NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 I
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
June 4,
N2 662
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
CONTENTS
SYRIA-IRAQ: Damascus to release
more Euphrates water to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
KENYA: Parliamentary report on
Kariuki murder released . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
IRAN: Placement of Hawk
missiles re-evaluated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
LEBANON: Situation in Beirut
returning to normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LAOS: Lao positions reiterated during
conversations with Habib . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
THAILAND: Labor leaders threaten
a general strike today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
USSR: Moscow's view of
Asian politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 12
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
After pursuing a largely one-sided quarrel with Iraq over the past two months,
Syria abruptly announced yesterday it would release more Euphrates River water to
Iraq as a "gesture of good will." A Syrian government spokesman said that, as a
result of the mediation of Saudi Oil Minister Yamani, Syria now had hope a
permanent agreement on sharing the river's water could be reached soon.
Iraq will be relieved by the Syrian gesture; the cutback in the flow of Euphrates
water threatened the livelihood of thousands of Iraqi farmers. Baghdad, nevertheless,
has refused to be provoked by Syrian harassment and propaganda, apparently
believing that President Asad would drop the dispute once it had served his
purposes.
Asad probably believes he has amply demonstrated that Syria can exert severe
economic pressure on Baghdad at any time if the Iraqis try to meddle in Syrian
internal affairs. Neither Iraqi political intrigue in Syria, nor Asad's antipathy for the
Baghdad regime is expected to end as a result of this step. The release of the
Euphrates water, however, should ease tensions, at least temporarily.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
President Kenyatta is reported to have forced the parliamentary committee
that is investigating the murder of regime critic J. M. Kariuki to delete two names
from its report. Committee members probably saw this deletion as the only way to
avoid their arrest or the disbanding of parliament.
The report, released yesterday, criticizes the police for covering up the crime
and planting false evidence. By implication, it also attacks the regime and is likely to
keep alive popular dissatisfaction with Kenyatta. The report alleges that Colonel Ben
Gethi, the commander of the paramilitary police and a mainstay of the regime, lured
Kariuki into the hands of his murderers. According to the press, the names deleted
at Kenyatta's insistence were those of a senior cabinet member and a high-ranking
police official-in all likelihood Minister of State Mbiyu Koinange and Police Chief
Bernard Hinga.
Kenyatta and his top associates, badly shaken at first by the hostile reaction to
Kariuki's murder, have resumed a confident and combatative manner. Throughout
May, delegations of government and party officials met with Kenyatta to pledge
loyalty and southern Kikuyu politicians-Kenyatta's main supporters-held rallies at
which the President's critics were castigated. In late May, Kenyatta got tough with
university students, a leading source of anti-government sentiment in the ca ital
using paramilitary troops to quell the students and close the university
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Tehran is re-evaluating its
plans for assigning the
improved version of the Hawk
surface-to-air missile which
began arriving in Iran last
December. Key military
installations will continue to
have highest priority, bul:
more emphasis is being
directed at protecting
important industrial and
petroleum sites. For example,
although the capital area still
is to receive the largest
number of missiles, it will not
get them before the Isfahan
steel works and the Kharg
Island petroleum facility
receive theirs.
U. S.S.R,
vpiaii a uvelali dIU I ARABIA ChahBahar
+ ..:_
defence plan for th
e
steadily falling behind
schedule. Some 25 Hawk 558010 e-75
missile launchers have already been delivered under th ase agreement with the
US, but none is yet operational. The first site at the Vahdati air base probably will
not be ready until late this summer-several months behind schedule. The battery
scheduled ' for Vahdati successfully test-fired two Hawk missiles in May, the first
firing by Iranian personnel.
Plans call for the missiles to be emplaced in eight locations by 1980, two more
than originally planned. The two additional battalions will be assigned to h
industrial center at Ahvaz and the port area at Bandar Abbas.
Planned Hawk Missile Sites
June 4, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin June 4, 1975
The situation in Beirut reportedly is returning to normal. All roads are open,
and the street fighting that paralyzed the city for two weeks has died down.
Prime Minister - designate Rashid Karami said yesterday that some progress was
being made toward forming a new government, but he stressed that the restoration
of calm is just as important. Lebanese security officers have cleared the streets of
barricades, and the sporadic shooting that kept residents home on Monday has been
halted after concerted efforts by security officials and politicians.
Karami's efforts to set up a cabinet of national unity are being continually
blocked by leftists who demand that the right-wing Phalanges Party be excluded
because of its part in the street, fighting. Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil has
rejected any suggestion that his party should be boycotted. After calling on
President Franjiyah, Karami said, "We have agreed on the plan to be followed in
forming a government."
Karami's efforts to improve the security situation notwithstanding, incidents
such as the killing of the commander of the National Liberal Party militia
demonstrated that security conditions are still poor. Former president Shamun's
supporters-who had not played a prominent role in the earlier hostilities-may now
be drawn into the conflict, which threatens to assume sectarian overtones. This
could have a polarizing effect on Christian and Muslim personalities who have sought
to preserve their neutrality in order to exert a calming influence during the past two
weeks. In this atmosphere, the rapid formation of a new cabinet in which all
segments of the population have confidence is of particular importance
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his Pathet Lao deputy, Phoumi
Vongvichit, broke no new ground in separate conversations on June 2 and 3 with
Assistant Secretary of State Habib.
Both Lao leaders reaffirmed the communist-dominated coalition government's
desire to maintain "good" relations with the US. They also made a strong pitch for
continued US assistance, but with the standard Pathet Lao caveat that such aid must
be unconditional and given directly to the Lao government.
In his discussion with Habib, Phoumi essentially reiterated a line he had taken
earlier with the US charge and acting AID director. He said that Laos was about to
embark on a long-range economic development program and that US assistance
would be welcome-particularly during the first two-year,
"healing-the-wounds-of-war" phase. This is not the first time Phoumi has described
American aid in the context of war reparations.
Phoumi said he would personally supervise negotiations on a new assistance
agreement. He also indicated he did not "think" there would be any more
"disorders" directed against Americans in Vientiane.
Meanwhile, Souvanna's lack of touch with reality and his acquiescence to
Pathet Lao viewpoints were abundantly apparent in his discussion with Habib. He
repeatedly emphasized that, in his view, "nothing had changed" in the
Lao-American relationship. The Prime Minister blamed "excited young people" for
the recent anti-American demonstrations in Vientiane, and argued that AID, not the
US, was the prime target.
Souvanna also maintained that there had been no real change in Laos, merely
an "evolution of attitudes." He said that in light of the "new situation," he had:
--"ordered" the two sides to collaborate;
--"ordered" Phoumi and acting Pathet Lao Defense Minister Khamouane
Boupha to purge the Royal Lao Army of "undesirables" and to integrate the
communist and non-communist armies;
--"asked" Phoumi to staff the coalition administration with civilian officials
from Sam Neua.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
The Pathet Lao, according to Souvanna, have no intention of taking over
Laos-at least not for another "five or six years." The Lao communists, he insisted,
were "reasonable nationalists" not dictators, who respected the monarchy and who
had never formed a separate government during their long years of isolation in Sam
Neua.
Souvanna gave no hint of any intention to resign or to go abroad.
Labor-management confrontations have intensified in Bangkok and labor
leaders have threatened a general strike for today unless the government yields to
their demands. Although the labor movement lacks sufficient strength to force a
nationwide shutdown, selected strikes could cause serious problems.
Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot is personally leading government efforts to
resolve the disputes. By appearing on television and directly involving himself in the
mediations, Khukrit is following the precedent set last year by his predecessor. At
that time, a similar approach, coupled with the enactment of stronger pro-labor laws
and establishment of a nationwide minimum wage, enabled the government to
resolve the crisis.
Continued inflation, with high prices unmatched by high wages, seems to be
the main issue for discussion in future bargaining sessions. Labor unions have
demanded the resignation of a tough senior police official and the disbanding of a
security unit at a local hotel--the scene of disturbances last month. Government
negotiators should have little difficulty in settling these issues.
Labor forces have traditionally worked closely with student groups. Together
these groups represent a formidable force with potential nationwide impact.
Historically, labor has desisted from using violence, and the current attitude of
students indicates their preference for peaceful action. At this juncture, both
organizations most likely are fearful of military intervention and reprisals aaainst
them and will not actively promote disorder.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
The Soviets are putting out the line that there has been a turn to the left in
China's domestic politics. Their purpose evidently is to suggest to the US and others
in the West that any improvement in relations with China will not be durable. The
tougher line appears timed to counter whatever gain Chinese Deputy Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping may have made during his visit to Western Europe last month and to raise
doubts prior to President Ford's trip to Peking.
This message was conveyed forcefully by Mikhail Ka itsa chief of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Far East Division,
Kapitsa asserted that Premier Chou n ai s position had been weakened
by the National People's Congress and that the "Shanghai" group, including Mao's
wife Chiang Ching, had moved into dominant positions overseeing the party and the
government. Kapitsa's deputy, Igor Rogachev, has made similar points about Chinese
politics to a US diplomat in Moscow.
Kapitsa and Rogachev made these assertions as if they were beyond dispute; in
fact, neither of the reputed leftists, Chiang Ching nor Yao Wen-van, has been
appointed to the Politburo standing committee, nor is there any sign that leftists
have gained control of it or of the party's control commission, as Kapitsa claimed.
Moreover, the Soviets themselves have heretofore interpreted the National People's
Congress as a victory for Chou and the moderates.
the new predominance of the Shanghai group
would lead to an interisi icai:ion o the struggle against both the Soviet Union and
the US. He did not speculate about what new policies China would follow, but he
implied that there was a good possibility of tougher days ahead for Sino-Soviet
relations.
Kapitsa raised the issue of the Soviet helicopter crew that has now been in
Chinese hands for more than a year and about which the Soviets have said very little
in the last six months. He argued disingenuously that Soviet authorities were under
public pressure to do something about the crew and stated that the Chinese
ambassador had been told Moscow may be compelled to retaliate.
I
A similar motive lay behind Kapitsa's description of the developing situation in
Southeast Asia. He said the 'Soviets wanted all countries in the region to strengthen
their defense against "Chinese expansionism" and, for this reason, were now
prepared to take a more favorable attitude toward the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations.
1APPrVVUU-rV1 III
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
Kapitsa described the outcome in Vietnam as a great defeat for China and by
implication a corresponding victory for the USSR. He was less enthusiastic about
Cambodia and even wept a few crocodile tears for the people of Phnom Penh.
Without giving any specifics, Kapitsa professed to see factions within the Cambodian
leadership and took care to describe the pro-Chinese faction as "savages" who were
responsible for the excesses. This factional formulation provides a rationale for
Moscow to seek ties with Cambodia even while condemning sotto voce the
Cambodian leaders.
On Japan, Kapitsa asserted that should the Japanese accept the hegemony
clause in a treaty with China, it would freeze Soviet-Japanese relations for a long
time. He also linked the hegemony issue to the question of the Northern Territories,
suggesting that the Soviets might show some flexibility if Tokyo resisted Chinese
pressures. He obviously hopes that such assertions will get back to the Japanese and
stiffen their resolve with China. Rogachev, has told a US diplomat that Moscow
anticipates that, in the end, Tokyo will agree to the hegemony language. The
implication is that the onus for the resulting "freeze" in relations will lie with Japan.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
BURMA: Labor unrest in Rangoon is continuing, and the government
apparently is ready to use 'force if necessary to prevent the situation from getting
out of hand. Thus far, the protests have been peaceful, but work slowdowns to
demand larger food rations and higher wages reportedly are spreading. There are
rumors that a general strike is planned to commemorate the anniversary on Friday
of last year's violent clash between troops and demonstrating workers. Government
leaders are meeting to discuss the situation, and troops are said to have been sent to
the sites of two of the slowdown strikes. The government apparently does not
believe the problem is crit'Jcal, but if the unrest becomes widespread, the army
almost certainly will be able to quell any disorders. Despite rumors of an alliance
between the workers and students, Rangoon University is calm and there have been
no further reports of student disturbances during the past week.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: President Balaguer has given cabinet-level posts to
two of the top military officers who resigned last month. General Enrique Perez y
Perez was designated secretary of the interior and police, and Rear Admiral Emilio
Jimenez was named secretary of foreign relations. As interior secretary, a post he has
held twice before, General (Perez will technically be the immediate superior of his
archrival, General Neit Nivar, whose appointment as chief of the national police was
the motive for Perez' resignation as army chief of staff on May 9. Balaguer's cabinet
shifts are in line with his policy of balancing military contenders for influence
against each other, seeming to favor first one and then the other. He is careful never
to allow any of the ambitious generals to accumulate enough support to move
against him.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
June 4, 1975
ROMANIA: President Ceausescu will arrive in Brazil today and move on to
Mexico on Saturday. At both stops he will push for increased economic cooperation
and will seek support for Romania's bid for observer status at the meeting of
nonaligned foreign ministers in Lima this August. Brazil resumed full diplomatic
relations with Romania only last year and has already concluded a bilateral
economic accord that provides for Romanian imports of Brazilian iron ore. Romania
has heretofore had to depend largely on the USSR for its iron ore. Ceausescu's
discussions in Mexico are expected to focus on President Echeverria's promotion of
the UN charter on the economic rights and duties of states. Ceausescu is also a
strong advocate of national control over exploitation of natural resources. He will
probably offer the Mexicans technical aid in developing their rapidly expanding
petroleum industry.
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Top Secret
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