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December 20, 2016
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May 16, 2006
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April 21, 1975
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Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 25X1 Top Secret Ni National Intelligence Bulletin 25)41 State Dept. review completed Top Secret April 21, 1975 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A0276000%3E667 - 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0 975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 CONTENTS VIETNAM: North Vietnamese divisions getting closer to Saigon. (Page 1) LATIN AMERICA: Attention focused on state of inter- American affairs. (Page 4) CAMBODIA: Situation report. (Page 6) USSR: Unsettled atmosphere persists in cultural affairs. (Page 7) ISRAEL: Rabin trying to calm Israeli fears over state of relations with US. (Page 9) USSR-SOMALIA: Soviets still firmly entrenched. (Page 11) CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Prague to spell out limits of its toleration of dissidence. (Page 12) FINLAND: Coalition government expected to resign in May. (Page 13) CHINA - NORTH KOREA: Peking cautious in approach to problems on Korean peninsula. (Page 14) THAILAND - NORTH KOREA: Bangkok to establish diplomatic relations wit Pyongyang. (Page 15) Approved For Releaser9nmin3im ? CIA-Rnp7QTn0975AO27600010036-6 Approved For Release CAMBODIA PHNOM `:' PENH 'Tay ,Tay Ninh SOUTH" Biers Hoa ?Long Tan,' ^,= N J~jt } Binh ONG AN Tan An 0 30 MILES 557736 4-75 VIETNAM Ham Tan Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 Approved For ReleaseI2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP7pTOO975AO27600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 The North Vietnamese divisions are getting closer to Saigon. In two critical areas--Xuan Loc to the east and Tan An to the southwest--the communists have kept the pressure on government defenses while sending additional forces past to new positions between the cities and Sai- gon. while the South Vietnamese have been extracting the remaining defenders from Xuan Loc, for example, North Vietnamese regiments have driven toward Bien Hoa city. This city's main defense units--two brigades of marines which escaped from Da Nang--are newly regrouped and suf- fering from very poor discipline. They are not expected to stand and fight. The nearby Long Binh supply depot contains about 60 percent of all government munitions. The loss of Bien Hoa city and the air base and supply depot is likely to lead to the rapid collapse of other government forces. To the northwest, remaining South Vietnamese 25th Division battalions have been pulled out of Tay Ninh city to blocking positions closer to Saigon. The North Viet- namese 9th Division is swinging around the southern flank of the 25th to threaten Saigon's western perimeter. Southwest of the capital, the North Vietnamese have moved additional forces up from the delta to challenge the main defenses of Long An Province directly, and other communist regiments are sweeping north of this action to approach the southwestern outskirts of Saigon. The communists are also moving five sapper regiments into the Saigon area to disrupt government control, ter- rorize the population, and guide North Vietnamese regu- lars into the metropolitan area. Approved For Release 2 - 00975AO27600010036-6 25X1 Approved For Release ; National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 Saigon no longer has any reserve forces available to help defend the city. The Joint General Staff does not consider it practical to attempt to bring any of its units deep in the delta closer to Saigon. Communist forces have taken Phan Thiet and Ham Tan, and are continuing their drive down the coast toward Vung Tau. They will probably capture that lightly de- fended port within a few days. The communists appear to be ruling out any consid- eration of a genuine negotiated settlement of the con- flict. At a press conference in Saigon Saturday, the Viet Cong's spokesman carefully avoided mention of ne- gotiations with the present government or even a recon- stituted one such as they had been demanding. Instead, he reiterated the Viet Cong's position of March 21 which called for the overthrow of Thieu and the immediate sus- pension of all US support as the only two preconditions which could bring about a "rapid settlement." On the government side, however, President Thieu still shows every sign of intending to stay in office. Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 Approved For Releas CIA-RnRZ~ National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 Despite Thieu's tough public stand, South Vietnamese opposition elements apparently are still trying to work behind the scenes to form a new government that could lead to negotiations with the communists. Catholic op- position leader Tran Huu Thanh, retired general Duong Van "Big" Minh, former Senate chairman Nguyen Van Huyen, and Buddhist opposition leader Senator Vu Van Mau plan to issue a joint proclamation on April 23 demanding the immediate resignation of President Thieu and calling for the formation of a "national leadership council." The new council would be headed by the same four leaders with a cabinet composed two thirds of "rightists"--pre- sumably military officers and others closely identified with the present government--and one third of "leftists"-- presumably elements represented by the four opposition leaders. The hazy plan of action for the proposed new govern- ment appears to consist of immediate negotiations with the communists and establishment of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord called for in the Paris Accords. Under the opposition scenario, the "leftist" faction of the government would concentrate on political competition with the communists within the Council, while the "rightist" faction would attempt to stabilize the military situation in what remains of South Vietnam's territory. Approved For Releas - 75AO27600010036-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2 National Intelligence Bulletin LATIN AMERICA April 21, 1975 Secretary Kissinger's trip to the region this week and the OAS General Assembly meetings next month are focusing Latin American attention again on the state of inter-American affairs. At the same time, events in Indochina have provided a peg for a new round of Latin commentary on broad aspects of US policy. While attitudes range from close identification with the US to antipathy, ,a common thread among the Latins is discomfort over the need to adjust to a new US view of the world. US positions on a variety of international topics have been interpreted as tougher toward the non- aligned and less benevolent toward friendly governments. A few Latin governments, including Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil, harbor some hope that reverses in Asia will turn US attention closer to home. Most seem to fear that current problems in the Far East will make Washington less flexible in other areas. In Brazil, some officials are expressing apprehension over the reliability of the US as an ally. Thus, govern- ment leaders will be particularly interested in exploring with Secretary Kissinger how events in Southeast Asia will affect Brazil's close relationship with the US. Concern over reverberations from Indochina is high- est in Latin countries that feel themselves embattled in an anticommunist struggle. Chile, for example, feels increasingly isolated in its effort to eliminate Allende's Marxist influence there. Events in Indochina, taken to- gether with the removal of Santiago from Secretary Kissin- ger's itinerary, have lowered US prestige and made Chile feel that its best option is to strengthen ties with neigh- bors in Latin America. Uruguayans question the value of their long loyalty to and cooperation with the US when the Secretary of State plans to visit Buenos Aires, capital of an osten- sibly nonaligned government, but not Montevideo. They view detente as an unwise accommodation to the communists and deplore Washington's change of heart about Cuba and Indochina. -4- Approved For Release - 75A027600010036-6 Approved For Relea 00975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 Panama's unique relationship with the US has raised grave fear over the political fallout from the Indochina situation. Panamanians speculate that US public opinion, weary of setbacks, will not tolerate yielding the Canal Zone to Panama. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, US attention to Asia has fortified the view that Latin America continues to have very low priority in US thinking. Few seem to ex- pect that Secretary Kissinger's travels to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela or the OAS meetings will restore the sense of rejuvenation that permeated inter-American events last spring. That enthusiasm has withered with the successive failures to find common ground on numerous economic issues, with the abortive effort to end sanc- tions against Cuba, with official revelations about US actions in Chile, and with growing discord in interna- tional forums between the US and the less developed world. Approved For Release - 0975A027600010036-6 1 007/03/07 - Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 00975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 CAMBODIA There is little firm information available regarding the fate of journalists and other foreigners in Phnom Penh. Press accounts of a Khmer com- munist broadcast re erring to the beheading of senior government leaders in Phnom Penh have not been confirmed. -6- Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79TD0975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 The failure of the Central Committee plenum of April 16 to fill the vacant post of party secretary for propaganda and culture indicates that the unsettled at- mosphere in cultural affairs evident during the past several months is persisting. As a result of candidate Politburo member Petr Demichev's appointment to the gov- ernment post of minister of culture, he was relieved of his long-time responsibilities for culture on the party secretariat at a Central Committee plenum last December. When the leadership failed at that time to name a successor to the party post, there were signs of inde- cision--and possibly even deadlock--not only on whom to choose, but also on the future course of cultural policy in an era of detente. Now that another plenum has passed without dealing with these problems, it is likely that cultural policy and the selection of Demichev's successor will become a part of the political maneuvering within the party hierarchy in advance of the CPSU congress scheduled for February 1976. So far, the leadership's stopgap solution has been to parcel out Demichev's former secretariat responsibil- ities among several incumbent secretaries, and also to act collectively at times when the intervention of the party secretary for culture is normally called for. In terms of policy, a pragmatic carrot-and-stick approach has been evident in some sectors and immobility and drift in others. The public drumbeat on cultural issues, however, has tended toward a reiteration of generally hard, doctrinaire positions. The latest example of collective responsibility in cultural affairs and of public policy orthodoxy was the joint meeting in Moscow of Soviet "creative" unions on April 15. It was attended by seven of the nine party secretaries--only Brezhnev and party secretary for agri- culture Kulakov were absent. Although Demichev, who also attended t4e meeting, was legitimately present in -7- Approved For Release 2 - A027600010036-6 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 his capacity as minister of culture and candidate Polit- buro member, he was nevertheless conspicuous as the only leader present who was not also a party secretary. This may strengthen speculation among some Soviet intellec- tuals that the vacuum in the party's cultural post has enabled Demichev to exercise more of a say in cultural affairs than is customary for a minister of culture. The joint meeting of the cultural unions, devoted to preparations for the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, took the opportunity to restate the commitment of the Soviet cultural establishment to the party and its program by "praising the heroism of the Soviet people during the war and philosophically assessing its result." The main speaker, head of the writers' union board Georgy Markov, never strayed from standard, orthodox positions. None of the party lead- ers present delivered a speech. Markov, who is also a full member of the Central Committee, was among the speakers at the CPSU plenum the following day. None of the speeches at the plenum has been published, but Markov's role evidently was to re- assure the political leadership that present controls over culture are adequate to maintain the status quo, at least until the leadership decides on where to go from Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin ISRAEL April 21, 1975 Prime Minister Rabin focused on the state of US- Israeli relations in a lengthy interview published Friday in Israel's largest daily. His remarks were apparently intended for Washington as well as for his domestic audience. Rabin was plainly attempting to calm widespread fears in Israel that relations with the US have danger- ously deteriorated in the wake of the suspension of in- direct talks with Egypt last month. He also served no- tice on the US that Tel Aviv believes there is little hope for further progress in negotiations with the Arabs until the "rough edges" in bilateral relations have been smoothed over. Rabin said that Foreign Minister Allon will try to obtain from Secretary Kissinger during their meeting to- day a reading on the implications for Israel of Washin - ton's policy reassessment. Rabin again denied, as he did in his speech on April 16 commemorating Israel's 27th anniversary, that the problem with the US was more than one of a difference of opinion.. He urged Israelis to remain sensible and calm in dealing with it. Defense Minister Peres, however, has openly labeled US-Israeli relations as in a state of "crisis." Rabin too, despite his public efforts to play down the matter, is worried. This is reflected in his candid outline of a two-pronged government effort to improve Israel's position in the US. The first task, which he deemed of "utmost" importance, is to conduct a detailed and full-fledged information campaign in the US to convince the American people that last month's indirect talks with Egypt broke off as a result of Egyptian inflexibility, despite Israeli willingness to compromise. Approved For Release 2 F" I - 0975AO27600010036-6 25X1 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 The other part of the effort, Rabin said, is directed at prominent members of the US administration and the Congress. Israel, he continued, must confront them over the content and position of the US in "every sphere" of Washington's relations with Israel, while displaying a firm stand of its own. This stand, he said, will have a "decisive" influence on determinin the outcome of Wash- ington's policy reassessment. Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 Approved For Release 975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin USSR-SOMALIA April 21, 1975 Although the power struggle in Somalia last month resulted in the "confinement" of several pro-Soviet figures, including Defense Minister Samantar, the upshot seems to be that the Soviets are still firmly entrenched and Samantar is back on the job. Speaking at the Somali army's 15th anniversary fes- tivities last week, Samantar blasted "Western propaganda" that implied Somalia is a Soviet satellite. The ceremony had some of the trappings common in Eastern Europe; behind the dais a portrait of General Secretary Brezhnev was given equal prominence with President Siad's likeness. Moreover, the organizers managed to leave Yugoslav diplomats off the guest list. There probably was a Soviet hand behind this omission, although the Yugoslavs are in trouble with the Somalis because of signs that they are selling arms to Ethiopia. The Soviets are not counting solely on Siad or Samantar to maintain their assets in Somalia. They have large numbers of advisers throughout the bureaucracy, including the army and security service. Siad appears to be content to go along with the Soviets, having decided for now that the Soviet presence is beneficial. In addition to becoming Somalia's major source of arms, the USSR: --is building a large airfield near Mogadiscio; -11- Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 25X1 9 Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0 975A027600010036-6 25X1 National Intelligence Bulletin CZECHOSLOVAKIA April 21, 1975 The limits of Prague's toleration of dissidence will probably be spelled out this week at a plenum of the party's Central Committee. In the speech on Wednesday, in which he condemned Alexander Dubcek, party boss Husak announced that the Central Committee will "examine certain proposals in the sphere of social policy" that will constitute an "impor- tant step for a great section of the population." Minister of Interior Obzina, in a speech the next day, picked up Husak's lead and warned that the security forces would do everything "immediately and resolutely" to suppress illegal activities of domestic reactionary groups and individuals, although without using the police as a "tool of repression against the people as a whole." These remarks buttress Husak's warning that some dissi- dents had mistakenly interpreted his avoidance of "ad- ministrative methods"--arrests and executions--as weak- ness. The leadership has been debating the highly contro- versial question of how to deal with the 1968 reformers-- andparticularly Dubcek--ever since Husak came to power six years ago. The debate has sharpened considerably over the past six months, however, and Husak's attack on Dubcek, after Dubcek's letter of last fall calling for a return to the rule of law was published recently in the West, suggests that hardliners in the party are asserting themselves. This week's plenum, plus Dubcek's reaction to Husak's condemnation, will set the stage for action in Prague. Should Dubcek run true to form, he will refuse to go into exile; Husak has now drawn the line, and any retreat from his stand will risk deepening the divisions in the party. -12- Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 Approved For Release 6007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 00975A027600010036-6 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 Finnish political observers now expect the current four-party coalition government to resign in early May, paving the way for an election on August 17-18. The Social Democrats and the Center Party--the major coalition partners--have set up a ministerial group in a last-minute effort to resolve persistent disagreements. In letters to leaders that were subsequently leaked to the press, President Kekkonen threatened earlier this month to dissolve parliament if coalition differences were not composed. Neither partner appears willing to make the neces- sary concessions, in part because opinion polls suggest both would improve their standing in parliament through a new election. The Social Democrats do not relish an election in the vacation season, but are said to be only going through the motions of negotiating and to be re- signed to the fall of the government. Observers assume that Kekkonen will turn to Helsinki Mayor Aura to form a nonpolitical administration until a new coalition can be hammered out after the election. Aura, who led similar teams in 1970 and 1971-72, may therefore be in office when Finland hosts the European security conference's concluding summit meeting, which could take place in mid-summer. -13- Approved For Release 2 00975A027600010036-6 Approved For Release ~ National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 CHINA - NORTH KOREA Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at the wel- coming banquet for North Korean President Kim 11-song last Friday in Peking reflects the cautious approach the Chinese are currently taking toward problems on the Korean peninsula. Although Teng took a pro forma swipe at the US for "clinging to a two Koreas policy" and for failing to with- draw its troops from South Korea, his emphasis was strongly on "peaceful reunification" of the two Koreas. Teng re- ferred three times to Chinese support for the "correct policy" of peaceful reunification, a policy he claimed had originated in Pyongyang. Kim was predictably harsher than Teng in describing the Korean situation, but did not go beyond his own pre- vious pronouncements.. He implied that either a war in- stigated by the South or a revolution there would result if US forces and the Pak government remained, and de- clared that Pyongyang would "not stand idly by" in either event. He guaranteed a durable peace and subsequent re- unification by peaceful means if US forces withdrew and Pak were replaced. Kim concluded that "everything" de- pended on the US attitude. Both Teng and Kim praised Prince Sihanouk's role in the Cambodian people's struggle for "liberation." They also singled out Sihanouk, whose presence at the banquet was featured, for post-speech toasts. Coupled with the absence of any reference to other Cambodian insurgent leaders, this suggests that both Peking and Pyongyang are solidly in favor of an important role for Sihanouk in the new Cambodian government. Kim continues to receive an extremely warm and high- level welcome in Peking. In addition to his meeting Friday with Mao, he has also met once with Premier Chou En-lai and twice with Teng. Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6 Approved For Release 00975A027600010036-6 25X1 National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975 THAILAND - NORTH KOREA The Khukrit Pramot government has agreed to estab- lish diplomatic relations with North Korea. The decision, which comes at Pyongyang's initiative, is the first concrete step by the new government to im- prove relations with Asian communist regimes. The two countries have exchanged sports teams and trade delega- tions in recent months. indeed, the decision was a relatively easy one; w i e the Thai are deeply suspicious of the intentions of Hanoi and Peking in Southeast Asia, they do not view Pyongyang as a potential threat to their security. Pyongyang views relations with Bangkok as another step forward in its diplomatic competition with Seoul and as beneficial to Pyongyang's side of the Korean ques- tion at the UN. Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea established relations with Malaysia in 1973 and with Australia last year; it has maintained ties with Indonesia since the Sukarno era. Approved For Release 2 00975A027600010036-6 25X1 Top s,jWjed For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6 Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010036-6