NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010012-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 21, 2006
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 8, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
July 8, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Policy statement
debate today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE: Finland
delays summit-level finale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
MALAYSIA-CHINA: Kuala Lumpur becoming
dissatisfied with relations with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
THAI LAND - NORTH VIETNAM: Thais apparently
refuse to continue normalization talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
JAPAN: Miki has caused some
resentment in his party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SAUDI ARABIA - I RAN: Talks on Persian
Gulf security termed "useful" by Saudis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Joint statement may
ease tensions over Spanish Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CHILE: Cancellation of UN commission
visit harms foreign investment prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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MEXICO: Echeverria hopes trip
strengthens ties to Third World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
The Armed Forces General Assembly convenes today to debate the relatively
moderate policy statement issued by the Revolutionary Council on June 21.
Since then, the authority of the military leadership has been eroded by:
--widespread strikes and civil disobedience;
--the unresolved dispute over the Socialist newspaper Republica;
--the Catholic Church's refusal to acquiesce in an order nationalizing its radio
station;
--the massive jailbreak by members of the former regime's secret police.
On top of this, Socialist Party leader Mario Soares has threatened to paralyze
the country with mass demonstrations if press freedom is not assured.
The Communists are reported by the press to have placed their followers on
alert because, they claim, an effort may be made to oust Prime Minister Vasco
Goncalves, their most powerful ally in the military. According to the US embassy,
the head of the internal security forces, General Otelo de Carvalho, intervened and
forced the Communists to back down on the threats to set up roadblocks and
checkpoints.
The session beginning today will provide an opportunity for extreme leftists
within the military to press for a more radical approach. A proposal that the military
forge "direct links with the people" is one of the key items on the assembly agenda.
In the policy statement last month, the Revolutionary Council approved the
idea of direct links between the Armed Forces Movement and the people, but did
not say how the idea was to be realized. Leftist officers-often associated with
General Carvalho-would like to abolish political parties and form "popular
councils," which they say would provide the armed forces with the links they want.
The Portuguese Communist Party wants to maintain the status of political parties,
but also favors establishment of "committees for the defense of the revolution,"
which it says would provide links with the people.
The US embassy reports that pressure is building up within the Movement to
tilt further to the left. In preparatory meetings for the assembly, the army called for
firm action to reassert authority of the military and for immediate steps to ensure a
"progressive interpretation" of the policy statement. The navy also demanded strong
action to strengthen "progressive" forces.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
July 8, 1975
Finland announced yesterday that it was no longer possible to stage a
summit-level finale to the European security conference in Helsinki on July 28,
stating that a minimum of three weeks' advance notice is required to make the
necessary preparations. For every day the conference participants fail to reach
agreement in Geneva, therefore, the summit in Helsinki will be delayed an additional
day as well.
Agreement on setting a date for a summit has been held up in Geneva by the
demands of several smaller Western and neutral states that further progress must first
be made toward settling unresolved issues. Turkey and Malta are most firmly
opposed to setting a date, and the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Romania have
also raised objections.
Over the weekend, tentative agreement was reached on most outstanding
East-West issues, and yesterday a tentative, but still fragile, compromise was worked
out on follow-on procedures for the conference. The French now appear willing to
agree to additional follow-up meetings of senior officials and a possible second
conference.
Turkish demands for a special clause exempting them from certain provisions
concerning confidence-building measures and Ankara's insistence on Turkish-Cypriot
representation in Helsinki remain as the major obstacles to agreement. Western
delegates believe that most of the resistance concerning confidence-building
measures is coming from the Turkish military, and they are hoping that the West
Germans can apply sufficient pressure when the chief of Turkish armed forces,
General Sancar, visits Bonn from July 7 to 10. Major demarches are also being made
in Ankara in hopes of forcing a change of policy when the Turkish cabinet meets
tomorrow.
Most of the debate in Geneva yesterday centered on a French proposal
establishing the end of July as a target date for the summit, while giving the
participants until July 12 to work out their differences on the most important
issues. If the July 12 deadline is not met, the Helsinki summit will be postponed and
conference participants would assume Finland's costs of beginning preparations for
the four-day, heads-of-state meeting.
EC political directors are meeting in Rome today, and a firm decision to
support the French proposal could be decisive in breaking the deadlock. Last-night,
conference participants agreed to postpone their next session until this evening to
allow more time for informal negotiations rther consultations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
MALAYSIA-CHINA
July 8, 1975
Kuala Lumpur is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with its relations with
Peking.
The Malaysians had some misgivings over the opening of diplomatic relations
with the Chinese a year ago, but for a time were reassured by Peking's correct
behavior. However, they were upset in April when the Chinese Communist Party
sent anniversary greetings to the Malayan Communist Party. Prime Minister Razak
was extremely irritated over this, even though the Chinese had attempted to impress
on him during his visit to Peking last year that moral support to liberation
movements is not incompatible with amicable state relations. Although there is no
evidence that the Chinese are materially aiding the Malayan Communist Party, the
message coincided with a spurt in terrorism that had already raised Malaysian
concern over the consequences of communist victories in Indochina.
Now, the Malaysian government is also distressed over growing Chinese
embassy contacts with Malaysian Chinese, which Kuala Lumpur describes as being
"on the fringes of the diplomatically acceptable." Malaysian limits on diplomatic
propriety in this case are extremely narrow; some Malaysians see the embassy's
cultivation of local Chinese as confirming their fears that a Chinese diplomatic
presence would lead to subversion.
To show its displeasure, Kuala Lumpur has decided to scale down cultural and
other exchanges. It has canceled the visit of a Chinese acrobatic troupe and has
postponed the visit of a trade mission to China. Trade relations with the Chinese
have not, in fact, lived up to expectations.
Nevertheless, rapprochement with Peking remains central to Malaysia's
nonaligned foreign policy. Kuala Lumpur's current disappointment may, however,
reinforce the cautious attitude of Indonesia and Singapore toward lomatic ties
with the Chinese. I IT
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
THAILAND - NORTH VIETNAM
Thai leaders apparently have decided to decline a North Vietnamese invitation
to continue bilateral negotiations in Hanoi this month, aimed at possible
normalization of relations.
The Thai will refuse on the grounds that Foreign Minister Chatchai, to whom
the invitation was extended, will be accompanying Prime Minister Khukrit on visits
abroad at that time. According to the US embassy, however, the real reason is that
Thai officials want all details of a joint communique worked out before a delegation
travels to Hanoi.
Discussions in Bangkok in late May bogged down over North Vietnamese
demands for the return of US military equipment removed from South Vietnam to
Thailand at the end of the Vietnamese conflict. The Thai were annoyed at the
Vietnamese negotiators' aggressive attitude and at efforts to garner beneficial
propaganda from the talks.
The Thai are hopeful that the normalization of diplomatic relations with China
will serve, in part, to counteract Hanoi's expanded presence in Southeast Asia.
Thai officials thus may well adopt a wait-and-see attitude before resuming
discussions with North Vietnam. This, coupled with Hanoi's past inflexibility,
indicates that it will probably be several months before any meaningful dialogue will
be establishe
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
Takeo Miki's operating style and last-minute reverses in his first Diet session as
Prime Minister have caused some resentment within the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), but he probably will ride out his current difficulties and lead the party
into a general election-most likely in December.
For the first time in years, two budget-related proposals failed to reach a final
vote before the Diet adjourned on July 4, an outcome that shocked LDP leaders and
overshadowed Miki's otherwise satisfactory legislative performance. The setback also
touched off a new round of complaining among rank-and-file party members
dissatisfied with Miki's tactic of cooperating with the political opposition at the
occasional expense of LDP unity. Previously, a dozen LDP members had abstained
from voting on an electoral reform bill-a move that nearly led to the defeat of one
of Miki's major reform proposals.
At a press conference the following day, Miki admitted the need for closer
consultations within his own party, but also reaffirmed his intent to cooperate with
elements of the opposition. He ruled out any immediate shuffle of the cabinet or
party leadership, and vowed to push the budget proposals through an extraordinary
Diet session in the fall.
Meetings of the major LDP factions later on July 5 indicate no change in the
balance of power sustaining Miki in office. The followers of LDP Secretary General
Nakasone and Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda voiced support of Miki, while the
factions of former prime minister Tanaka and Finance Minister Ohira remained
sharply critical. Significantly, Ohira appeared as scheduled with Miki at a political
rally the following day; as a major contender for power and having been especially
stung by the failure of the budget proposals, the finance minister might have used
this occasion to withdraw from the cabinet. The emotions of the past week should
subside somewhat now that the Diet has adjourned.
Even so, one of Miki's major strategems-using opposition support as leverage
within his own party to push various reform proposals-has been damaged. Lacking a
strong power base of his own, he will at least have to assuage some of the resentment
within his party and, in all likelihood, remain more sensitive to this consideration in
the future. Otherwise, Miki is banking on a gradual economic upturn and favorable
publicity from his trip to the US next month-and from a similar trip by the
Emperor in October-to set the stage for a successful general election near the end of
the year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
The Saudis report that Crown Prince Fahd held "useful" discussions on the
"general-subject" of Persian Gulf security during his visitto Iran last week.
According to the final communique, the two sides agreed that the Gulf should
remain a "peaceful, secure, and stable region, free from foreign interference.
Moreover, the necessity for keeping the region free from foreign bases was
confirmed."
An official of the Saudi Foreign Ministry who accompanied Prince Fahd on the
visit stated, in a conversation on July 5 with US officials in Jidda, that the reference
to foreign bases included not only US navy facilities in Bahrain and Soviet
installations in Iraq, but also US communications facilities in Iran. This is the first
time that US facilities in Iran have been mentioned since the Gulf states began
talking about a-security arrangement. The Saudi official's comment may not, in fact,
have accurately reflected the talks between Fahd and the Shah.
Despite agreement with the Iranians on opposition to foreign activity in the
Persian Gulf-a position already spelled out in Saudi policy statements-the Saudis
apparently showed little enthusiasm for Tehran's proposed Gulf security conference.
The Saudi official said that the Saudi side demurred when the Iranians tried to insert
language in the communique endorsing the holding of such a conference soon. The
Saudis are contending, according to the official, that complete agreement on
security arrangments should be worked out bilaterally before any such conference is
held-thus ensuring that the smaller Gulf states are not forced to accept positions
with which they do not agree.
Although trying to depict themselves as protectors of the interests of the small
states, the Saudis are probably more concerned with being railroaded into
arrangements they do not want. They favor general cooperation among Gulf-states,
but are suspicious of any formal defense pact, fearing that such an arrangement
would legitimize a stronger Iranian role on the Arab side of the Gulf.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 8, 1975
MOROCCO-ALGERIA
Tensions between Morocco and Algeria have eased with the publication of a
statement professing common understanding on the future of Spanish Sahara. In a
joint communique issued on July 4 at the end of a four-day visit to Rabat by
Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika, the Algerian side noted "with complete
satisfaction" the "understanding" between Morocco and Mauritania regarding the
future of Spanish Sahara. According to other reporting, this "understanding"
envisages a partition of the disputed territory-assuming that Spain goes along-with
the phosphate-rich northern region going to Morocco and the southern portion,
containing iron ore deposits, to Mauritania.
.The communique also stated that Morocco and Algeria were determined to
implement projects that have been agreed to but never acted upon. This presumably
refers to an accord signed in 1972 providing for joint exploitation of iron deposits in
southwestern Algeria and./to an accompanying border agreement in which Morocco
renounced all claims to Algerian territory. Rabat's failure to ratify the border
agreement, in part because Moroccan political parties denounced it, has been a major
sticking point in relations with Algeria. Algiers ratified the border agreement in
1973.
So far, there has been no confirmation of the understanding from Algiers other
than publication of the joint communique, which is sufficiently vague to allow
Algeria room' for maneuver. We doubt that President Boumediene, who has
consistently opposed Morocco's claim and has supported self-determination for the
territory, is ready to make such an about-face. He considers the border accord with
Morocco a dead issue, and last November he announced plans to push ahead with
.unilateral exploitation of the iron deposits in southwestern Algeria.
Algeria's "position may become clearer when it makes an oral presentation this
week to the International Court of Justice, which is to give an advisory opinion on
legal aspects of the Saharan dispute. Algeria's future policy toward the Polisario
Front, a pro-independence Saharan party that Algiers has been backing, will be
another indicator of the degree of Algerian support for Morocco's claim to the
Sahara
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 8, 1975
President Pinochet's abrupt decision to cancel the visit this week of the UN
Human Rights Commission is likely to damage government efforts to obtain badly
needed credits and new foreign investment. A number of West European nations are
already sour on Chile because of its abuses in the human rights field and its poor
credit standing. Pinochet's latest action may, in particular, complicate Chile's
attempts to renegotiate its foreign debt, on which principal payments amounting to
$490 million are due this year. The British have been intransigent on this issue, and
other creditor nations may follow suit.
In his speech banning the visit by the UN commission, Pinochet reiterated that
Chile would not receive such groups unless the USSR and Cuba were likewise made
subjects of investigation. Pinochet's sharp words about the international Marxist
campaign directed against Chile probably reflect his annoyance with recent
resolutions by the International Labor Organization in Geneva and the International
Women's Conference in Mexico City, both of which harshly condemned the military
government.
Reports that the UN group had interviewed Chilean exiles in advance of the
planned trip to Santiago probably heightened the Chilean leader's fears over the
prospect of yet another rebuke by an international organization. Pinochet evidently
has opposed any offer to invite independent observers into Chile to study alleged
human rights violations. Indeed, favorable responses to earlier overtures probably
can be attributed solely to efforts by those junta advisers who seek to moderate the
country's international image.
The government's nervousness over reported plans by communist and other
political opponents to step up labor and peasant agitation may also have played a
part in Pinochet's decision. The press claimed recently that the outlawed Communist
Party had instructed militants to take asylum in foreign embassies to embarrass the
government during the UN group's visit.
If junta leaders are fully behind the President on his decision to adopt a hard
line on the human rights issue-and if it sticks-Chile will face growing problems in
obtaining financial and military aid at a time when it can least afford it. Mounting
economic troubles and an imbalance in military hardware with neighboring Peru-its
principal adversary-could lead to an increase in internal tensions as military and
civilian officials seek a turnabout in Chilean fortunes. The result over the longer run
could be a gradual erosion of unity within the military junta.
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July 8, 1975
President Echeverria begins a 40=day trip to 13 Asian, African, and Caribbean
nations, including Cuba.
Described by Echeverria as his most important trip abroad during his
administration, the journey is calculated tostrengthen Mexico's and Echeverria's ties
with Third World countries. Laying the groundwork for increased trade will be a
secondary goal.
Another major concern at each stop will be the promotion of Echeverria's
ambitions to become the next secretary general of the UN. Press stories speculating
on Echeverria's candidacy have been appearing for several weeks, and last week the
campaign apparently began in earnest when Foreign Minister Rabasa raised the
matter officially with a European diplomat.
Echeverria is certain to dwell at length on concepts contained in the UN
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which he sponsored. The charter,
which attempts to reorder priorities in international economic activity, is his chief
claim to recognition in the Third World.
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The Cuba visit, set for the end of the trip, will fulfill a desire to meet with
Castro that Echeverria is said to have 'had for some time. In recent weeks, two
Caribbean leaders-Williams and Burnham-have gone to Cuba, and Echeverria
apparently now considers it important to demonstrate Mexico's "bold and
independent" foreign policy by meeting with Castro while Cuba is still an outcast
among Latin nations.
Echeverria will be visiting Guyana, Senegal, Algeria, Tanzania, Iran, India, Sri
Lanka, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Trinidad-Tobago, and Cuba, spending
about three days in each country.
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