NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800Qa0 12-ecret
H
National Intelligence
Bulletin
USAF review(s) completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
June 7,
N?_ 662
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2 - T00975A027800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
AZORES: Local military take over
Sao Miguel island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
.ANGOLA: New round of heavy fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: Lisbon divided on how
to deal with Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
UK-EC: Implications of Wilson's
referendum victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
LEBANON: Sadat offers to assist in talks
between new government and fedayeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
TAIWAN: Co-production of F-5Es
to be expanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
JAPAN-CHINA: Tokyo approves trade credit
for Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Husak's prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
SPANISH SAHARA: Madrid offers to host
four-party negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2
ILHA DO CORVO
ILHA DAS
FL~(OR?S
IsTI{Iro DA HoRr,
GRACIOSA' "--
/Santo Cruada Gractosa
.Y / DI87RITO DE ANGRA
F/ DSO HEnotsmo
Lajes
ILHA DO' I SAO
FATAL. JORGE f1 RCEIRIF'
Angrl3smo d0
Hero
" SAO' MIGUELN
s 7._l_[-V Ti Cj OC.~ ]A f 1 _
I Pants CeI' aLdda?.
Approved For Release 100-7701W: CIA-RD137i'' 01
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP791f00975A027800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
The local military have taken over the Azorean island of Sao Miguel, after a
protest demonstration forced the resignation of the civil governor and apparently
touched off a separatist effort to seize control.
Separatists apparently sought to exploit a demonstration by some 3,000
Azoreans who occupied the Portuguese civil governor's office in Ponta Delgada
yesterday afternoon.
The separatists closed Ponta Delgada airport and took over a local radio station.
The airport was later reopened, apparently on orders of the military governor.
There were early indications that some army members on Sao Miguel had
acquiesced in the separatist effort. The separatists issued a call for their supporters
elsewhere in the Azores to seize "points of decision" and implied that they had
military support.
A member of the Azorean Liberation Front later told the US consul in Ponta
Delgada that Military Governor Magalhaes was meeting with representatives of the
Front. The military on Sao Miguel, after some vacillation, appear to have decided to
remain loyal to Lisbon, at least for now.
A communique issued in Lisbon last night claimed that the situation was fully
under the control of the Armed Forces Movement.
Magalhaes' tie to Lisbon appears to be weak, however, and may be cut if
Portugal's ruling military authorities seek to retaliate for yesterday's events. So far,
apparently, no one has been arrested, and the separatists are thus free to try to
capitalize on the support they received yesterday and perhaps to try again with more
preparation.
Coordination with groups outside Ponta Delgada was not established yesterday,
and nothing happened on other islands. The separatists had little chance of seizing
the key points-military armories and communications facilities-allegedly called for
in their original plan.
US military officials at Lajes air base, on Terceira Island, report that the
situation there remained calm.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
There was no interference with the seven NATO ships-including a US vessel
and a Portuguese ship-currently visiting Ponta Delgada.
Lisbon's initial reaction to the developments was subdued, but charges of a
rightist attempt to thwart the Portuguese revolution are sure to arise. Leftists are
likely to make an effort to link the US to the disturbances.
pp ov or elease'2DU7JOT3T07- CIA-RDP79T00975A0
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin June 7, 1975
A new round of heavy fighting broke out in Luanda on Thursday when
troops of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola attacked several
areas in the city held by forces of the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola. Thus far, the Popular Movement appears to have the upper hand.
The Popular Movement's military successes over the past week in northern
Angola and the exclave of Cabinda have probably encouraged it to try to force
the Front out of Luanda. In other parts of Angola, the Popular Movement now
seems in a good position to disrupt the Front's supply routes from northern
Angola and Zaire to Luanda. The Front already appears to be suffering
shortages of arms and ammunition. Fragmentary reports on the fighting in
Cabinda suggest the Popular Movement may have pushed the Front out of the
capital city.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2q
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
Renewed fighting in Angola is posing serious problems for Portugal's ruling
Armed Forces Movement, which is divided on how to deal with its African territory.
A recent Portuguese delegation to Zaire led by Revolutionary Council member
Vitor Alves signed a joint declaration reiterating Portugal's position of neutrality
among the factions and stating that Portugal pledged to avoid any action that might
worsen the Angola situation. Although the communique is consistent with Portugal's
public stand, it also served to mollify President Mobutu, who had been publicly
denounced by Rosa Coutinho for his support to the Front.
Further evidence of the split in the Armed Forces Movement on the Angolan
issue came to light thi;; week in remarks made to Ambassador Carlucci by
Interterritorial Coordination Minister Almeida Santos. Santos claimed that over the
objection of Rosa Coutinho he had succeeded in persuading Portuguese leaders to
adopt a position of genuine neutrality. He argued that the Popular Movement clearly
would be defeated and that Portugal could not afford to back a loser. His admission
that Portugal has been secretly backing the Popular Movement is the first by any
high government official.
The issue, however, may not have been finally resolved as Santos claims. Rosa
Coutinho has a large following and may yet sway the Armed Forces Movement to
his point of view. His arguments will be strengthened by recent Popular Movement
successes in the fighting in Angola.
Meanwhile, the influx of white refugees from the Portuguese colony could
cause additional problems for Portugal's leaders. It is estimated that at least 5,000
Approved For Release 2b07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Releasj 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDPp9T00975A027800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin June 7, 1975
Portuguese emigrants have left Angola since August, with 1,500 returning home. As
many as 50,000 more are now said to have booked passage. The refugees that do
return to Portugal will not only swell the ranks of the unemployed but will also
reintroduce into Portugal's turbulent political life a large number of conservative
military officers who view present political developments in Lisbon with alarm.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release g
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
. The British electorate's overwhelming endorsement of EC membership in
the referendum on June 5 indicates that Prime Minister Wilson's gamble with
his political future paid off. Several years ago, Wilson had suggested holding a
referendum in order to prevent the Labor Party from splitting over this
controversial question.
Over 67 percent voted in favor of remaining in the EC. Roughly 65
percent of the electorate turned out-less than normal for general elections but
sufficiently high for the government to declare that the voters had made clear
their views. Wilson hoped that a positive vote in the referendum would put to
rest, particularly within his own Labor Party, the question of Britain's
European connection.
In Scotland, a surprising 58 percent voted to remain in the EC. This is a
blow to the Scottish Nationalists, who had urged a "no" vote to protest that
England had dragged Scotland into the EC. Some Scottish members of
Parliament suggest that the positive Scottish vote indicates that Nationalist
strength has peaked.
Despite the outcome of the vote, some opponents may try to keep the
issue alive. The chairman of the National Referendum Campaign-the
anti-Market umbrella organization-said that a "yes" vote did not need to be
final and that what one parliamentary session did, another could undo.
However, one of the leading anti-Marketeers-who is also head of Britain's
largest trade union-called on Britons to look ahead now and unite behind the
government to solve the country's mounting economic problems.
Now that the all-consuming referendum campaign is over, Wilson is
expected to move in two directions before Parliament recesses in mid-July:
--shuffle the cabinet to move some of the uncooperative vocal
anti-Marketeers to less important positions;
--address growing economic problems, especially rising inflation and
unemployment. The trade unions, industry, and the government will search
more urgently than before for a substitute for the nearly defunct social
contract.
The unqualified British "yes" to EC membership is being greeted with
immense relief in the EC capitals. The Community can now devote more
attention to problems that had been deferred while the British question
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T009 5 125 -
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
preoccupied the Nine. The referendum is a major political success for the
Community and could provide new forward momentum. At the least, it should
temporarily still anti-EC sentiment in Denmark that was deriving inspiration
from the UK.
London will move quickly to mend fences with its EC partners and
assuage the considerable resentment currently felt toward it in many quarters.
There will be opportunities for conciliatory moves at several Council meetings
this month, including one of the foreign ministers, and at a "European
Council" of the nine heads of government next month. Recently announced
changes in the UK Foreign Office and diplomatic service probably point to
Wilson's intention to increase the "European" cast of British foreign policy.
The Labor Party, for the first time, will now take seats in the European
Parliament, and British representatives, including those from the trade union
sector, will attend meetings of the economic and social committee. No major
changes in London's position on principal issues under EC competence are
expected anytime soon, and Britain will continue staunchly to protect its
national interests in EC forums.
British influence on the EC has been to broaden and liberalize the
Community's external policies while making its machinery more pragmatic and
less bureaucratic. This positive impact can be expected to continue, as will
Lond n's efforts to counter the EC's tendency to evolve along protectionist
lines.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
There have been no major anti-US demonstrations or disturbances in Vientiane
for nearly a week, but harassment of Americans continues.
Yesterday, a so-called "protest committee" claiming to represent some 2,700
Lao employees of AID demanded an extra three months' severance pay for these
employees, on top of the generous termination benefits already promised them. In
order to keep the AID dissolution negotiations on track and to protect the safety of
the 200 or so Americans still in the Lao capital, US officials had little choice but to
acquiesce.
The Pathet Lao are continuing to enter the private residences of American Al D
personnel, ostensibly for the purpose of inventorying the "furniture." In some cases,
they have confiscated refrigerators, stoves, and air conditioners-possibly in the
belief that AID personnel wit attempt to remove these appliances when they leave
Laos on or before June 30.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Relea
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
LEBANON
Lebanese Prime Minister - designate Rashid Karami, who has been trying for
ten days to assemble a new cabinet, yesterday received an assist from Egyptian
President Sadat.
In an interview published in a Beirut newspaper, Sadat urged all Arab states to
refrain from interference in Lebanon's domestic affairs, proclaimed his own
willingness to visit Beirut to facilitate the negotiation of a new agreement between
the Lebanese and the fedayeen, and expressed confidence that the head of the
right-wing Phalanges Party, Pierre Jumayyil, will recognize his "Arab responsibility.
Sadat appealed to Jumayyil to cooperate in seeking an end to Lebanon's
political and security crisis, adding that he has "no doubt that Jumayyil will
respond." This expression of confidence, although qualified, will tend to undermine
the position of Progressive Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, who has held up the
formation of a government by insisting that the Phalangists should be excluded
because of their role in the recent fighting.
Jumayyil has publicly welcomed Sadat's initiative. He has shown no sign,
however, of backing down from his demand that the Phalangists be included in any
new government.
A variety of Lebanese political and religious leaders-and, probably,
representatives of the Syrian government-have also been attempting to persuade
Jumblatt to limit his demands and cooperate with Karami. With this combination of
Arabs calling for moderation, Jumblatt is not likely to hold out for long-especially
if as is likely, his party is offered important cabinet posts.
Karami has said only that he will form a government "in due time." He has
justified his failure to make quick progress by repeating that the country needs a
cabinet competent to deal with, rather than ignore, Lebanon's problems.
Karami has indirectly criticized President Franjiyah's handling of the current
crisis by publicly praising former president Shihab, who-with Karami as prime
minister-provided vigorous and effective leadership after the 1958 civil war. Karami
probably holds only limited hope that Franjiyah will provide much help in
assembling a cabinet, but is eager to protect himself against his own possible failure
by moving in advance to put some of the blame on Franjiyah.
In fact, recent developments have significantly reduced Franjiyah's political
strength and popularity, although he remains the dominant figure. Still, he has been
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
politically embarrassed by having publicly to recognize the failure of his preferred
military cabinet, the need to turn to his longtime rival Karami, and the continuing
ne
it
cess
y to accommodate Syrian desires when dealing with Lebanon's domestic
Taipei wants `to increase assembly of F-5Es under an existing co-production
agreement with the US from 100 to possibly as many as 200. This will increase the
fighter force, as well as lower the unit costs and keep trained personnel employed.
The Nationalists' initial requst to co-produce an additional 20 F-5E aircraft has
been approved by the US. Their requested credit arrangements for these aircraft
have been disapproved, however, and Taiwan is expected to attempt domestic
financing to support the operation.
Taiwan's participation in co-production of the aircraft-which has been limited
to the assembly of prefabricated components and parts-is to undergo a phased
increase. By mid-1976, the Nationalists should be manufacturing some components
from US-supplied raw materials. Taiwan would also like to co -produce 60 to 80
engines for the aircraft,
Approved For Release 2007/0
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
JAPAN-CHINA
Tokyo has tentatively approved a one-year, $500-million trade credit for China.
The credit, arranged in April, will help correct Peking's balance of payments this
year.
The credit will be used to finance Chinese imports of 1.5 million tons of steel
from Japan this year. It will also enable Peking to continue importing industrial
products and equipment, while avoiding at least temporarily a balance-of-payments
problem.
Without the credit, China had anticipated a $600-million trade deficit with
Japan this year. In 1974, the deficit with Japan was $840 million-five times the
deficit in 1973. Total Japanese trade with Chinawill reach $4 billion this year, $1
billion more than last year.
The credit will provide some relief to Japan's depressed steel industry. Peking's
'
s total steel exports.
1.5-million-ton steel order represents nearly 4 percent of Japan
Shipments to China have grown from 500,000 tons in 1970 to a high of 1.9 million
tons last year.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
Gustav Husak's election to the presidency, on top of his continuing role as
party secretary, confirms his position as the strongest leader in the Prague regime.
Over the coming months, however, his political acumen will be put to the test as he
grapples with difficult internal problems.
Husak's tenure in the two top jobs appears secure, at least until the party
congress next spring. He is apparently in good health and, after several months of
intensive internal debates centering on the selection of a successor to former
president Svoboda, he has clearly emerged as "first among equals." More important,
the fact that Husak won the presidency demonstrates he has Moscow's endorsement.
The US embassy reports that its diplomatic contacts in Prague are, nevertheless,
generally reluctant to conclude that Husak's position is now unassailable. Indeed,
the Central Committee plenum that nominated Husak for the presidency
conspicuously avoided removing the incapacitated Svoboda from the party
Presidium. Although Svoboda's retention in the party's top ruling body preserves the
delicate balance between moderates led by Husak and the hard-liners, Husak
probably would have preferred replacing him with another moderate.
Husak's dual posts will probably make him increasingly vulnerable to internal
critics, and he will no longer be able to devote full time to running the party.
Moreover, some members of the leadership-rightly or wrongly-can be expected to
interpret his elevation to the presidency as a "kick upstairs." The resulting
uncertainty about Husak's political strength, plus the need eventually to replace
Svoboda on the Presidium, could lead to increased political in-fighting, thereby
further complicating Husak's efforts to lead the regime.
Husak must still find a way to heal the wounds of 1968, when as many as
500,000 party members were purged in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. He
favors moderation and is engaged in factional struggles with party hardliners who
oppose his efforts to rehabilitate former party members-primarily at the lower
levels-on a case-by-case basis. There are no signs that Husak has won this struggle.
Another problem confronting Husak is what to do with his predecessor,
Alexander Dubcek.
Husak could find it difficult to
muzzle Dubcek and his supporters. Failure to do so will bring Husak under
increasing pressure from revenge-seeking hard-liners at home.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
The determining factor in Husak's future will probably be Moscow's continuing
appraisal of his performance? He will have to be particularly adroit both in living up
to Soviet expectations and in establishing political stability in a party and a nation
still haunted by the events of 1968
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Releas4 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP719T00975AO27800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
A Spanish Foreign Ministry official has indicated that his government this week
informed Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria that it would soon invite them formally
to a four-party international conference to discuss the future of Spanish Sahara.
According to the official, if one or more of the parties reject the invitation,
Spain then plans to request UN Secretary General Waldheim to 'convoke such a
conference under his own auspices. Waldheim's announced visit 'to all four countries
next week may lay the groundwork for such a conference. The official stated that if
a conference cannot be successfully convoked even under UN auspices, Spain's
"hands will be clean"; it will have made an honest effort to seek a solution among
the interested parties. The next step then would be up to the UN.
The official stressed Spain's willingness to consider any possible solution-not
excluding annexation or partition-that the interested parties may propose. He
insisted that Madrid is not committed to the creation of an independent state or to
surrender sovereignty to any particular Saharan political force. Rabat has not yet
dropped its objection to Algerian participation in negotiations to settle the
disposition of the territory, but we believe Morocco will acquiesce to prevent an
early Spanish withdrawal-a possibility raised in a statement issued by Madrid last
month.
A mutually acceptable political solution will be difficult to achieve. Algiers
opposes Moroccan annexation of all the territory, while Rabat opposes Spanish
Saharan independence. Both Morocco and Mauritania fear a hasty Spanish
withdrawal before a political settlement can be negotiated.
Algerian opposition to Morocco's claims has not diminished. To exert pressure,
King Hassan has orchestrated an anti-Algeria press campaign, including attacks by
Moroccan party leaders.
For the present, the Algerians seem unconcerned about Moroccan pressure
tactics. They would like to see Spain withdraw leaving an established government in
place, presumably the pro-independence party in the Sahara that Algeria is publicly
supporting. The Algerians have the capability to exert pressure on Morocco by
enlisting international diplomatic support for granting Spanish Sahara independence
or by supporting subversive activity by Moroccan dissidents residing in Algeria.
Mauritania, for its part, remains fearful of Moroccan irredentism. Nevertheless,
it is interested in a partition of the region with Morocco and claims to have reached
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 : CIA-RDP7 000975AO27800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
agreement with Rabat. It accepts Algeria as an interested party, but gives it a
secondary role because Algiers has no territorial claim. In any negotiations,
Nouakchott will argue that partition is the most viable compromise solution.
25X1
Approved For Release 2Q07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010
 Approved For Releas
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
FRANCE: The US defense attache in Paris reports that a French naval task
force of two destroyers is en route to the Indian Ocean. The ships reportedly will
transit the Suez Canal on June 15, after a four-day visit to Greece. The two warships
will relieve a guided-missile frigate and a destroyer in the Indian Ocean and will
remain there until the end of the year. The reopening of the Suez Canal will have a
significant impact on the French Indian Ocean Fleet. Transit time around the Cape
of Good Hope is about 18 days. The Red Sea route via the canal will shorten the
logistics support line from the main French Mediterranean naval base at Toulon to
forces in the Indian and Pacific oceans by nearly two weeks.
BURMA: Workers and students staged small protest demonstrations in
Rangoon yesterday, but no violence was reported. The protesters were
commemorating the anniversary of last year's violent labor disorders, during which
troops killed more than 20 demonstrators. The government hopes to keep the
situation in hand this year and has sent high-ranking officials to meet with the
workers and students. It has also announced that overtime pay for workers will be
increased; low pay has been one of the main grievances of the workers. The US
embassy reports that both the authorities and the protesters appear to be trying to
avoid a serious confrontation. The mood is described as tense, however, and the level
of unrest could escalate
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027800010012-0
 Approved For Release 00975AO27800010012-0
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
PHILIPPINES-CHINA: President Marcos leaves today for a five-day trip to
Peking. He will probably meet with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou
En-lai. The principal purpose of the visit is to conclude an agreement to establish
The
mese Nation is s reca a eir am assa or to Manila yesterday, signs mg aipei's
intention to sever official 1111 ns when Sino-Philippine ties are announced.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Approved For Releas
National Intelligence Bulletin
June 7, 1975
USSR: The two Kanin-class guided-missile destroyers and an armed
replenishment oiler that made a 12-day visit to Cienfuegos, Cuba, left there on June
4, probably en route to Northern Fleet waters. These units were in Boston from May
12 to 17 as part of an exchange visit, prior to their arrival in the Caribbean on May
25X1 21.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
 Top Stemd For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27800010012-0