NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
July 23, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
CONTENTS
EGYPT-ISRAEL: Sadat still undecided
on extending UN mandate in Sinai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PORTUGAL: Socialists
refuse to join cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
TURKEY: Postponement of action on
US base issue not heavily criticized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ITALY: Christian Democrats
oust Fanfani as party leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGENTINA-UK: Construction of
UK-designed frigates planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SPAIN: Another regime setback
on issue of political associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR-ANGOLA: Moscow more open
in supporting Popular Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
OPEC: Increase in economic
aid to developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
USSR: Soviets testing waters for
Asian collective security conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
LAOS: Worsening
economic conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
President Sadat maintained the tensions surrounding Middle East
negotiations with his announcement last night that he has not yet decided whether
to approve the extension of the UN mandate in the Sinai, which expires tomorrow.
Sadat acknowledged that the UN Security Council's appeal on Monday for a
favorable Egyptian decision indicates a concern about "the gravity of the Middle
East situation," but he indicated that in making its decision Egypt will take into
account the council's responsibility not only for easing tensions but also for
"implementing" past resolutions on Israeli withdrawal.
The President implied that Egypt still expects the UN to adopt an extension
resolution that clarifies that the UN force is not being used to perpetuate the status
quo. Foreign Minister Fahmi told the US ambassador yesterday that Egypt still
wants an "acceptable" resolution which states the urgency of the need to move
toward a settlement.
Egypt's ambassador to the UN told Ambassador Moynihan yesterday that he
expects Sadat to reply to the Security Council's appeal sometime today. If Sadat's
response is positive, the Egyptian diplomat said an extension resolution could be
based on the most recent UN resolution providing for UN forces in the Sinai, but it
must also include a reference to the Security Council's appeal, Egypt's response, and
a paraphrase of the Secretary General's recent report on the purposes of the UN
force.
The US embassy in Cairo has also interpreted Sadat's failure to make a decision
now on the UN mandate as an indication that he is leaving the door open for an
extension.
Sadat did not mention the status of current negotiations at any point in his
two-hour speech. The political congress he was addressing ends tomorrow; he may
speak again at its closing session.
The Israelis interpreted favorably Sadat's avoidance of the subject of
negotiations. Quoting "senior observers" in Israel, Jerusalem's international news
service reported their initial impression that Sadat is still interested in negotiations
for an interim agreement and wants to continue the presence of UN forces in the
Sinai.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
On another front, Israeli Defense Minister Peres told the Knesset yesterday that
he was "taking seriously" the redeployment of Jordanian troops from the Syrian
border to the Jordan River opposite Israeli forces. He reportedly said that while the
Jordanian deployment was "admittedly" of a "defensive nature," it could quickly
change into an offensive posture. Peres did not suggest that Jordan had redeployed
additional forces toward the Israeli front over thepast few days; rather he seemed to
have had in mind movements which occurred over a month ano_
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 23, 1975
The rejection by two Socialist Party officials of a request that they join the
cabinet apparently reflects their party's continued commitment to a joint strategy
with Revolutionary Council moderates of preventing Prime Minister Vasco
Goncalves from forming a new government.
The two Socialist leaders, Constituent Assembly leader Antonio Lopes Cardoso
and an unidentified party official, reportedly declined to accept cabinet posts during
a meeting with President Costa Gomes on Monday. The Socialist refusal ignores an
earlier appeal by the Armed Forces Movement calling on all parties to place the
national interest above partisan considerations during the present crisis.
Goncalves' position was further eroded yesterday by the announced resignation
of three more non-Communist members of the former cabinet. The ministers of
interterritorial affairs, external trade, and social infrastructure and environment
reportedly said they would refuse to take part in the new government. The first two
are independents with Socialist sympathies, but the third was a personal friend of
the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister apparently has also been deserted by his key leftist
economic advisers in the former cabinet. The Revolutionary Council has set a
deadline of late July for the cabinet to solve Portugal's deepening economic crisis.
Since no progress has been made, these ministers-who are closely identified with
Goncalves' economic failures-probably feel there is little point in accepting posts in
the new cabinet.
Meanwhile, anti-Communist mobs defied an appeal by the Revolutionary
Council for calm by continuing their attacks on Communist Party headquarters and
officials in northern and central Portugal yesterday. Party offices in widely scattered
areas were sacked and burned and government security forces were forced to
intervene to rescue beleaguered Communist officials.
In light of increasing pressures upon the Communists, a strong reaction on their
part cannot be ruled out. In the event of a showdown, control of the security forces
will be critical. Following the departure for Cuba on Monday by the forces' leftist
but anti-Communist commander, General Otelo de Carvalho, army Chief of Staff
Fabiao was disclosed yesterday to have postponed a scheduled trip to London.
Fabiao is generally considered aligned with the moderates.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
In addition to its appeal for order, issued following a marathon meeting which
lasted until early yesterday morning, the Revolutionary Council announced that it
was continuing to review the present political situation. The Council communique
also said that reports had been presented on recent developments in Angola and the
Azores. It is probable that the current turmoil in Lisbon is providing encouragement
to Azorean separatists, who are apprehensive over Communist influence on the
mainland.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 23, 1975
Opposition criticism of the Demirel government's decision to postpone action
against the US bases has been neither as severe nor as sustained as the government
had feared.
The leading opposition figure, Bulent Ecevit, waited three days before issuing a
statement that strongly attacked the US arms embargo. His statement made only a
brief reference to the "excessively soft-line" policy of Prime Minister Demirel. One
of Ecevit's associates in the Republican People's Party has told a US embassy official
that the party was exercising restraint because of the realization that there is little
sentiment in Turkey for loosening ties with the US. The embassy believes that
Republican leaders do not want to leave themselves open to the charge that they
forced the government to retaliate against US installations.
The Turkish press at first was highly critical of the government's decision to
temporize before taking action against the bases. After this initial reaction, however,
the base issue received less emphasis, while the arms embargo itself continued to be
given major play.
The Turkish government probably still believes, nonetheless, that domestic
political pressures require a new defense cooperation agreement with the US to
replace the one signed in 1969. According to the US embassy, the content of the
new agreement will depend on the outcome of the Congressional debate on the arms
embargo and could include any or all of the following stipulations:
--linkage of the agreement to continued Turkish access to arms, although not
necessarily providing for grant military assistance;
--a requirement that monetary compensation be paid for continued use of US
facilities;
--appointment of Turkish commanders for joint defense installations;
--suspension of operations at certain installations.
The embassy believes the Turks will probably feel compelled to announce some
form of provisional status for US installations as early as the end of this month
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
Italy's Christian Democrats voted out party leader Fanfani at their national
council meeting yesterday, taking the first step toward improving their relations
with the Socialists and changing their conservative image.
Fanfani had resisted resigning even though the Communist Party last month
came close to outpolling the Christian Democrats. He stepped down only after
almost 60 percent of the Christian Democratic national council opposed him in a
confidence vote yesterday.
The Christian Democrats have not yet named Fanfani's successor. If they
decide against Prime Minister Moro's plan for a "collegial" leadership, the new leader
will almost certainly be a moderate who has reached an accommodation with the
Christian Democratic left wing. The left has adamantly opposed Fanfani's
conservative policies.
Attention will now shift to the Socialists, whose party central committee will
convene tomorrow to evaluate the results of the Christian Democratic meeting.
Fanfani's ouster meets one of the conditions recently set by Socialist chief De
Martino for his party's inclusion in another center-left coalition. Such a government
is still the only workable alternative to one with Communist participation.
The Socialists want policy concessions from the Christian Democratic Party in
line with their leftist ideology. Even those Christian Democrats inclined to make
such concessions, however, have trouble with De Martino's idea of bringing the
Communists directly into the process of deciding national policy.
De Martino, in an interview last week, ruled out giving the Communists any
position in the next government, but he called for institution of formal
consultations with them on the government's programs. De Martino said he could
not see how his party could accept responsibility in any government that leaves the
Communists totally in opposition.
The Socialists evidently believe their party will suffer at the polls if it remains
associated only with the Christian Democrats. At the same time, the Socialists fear
they would be dominated in any partnership with the stronger and better organized
Communists. De Martino's idea of getting all three parties committed to the same
program represents an attempt to solve both problems.
The Communists are still preoccupied with consolidating their regional and
local election successes, but they will regard Fanfani's fall as victory. The
Communist electoral campaign was directed against Fanfani, who was more
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explicitly anti-Communist than other Christian Democratic leaders. Communist
chief Berlinguer regards Fanfani as a threat to the Communists' chances of gaining
acceptance as a national political party entitled to a role in government.
Argentina has apparently signed contracts with a British shipbuilding firm
under which six frigates will be constructed in Argentina over a ten-year period.
The $379-million arms deal-the largest ever concluded by Buenos Aires-calls
for some equipment and materials to be produced locally. Most of it, however,
including guns, air-defense missiles, antisubmarine warfare weapons, and electronics,
will be provided by the UK. Britain won the contract over strong competition from
other European suppliers, particularly Italian.
The new combatants-2,500-ton, 384-foot ships-will augment the Argentine
navy's World War II - vintage fleet of modernized US and British warships.
Argentina's claims to a 200-nautical-mile territorial sea limit, as well as Brazil's fleet
modernization and expansion program, prompted the decision to procure a larger
and more modern patrol force.
In 1970, Buenos Aires ordered two British guided-missile destroyers. One is
under construction in the UK and will be ready for delivery in late 1975. The other
ed materials and technical assistance; it is
is being built in Argentina with Ur7
scheduled for completion in 1978.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
Prime Minister Arias has suffered yet another setback in his drive to encourage
the establishment of government-approved associations to serve as forerunners of
political parties.
Earlier this month, a group of moderates-most of whom had been associated
with the regime at one time or another-formally constituted a political action group
under the guise of a research corporation. The largely center-right group refused to
apply for status as a political association because this would have required the
approval of the Franco regime's National Movement.
The founders of the new organization, to be known as the Independent Studies
Federation (FEDISA), stated that their purpose is to study political, social, and
economic problems confronting Spain.
The impressive political credentials of the founders will make FEDISA an
important pressure group. The most prominent member is Manuel Fraga Iribarne,
currently ambassador to London, who earlier this year decided not to form a
political association after the regime failed to provide sufficient guarantees of
freedom of action.
By incorporating as a research corporation, Fraga and other founders of
FEDISA have signaled their intention to have a political voice, while remaining aloof
from regime-sponsored schemes to promote political associations. The move follows
the recent formation of a center-left organization that has made it clear it does not
intend to apply for association status.
The Franco government reportedly is angered at the formation of FEDISA
outside the framework of the political associations statute. The newly appointed
minister of the National Movement called the device of incorporation "a fraud
against the nation."
In the period since last January, when the statute on political associations took
effect, only five-largely rightist-regime-oriented political associations have been
approved by the government. On the other hand, the clandestine opposition parties,
including the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, are gradually being drawn into
the Democratic Conference, a clandestine grouping which is emerging as a rival of
the Communist-dominated Democratic Junta formed in Paris last summer.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 23,1975
USSR-ANGOLA
Recent substantial Soviet arms deliveries to the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola and harsher press treatment of the rival National Front for the
Liberation of Angola indicate that Moscow is playing a more open role in its support
of the Popular Movement.
Soviet military shipments since May have reportedly included trucks, various
armored vehicles, artillery, grenades, machine guns, and small arms. The Soviets are
also continuing to train substantial numbers of officers and troops of the Popular
Movement in the USSR, East Germany, and the Congo.
Moscow and its East European allies are rumored to have made some direct
arms shipments to the Popular Movement in Angola, but the Congo is the
conduit for Soviet arms.
The Soviet press has consistently accorded special praise to the Popular
Movement, but until recently it avoided direct attacks on the National Front and
Angola's smallest group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
In the wake of the recent fighting in Luanda, however, the press has charged that the
National Front is a client of China and the US and has labeled it a "reactionary
organization" whose members are "culprits for the death of hundreds of people."
Moscow probably still has not written off the prospect of a coalition
government in Angola. With the Popular Movement now having a clear military
advantage, however, the Soviets appear to expect that the Movement will dominant role following independence.
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OPEC: Economic Aid Disbursements to LDCs
and Multilateral Aid Institutions
Saudi (1st Half, 1975)
2500 Arabia
To multilateral institutions
Bilateral, to LDCs
Kuwait
*Algeria, Libya, Nigeria & Qatar
558240 7-75
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 23, 1975
Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries disbursed $4.5
billion in bilateral aid to the developing countries in the first half of this year,
compared with $3 billion in all of 1974.
They provided an additional $1.1 billion to multilateral aid institutions, mainly
the International Monetary Fund's oil facility, and small amounts to special Arab
funds and regional development banks. We expect OPEC bilateral disbursements and
payments to multilateral agencies to rise to $8 billion for the year as a whole, up
from $5 billion last year.
About 70 percent of bilateral aid so far this year was from the Arab oil
producers to other Arab states that have balance-of-payments problems. Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait alone disbursed at least $2 billion in newly committed funds,
primarily to Egypt. Other bilateral transfers mainly implemented 1974
commitments, including $1 billion in Rabat "war-chest" grants to Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan.
Egypt was the only Arab recipient of bilateral aid from Iran. Romania,
Bulgaria, and North Korea received some $680 million in payments from Iran
against future deliveries of goods to support Iranian development.
Bilateral aid to other developing states that import most of their oil totaled
only $295 million in the first half of 1975. OPEC funds from multilateral
institutions provided another $935 million. Nearly all of this money was channeled
through the International Monetary Fund's oil facility, which gave most of it-$590
million-to Spain, Turkey, and Chile.
For all of 1975, OPEC bilateral and multilateral aid should cover a little less
than one third of the $10-billion increase in the oil import bills of the developing
countries. Some of the poorer countries, particularly Muslim states like Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, North Yemen, and Pakistan, have fared well. Aid to other hard-hit
countries-India, for example-has barely made a dent in higher oil bills.
As a group, the developing states designated by the UN as most seriously
affected by higher prices received about $2 billion in aid from OPEC countries and
OPEC-funded sources in 1974. So far this year, however, the have taken only $415
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 23, 1975
Soviet officials in some Southeast Asian countries are again putting out feelers
regarding a meeting on Asian collective security, but the Asian states are not
expected to show any more interest or desire than they did in 1972.
The idea of developing such a system was first advanced by General Secretary
Brezhnev at the international communist conference in June 1969. As originally
conceived, the proposal was clearly aimed at China, but the Soviets now maintain
publicly that Peking could take part. Because the idea aroused little if any
enthusiasm among Asian states, the Soviets put it on the back burner until early
1972. Then, with the end of the Indian-Pakistani war and the return of former
President Nixon from Peking, Moscow launched another attempt to generate interest
by stressing that an Asian collective security system would make it more difficult for
"imperialists to unleash aggressive wars."
The Soviets maintain that an Asian collective security system should be based
on the following principles:
--renunciation of the use or threat of force;
--respect for sovereignty of states;
--inviolability of frontiers;
--noninterference in internal affairs;
--development of cooperation based on equality and mutual interest.
Moscow's latest attempt to generate interest in an Asian conference has been
stimulated by the end of the conflict in Indochina and by the Soviet experience in
and the apparent success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
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Deteriorating economic conditions and signs of discontent appear to have
caused the communists to slow efforts to implement more revolutionary changes.
Food shortages, unemployment, and an increase in crime have been reported
recently in Vientiane, and the government has recommended increased police
patrols. It is difficult to assess the seriousness of the situation countrywide because
of restrictions on the movement of foreign personnel; however, recent statements by
senior Lao communist leaders reflect a growing concern with these problems.
Communist leaders have stated that the Pathet Lao - dominated government
wants to maintain friendly relations with the US, but they are continuing to insist
that the US has an obligation to provide aid with "no strings." Unless such aid is
forthcoming, the Pathet Lao may be tempted to blame the US for their inability to
cope with the deteriorating economic situation. In such case, the security of
remaining Americans will become more tenuous. 25X1
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