CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010036-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: April 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Ni
National Intelligence
Bulletin
25)41
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
April 21, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 21, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: North Vietnamese divisions getting closer to
Saigon. (Page 1)
LATIN AMERICA: Attention focused on state of inter-
American affairs. (Page 4)
CAMBODIA: Situation report. (Page 6)
USSR: Unsettled atmosphere persists in cultural affairs.
(Page 7)
ISRAEL: Rabin trying to calm Israeli fears over state
of relations with US. (Page 9)
USSR-SOMALIA: Soviets still firmly entrenched. (Page 11)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Prague to spell out limits of its
toleration of dissidence. (Page 12)
FINLAND: Coalition government expected to resign in
May. (Page 13)
CHINA - NORTH KOREA: Peking cautious in approach to
problems on Korean peninsula. (Page 14)
THAILAND - NORTH KOREA: Bangkok to establish diplomatic
relations wit Pyongyang. (Page 15)
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CAMBODIA
PHNOM `:'
PENH
'Tay ,Tay Ninh
SOUTH"
Biers Hoa
?Long
Tan,' ^,=
N J~jt } Binh
ONG AN
Tan An
0 30
MILES
557736 4-75
VIETNAM
Ham
Tan
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 21, 1975
The North Vietnamese divisions are getting closer to
Saigon. In two critical areas--Xuan Loc to the east and
Tan An to the southwest--the communists have kept the
pressure on government defenses while sending additional
forces past to new positions between the cities and Sai-
gon. while the South Vietnamese have been extracting the
remaining defenders from Xuan Loc, for example, North
Vietnamese regiments have driven toward Bien Hoa city.
This city's main defense units--two brigades of marines
which escaped from Da Nang--are newly regrouped and suf-
fering from very poor discipline. They are not expected
to stand and fight. The nearby Long Binh supply depot
contains about 60 percent of all government munitions.
The loss of Bien Hoa city and the air base and supply
depot is likely to lead to the rapid collapse of other
government forces.
To the northwest, remaining South Vietnamese 25th
Division battalions have been pulled out of Tay Ninh city
to blocking positions closer to Saigon. The North Viet-
namese 9th Division is swinging around the southern flank
of the 25th to threaten Saigon's western perimeter.
Southwest of the capital, the North Vietnamese have
moved additional forces up from the delta to challenge
the main defenses of Long An Province directly, and
other communist regiments are sweeping north of this
action to approach the southwestern outskirts of Saigon.
The communists are also moving five sapper regiments
into the Saigon area to disrupt government control, ter-
rorize the population, and guide North Vietnamese regu-
lars into the metropolitan area.
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Saigon no longer has any reserve forces available
to help defend the city. The Joint General Staff does
not consider it practical to attempt to bring any of its
units deep in the delta closer to Saigon.
Communist forces have taken Phan Thiet and Ham Tan,
and are continuing their drive down the coast toward
Vung Tau. They will probably capture that lightly de-
fended port within a few days.
The communists appear to be ruling out any consid-
eration of a genuine negotiated settlement of the con-
flict. At a press conference in Saigon Saturday, the
Viet Cong's spokesman carefully avoided mention of ne-
gotiations with the present government or even a recon-
stituted one such as they had been demanding. Instead,
he reiterated the Viet Cong's position of March 21 which
called for the overthrow of Thieu and the immediate sus-
pension of all US support as the only two preconditions
which could bring about a "rapid settlement."
On the government side, however, President Thieu
still shows every sign of intending to stay in office.
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Despite Thieu's tough public stand, South Vietnamese
opposition elements apparently are still trying to work
behind the scenes to form a new government that could
lead to negotiations with the communists. Catholic op-
position leader Tran Huu Thanh, retired general Duong
Van "Big" Minh, former Senate chairman Nguyen Van Huyen,
and Buddhist opposition leader Senator Vu Van Mau plan
to issue a joint proclamation on April 23 demanding the
immediate resignation of President Thieu and calling for
the formation of a "national leadership council." The
new council would be headed by the same four leaders
with a cabinet composed two thirds of "rightists"--pre-
sumably military officers and others closely identified
with the present government--and one third of "leftists"--
presumably elements represented by the four opposition
leaders.
The hazy plan of action for the proposed new govern-
ment appears to consist of immediate negotiations with
the communists and establishment of the National Council
of Reconciliation and Concord called for in the Paris
Accords. Under the opposition scenario, the "leftist"
faction of the government would concentrate on political
competition with the communists within the Council, while
the "rightist" faction would attempt to stabilize the
military situation in what remains of South Vietnam's
territory.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
LATIN AMERICA
April 21, 1975
Secretary Kissinger's trip to the region this week
and the OAS General Assembly meetings next month are
focusing Latin American attention again on the state of
inter-American affairs. At the same time, events in
Indochina have provided a peg for a new round of Latin
commentary on broad aspects of US policy.
While attitudes range from close identification with
the US to antipathy, ,a common thread among the Latins is
discomfort over the need to adjust to a new US view of
the world. US positions on a variety of international
topics have been interpreted as tougher toward the non-
aligned and less benevolent toward friendly governments.
A few Latin governments, including Venezuela, Argentina,
and Brazil, harbor some hope that reverses in Asia will
turn US attention closer to home. Most seem to fear that
current problems in the Far East will make Washington
less flexible in other areas.
In Brazil, some officials are expressing apprehension
over the reliability of the US as an ally. Thus, govern-
ment leaders will be particularly interested in exploring
with Secretary Kissinger how events in Southeast Asia will
affect Brazil's close relationship with the US.
Concern over reverberations from Indochina is high-
est in Latin countries that feel themselves embattled
in an anticommunist struggle. Chile, for example, feels
increasingly isolated in its effort to eliminate Allende's
Marxist influence there. Events in Indochina, taken to-
gether with the removal of Santiago from Secretary Kissin-
ger's itinerary, have lowered US prestige and made Chile
feel that its best option is to strengthen ties with neigh-
bors in Latin America.
Uruguayans question the value of their long loyalty
to and cooperation with the US when the Secretary of
State plans to visit Buenos Aires, capital of an osten-
sibly nonaligned government, but not Montevideo. They
view detente as an unwise accommodation to the communists
and deplore Washington's change of heart about Cuba and
Indochina.
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Panama's unique relationship with the US has raised
grave fear over the political fallout from the Indochina
situation. Panamanians speculate that US public opinion,
weary of setbacks, will not tolerate yielding the Canal
Zone to Panama.
Elsewhere in the hemisphere, US attention to Asia
has fortified the view that Latin America continues to
have very low priority in US thinking. Few seem to ex-
pect that Secretary Kissinger's travels to Argentina,
Brazil, and Venezuela or the OAS meetings will restore
the sense of rejuvenation that permeated inter-American
events last spring. That enthusiasm has withered with
the successive failures to find common ground on numerous
economic issues, with the abortive effort to end sanc-
tions against Cuba, with official revelations about US
actions in Chile, and with growing discord in interna-
tional forums between the US and the less developed
world.
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CAMBODIA
There is little firm information available regarding
the fate of journalists and other foreigners in Phnom
Penh.
Press accounts of a Khmer com-
munist broadcast re erring to the beheading of senior
government leaders in Phnom Penh have not been confirmed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 21, 1975
The failure of the Central Committee plenum of
April 16 to fill the vacant post of party secretary for
propaganda and culture indicates that the unsettled at-
mosphere in cultural affairs evident during the past
several months is persisting. As a result of candidate
Politburo member Petr Demichev's appointment to the gov-
ernment post of minister of culture, he was relieved of
his long-time responsibilities for culture on the party
secretariat at a Central Committee plenum last December.
When the leadership failed at that time to name a
successor to the party post, there were signs of inde-
cision--and possibly even deadlock--not only on whom to
choose, but also on the future course of cultural policy
in an era of detente. Now that another plenum has passed
without dealing with these problems, it is likely that
cultural policy and the selection of Demichev's successor
will become a part of the political maneuvering within
the party hierarchy in advance of the CPSU congress
scheduled for February 1976.
So far, the leadership's stopgap solution has been
to parcel out Demichev's former secretariat responsibil-
ities among several incumbent secretaries, and also to
act collectively at times when the intervention of the
party secretary for culture is normally called for. In
terms of policy, a pragmatic carrot-and-stick approach
has been evident in some sectors and immobility and
drift in others. The public drumbeat on cultural issues,
however, has tended toward a reiteration of generally
hard, doctrinaire positions.
The latest example of collective responsibility in
cultural affairs and of public policy orthodoxy was the
joint meeting in Moscow of Soviet "creative" unions on
April 15. It was attended by seven of the nine party
secretaries--only Brezhnev and party secretary for agri-
culture Kulakov were absent. Although Demichev, who
also attended t4e meeting, was legitimately present in
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his capacity as minister of culture and candidate Polit-
buro member, he was nevertheless conspicuous as the only
leader present who was not also a party secretary. This
may strengthen speculation among some Soviet intellec-
tuals that the vacuum in the party's cultural post has
enabled Demichev to exercise more of a say in cultural
affairs than is customary for a minister of culture.
The joint meeting of the cultural unions, devoted
to preparations for the 30th anniversary of the end of
World War II in Europe, took the opportunity to restate
the commitment of the Soviet cultural establishment to
the party and its program by "praising the heroism of
the Soviet people during the war and philosophically
assessing its result." The main speaker, head of the
writers' union board Georgy Markov, never strayed from
standard, orthodox positions. None of the party lead-
ers present delivered a speech.
Markov, who is also a full member of the Central
Committee, was among the speakers at the CPSU plenum the
following day. None of the speeches at the plenum has
been published, but Markov's role evidently was to re-
assure the political leadership that present controls
over culture are adequate to maintain the status quo, at
least until the leadership decides on where to go from
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National Intelligence Bulletin
ISRAEL
April 21, 1975
Prime Minister Rabin focused on the state of US-
Israeli relations in a lengthy interview published Friday
in Israel's largest daily. His remarks were apparently
intended for Washington as well as for his domestic
audience.
Rabin was plainly attempting to calm widespread
fears in Israel that relations with the US have danger-
ously deteriorated in the wake of the suspension of in-
direct talks with Egypt last month. He also served no-
tice on the US that Tel Aviv believes there is little
hope for further progress in negotiations with the Arabs
until the "rough edges" in bilateral relations have been
smoothed over.
Rabin said that Foreign Minister Allon will try to
obtain from Secretary Kissinger during their meeting to-
day a reading on the implications for Israel of Washin -
ton's policy reassessment.
Rabin again denied, as he did in his speech on
April 16 commemorating Israel's 27th anniversary, that
the problem with the US was more than one of a difference
of opinion.. He urged Israelis to remain sensible and
calm in dealing with it.
Defense Minister Peres, however, has openly labeled
US-Israeli relations as in a state of "crisis." Rabin
too, despite his public efforts to play down the matter,
is worried. This is reflected in his candid outline of a
two-pronged government effort to improve Israel's position
in the US. The first task, which he deemed of "utmost"
importance, is to conduct a detailed and full-fledged
information campaign in the US to convince the American
people that last month's indirect talks with Egypt broke
off as a result of Egyptian inflexibility, despite Israeli
willingness to compromise.
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The other part of the effort, Rabin said, is directed
at prominent members of the US administration and the
Congress. Israel, he continued, must confront them over
the content and position of the US in "every sphere" of
Washington's relations with Israel, while displaying a
firm stand of its own. This stand, he said, will have a
"decisive" influence on determinin the outcome of Wash-
ington's policy reassessment.
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USSR-SOMALIA
April 21, 1975
Although the power struggle in Somalia last month
resulted in the "confinement" of several pro-Soviet
figures, including Defense Minister Samantar, the upshot
seems to be that the Soviets are still firmly entrenched
and Samantar is back on the job.
Speaking at the Somali army's 15th anniversary fes-
tivities last week, Samantar blasted "Western propaganda"
that implied Somalia is a Soviet satellite. The ceremony
had some of the trappings common in Eastern Europe; behind
the dais a portrait of General Secretary Brezhnev was
given equal prominence with President Siad's likeness.
Moreover, the organizers managed to leave Yugoslav
diplomats off the guest list. There probably was a
Soviet hand behind this omission, although the Yugoslavs
are in trouble with the Somalis because of signs that
they are selling arms to Ethiopia.
The Soviets are not counting solely on Siad or
Samantar to maintain their assets in Somalia. They have
large numbers of advisers throughout the bureaucracy,
including the army and security service.
Siad appears to be content to go along with the
Soviets, having decided for now that the Soviet presence
is beneficial. In addition to becoming Somalia's major
source of arms, the USSR:
--is building a large airfield near Mogadiscio;
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
April 21, 1975
The limits of Prague's toleration of dissidence will
probably be spelled out this week at a plenum of the
party's Central Committee.
In the speech on Wednesday, in which he condemned
Alexander Dubcek, party boss Husak announced that the
Central Committee will "examine certain proposals in the
sphere of social policy" that will constitute an "impor-
tant step for a great section of the population."
Minister of Interior Obzina, in a speech the next
day, picked up Husak's lead and warned that the security
forces would do everything "immediately and resolutely"
to suppress illegal activities of domestic reactionary
groups and individuals, although without using the police
as a "tool of repression against the people as a whole."
These remarks buttress Husak's warning that some dissi-
dents had mistakenly interpreted his avoidance of "ad-
ministrative methods"--arrests and executions--as weak-
ness.
The leadership has been debating the highly contro-
versial question of how to deal with the 1968 reformers--
andparticularly Dubcek--ever since Husak came to power
six years ago. The debate has sharpened considerably
over the past six months, however, and Husak's attack on
Dubcek, after Dubcek's letter of last fall calling for a
return to the rule of law was published recently in the
West, suggests that hardliners in the party are asserting
themselves.
This week's plenum, plus Dubcek's reaction to Husak's
condemnation, will set the stage for action in Prague.
Should Dubcek run true to form, he will refuse to go into
exile; Husak has now drawn the line, and any retreat from
his stand will risk deepening the divisions in the party.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 21, 1975
Finnish political observers now expect the current
four-party coalition government to resign in early May,
paving the way for an election on August 17-18.
The Social Democrats and the Center Party--the major
coalition partners--have set up a ministerial group in a
last-minute effort to resolve persistent disagreements.
In letters to leaders that were subsequently leaked to
the press, President Kekkonen threatened earlier this
month to dissolve parliament if coalition differences
were not composed.
Neither partner appears willing to make the neces-
sary concessions, in part because opinion polls suggest
both would improve their standing in parliament through
a new election. The Social Democrats do not relish an
election in the vacation season, but are said to be only
going through the motions of negotiating and to be re-
signed to the fall of the government.
Observers assume that Kekkonen will turn to Helsinki
Mayor Aura to form a nonpolitical administration until
a new coalition can be hammered out after the election.
Aura, who led similar teams in 1970 and 1971-72, may
therefore be in office when Finland hosts the European
security conference's concluding summit meeting, which
could take place in mid-summer.
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CHINA - NORTH KOREA
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at the wel-
coming banquet for North Korean President Kim 11-song
last Friday in Peking reflects the cautious approach the
Chinese are currently taking toward problems on the
Korean peninsula.
Although Teng took a pro forma swipe at the US for
"clinging to a two Koreas policy" and for failing to with-
draw its troops from South Korea, his emphasis was strongly
on "peaceful reunification" of the two Koreas. Teng re-
ferred three times to Chinese support for the "correct
policy" of peaceful reunification, a policy he claimed
had originated in Pyongyang.
Kim was predictably harsher than Teng in describing
the Korean situation, but did not go beyond his own pre-
vious pronouncements.. He implied that either a war in-
stigated by the South or a revolution there would result
if US forces and the Pak government remained, and de-
clared that Pyongyang would "not stand idly by" in either
event. He guaranteed a durable peace and subsequent re-
unification by peaceful means if US forces withdrew and
Pak were replaced. Kim concluded that "everything" de-
pended on the US attitude.
Both Teng and Kim praised Prince Sihanouk's role
in the Cambodian people's struggle for "liberation."
They also singled out Sihanouk, whose presence at the
banquet was featured, for post-speech toasts. Coupled
with the absence of any reference to other Cambodian
insurgent leaders, this suggests that both Peking and
Pyongyang are solidly in favor of an important role for
Sihanouk in the new Cambodian government.
Kim continues to receive an extremely warm and high-
level welcome in Peking. In addition to his meeting
Friday with Mao, he has also met once with Premier Chou
En-lai and twice with Teng.
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THAILAND - NORTH KOREA
The Khukrit Pramot government has agreed to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with North Korea.
The decision, which comes at Pyongyang's initiative,
is the first concrete step by the new government to im-
prove relations with Asian communist regimes. The two
countries have exchanged sports teams and trade delega-
tions in recent months.
indeed, the decision was a relatively easy one; w i e
the Thai are deeply suspicious of the intentions of Hanoi
and Peking in Southeast Asia, they do not view Pyongyang
as a potential threat to their security.
Pyongyang views relations with Bangkok as another
step forward in its diplomatic competition with Seoul
and as beneficial to Pyongyang's side of the Korean ques-
tion at the UN. Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region,
North Korea established relations with Malaysia in 1973
and with Australia last year; it has maintained ties
with Indonesia since the Sukarno era.
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