.
The council broke off talks with Smith in early
March after Sithole was detained by Rhodesian authorities
on vague charges of plotting to kill rival council lead-
ers. Under pressure from South Africa, Smith released
Sithole to attend a special OAU meeting last week on
southern Africa in Dar es Salaam. Rather than return
home to possible reimprisonment, Sithole announced he was
remaining to set up a new council office in the Tanzanian
capital.
According to the Zambian foreign minister, Rhodesia
placed no time limit on how long Sithole could remain
outside the country. Smith presumably is glad to be rid
of Sithole, whom he has always regarded as the most intran-
sigent of all the council leaders. PresumaY~ly, both Smith
and the nationalists can now ignore the technical ques-
tion of whether or not Sithole is still in detention and
could resume negotiating if they choose.
Council leaders, however, are raising other condi-
tions they say Smith must meet before talks can begin
again. Bishop Muzorewa, head of the council, implied
to tYie OAU session that talks could not resume unless
Smith fulfilled all of the conditions of the truce agree-
ment both sides accepted list December. He specifically
cited Smith's failure to release all political detainees,
the continuation of political trials and exE~cutions in
Rhodesia, and Smith's refusal to remove restrictions on
travel inside Rhodesia by nationalist leaders. The coun-
cil also said that there would be no meeting with Smith
until the 18 nationalists arrested this month were re-
leased.
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i i
Natienal Intelligence bulletin April 17, 1975
Egypt: At least 21 recently delivered Soviet MIG-23
Flogg~ers are being assembled at Jiyanklis.Air Base near
Alexandria by some 150 Soviet contract technicians. The
defense attache indicates the Egyptians expect to have
two Flogger squadrons operational in about nine months.
This is robabl a realistic ob~'ective.
North K?rea: President Kim Il-song, who only rarely
travels abroad, will soon visit Peking, possibly as early
as Friday. E-Ie is likely to discuss the implications of
the deteriorating US position in Indochina for the Korean
peninsula and may also seek increased Chinese aid and
political support. The visit is the North Korean leader@s
first announced trip abroad since 1965 when he went to
Indonesia. The last time Kim is known to have visited
Peking was in 1961, at which time he signed a mutual de-
fense treaty with China.
Chad: Anine-member ruling military council was
formed?n April 15, t.wo days after the coup against Presi-
dent Tombalbaye. The council president is General Malloum,
the well-respected former armed forces commander who had
been detained by Tombalbaye since 1973 for alleged coup
plotting. Colonel Djime, commander of the gendarmerie
and one of three top military leaders arrested by
Tombalbaye earlier this month, has been installed as
vice president. General Odingar, who led the coup
against Tombalbaye, is a member of the council. The co~~..:--
cil has established four commissions to administer the
government and has promised additional appointments soon.
The constitution has been suspended, the National Assembly
dissolved, and all political activity has been banned.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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