CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 26, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
DIA review(s) completed.
April 26, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
LATE ITEM
PORTUGUESE ELECTION RESULTS
April 26, 1975
Unofficial tallies, with most of the ballots counted,
show the combined votes of the three moderate parties at
about 70 percent. The Communist Party and its close
ally, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, are coming in
with about 17 percent.
The latest figures show:
---The Socialist Party with about 34 percent.
---The moderate Popular Democratic Party, about 29
percent.
---The Communist Party, some 14 percent.
---The center-right Sdcial Democratic Center,
about 7 percent.
With a 92-percent turnout, only about 8 percent
of the voters cast blank ballots, a way some members
of the ruling Armed Forces Movement had urged undecided
voters to show their support for the government.
days.
The official results will not be released for eight
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release 007/03/09 - - 00975A027600010046-5
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
CONTENTS
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
GREECE: Athens' views on NATO relationship may be more
flexible than earlier expected. (Page 5)
CAMBODIA: New regime not yet formally established.
,Page 6j
CAMBODIA: Food supply and distribution is a major prob-
lem. Page 7)
INDONESIA: Jakarta alarmed about the possibility of a
communist threat to its Natuna Islands. (Page 9)
THAILAND: Precis of Interagency Memorandum. (Page 10)
USSR: Soviet and US warships to exchange visits.
(Page 11)
ROMANIA: Ceausescu's trip to the Middle East is seen
as a move for closer association with the nonaligned
world. (Page 12)
ITALY: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ratified after
considerable delay. (Page 13)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 14)
ANNEX: North Korean Navy Now Superior to That of South.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release
20O7I03109 ? r_in-RPP79T 0975AO27600010046-5
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
South Vietnam's President Huong asked the National
Assembly today to decide whether he should turn over
power to General Duong Van "Big" Minh. Huong appealed to
the legislators to support his own efforts to seek ne-
gotiations with the communists, but he indicated that he
would resign so that Minh could become president if the
assembly asked him to do so. Huong has been under con-
siderable pressure by influential Vietnamese of all po-
litical persuasions to step down in favor of Minh, and
it seems likely that the assembly will also ask him to
do so?
A Minh government's raison d'etre would be to seek
and accept immediately whatever terms the communists
offer. Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang says that Minh's
return to power would only be to "hoist the white flag."
It is no longer possible to do more than "save the fur-
niture."
To emphasize this point, Minh already has tentatively
selected a government of surrender featuring leaders of
South Vietnam's previously vocal opposition movements.
Senator Nguyen Van Huyen, a moderate southern Catholic
and outspoken Thieu opponent, has been designated vice
president in charge of negotiations. The selection of
Huyen is obviously designed to reassure Catholics and
conservatives and encourage their support. Senator Vu
Van Mau, representing the militant An Quang Buddhists,
would serve as prime minister and foreign minister con-
currently. In a gesture of accommodation to the commu-
nists, Madame Ngo Ba Thanh--an American-educated lawyer
and longtime leftist gadfly who has been involved for
years in various antigovernment organizations--would be-
come minister of justice.
The Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government,
through its foreign minister, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, has
indicated that it would consider negotiations with a
government headed by Minh. Moreover, Minh's selection
of individuals for his new government complies with a
-1-
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release 267/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T 0975A027600010046-5
PHNOM
PENH
Joc
TUY %
Phuoc Le
(Ba Ria) MR 3
VIETNAM
MR 4
MILES
"Yung Tau
CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 20 0- 710 3-.10- 9- - C1 A -Rl;)PZQ
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
PRG demand that the new Saigon administration must repre-
sent a clean break from the former regime and include no
one who was sympathetic to former president Thieu. The
communists probably also believe that Minh would accept
their other demand that all US military support and per-
sonnel. be withdrawn.
In a statement on April 24, the PRG used a formu-
lation that at least suggested that the communists might
allow a residual US diplomatic presence to continue in
Saigon by stating that any new government must demand
the immediate withdrawal of all American "military and
intelligence personnel." This appears to represent a
refinement of earlier statements that the communists
viewed all American civilians in South Vietnam as "dis-
guised" military advisers and that all these must also
be included in the total withdrawal.
The communists are maintaining pressure on Saigon's
outer defenses with small-scale attacks along the main
approaches to the city. As the communists continue to
secure avenues of attack toward the capital, South
Vietnamese bases and outposts west of Saigon are prime
targets, and the shellings of these positions are heavy.
at
two major government positions virtually all of the
South Vietnamese artillery was destroyed. The Bien Hoa
airbase and other targets northeast of Saigon are also
being shelled regularly, and the South Vietnamese train-
ing camp on the city's outskirts has come under attack.
The communists are also positioning forces closer
to Vung Tau. One regiment of the North Vietnamese 325th
Division with its supporting armor is moving down Route
2, just outside the Phuoc Tuy Province capital of Phuoc
Le. This force could move against Phuoc Le at any time,
but will be difficult to move beyond Phuoc Le to Vung
Tau--a distance of 12 miles down a narrow peninsula that
has only one road. An advance section of the North Viet-
namese 320th Division has shown up'to the north along
Route 15, the main road linking Vung Tau with Bien Hoa
and Saigon. This division could act as a blocking
Approved For Release 975A027600010046-5 25X1
 Approved For Release 20
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
force in its present position or it could move to at-
tack Bien Hoa from the south or even shift westward
toward Saigon.
Despite the relatively low level of combat on the
battlefronts around Saigon, there continue to be abun-
dant indications of communist planning for increased
fighting that could lead to direct assaults on Saigon
itself.
Although there have been only minor incidents among
those awaiting evacuation at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut air-
base, the commander of the Airborne, General Le Quang
Luong has two Airborne brigades in Saigon, and he has
warned that he will take unilateral action to restore
order at the airbase should large-scale violence erupt.
Such action could lead to direct confrontation be-
tween various groups of armed South Vietnamese military
and civilian security personnel, which in turn could lead
to the closing of the airbase to evacuation aircraft.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release LQQ7iQWQQ : C-'A-Rl-;)PZQ- - - 975A027600010046-5 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin
GREECE
April 26, 1975
In a private meeting yesterday with a select group
of NATO representatives, the Greek delegate presented a
paper outlining Athens' views on the future of the mili-
tary relationship between Greece and NATO. Although the
paper is tentative and sketchy, it indicates a flexibil-
ity on the Greek military role in NATO that the Karaman-
lis government has previously not shown.
The paper states that, as a general rule, Greek
forces will remain under national command, but that in
the case of a "clear threat" of aggression, such forces
as will be mutually agreed upon can be considered NATO
reserve forces. In the event of imminent or actual ag-
gression these forces would be assigned to NATO.
In order to facilitate the cooperation of Greek
forces in NATO, the paper proposes that Greece partici-
pates in those NATO peacetime activities that are "essen-
tial to the fulfillment of its agreed NATO mission."
The paper does not define the nature and scope of this
participation. The Greek delegate asked for an informal
dialogue with the NATO representatives on the paper and
for their suggestions on points that need to be clarified.
The NATO select group will now work informally to
clarify vague points in the paper before presenting it
to a wider NATO forum. Such issues as the extent of
peacetime cooperation are bound to be sticky. The Greek
representative appeared most forthcoming on this point,
but the Karamanlis government will have to move care-
fully in reestablishing open military cooperation with
NATO if it wishes to avoid provoking-strong parliamen-
tary opposition. The NATO representatives are scheduled
to discuss the paper again on May 12.-F--
-5-
Approved For Release 2 75A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
More than a week has passed since Phnom Penh's
surrender, and there is still no sign that the new re-
gime has been formally established in the capital.
Two Chinese Boeing 707s flew to Phnom Penh on Wednes-
day and Thursday, but so far there is no sign that
Prince Sihanouk was aboard either aircraft.
Phnom en ra io as been
broadcasting special programs as part of an official
three-day "victory celebration" but has made no mention
of Sihanouk's arrival or the presence of any other
notables. The broadcasts earlier in the week by Deputy
Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and Information Minister
Hu Nimm were recorded.
Sihanouk has said he is delaying his departure
from Peking to be at the bedside of his ailing mother,
Queen Kossamak. The Khmer communists may be deliberately
keeping the Prince waiting both to prevent his stealing
the "victory" show and to allow time for the communist
administrative apparatus to become firmly entrenched.
Approved For Release 2007/03/9-CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release 107/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T 0975A027600010046-5
National Intelligence Bulletin April 26, 1975
CAMBODIA
A major problem facing the Khmer communists in Phnom
Penh is food supply and distribution.
Previously, enough rice for the 3.5 million people
under their control had come largely from local sources.
Since the fall of Phnom Penh, however, the communists
have had an additional 4 million people to feed. To meet
total demands, some half million metric tons of rice will
be required until the 1975-76 rice harvest begins in late
August. Stocks in Cambodia are believed to be about a
quarter million metric tons.
In order partially to solve the immediate distribu-
tion problem of stocks presently on hand, the communists
have begun to relocate people living in the capital and
other cities to areas where food is more abundant. These
individuals have been instructed to sow as much rice as
possible for the 1975-76 planting season which starts in
mid-May.
There are only a few potential suppliers to make up
the expected shortfall. The most likely source is China,
which has continuously supported the insurgent movement.
The quantities needed would not strain Peking's food
stocks, and the Chinese are anxious to maintain their
influence over the communist-dominated government. The
USSR may also offer to send food aid, as they have to
that part of South Vietnam recently taken over by the
North Vietnamese. Shipments of food from these sources
would have to begin arriving in Cambodia by mid-June to
avert serious shortages.
Even after the 1975-76 rice crop is harvested there
will be shortages. Because of the current domestic sit-
uation, it is likely that no more than 1 million metric
tons of milled rice will be produced. At current con-
sumption rates, this would present the new government
with a deficit of between 200,000 and 300,000 metric
tons. There are several arrangements that could be
made to obtain this rice. Grants or long-term credit
could be extended from China or the Soviet Union. In
addition, Thailand and Burma would be able and willing
to sell rice, but the Khmer communists would be hard-
pressed to meet the financial requirements.
Approved For Release 2007/03/0'97tIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T 975AO27600010046-5
EAST
~~NNESt MALA
,,MALAY,SIA _{ r.7N.
IND?AN C)C'EAN
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 75A027600010046-5
National Intelligence Bulletin April 26, 1975
INDONESIA
Indonesia is becoming increasingly alarmed that the
fall of Saigon may result in a communist threat to its
Natuna Islands. These islands lie between the coast of
Borneo and South Vietnam and are of particular concern
to Jakarta because of the oil concessions the Indonesians
have granted in the area to several foreign companies.
South Vietnam also has claims in the area that overlap
those of Indonesia, and the Indonesians fear that the
communists may now press the Vietnamese claims.
As a precautionary measure, some military units in
northern Sumatra have been placed on alert for detachment
to the islands, and the upgrading of other units is be-
ing accelerated.
These moves are designed to dissuade any communist
incursion into the area. Although Indonesia's forces--
numbering almost 375,000--are the third largest in South-
east Asia, the force's effectiveness is reduced by inad-
equate logistic and a limited command-and-control system.
The air and coastal defense systems are weak and the
navy has too few ships to patrol the far-flung archipe-
lagos.
-9-
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
25X11
 Approved For Release 2q
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
The Bulletin today prints the precis of an Inter-
agency Intelligence Memorandum, "Thai Foreign Policy in
the Post-Vietnam Period," April 25, 1975.
The speed of the communist takeover of Indochina has
deeply shocked the Thai and accelerated trends away from
reliance on the US security commitment.
Events are still moving too fast for the Thai to
have come to any firm conclusions on long-term adjust-
ments of their foreign policy, but we believe that they
will clearly move toward a neutral position.
--This is likely to be the case whatever govern-
ment is in power.
--The special Thai-US rapport has ended.
--The Thai will probably attempt to keep a rela-
tively close relationship with the US; in partic-
ular they will continue to look to the US as an
important economic partner and for military assist-
ance.
--Even so, we believe the Thai government will
stick to its demand that US forces be withdrawn
within 12 months.
Other US security interests in Thailand
I ill probably survive for two
or three years if the US provides substantial military
assistance to Thailand.
As the Thai put more distance between themselves
and the US, they will move toward improved relations
with Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.
--Diplomatic relations with Hanoi seem probable;
but not before US forces are withdrawn.
--Although there is general agreement to the need
to improve relations with China, pressure from the
military to go slow and problems over the status
of Chinese aliens make it unlikely that formal ties
can be established before the end of the year.
Approved For Release 2007/03/091:OC1A-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
--The Thai are probably prepared now to make some
gestures in the direction of closer relations with
the Soviet Union, primarily as a means of enhanc-
ing Thailand's neutralist credentials in the eyes
of competing communist powers.
Soviet and US warships will exchange visits next
month for the first time in more than 30 years.
Between May 12 and 17, two Soviet Kanin-class
guided-missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler
from the Northern Fleet will visit Boston. Two US navy
warships are to make a port call at Leningrad during
the same period.
The Kanin-class units are general-purpose warships
with antisubmarine and antiair warfare missions. By
sending these older ships, the Soviets apparently in-
tend to protect their newer, more sophisticated units
from intelligence exploitation. It is customary for
ships on such visits to be open to the public while in
port. Kanin-class units have previously taken part in
calls to several non-communist countries including some
NATO nations, therefore the visit will represent little
intelligence risk for the Soviets.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09"-e A-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release 007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T0 975A027600010046-5 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin
ROMANIA
April 26, 1975
Romanian President Ceausescu's sudden trip to Da-
mascus and Cairo suggests that Bucharest is pushing hard
for closer association with the nonaligned world and
possibly for a seat at the Geneva talks on the Middle
East.
Ceausescu arrived in Damascus on Thursday on very
short notice and immediately went into a closed-door
session with Syrian President Asad. Afterwards, in a
joint statement, the two presidents affirmed their sup-
port for nonaligned principles such as self-determina-
tion and called for an early convening of the Geneva
talks attended by all concerned.
On Friday, Ceausescu moved on to Egypt. Foreign
Minister Fahmi's office has told a US official that
Ceausescu invited himself and that Cairo agreed to re-
ceive him only when it became apparent that the visit
would be short. The talks in Cairo covered essentially
the same points as those in Damascus, but with a slightly
greater emphasis on the nonaligned principles.
Ceausescu's trip takes place against a background
of increasingly open differences over ideological and
foreign policy between Bucharest and Moscow. Ceausescu
may believe that by inserting himself into the Middle
East picture and by improving relations with key non-
aligned nations, he will be better able to resist Soviet
pressure. In the past he has carefully balanced his re-
lations with the Israelis and the principal Arab antago-
nists. Romania is the only East European state to maintain
full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.
-12-
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release 4
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
After stalling for years, Italy has completed rati-
fication of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The Italians probably decided to ratify when it be-
came apparent they lacked support in the International
Atomic Energy Agency for a legal maneuver allowing them
to continue receiving nuclear materials by ratifying
the treaty's safeguards agreement, but not the treaty
:itself.
Continued access to nuclear materials is particu-
larly important to Rome now that it is seriously consid-
ering a plan to reduce dependence on imported oil by
constructing 20 new nuclear power plants by 1985. Canada,
one of Italy's major potential sources for uranium, re-
cently made it known to the Italians that their request
for supplies would not be considered until Rome ratified
both the treaty and the safeguards agreement.
Rome had long resisted pressure from the US, the
USSR, and many of its EC partners to submit the treaty
to parliament for ratification. The Italian Foreign
Ministry frequently claimed that the treaty would run
into stiff opposition in the legislature.
The treaty's speedy passage through parliament--it
was submitted on march 26 and approved on April 23--how-
ever, lends support to earlier indications that this was
a smokescreen used by top Foreign Ministry professionals
to conceal their own opposition.
There is no evidence that Italy wants to join the
nuclear club, but these officials were clearly reluctant
to give up the maneuverability they thought Rome retained
by keeping the option open.
Italy's ratification opens the way for the remain-
ing EURATOM states that have not deposited their instru-
ments of ratification--the West Germany, Luxembourg,
Belgium and the Netherlands--to do so. The five had
agreed among themselves- to complete the process only as
a group.
Approve
 Approved For Release ;
National Intelligence Bulletin April 26, 1975
Argentina: Argentine President Peron is apparently
trying to dissuade Peronist legislators from placing a
strong figure in the senate presidency, the post from
which her constitutional successor would come were she
to leave office. She probably fears that the availabil-
ity of an attractive successor would increase the chances
of her being replaced. Indeed, to protect her own posi-
tion, Mrs. Peron reportedly wants the post left vacant
if the non-Peronist incumbent, Jose Allende, is removed.
Fearful that the President, who has been coming under in-
creased pressure, might resign before the 1977 presiden-
tial election, however, the Peronist-controlled senate
may well ignore her wishes.
-14-
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Approved For Release ~
National Intelligence Bulletin April 26, 1975
North Korean Navy Now Superior to That of South
During the past few years Pyongyang has expended
considerable effort in building up and improving its navy.
North Korea still receives some naval assistance from the
USSR and China, but North Korean shipyards are now turn-
ing out a missile boat, submarines, and several classes
of patrol and amphibious craft. The navy's primary role
remains that of coastal defense, but it now has a growing
offensive capability with a clear superiority over its
Southern counterpart.
The North Korean navy is divided into two separate
fleet commands, one on each coast. The East Coast Fleet
traditionally has been the stronger, but since 1969 the
North Koreans have built up and improved their western
fleet. The navy has no air arm and no combatants are
equipped with surface-to-air missiles. For protection,
Northern ships rely on land-based air cover and conven-
tional antiaircraft armament.
Pyongyang's major naval combatants comprise two
conventionally armed destroyer escorts of native design,
eight Osa and ten Komar guided-missile boats, and eight
diesel-powered torpedo attack submarines. Most of these
were supplied by Pyongyang's two communist sponsors and
are divided between the two fleets:
--On the east coast, there are four W-class subma-
rines plus ten Komar and four Osa missile boats sup-
plied by the Soviets.
?--On the west coast, there are four Soviet-supplied
Osas and the four R-class submarines received from
the Chinese.
,--One destroyer escort is assigned to each fleet.
In recent years, however, the North Koreans have
dramatically increased their naval combatant construc-
tion program, in part to reduce what they have come to
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
D
 Approved For Release ~
National Intelligence Bulletin
view as excessive de-
pendence on their two
allies. They have de-
voted considerable ef-
fort toward building
ships with a distinc-
tively offensive orien-
tation: an amphibious
landing craft and fire
support - type boats.
During the last three
years some 100 of these
craft have been built
and assigned to squad-
rons in both fleets.
Another class of fire
support ship is now
under construction, and
the lead units could be
ready by late this year.
Other types of patrol
craft, and some small
submarines, are also
being built.
April 26, 1975
East Fleet Hq.
NORTH KOREA
Northern Line
West Fleet Hq.
wNorthern Limit
Line
;Demarcation Line
.SEOUL
SOUTH KOREA
In addition, the
North Koreans are turn-
ing out more sophisticated ships. In these efforts,
Pyongyang almost certainly is receiving technical as-
sistance from the Soviets or Chinese or both.
Recent Activities
Since the incident on February 26 in which a North
Korean fishing boat was sunk in international waters in
the Yellow Sea, the navy has been involved in extensive
training activity. Starting in late February and lasting
through early this month, training has encompassed vir-
tually all aspects of the navy's combat capability--
troop landings, fire and maneuver exercises, coastal
bombardment, and joint exercises with the air force.
Guided-missile boats, submarines, and the west coast de-
stroyer escort have participated.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 AE' A-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release'2997i93 99 - GI" 149137 n0975A027600010046-5
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 26, 1975
While the exercise and training activity were prob-
ably not the direct result of the February incident, the
North Koreans no doubt were spurred by it to improve crew
proficiency and to test tactics and assess ship perform-
ance. The joint naval-air exercise could, for example,
have stressed improved coordination between ships and
planes in order to be better prepared for possible future
incidents.
Pyongyang has also improved its naval posture near
Southern waters. In early February the North Koreans
shifted their east coast destroyer escort to a base some
60 nautical miles from the Northern Limit Line--the un-
official seaward extension of the Military Demarcation
Line. With that shift, both destroyer escorts are now
positioned fairly close to their respective Northern Limit
Lines.
Future Options
The North Korean navy will continue to grow over the
long term, with Pyongyang probably giving construction
priority to missile boats, submarines, and amphibious
and fire support - related ships. The North will continue
to need Soviet and Chinese assistance, especially in the
areas of sophisticated weapons and electronics systems.
It appears unlikely that any additional large surface
ships, such as destroyers or destroyer escorts, will be
built in the next few years.
The North Koreans will also continue efforts to de-
velop and refine their offensive naval capabilities.
With their present missile boat and submarine construc-
tion programs, the North Koreans are likely to retain
their naval superiority over the South. Seoul's navy
currently lacks both missile boats and torpedo attack
submarines and no South Korean ship can match the fire-
power of the 20 to 25 nautical-mile-range Styx missiles
carried by Northern missile boats. Pyongyang's major
disadvantage is that, in time of war, its navy would
have to operate as two fleets separated by South Korea.
A3
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010046-5
 Approved For Release ~
National Intelligence Bulletin April 26, 1975
A potential use for Pyongyang's growing offensive
capability is in the area of the offshore islands, and
the North Koreans are capable of taking them by amphib-?
ious and airborne assault. For the near term, Pyongyang
almost certainly will continue naval patrolling along
the Northern Limit Line and near the UN Command - con-
trolled islands in the west. Additional fishing boats
may well be sent south for the coming fishing season,
perhaps under armed escort, to ply international waters
heretofore "reserved" for Southern fishermen. The North
Koreans could also increase naval probing on both coasts
in an effort to assess South Korean--and US--reactions
and resolve. This could lead to additional incidents
and a significant increase in tension in the area. I
Approved For Release 2007/03/091 CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
 Top Se oeoed For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010046-5