CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
I
DIA review(s)
Top Secret
25X1
25X1 July 10, 1975
N9 662
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
PORTUGAL: Assembly proposals
draw sharp reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
TURKEY: Actions against
bases still being weighed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ITALY: Moro may withdraw
support from Fanfani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
UK: Statutory wage controls
may be avoided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
INDIA: Parliament convoked to
endorse state of emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PANAMA: Torrijos frustrated over
slow pace of canal negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CHILE: Pinochet irritating
other junta members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CAMBODIA: Apparent progress on
border issues with Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
AUSTRALIA: Special session
of Parliament called . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SOUTH KOREA: Political
controls strengthened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
Proposals announced yesterday by the Armed Forces General Assembly called
for the creation of "popular councils," and are drawing a sharp reaction from
moderate political leaders who see a threat to their parties' continued existence.
The Socialist Party reportedly convened an emergency meeting of its national
executive council. A spokesman for the center-right Social Democratic Center Party
expressed "consternation, concern, and regret." He said the parties should have been
consulted before such far-reaching proposals were announced. The Assembly's
proposals call for the development of popular councils, first at the local level,
leading to district and regional assemblies, and eventually to a national assembly.
The military proposes to play an active role in each of these bodies.
The aims of these popular councils, as set out by the Assembly, would be:
--to foster mass participation in the revolution;
--to protect the revolution through self-defense organizations;
--to enlist the workers' assistance in increasing production.
The councils would gradually take over local administration, along with the job
of political indoctrination of the people and control of the means of production.
The Assembly noted that the formation of these popular bodies would not preclude
cooperation by those political parties favoring socialism, but did not say what form
this cooperation might take. It implied there would be no significant role for the
parties once the popular councils are functioning.
The councils represent a compromise between the committee structure favored
by the Communists and that supported by the even more extreme left. The
Communists, however, were quick to announce their support for the Assembly's
action. They also said they would carry out an intensive organizing effort at the
local level. The. new councils are attractive to the military because they would allow
the Movement to control the form of the "direct links" it wants between itself and
the people and to by-pass the parties if it chooses to do so. The formation of a
national assembly is some time off, but the promise of one to come could be used
by the Movement to sidestep its earlier commitment to the election of a legislative
assembly.
The Assembly also promised further nationalization measures, progressive land
reform, and a revamping of the civil service, including further purges of officials. On
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
foreign affairs, the Assembly had only this to say: "Any type of ideological,
political, or economic hegemony" over the Portuguese revolution will 'be avoided.
The statement is an effort to answer the critics on the right who are wary of
Communist domination and critics on the left who fear the Armed Forces
Movement will sell out for financial assistance from Western Europe.
There have been no reports of a power play from either the left or the right at
the Assembly, and a Movement spokesman has described such rumors as
"completely unfounded." Rumored attempts to unseat Prime Minister Goncalves
failed to materialize.
Meanwhile, the Communists have scheduled a mass demonstration in Lisbon
tonight to show support for the Prime Minister and the military government. The
Socialists have countered with plans for their own rally.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 10, 1975
The Turks are continuing to weigh various options for action against US bases
and possible policy reassessments in the event the US arms embargo is maintained
beyond the July 17 deadline set by Prime Minister Demirel.
So far, there has been no official Turkish reaction to the possibility of a
compromise arrangement by which the ban on arms sales to Turkey would be lifted
while the halt in grant aid would remain in effect. Demirel indicated to US embassy
officials on July 2, however, that the ban on delivery of armaments already
purchased and the cutoff in the flow of spare parts were by far the most serious
aspects of the embargo.
Demirel and the Turkish general staff have been casting about for an
appropriate response to make on July 17, however, and may see such a compromise
as a way out of the dilemma they created for themselves with the establishment of
the deadline. Faced with hard realities, the Turks now see clearly that there is no
other viable source of armaments and are searching for an approach that will satisfy
the political necessity for a tough response, but will not preclude reinstatement of
US military assistance at some future date.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
Prime Minister Moro may soon withdraw his support from Christian
Democratic leader Fanfani, strengthening the possibility that the party's national
council will decide on a leadership change when it meets next week.
If Fanfani loses the support of the Moro faction, it will mean that roughly 80
percent of the party hierarchy has broken with the Christian Democratic leader. At
the party directorate meeting last week, center and left factions-about 70 percent
of the party-joined in opposing Fanfani's proposal to delay debate on Christian
Democratic leadership and policies until a party congress in the fall. The directorate
voted instead to begin such a debate on July 19 at a meeting of the Christian
Democratic national council-the party's principal deliberative body.
It is probably only a matter of time before Fanfani resigns or is eased out of
the top party post in any event, but a nod from Moro would ensure his departure.
Moro's support for his longtime rival was one of the key factors in Fanfani's return
to the party leadership two years ago. Moro is the party's most prestigious
left-of-center leader, and his alliance with Fanfani helped insulate the latter from the
growing attacks by left-wing Christian Democrats as the party suffered successive
defeats in the last two years.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
The 19 to 13 decision yesterday by the general council of the Trades Union
Congress to hold weekly wage increases to $13 during the next year should allow
Prime Minister Wilson to avoid imposing statutory wage controls, at least for the
present. Wilson still may ask for standby authority to impose controls if the
individual unions do not stick to the agreement when he announces his anti-inflation
package later this week.
In return for their agreement, the union leaders have asked the government to
deny pay raises to persons earning over roughly $15,000 and to work diligently to
reduce unemployment. They have also demanded a six-month freeze on prices.
The general council's decision follows a harsh speech by Chancellor of the
Exchequer Healey to the Labor members of Parliament, many of whom are opposed
to statutory controls. Healey warned that failure to support a voluntary 10-percent
limit on wage increases would mean a drastic cut in the country's standard of living
and force Britain "to crawl to the International Monetary Fund and accept the
terms they impose on us."
The cabinet this morning will discuss the anti-inflation proposals submitted by
the Congress and the Confederation of British Industry and will try to iron out any
remaining differences over the government's anti-inflation package. Healey claimed
several weeks ago that he had complete cabinet backing for his voluntary plan, but
some cabinet members may balk over asking for standby authority to impose
statutory controls.
The government was heartened earlier this week when the miners opted to
"seek" rather than "demand" a weekly pay increase of more than 60 percent. The
miners' move, plus the decision yesterday by the British seamen to settle for a wage
increase of 37 percent, suggests that for now even individual unions may cooperate
with the government. The miners' unanimous vote that their leaders begin
immediate negotiations for a four-day week suggests that their cooperation may be
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
Both houses of parliament have been convoked for July 21 to endorse the
recent proclamation of a state of emergency. Approval of the proclamation by
parliament is constitutionally required within 60 days.
The Ruling Congress Party's parliamentary majority ensures easy approval.
Government officials claim the proceedings will be valid, despite the fact that many
opposition members of parliament are in jail. They warn, however, that attempts to
disrupt parliament by opposition members not yet incarcerated will not be
tolerated.
The decision to summon parliament now, rather than next month as had been
generally expected, reflects Prime Minister Gandhi's apparent determination to
proceed quickly to legitimize the continuation of her authoritarian control over the
country. She probably believes parliament's rubber stamp will also put her in a
strong political position should she need eventually to employ other controversial
means to overcome a possible negative Supreme Court decision on her appeal against
her conviction last month for illegal campaign practices in 1971.
The court will take up her case on July 14. Although a full written decision is
unlikely before late summer, in view of the importance of the case an oral judgment
may be issued much sooner.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
Panamanian leader General Torrijos is laying the groundwork for a campaign to
demonstrate his frustration about the delay in negotiations on a new canal treaty.
He released for publication in a Panamanian newspaper this morning a
statement on a meeting he held yesterday with Panamanian student leaders. The
statement makes clear his strong irritation at the US, but does not break his
commitment to keep the details of the negotiations confidential. The statement
does, however, complain about what Torrijos considers the US failure to keep its
part of the bargain.
Although Torrijos, his chief treaty negotiator Juan Tack, and other
administration members have generally used restraint in their public statements
about the negotiations, at the same time notes of concern and impatience are
becoming increasingly apparent. In talking with reporters last week, Torrijos
indicated Panama's mounting impatience and maintained that "when all peaceful
solutions are closed to a country then it must resort to solutions that are not
peaceful."
Torrijos is discouraged about the prospects of a treaty because of setbacks such
as the US House of Representatives' approval of an amendment to cut off funding of
the negotiations and the publication of pessimistic articles in the US press about the
future of the negotiations. He is also facing increasing criticism about his handling of
the negotiations at home. To a considerable degree, Torrijos himself is responsible
for the domestic pressures, because he had raised expectations that an advantageous
treaty could be concluded within a fairly short time. He feels compelled to produce
concrete results, and fears that a prolonged delay will provide ammunition to critics
and weaken popular support for his regime.
In these circumstances, Torrijos may now feel a strong need to show that his
negotiating stance does have broad popular backing and to give Washington a
suggestion of the problems it could face if a new treaty is not attained. Torrijos
could very well, opt to use carefully controlled student demonstrations, perhaps
involving minor harassment of US citizens, to manifest his unhappiness with the
present situation.
At least initially, Torrijos would consider such actions a necessary tactical
move, and they probably would not mean a reversal of his view that negotiation is
the best way to achieve Panama's canal goals. If these small-scale actions did not
produce forward movement in the negotiations, more serious demonstrations could
occur.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
President Pinochet's imperious and independent actions, especially his recent
failure to consult with the three other junta members on major decisions, are
aggravating relationships within the ruling military junta. The most recent instance
was Pinochet's unilateral announcement that he had canceled the scheduled visit of a
UN human rights fact-finding team. A serious rift does not appear to be in the cards,
but the President's handling of the difficult problems facing the government is likely
to provoke continuing criticism by his junta partners.
The Chilean leader apparently is aware of some friction and may take steps to
reduce it. For the most part, the other service chiefs see eye-to-eye on basic
government policies and would not risk a split over individual issues or because of
personal rivalry with the President. If Pinochet can improve Chile's economic
situation and begin to change its poor international image, he will probably have
little trouble keeping the other junta members behind him.
Pinochet reportedly is considering the release of imprisoned Communist Party
leader Luis Corvalan as a means of offsetting the bad press caused by his decision to
keep the UN mission out of Santiago. Freeing Corvalan, however, will not go very
far in easing Chile's poor reputation on the human rights issue.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 10, 1975
Cambodian and Vietnamese communist officials appear to be making progress
in resolving their border problem.
The Cambodians had announced publicly, and apparently prematurely, on June
27 that they had solved the border problem with South Vietnam, but Vietnamese
forces violated Cambodian territor on several occasions
Although the Cambodians appear to feel that
agreement is near, isolated clashes may continue for some time, because lingering
animosities will probably complicate attempts by local officials to implement the
boundary decisions reached at higher levels.
The Cambodian desire to resolve the territorial dispute with South Vietnam
appears to be on the agenda of Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak as he continues his trip
to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
Prime Minister Whitlam is making an intense effort to strengthen his position
before the Labor Party caucus meets Monday to discuss his firing of Deputy Prime
Minister Cairns. The Prime Minister called a special session of Parliament yesterday
to explain away any suspicions that he was involved in questionable efforts to get
foreign loans. Alleged indiscretions of this nature by Cairns led to his dismissal.
Whitlam may have concluded that bringing matters to a head was preferable to
facing a continuing barrage of hostile and sometimes distorted press attacks. He may
calculate that a forthright move-and an acceptance of his explanation if not a
formal vote of confidence from Parliament-will put him in a good position to get
his way when the party caucus debates the Cairns issue.
If the caucus backs Whitlam, it will agree to replace Cairns as deputy party
leader. The individual selected will also become deputy prime minister. Most
observers in Canberra expect Whitlam to push William Hayden, a promising member
of Whitlam's moderate wing of the party, as Cairns' successor. Whitlam named
Hayden to replace Cairns as federal treasurer last month.
State parliamentary elections to be held in South Australia on Saturday could
provide another measure of the impact of the Cairns scandal on Labor's standing
with the public. South Australia is one of only two states with Labor governments,
and recent public opinion polls-which have a good record in Australia-show that
the state government's local standing has dropped by 12 percent. State Laborites
hope this disadvantage will be offset by a split among the Liberals. A by-election in
the state of Tasmania two weeks ago cost Labor the loss of a traditional seat in the
federal Parliament, and the strength of the anti-Labor trend would be underscored
by another unfavorable outcome in South Australia.
Thus far, the opposition Liberal-Country coalition has given no indication that
it will take advantage of Labor's difficulties to move for early national elections. The
opposition-controlled upper house of Parliament, however, has decided to call public
officials to testify next week on the loans controversy. If the opposition decides that
the government has been fatally wounded by the Cairns' imbroglio, it could at any
time use its control of the upper house to maneuver the government into elections.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
The "wartime security" bills pushed through the National Assembly by the Pak
government yesterday are the latest in a series of measures aimed at strengthening
political controls and security preparations. The new laws give the government
power to:
--place surveillance, or detain in camps, persons who in the past have been
convicted of security related offenses;
--increase defense taxes by some $400 million, which could raise the defense
budget to some $1 billion;
--organize virtually all males under age 50 into a civil defense corps;
--eliminate tenure for university professors, some of whom have encouraged
student demonstrations.
Although the new laws are in keeping with the authoritarian style Pak adopted
in late 1972, government spokesmen emphasized the increased threat from the
North as a rationale for their enactment. Opposition politicians in the Assembly
spoke out against the new controls, but were easily overridden by the government's
large majority.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 10, 1975
INDOCHINA: The US container ship SS Gateway City was reportedly fired
upon about 40 miles south of Sattahip, Thailand, Tuesday afternoon (see map facing
page 13). The ship's master heard gunfire and sighted two small fishing boats of
unknown nationality. Indentations believed caused by small arms fire were observed
on the ship's radio shack. No injuries were reported. The vessel continued on to
Sattahip without further incident. Owners of the Gateway City have ordered her to
remain in port until safe passage can be assured to Singapore, the ship's next port of
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