NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010032-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 19, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Power struggle 1
nearing showdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ?
USSR-PORTUGAL: Moscow expresses support 2
for Communists and Armed Forces Movement . . . . . . . . . .
PANAMA: Government considers 3
treaty options . . . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ' '
ARGENTINA: Pressures growing for 4
President Peron to depart from office . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDIA: Key points of
interagency memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ?
ETHIOPIA: Police officers arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PERSIAN GULF: Security cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SPANISH SAHARA: Algeria supports Spanish 11
Sahara before international court . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ANGOLA: Liberation Movement has 12
nearly complete control of Luanda . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WEST GERMANY: New economic measures . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ROMANIA: Ceausescu seeking scapegoats 15
for failures of flood-control measures . . . . . . . . . . . .
NORTH KOREA: Pyongyang attempting 18
to reopen talks with Seoul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
PORTUGAL
The power struggle in Portugal between Communist and moderate forces
appears to be nearing a showdown.
Despite Communist threats to try to prevent the demonstration in Oporto, the
Socialists opened all roads into the city last evening, and a crowd of more than
70,000 put on an impressive show of strength. Small groups of Communists
dispersed quickly and there were reportedly only brief clashes.
A potentially more serious test of strength will likely occur in Lisbon today
where the Communists have set up a number of roadblocks in an effort to prevent
another Socialist demonstration. Following a quickly summoned meeting of
members of the Revolutionary Council yesterday afternoon, President Costa Gomes
called in Socialist and Communist leaders for consultations and the military was put
on full alert.
In defiance of the Council, Communist leader Cunhal last night called on his
followers to use any means possible to stop the Socialist demonstration.
The spokesman for the Council subsequently also announced that it had been
decided that the roadblocks around Lisbon would be manned only by the armed
forces-not to prevent people from entering Lisbon, but "to check only for possible
reactionary elements. In view of the highly uncertain discipline within the military
at this point, it is uncertain what this may mean in practice.
The Communists are increasingly apprehensive over whether they can retain the
influence they have enjoyed thus far through the radical officers who have
dominated the Armed Forces Movement. The prospect of losing their main peg to
power-Prime Minister Goncalves-appears to have stiffened their determination to
meet the moderate challenge.
The US defense attache in Lisbon has learned that President Costa Gomes has
decided he must support the moderates in their attempt to oust Prime Minister
Goncalves in the Revolutionary Council meeting today or risk a further erosion of
his own power base.
There is a greater sense of urgency reflected in this later report than was
conveyed to Ambassador Carlucci Thursday by Costa Gomes' chief of cabinet. At
that time, Costa Gomes was said to be building support, while giving assurances that
he would act when the "proper opportunity presented 'itself. Moderates on the
Council may finally have convinced him that the opportunity may be lost if he fails
to act now.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
The Soviet ambassador to Portugal reportedly visited Costa Gomes yesterday
afternoon in an apparent attempt to convince him to go along with pro-Communist
sympathizers on the Revolutionary Council. Costa Gomes, who has vacillated in the
past, would not be tempted by Soviet blandishments, but might be susceptible to
the argument that he would be taking an unacceptable and unnecessary
to openly side with the moderates.
F7 I
Moscow has placed itself more fully and openly on the side of the Portuguese
Communists and Armed Forces Movement.
Over the past few days signed commentaries have appeared in Izvestiya and
Pravada pillorying the Portuguese Socialists and expressing support for the Armed
Forces Movement. An Izvestiya commentary, going further than Moscow has
heretofore, asserts that the "new Portugal" can count on active economic and
political support from the "socialist" countries. The Portuguese Socialists are, in
essence, charged with being class enemies.
Moscow's more forthright backing of the Armed Forces Movement and the
Portuguese Communists suggests the Soviets expect the rapidly changing political
situation will soon come to a head. The Soviets clearly want to be publicly aligned
with the "progressive" forces, but they also may have been under pressure from the
Portuguese Communists to take a stronger stand.
If, as Moscow apparently believes, the Armed Forces Movement comes out on
top, the Soviets will be in a better position in Lisbon. Even if things go badly for the
Portuguese Communists, on the other hand, the Soviet gesture of support at a
critical juncture could help protect Moscow from criticism within the communist
movement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
Senior Panamanian officials, pessimistic about the outlook for the treaty
nanntiations with the US. are discussing possible alternative courses of action.
Torrijos is consulting various sectors of the society to learn about their
attitudes, as well as to inform them of his negotiating efforts. His appraisal of their
reactions will almost certainly influence his choice of a future course of action. Thus
far he has pursued a mixture of moderation and pressure on the US, and he may well
decide to combine elements of all three of the options described. He appears to want
to continue to negotiate, but has declared he no longer feels bound to preserve the
confidentiality of the talks, thus clouding the atmosphere. He may no longer believe
that a treaty can be negotiated and ratified before 1977, but he almost certainly
feels that he must have some concrete achievement in order to keep the people's
confidence until that time. He is increasingly likely to believe that his patience has
not been productive and t nive considerable thought to the possible benefits-and
hazards-of using violence.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
Steadily growing pressures on Argentine President Peron are increasing the
chances of her early departure from office.
Labor is pressing hard-apparently with the backing of politicians and the
military-for the replacement of Economy Minister Rodrigo and three other cabinet
officers linked to the ousted Lopez Rega. Exile is being demanded for Mrs. Peron's
discredited confidant. Mrs. Peron's reported refusal to dismiss Rodrigo can only
hasten a showdown.
Labor leaders have been calling vehemently for his ouster because of his role in
the attempt last month to roll back wage hikes. Moreover, as a protege of Lopez
Rega, Rodrigo represents an unpopular vestige of Lopez Rega's influence in the
government. Rodrigo has already been rendered ineffective. His departure would
leave the administration with no one in charge of economic policy at a critical time.
There are no signs that President Peron is attempting to deal with the country's
mounting problems. Her main preoccupation appears to be how to survive the stress
she is under, and she may soon request a leave of absence from her duties. She may
view the prospect of an extended leave-from which the military might well not
permit her to return-as a relatively painless way out of her seemingly insoluble
dilemma.
The prospect for an orderly transition in the event Mrs. Peron should leave
office soon, has improved considerably with the recent election of a moderate
Peronist-Italo Luder-as president of the senate. Constitutionally next in the line of
succession, Luder is generally well regarded and is not known to have any links to
Lopez Rega.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
Prime Minister Gandhi's recent repressive actions, though technically lawful,
have substantially changed India's political system.
She has dramatically tightened her control and is likely to remain in power for
at least the next year.
--Within the Ruling Congress Party, opposition to Gandhi is unlikely to grow
serious enough to jeopardize her position.
--Anti-Congress opposition groups will probably remain unable to mount a
major challenge for some time.
--The security forces are likely to remain loyal to the Prime Minister's
constitutional authority and to be able to contain protest activities.
The Indian Supreme Court's decision on Gandhi's alleged campaign violations is
not likely to lead to her removal as Prime Minister.
--Even if the decision were adverse, she probably would take steps that would
enable her legally to remain in office.
--In the unlikely event she did leave office, her likely successor would be
Agriculture Minister Ram or Foreign Minister Chavan, either of whom would
probably be less leftist-oriented than Gandhi and perhaps somewhat friendlier
to the US and China.
The timing of the next national election will depend on Gandhi's reading of the
mood of the country.
--Under the state of emergency, the normal constitutional deadline for the next
election-March 1976-could be waived.
--Whenever the election is held, the Congress Party appears likely to win a
majority.
India's longer term future is less clear.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
--Monsoon failures and the inability of the government to get the economy
moving could lead to serious unrest and instability.
--This could lead to even more sweeping controls and repressive measures.
--Gandhi might succeed in cowing all opposition by such action, but the
chances of either the Congress Party replacing her or of the military stepping in
to assume power would increase as would the possibility of general instability.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 19, 1975
ETHIOPIA
The ruling military council has arrested several high-ranking police officers and
some air force officers for allegedly participating in anti-government activity.
Six police officers, including the vice commissioner, and six police
noncommissioned officers were arrested Tuesday. Five other police officers were
arrested yesterday. A large number of air force personnel, including many officers,
were arrested yesterday and brought to Addis Ababa from the main air base south of
the capital.
Those arrested are accused of complicity in the temporary detention last
weekend of General Berhane Tefera, the national police commissioner, by dissident
security forces in eastern Ethiopia. It is not clear whether army or police units-or
both-were responsible. The dissidents reportedly also tried to seize General Teferi
Benti, the council's chairman. Berhane and Teferi were visiting the Third Division,
which is headquartered 225 miles northeast of Addis Ababa, to attempt to calm the
troops' increasing opposition to the council, especially its land-reform program.
The dissidents detained Berhane for four hours to dramatize their demands for
restoring land grants to retiring military personnel, an immediate return to civilian
rule, and a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Eritrea. The arrested police
officers allegedly plotted against Berhane and gave information to the eastern
dissidents that caused them to detain Berhane. The council reportedly discovered
leaflets linking the arrested air force personnel to the incident.
The arrests have increased tensions within the police and the military. The
Ethiopian police are a large and well-organized force. A confrontation between them
and forces loyal to the council could lead to serious fighting. There is no evidence so
far, however, that police or armed forces dissidents are attempting to organize an
overt move against the council.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 19, 1975
The foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia apparently failed to agree
on new steps to strengthen regional security cooperation when they met with Gulf
foreign ministers this week in Jidda during the Islamic Conference. According to
Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, no decisions were taken because the majority of
states were uninterested in moving quickly on the subject.
Earlier this year, the Shah of Iran was encouraged by political developments in
the Gulf to believe that the time was ripe to resume his search-begun in 1968-for a
formula under which Iran could play a greater peacekeeping role on the Gulf's
western shore. He had hoped the discussions in Jidda would lead to an early
conference on regional security and eventually to a comprehensive pact protecting
existing regimes against both foreign interference and local threats to the status quo.
The main obstacle in Jidda was apparently Saudi Arabia, with the smaller Gulf
states probably following its lead. The mistrustful Saudis do not believe a regional
security arrangement is warranted and prefer to rely on bilateral ties. They certainly
do not share the Shah's perception of a power vacuum on the western side of the
Gulf that Iran should help fill.
Iraq supported the idea of a formal declaration restricted to assuring freedom
of navigation in the Gulf, according to the Iranian ambassador, but it did not favor
the more comprehensive Iranian approach.
The Iranians can be expected to portray the Jidda meeting in the best light,
claiming as progress the fact that for the first time all Gulf states met to discuss
common problems. Nevertheless, the apparent failure to agree either on holding a
conference, or on issuing a common statement on the desirability of limiting foreign
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 19, 1975
SPANISH SAHARA
Algeria's reiteration of support of self-determination for the people of Spanish
Sahara before the International Court of Justice this week may again strain relations
with Morocco.
The Algerian representative concluded a three-day presentation on July 16 by
calling upon the court, which is to give an advisory opinion this fall on legal aspects
of the Saharan dispute, to acknowledge "the inalienable right of the people of
Spanish Sahara to self-determination."
The Algerians characterized this right as a higher principle than existing
territorial claims, an obvious reference to the arguments advanced earlier by
Mauritania and Morocco. The Algerian presentation specifically mentioned the need
for a referendum organized and held under UN auspices.
It also affirmed that intervention was lawful in support of national liberation
struggles, presumably in defense of Algiers' support of a pro-independence Saharan
party, the Polisario Front.
So far the Moroccan government has reacted with restraint. A joint
Algerian-Moroccan statement issued two weeks ago following a visit to Rabat by
Algeria's foreign minister professed a common understanding on the future of
Spanish Sahara. The Moroccan opposition press has predictably condemned Algeria's
presentation and questioned the value of the recent Moroccan-Algerian
understanding.
In a recent conversation with US officials, King Hassan appeared confident he
and the Algerians were in agreement that:
--Algiers will not intervene militarily if Morocco occupies the Sahara.
--There will be no repetition of the Moroccan-Algerian border war of 1963.
--Algiers has no territorial claims on the Sahara.
In return, King Hassan presumably has promised ratification of a border
agreement signed in 1972 as the reward for Algerian acquiescence.
King Hassan's confidence may be misplaced. The Algerians may only have been
buying time for maneuver. A reference to the right of intervention in Algeria's
presentation to the court keeps o en Algiers' option to build up the insurgent
capabilities of the Polisario Front.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola now has nearly complete
control of Luanda, with only one area where elements of the Front for the
Liberation of Angola are holding out.
Rumors abound in Luanda that a large group of reinforcements for the Front
are on the way from Zaire and the north, but they will have to pass through Popular
Movement lines to reach Luanda. Meanwhile, the capital is limping back to order as
power is being restored and food is arriving. The third nationalist group-the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola-which has largely remained
out of the fighting may soon have to choose between joining the Popular Movement
or leaving.
Despite the end of the fighting in Luanda, the Popular Movement will continue
to try to push the Front from other areas. Militant members of the organization
want an all-out military struggle. Virtually all of its 18,000-man force is in Angola,
with the heaviest troop concentrations in the Luanda area and in the interior north
and east of the capital. The Popular Movement has numerous armed civilian
sympathizers in Luanda. All are well armed with modern infantry weapons of Soviet
and East European origin and assured resupply from the Congo. Military elements
are equipped with heavy weapons such as 122-mm. rockets and a small number of
light armored vehicles.
The armed strength of the Front for the Liberation of Angola stands at 18,000
men, with another 10,000 in training. Many of the latter are in Zaire and are
receiving material and financial support from Peking. The Front has its heaviest
troop concentrations in the extreme northern part of Angola and is in the process of
moving its main base from Zaire into northwestern Angola. It is well equippedwith
modern small arms and some support weapons of Chinese and Western origin, but
recent reverses in Luanda have nearly depleted ammunition stocks. The supply
situation is precarious since both Peking and Kinshasa have apparently not been able
to replenish recent losses.
The National Union, with 6,000 troops, is concentrating in Central Angola but
maintains scattered garrisons only in the southern ortion. It has no regular sources
of supply and is short of weapons.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 19, 1975
Bonn will almost certainly introduce measures around the beginning of
September to stimulate the economy. The magnitude of the program will be the
subject of considerable debate between the Social Democrats and the more
conservative Free Democrats in the coalition cabinet, but the estimates range
between $1 to $2 billion.
Chancellor Schmidt is calling for the new measures primarily to offset some of
the sharp drop in foreign demand. Export volume fell at an annual rate of 24
percent in the first half of 1975, seasonally adjusted, a key factor in a drop of at
least 6 percent in real GNP during that period.
Even a $2-billion program will do little to get the $440-billion economy
moving. But with most of the funds ticketed for the severely depressed and
labor-intensive construction industry, it could keep up to 75,000 off the
unemployment rolls this winter. One economics institute recently predicted that
unemployment would reach 1.5 million-6.7 percent of the labor force-by January.
Unemployment in June was 1 million, the highest for that month in 20 years.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 19, 1975
Premier Ceausescu may attempt to deflect criticism from himself at a Central
Committee plenum on Monday by seeking scapegoats for deficiencies in the
country's flood-control measures. The plenum, which was scheduled before the
floods, is now slated to discuss both fulfillment of the economic plan and flood
damage.
The Romanian leader is on the spot because the regime's emphasis on rapid
industralization has prevented the full implementation of the flood-control program
that the regime adopted in 1970. Possible scapegoats include Virgil Trofin, a known
Ceausescu critic who has been exiled as first secretary to Brasov, and Angelo
Miculescu, the minister of agriculture, food, and waters. Some local party officials in
those areas hardest hit by the floods may also be ousted.
Ceausescu's long-held determination to fulfill the country's current five-year
plan ahead of schedule is undiminished. The population has been mobilized to
salvage the harvest, and increased pressure is being put on many already hard-pressed
workers to make up for flood-related production losses by the end of the year.
Public morale, already low because of the regime's insenitivity to consumer
interest, has undoubtedly deteriorated since Bucharest announced price increases
last weekend. Romanians must now pay 103 percent more for heating oil and 25
percent more for natural gas. The regime, however, attempted to offset some of the
burden by announcing token across-the-board wage increases.
The US embassy speculates that some form of popular discontent, such as work
slowdowns and stoppages, is likely. Although Ceausescu's position does not appear
threatened, he is nonetheless increasingly vulnerable to popular criticism. He is quite
capable of meeting any challenge, however, by carefully measured concessions and
by increasing his efforts to seek foreign assistance.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
NORTH KOREA
July 19, 1975
Pyongyang has consented to reopen talks with Seoul as part of a broader
campaign to project an image of flexibility and reason. Earlier this week, the North
agreed to resume Red Cross negotiations on July 21. The talks, until they were
postponed by Pyongyang a month ago, had been addressing such problems as the
reunion of separated families.
North Korea is also sounding a softer note on its preconditions for resuming
the North-South Coordinating Committee talks. The committee, established in July
1972 to explore possibilities for political accommodation, last met in May.
During his visit to East Europe and North Africa in May and June, President
Kim II-song began to reemphasize that North Korea seeks reunification of the
peninsula by peaceful means and has continued this line with recent visitors to
Pyongyang. This week a delegation of Japanese Socialists returned home with word
that North Korea will put out a new peace proposal on July 20. The North is
particularly anxious to enhance its prospects for membership in the conference of
nonaligned nations in August and for assa a of a resolution favorable to its interests
at the UN General Assembly this fall.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
SYRIA-USSR: Syria is to receive today its first delivery of helicopters from
the USSR in more than a year, a shipment of eight MI-8s ordered last November
under a $9-million contract. Each of these aircraft can carry 24 fully equipped
soldiers, augmenting Syrian helicopter troop-carrying capacity by almost 20 percent.
Syria's helicopter inventory now includes 44 MI-8s and five Ml-4s; the MI-4s carry
16 fully equipped troops. In addition, Syria has nine KA-25s, which have an
antisubmarine warfare capability. So far, Syria has expressed interest in buying
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