CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: April 25, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

r-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
Top Secret
25X1
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
25X1 I
Top Secret
April 25, 1975
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0276000W407
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Relea - 975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 25, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
PORTUGAL: Election today will not affect government
policies but should reflect public reaction. (Page 4)
LAOS: Plans finalized for King's visit to Pathet Lao
Feadquarters. (Page 7)
PHILIPPINES-US: Manila seeks reaffirmation of US
security commitments. (Page 9)
KOREA: Pak concerned about North Korean intentions
especially because of Kim's visit to Peking. (Page 10)
NORTH KOREA: Pyongyang defaults on trade debts.
Page 12T-
SYRIA: Asad to seek better relations with the US.
Pagee 13)
MOZAMBIQUE: Communist economic and military aid sought.
(Page 15)
ETHIOPIA: Some members of military council arrested
for coup plot. (Page 16)
ANNEX: Saigon's Access to the Sea.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
25X1'
 Approved For Release 2
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
07/03/06: CIA-RDP79T0
? v...- r...
 Approved For Releas - 00975A027600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM
April 25, 1975
Most communist combat initiatives remain concentrated
on the western and southwestern approaches to Saigon.
Communist units on April 24 captured several govern-
ment outposts blocking their way in Hau Nghia Province.
To the south, in Long An Province, the North Vietnamese
8th Division continued driving north, overruning a number
of government positions. If these forces continue at
their current rate, they could reach the outskirts of
Saigon within a few days.
The threat to the important port of Vung Tau, which
is at the mouth of the Saigon River and has been consid-
ered as an evacuation site, is growing. The newly ar-
rived 325th North Vietnamese Division, which helped cap-
ture Ham Tan several days ago, has moved west and is fast
approaching the port city. Another division may be con-
verging on the city from the north. The government has
shifted the Airborne brigade and a regiment from the 18th
Division extracted from Xuan Loc into Phuoc Tuy Province
in an attempt to block North Vietnamese forces moving
against the city, but these units and the forces closer
to Vung Tau are no match for the communists. Vung Tau
could fall within the next one or two days.
Many refugees have been pouring into Vung Tau each
day this week--as many as 65,000 arriving in one day.
Government officials are also transferring many refugees
by ship to the delta to relieve the crowded conditions
and to prevent another panic situation such as developed
at Da Nang.
Despite these actions, large numbers of people are
likely to continue to head for Vung Tau in the belief
that is their best hope of escape. At last report, the
road from Saigon was still open and both civilian and
military traffic were heavy.
The level of fighting is low in the delta. With the
movement of communist divisions normally operating there
up toward Saigon, the local balance of forces is now more
in favor of the government. Some military officials
Approved For Release 2007/03/061 CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
I 25X1
 Approved For Release 2 07/03/06 : CIA-RDP79 00975A027600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
admit that the fate of the delta will be decided in Saigon.
The defeatist attitude prevalent in the military hierarchy
at Saigon and Bien Hoa is now spreading to Can Tho, where
the main topic of conversation among the military staff
members is the question of what to do when the communists
win.
The South Vietnamese are now able to fly about two
thirds of their 1,500 aircraft, mostly from Bien Hoa,
Tan Son Nhut, and Can Tho. Official estimates conclude
that at the current rate of usage, there is enough ord-
nance remaining for 15-20 days.
Negotiations between General "Big" Minh and Presi-
dent Huong to organize a new government have hit at least
a temporary snag.
Minh apparently has picked up some powerful support
from among former members of the Thieu government. In
a conversation with an American official yesterday, Minh
said that Joint General Staff chief Vien agreed that
Huong should resign. Former prime minister Khiem will
also support Minh's bid and try to persuade Huong to
step down. Khiem feels that with his and Vien's support,
the military can be persuaded to accept Minh as president.
-2-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
 Approved For Release 2007703706 : - T00975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
A Viet Cong commentary broadcast over Liberation
Radio yesterday hardened earlier communist demands for
a new government and appeared to support Minh's argument
that he is the only South Vietnamese nationalist of
prominence with whom the communists might agree to nego-
tiate. The commentary stated that any new government in
Saigon must "not consist of those who have closely asso-
ciated with Thieu." Such a government must, demand that
the American military and intelligence personnel be imme-
diately withdrawn and "all US warships and Marines be re-
moved." The commentary also reiterated earlier communist
opposition to the US evacuation of South Vietnamese, and
implied that some action might be taken to stop them. It
warned that the US would "be held fully responsible for
all consequences" if it insisted on continuing its "present
policy."
Approved For Release 2 975AO27600010044-7
F, T
 Approved For Release 267/03/06 : CIA-RDP79 00975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
The Portuguese will go to the polls today--the first
anniversary of the overthrow of the Caetano regime--in
their first contested election in nearly 50 years.
The left-wing fringe parties have made clear their
distaste for this exercise in "bourgeois democracy" and
may try to cause trouble at the polls. government has pledged to respond The Portuguese
to any attempt to disrupt theelectionkly and forcefully
The voters will elect 247 members of an assembly
that is to draft a new constitution; in fact, a substan-
tial portion of that document has already been written
by the ruling Armed Forces Movement and accepted by the
country's major political parties.
The returns will not affect the composition of the
government or significantly alter its policies, but they
will provide the first reading of popular reaction to
the leftward course the military has charted.
Although the Portuguese Communist Party and its
close ally, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, have
waged an impressive campaign, recent polls show that even
if their votes are combined they have little chance of
finishing better than third.
Some Armed Forces Movement spokesmen, not enamored
of the election process, are trying to persuade "unde-
cided" voters to cast blank ballots. Should a signifi-
cant proportion of the ballots be blank, the Movement
might seek to portray them as votes for itself or, more
likely, as demonstrating that Portugal is. not yet ready
for democracy.
Portugal's central labor confederation, Intersindi-
cal, has joined the Movement's effort to persuade voters
to cast blank ballots, as have a few of the smaller
socialist groups. The Communist Party, which dominates
-4-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release JeeffeSfH : - 0975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
Intersindical, has not endorsed the campaign, even though
such a move would have helped the party solidify its
ties with the Movement and would have served to obscure
its expected poor showing at the polls.
In the election, which is expected to be relatively
free from tampering, the moderate parties will almost
certainly poll a clear majority. Some observers estimate
the Socialist, Popular Democratic, and Social Democratic
Center parties will get 65 to 70 percent of the vote.
The three are expected to finish in that order, though
the Communist Party could ease out the Social Democrats
for third place.
A large majority for the moderate parties would not
be a vote of confidence for the Armed Forces Movement,
but it might not be a decisive defeat either. The moder-
ate parties have already accepted continued military rule,
and all but the Social Democratic Center have platforms
that advocate many of the policies espoused by the Move-
ment.
What the dominant radical military officers fear
most is that the results may strengthen moderates in the
military. A resounding victory for the moderate parties
might even provide the impetus for a move within the
Movement to restrict the influence of the Communists.
Admiral Rosa Coutinho, who seems to be assuming a
position of leadership in the Movement, might be the man
to lead an effort to head off the Communists. Coutinho
has spoken of forming a new party to become the civilian
partner of the Armed Forces Movement. Such a party might
be a vehicle not only to reduce the Communist role but
also to water down any moderate surge that results from
the election.
Whatever the outcome of the election, it will have
only an indirect impact on government actions. President
Costa Gomes and Admiral Coutinho have said they will not
feel constrained by the outcome and will continue on
their path toward socialism. The Movement also seems
determined to move toward a nonaligned international
position, maintaining ties with the West while improv-
ing relations with the Third World and Eastern Europe.
-5-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release 4
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
The election will not silence the opposition to these
policies. Conservatives and moderates who oppose the
current leadership were thrown off balance by the events
of March 11 and what followed. They are still disorgan-
ized and unprepared to reassert themselves. They have
been nourished on a hope that the election will improve
their position. Even if it does not, they are likely
to try again to organize themselves against the radical
leadership in the months to come. The continuing dete-
rioration of Portugal's economy could strengthen their
-6-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release 1 ..1
2_00 1103106 ; - T00975A027600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
LAOS
King Savang has finalized previously announced plans
to pay his first official visit to Pathet Lao headquarters
at Sam Neua in remote northeastern Laos. He is scheduled
to arrive on April 28 for a six-day sojourn which may also
include trips to other areas in the communist-controlled
zone. The King's visit will almost certainly be inter-
preted as a major step toward national reconciliation and
reunification.
The King's 22-member party, which includes senior
communist coalition government officials Prince Souphan-
ouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, will travel from the royal
capital of Luang Prabang to Sam Neua via Pathet Lao heli-
copter. Interior Minister Pheng Phongsavan is the only
high-ranking, non-communist coalition official accompany-
ing the royal entourage.
Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong extended the invita-
tion for the visit and will be in charge of festivities
at Sam Neua. He is also handling arrangements for the
King's coronation, which is expected to take place some-
time before the end of 1976. Souphanouvong's efforts
to identify himself with the King, who is held in awe
and respect by all Lao groups and factions, could have
an important bearing on his acceptability as a future
prime minister.
The King's decision to visit Sam Neua will give him
the opportunity to demonstrate good will toward Peking
as well as the Pathet Lao.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
 Approved For Release 20 0975AO27600010044-7
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NORTH
VIETNAM
LUZON>
PHILIPPINES
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
r E3HONG KONG
MACAO (U.K.)
(PORT.)
BRUNEI
(U.K.)
25X1
 Approved For Relea4
National Intelligence Bulletin
'PHILIPPINES-US
April 25, 1975
President Marcos is using recent reports alleging
hostile North Vietnamese activity in the Spratly Islands
to seek reaffirmation of US security commitments to the
Philippines. Manila claims some of the islands, and
stations troops on several.
On April 21, a Philippine defense official raised
the "Spratly affair" in the context of the US-Philippine
Mutual Defense Treaty, which pledges the US to act to meet
an attack on Philippine "armed forces, public vessels,
or aircraft in the Pacific in accordance with US consti-
tutional processes." On April 22, the Philippine Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the American
embassy advising the US "as an ally under SEATO" that
North Vietnamese forces had attacked South Vietnamese -
held islands in the Spratlys on April 14.
There is confusion about exactly what happened in
the Spratlys on April 13 and 14. Philippine assertions
that North Vietnamese gunboats attacked a South Vietnam-
ese garrison there are based in part on the account of
a South Vietnamese soldier who fled to a Philippine-held
island. The situation may become clearer after the South
Vietnamese soldier is brought to Manila for debriefing,
and if other accounts, including those of a nearby Philip-
pine garrison, are confirmed.
Philippine officials are convinced that an attack
took place and fear that Hanoi may have designs on all
of the Spratly Islands. The islands are claimed by a
number of countries, including China; Taiwan and the
Philippines have garrisons stationed there.
The Spratly affair comes at a time when Philippine
officials have been publicly questioning US willingness
to honor its security treaties with the Philippines.
Marcos is miffed because recent public statements in
Washington designed to reassure its allies have not spe-
cifically cited Manila. He wants not only a reaffirma-
tion of US willingness to stand by Manila, but also a
clarification of the scope of the existing agreements.
-9-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
 Approved For Release 007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T 0975A027600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin
KOREA
April 25, 1975
Developments in Indochina coupled with Kim Il-song's
recent visit to Peking left President Pak Chong-hui in
a somber mood.
In a series of conversations with US officials
earlier this week, Pak expressed serious concern that
the North Koreans might soon attempt a test of South
Korean and US military capabilities and intentions. In
his view, the most likely North Korean move would be an
attempt to seize and hold one or more of the Yellow Sea
islands under control of the UN Command and garrisoned
by South Korean forces.
Pak warned of the consequences to South Korean
morale should the North Koreans manage to win a foot-
hold on the islands. He quizzed US military officers
on existing plans for retaking any lost territory in the
face of admitted difficulties in resupply and reinforce-
ment of the island area.
Pak's concerns are not farfetched. In late 1973,
North Korea claimed jurisdiction over the waters sur-
rounding the Yellow Sea islands. Since then, the North
has made repeated efforts to assert the right of its
vessels and aircraft to operate south of the islands;
several North-South clashes and near clashes have been
triggered by these operations.
Pak's forebodings over the product of Kim I1-song's
conversations in Peking, however, may be unwarranted.
It is unlikely, for example, that Kim Il-song would seek
Chinese approval for any specific military course of
action. It would be completely contrary to his commit-
ment to "independence" to offer Peking any sort of veto
on his actions vis-a-vis the South.
-10-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
 Approved For Release 0975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
More likely, Kim's visit to Peking was essentially
an effort to explore the possibilities for moving Pyong-
yang's campaign to weaken South Korea off dead center--in
particular to learn China's current attitude toward the
US military presence in Korea and prospects for gaining
Chinese support for an initiative to secure a complete
withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.
Kim might argue that, even if it failed, a diplo-
matic move of this sort would stir dissension between
Seoul and the US and generate new arguments in Washing-
ton on the advisability of US forces remaining hostage
to the acts of the competing Korean regimes.
Kim's presence in Peking probably had additional
motives. Kim and the top North Korean military officials
who accompanied him almost certainly requested more Chi-
nese military aid. Kim's flamboyant presence was also
an attempt to identify his regime with the current tide
of communist success in Indochina and to generate at
least the appearance of firm Chinese support for his 25-
year campaign to unify Korea on communist terms.
-11-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release 007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T 0975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
North Korean defaults on trade debts to the West
are hindering deliveries of goods already under contract,
as well as new purchase negotiations.
Pyongyang is behind in payments of many bank loans
and letters of credit; some payments are as much as eight
months overdue. F- I
Payments defaults to Japa-
nese banks an business firms total some $50 to $100 mil-
lion.
North Korea is the first communist country to default
on payments to Western banks and its credit rating is
poor. A Swiss bank recently ranked North Korea as only
a somewhat better credit risk than Chile or Upper Volta.
France and West Germany have suspended government guaran-
tees for further credits, and Pyongyang's access to
Japanese Export-Import Bank credits is in jeopardy. Even
more serious, several firms have suspended production of
equipment under existing North Korean contracts and have
halted further deliveries until the problem is resolved.
North Korea has done little to deal with its prob-
lems, beyond offering assurances that debts will be paid
in time and requesting extensions and new loans. Gold
sales in the West have made only a small dent in the past
due accounts. The payments crisis is likely to slow
achievement of North Korea's ambitious goals for indus-
trialization through the acquisition of Western technol-
ogy.
In part, the current arrears in payments stem from
improvident buying of so much equipment and grain.
Pyongyang overestimated its ability to expand earnings
from exports, which did well until the Western industrial
boom turned sour and prices for principal export commodi-
ties fell. In addition, the problems reflect poor plan-
ning and management on the part of the North Koreans;
their inexperience in Western trade and finance has been
compounded by the inflation in rices of Western imports,
freight services, and t._Fp
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
25X1
 Approved For Release
P975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
SYRIA
During the recent Syrian Baath Party Congress,
President Asad reportedly affirmed his intention to seek
better relations with the US. Syrian Chief of Staff
Shihabi has informed Ambassador Murphy that Asad sought
to assure party members that this approach poses no threat
to Syrian interests.
Shihabi said that he had never before heard Asad
address the issue of US-Syrian relations so categorically
and that Asad's views dominated the discussion. At past
congresses of the Baath Party, delegates have vied with
one another in attacking the US.
Asad, according to Shihabi, also tried to inject a
note of realism into the party's discussion of the extent
of Syrian backing for the Palestinians. Asad said, in
effect, that the Palestinians would have to accept the
fact that there is "no prospect of Israel changing its
character as a Jewish state" and that there is no pos-
sibility that Israel can be destroyed. The President
repeated, however, that Israel must withdraw from all
territory occupied in 1967 and that the Palestinians
should have the right to establish a Palestinian state
on the West Bank and Gaza.
Shihabi's account may well have been passed to the
US in an attempt to curry favor during the Middle East
policy review by the US. Asad is probably anxious to
preserve good relations with the US right now, when his
relations with Egypt are uncertain and when he sees
little chance for any diplomatic progress without a fur-
ther US initiative.
Asad's reported statements on Israel are consistent
with his remark last February that he was ready to sign
a long-term peace treaty with Israel, provided that the
Israelis withdraw to the pre-June 1967 borders and ac-
cept a Palestinian state. References by Arad to "his-
torical realities" and to the indestructibility of
Israel accord with other indications that Damascus is,
at this point, reluctant to take on Israel militarily
and believes that negotiations---however difficult--pro-
r
it
y.
o
vide the best chance for regaining occupied terr
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 A-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release - 0975AO27600010044-7
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
Soon-to-be independent Mozambique is attempting to
secure communist economic and military assistance with-
out establishing strong political ties.
Samora Machel, leader of the Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique, has traveled to several East European
countries to secure assistance for the post-independence
period after June 25, 1975. The trips--begun late last
year--have reportedly resulted in promises to provide
$25 million in unspecified aid. The Soviet union will
supply the largest share, $10 million; East Germany,
$5 million; and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland will
provide $10 million. East German and Soviet economic
aid delegations arrived in Lourenco Marques in early
1975.
East Germany is expected to help establish Mozam-
bique's security and intelligence service as well as to
provide some militia training. Moscow will supply army
materiel, and Poland is scheduled to deliver naval craft,
probably patrol boats. Deliveries of Soviet small arms
began arriving openly at the port of Beira in January;
previously all equipment supplied by Moscow to the Front
for the Liberation of Mozambique was sent through Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania.
Despite his quest for communist assistance, Machel
has consistently maintained that he does not wish to
see Mozambique become the political vassal of any country
or bloc of nations. Machel has indicated that Mozambique
will be socialist, but that its form will be determined
by local conditions and that aid from the West as well
as the East will be welcome.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
The ruling military council has arrested some of its
members for allegedly plotting a coup.
The number of council members in custody is not
known.
Among those now being held are Lieutenant Colonel Negussie
Haile and Captain Debessu Beyne--both members of the
council's intelligence committee--and at least two en-
listed men. Negussie is a member of the council's inner
decision-making committee.
The dispute over land reform and the arrest of the
alleged coup plotters may bring to a head several other
contentious issues between the council and armed forces
units. These include grievances over pay and allowances,
the living conditions of some garrisons, and the council's
failure to consult the units on important decisions.
The US embassy reports signs of rising tensions in
Addis Ababa. Guard forces at key buildings have been
increased this week, and additional checkpoints estab-
lished on major roads. Some high Defense Ministry offi-
cials reportedly have fled the country.
F-
Approved or Release - -
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
Saigon's Access to the Sea
As the North Vietnamese continue their advance to-
ward Saigon, access to the capital is becoming more crit-
ical. Most land routes have been cut, or they are
strongly threatened, as are Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa
airfields. The communists have had the capability for
some time of attacking ships in the sea channel--the
third access route to Saigon--with command-detonated
water mines, but they have not done so.
The key to controlling the shipping lane is Vung
Tau. located at the mouth of the channel.
Saigon has moved a regiment of the ARVN 18th Division
and the 1st Airborne Brigade to defend the area. Both
units, however, recently fought at Xuan Loc and need rest
and refitting. These units could probably hold the area
unless the large numbers of refugees in Vung Tau create
civil disorders and cause the defense to collapse--as
occurred in Da Nang. (See map facing page 1.)
If the Vung Tau area is successfully defended, the
communists might opt to interdict the channel from the
east, between the Rung Sat mangrove swamp and Saigon.
They would, however, expose their forces to artillery
and air strikes, because the river banks are open. To
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin April 25, 1975
prevent this, the communists probably would first move
against Bien Hoa airbase, and clear South Vietnamese
forces from the area, an operation that would probably
take two or three days. The channel could then be closed
within a few hours.
If the North Vietnamese decided to move into the
Nha Be area from the west, destroying this vital POL
facility and closing the channel, they would have to
close Route 4 permanently, isolate government forces in
the delta, and eliminate the South Vietnamese troops at
Binh Chanh. They would probably need two days to clear
Binh Chanh and the area south of Saigon, and one or two
more to capture the river bank.
The communists are not likely to try to close the
ship channel in the Rung Sat. They would have to operate
in difficult terrain and in water above their waists,
while trying to move heavy equipment through an area
where even a back pack is a great. burden. Sampans could
carry equipment, but it would be limited to small arms
and mortars.
A major effort to interdict Saigon's sea lifeline
would require a political decision in Hanoi to try to
achieve the collapse of the South Vietnamese government
without a direct attack on Saigon.
Although Vung Tau has
been targeted as well, closure o the shipping channel is
probably not the primary purpose. The communists are
determined to press their advantage and continue the disin-
tegration of Saigon's military structure; closing the
channel is only a secondary objective.
A2
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010044-7
25X1
 Top S forced For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010044-7