NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
DIA review(s)
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Top Secret
July 24, 1975
N2 662
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
EGYPT: Sadat moderates his
tough stance on UN mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
PORTUGAL: Possibility of
government reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
GREECE: Workers and students
clash with police in Athens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CYPRUS: Third round of
intercommunal talks postponed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
NORWAY-USSR: Relations strained over
Barents Sea and Svalbard issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CANADA-USSR: Atlantic ports to
be closed to Soviet fishing fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ARGENTINA: Armed forces' role
in Lopez Rega exile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CAMBODIA: Food shortages continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CHINA: Outlook for
summer grain harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
Egypt backed down yesterday from its tough position on the UN force
mandate, informing the Security Council that it would extend the mandate for three
months from its expiration today.
Last week Fahmi had said the UN must live up to its responsibilities-which he
never clearly specified-before Egypt could extend the mandate.
The reason for Sadat's abrupt relaxation of his political pressure over the UN
mandate issue may be that he believes prospects for negotiation of an interim
agreement are now encouraging and that further obvious pressure could jeopardize
its successful conclusion.
Sadat's exercise in brinkmanship has served to show both Arabs and Israelis
that he can be tough in his negotiating position and can raise temperatures virtually
at will whenever he is not satisfied with the pace of the talks. At the same time,
however, by backing down from his tough stance without yet having achieved visible
progress, he has left unfulfilled the Arabs' expectations that he could force the pace
of negotiations. He also may have hurt his credibility not only with Arabs but with
Israelis as well.
The Israelis, for their part, can draw satisfaction from the fact that they kept
their powder dry for six days before reacting to Egyptian military demonstrations.
Prime Minister Rabin fired the first shot in the next round with his statement
yesterday that negotiations for an interim agreement will not be concluded "without
a face-to-face parley" between Egyptian and Israeli delegations. The negotiations are
taking a long time, he said, because of the Egyptians' insistence on dealing through
the good offices of the US.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
The Israeli embassy in Washington, worried about the impact of Rabin's
statements, has been quick to point out Rabin's remark concerning face-to-face talks
was not a demand for new ground rules. Rather, the embassy stated, the remark was
a reference to Israeli and Egyptian representatives working out the details of
negotiations directly, as they did during the last disengagement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
Reports that a move is under way to restructure the present military regime
have been denied by the president's office. The denial may, however, mean only that
military leaders want to scotch such rumors until the Revolutionary Council and the
Armed Forces General Assembly have a chance to vote on the restructuring plan.
According to earlier reports received by the US embassy from several sources,
the revamped regime would be headed by
an 11-man directorate drawn from the present ruling Revolutionary Council. The
directorate-whose members have not been named-would be served by a three-man
executive collegium composed of President Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Goncalves,
and security chief Otelo de Carvalho.
The collegium, in turn, would be assisted by two vice prime ministers-one
civilian and one military man-who would have charge of the day-to-day running of
the provisional government. The present Revolutionary Council would be relegated
.to a pro forma role linked to the directorate.
Such a formula could streamline the present unwieldy governing machinery
and, depending on the proposed composition of the 11-man directorate, might be
acceptable to a battle-weary majority in the Revolutionary Council.
The reasons for the official denial are not yet clear. The reorganization
proposals, which have been widely publicized by the international media, may have
triggered an initial unfavorable response among opposition groups, including the
Socialists.
A meeting of the General Assembly, which has been postponed several times,
was erroneously reported by the Lisbon press as scheduled for yesterday. This
apparently was confused with a meeting of the army assembly, which was held
yesterday to prepare for a full assembly meeting to be held later. The army assembly
reportedly took up the formation of the new government.
Meanwhile, the Socialists have called for a "government of national salvation,"
which is reminiscent of the "national salvation junta" formed immediately following
the coup of April 1974. The Socialists also threatened to expel any party member
who agrees to join a government headed by Goncalves.
Although we have seen no serious weakening on the part of the Socialist
leadership's resolve to continue the struggle to oust the Prime Minister, party leader
Soares' reported concern that he might not be able to retain full control of the
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
membership may be borne out. According to sources of the US embassy, four
renegade Socialists from the extreme left of the party have reportedly agreed to join
the government that Goncalves is still trying to form.
Should the stalemate drag on much longer, there will be the growing risk that
right-wing elements will be stirred into acts of violence or ill-planned moves similar
to the fiasco last March. Any such attempt would likely serve the Communists in
their effort to smear the Socialists' campaign as counterrevolutionary and could
provide the government an excuse for another-and perhaps decisive-lurch to the
left.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 24, 1975
Construction workers and students battled the police yesterday in violent
demonstrations in Athens.
The demonstrations followed a meeting called by construction workers to
highlight their economic demands. When the police tried to stop the workers, who
had been denied a permit to hold a demonstration, they were attacked with clubs
and stones. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowds, and some 40 persons
were injured. Sporadic disorders are continuing.
Before the military coup in 1967, the construction workers' federation was
leftist oriented. Some of its affiliated unions were Communist-dominated and often
supplied cadres willing to take to the streets to further the economic and social
demands of the workers.
Students and construction workers in October 1973 sparked the violent
demonstrations that led to the downfall of the Papadopoulos government.
The present leadership of the federation is court-appointed. These leaders had
called off a strike planned for Tuesday, once the government assured them that it
would meet most of the workers' demands. A faction of the federation disagreed
with that decision, however, and urged the workers to demonstrate.
Perhaps unwilling to give the Karamanlis regime an opportunity to crack down
on the left, which the government's moderate and conservative supporters have been
urging, the extreme leftist Panhellenic Socialist Movement and the Greek
Communist youth organization canceled plans for demonstrations for this
evening-the anniversary of Greece's return to civilian rule. Leftist leader
Papandreou labeled the violent incidents yesterday the work of "provocateurs," but
he also criticized the strong reaction of the police.
Radical students are smarting because of a new university law requiring that all
students vote in student elections. The Communists and radical elements have been
able to dominate the student unions up until now because the moderate
students-who are in the majority-usually have not bothered to vote.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
The third round of intercommunal talks, scheduled to be held in Vienna today
under the auspices of UN Secretary General Waldheim, has been postponed because
of developments in the Middle East. The talks will resume on July 31.
In the meantime, the EC Nine on July 21 made a demarche to Greek and
Turkish Cypriot leaders, as well as to Athens and Ankara, urging that neither side
take any unilateral action that would disrupt the negotiations. The EC specifically
asked Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to renounce the extreme position he had
taken the day before, when he threatened to expel five Greek Cypriots from the
north for every Turkish Cypriot who was prevented from leaving the south.
Although Denktash defended his position on the expulsions, he later
moderated his stand by hinting to reporters that his plan to expel Greeks from the
north might be postponed, presumably at least until after the Vienna talks.
Denktash also offered the conciliatory comment that he and Greek Cypriot leader
Clerides had made further progress toward resolving problems relating to the
exchange of certain categories of the population and that he was now ready to carry
out his part of the bargain.
The Turks, however, are not disposed to be conciliatory on the use of the
now-repaired Nicosia airport. Secretary General Waldheim had hoped to get an
agreement in Vienna for the UN Cyprus Force to use the airport immediately.
If the Greek Cypriots refuse Turkish proposals at Vienna, the Turks expect
Cypriot President Makarios to take the Cyprus problem to the UN once again. This
prospect does not disturb the Turks, however, as they believe that they have rallied
sufficient Arab support to ensure a sympathetic hearing for their side.
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h
Equidistant line
Sector line
0 100 200 300 400
Nautical Miles
GREENLAND
(Denmark)
Jan Mayen
(Norway)
Spitsbergen )-
Ny-AlesuDd.
?Pyramiden
Barentsburg?? Longyearbycn
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FRANZ JOSEF
LAND
nes Pechenga
Murmansk
KOLA PEN.
Kirovsk
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 24, 1975
Disagreement over national boundaries in the Barents Sea and administrative
problems on Svalbard continue to strain relations between Oslo and Moscow.
The Soviets recently hinted at a package deal to settle the question of dividing
the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and solving jurisdictional problems off
Svalbard. They have implied that their position may soften if Norway adopts a
policy on petroleum exploration and exploitation off northern Norway that accords
with Soviet interests.
Norway backs a median or equidistant line to divide the shelf, while the USSR
wants a "sector line" giving them more territory. Sporadic talks between the two
countries have failed to produce an agreement. A Soviet official recently suggested
that both sides should suspend activity in the disputed area pending an accord.
The Soviet community on Svalbard-currently about 2,000-is pressing Norway
for "administrative reforms." Although the Norwegians admit that some revision
may be necessary, they are concerned that the reforms would infringe on Norway's
sovereignty over the area.
The Norwegians are also annoyed that the Soviets have ignored regulations
requiring helicopters flying to Svalbard to be licensed. Soviet scientific expeditions
have not requested permission to use radio-transmitting equipment. In addition, the
Soviets have not complied with Norwegian oil-drilling safety regulations.
Norway's decision to limit to those ambassadors resident in Oslo invitations to
the 50th anniversary celebration of the Svalbard treaty on August 14 has irritated
Moscow. The Norwegians originally intended to invite each signatory to send two
representatives but changed their mind to keep the level of representation equal and
to prevent the Soviets from sending a high-level delegation.
The Norwegians have repeatedly insisted that they intend to maintain tight
control over exploration and development in the Svalbard Archipelago. The Soviets
regard extensive economic activity in the area as a hindrance to their right of free
passage to and from their large military bases on the Kola Peninsula. Moscow is
particularly apprehensive about the possibility that future oil installations may be
used by NATO for military surveillance purposes.
In addition to the Barents Sea dividing line
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
and the Svalbard problem, which Frydenlund pointed to as the greatest potential
threats to Norway, the foreign minister listed border problems in the far north and
the growth of the Soviet embassy staff in Oslo as factors straining bilateral relations.
The Canadians plan to close their eastern ports to the Soviet fishing fleet on
July 28.
Prime Minister Trudeau's government has for some time been under heavy
pressure from the Canadian fishing industry and political leaders in the maritime
provinces to stop the overfishing in Canada's North Atlantic waters, especially by
the Soviets and Japanese. The Soviets apparently are making "consistent and
flagrant" violations of international North Atlantic fisheries agreements. The
Canadians presumably chose not to include Japan in the ban at this time because
Ottawa wants to improve its economic and political ties with the Japanese as part of
an effort to counteract its heavy dependence on the US.
Canada is also investigating the fishing practices of several other countries and
has made direct approaches to Spain and Portugal regarding violations.
Soviet fishing fleets operating in Canadian waters had been replenished almost
entirely by tankers that came directly from the Soviet Union. Since the latter part of
1974, however, the Soviets have taken greater advantage of the facilities available at
Canadian ports.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 24, 1975
Despite a generally cautious attitude toward overt political involvement in the
current political crisis, the armed forces played a direct role in Lopez Rega's exile.
Further direct action by the officers-including the ouster of President Peron
herself-is possible if she opposes their growing behind-the-scenes role in
decision-making.
According to the press, the first direct military intervention in the recent crisis
was triggered on July 18, when Interior Minister Benitez was prevented from
entering President Peron's residence. Informed of this, the three service chiefs
ordered the disarming of all private and personal bodyguards at the President's
residence and placed the commander of the presidential guard in charge. Orders were
then issued that all cabinet members would henceforth have free access to Mrs.
Peron.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 24, 1975
Since taking over three months ago, the Khmer communists have not solved
Cambodia's serious food problem. Pressure on meager supplies in urbanareas was
initially relieved by forced migration to the countryside. Although the communists
are providing small quantities of food to rural areas, the bulk of the population is
being forced to fend for itself.
Total rice stocks available after the fall of Phnom Penh were at most 300,000
tons, enough to feed the country's population for about three months. Imports of
250,000 tons will probably be needed before the fall harvest. Only a fraction of this
amount-presumably all from China-has so far been observed entering the country.
Rice stocks in rural areas almost certainly have been reduced sharply. Rice is
difficult to move to food-deficit areas because of war-related damage to the
The cessation of hostilities provided an opportunity to improve agricultural
output by restoring fallow land to production and employing former refugees and
urban dwellers in farm activities. Many of those transferred to rural areas, however,
are unfamiliar with agricultural techniques. Supplies of basic farm tools, seeds, and
draft animals are inadequate and modern inputs-chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and
fuel-also are in short supply.
These factors make it highly unlikely that the harvest this September will
exceed last year's level of about 1 million tons of milled rice-some 200,000 tons
below domestic needs at current consumption rates. Since per capita consumption
rates are already below acceptable levels, the communists have the choice of seeking
imports or allowing large numbers of people to starve. There is no evidence to date
that they have sought to import sizable quantities of food.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 24, 1975
China's summer grain harvest this year increased by a wide margin, according to
Chinese press releases, but Peking has stopped short of claiming that output matched
the record crop in 1972. Weather data support Peking's assessment.
Although this year's crop was better than the poor summer harvests of 1973
and 1974, there were the usual problem areas. Output was down in most of southern
China because of the damp, cool weather that prevailed throughout the spring and
early summer. These losses were more than offset by the good harvest of summer
grain-primarily wheat-in northern China, an area dependent on grain imports to
maintain urban rations. Thus, China is not likely to require additional large
quantities of grain imports above the roughly 4 million tons of wheat already
booked for delivery this year.
Early rice-also a major early grain-is not yet ready for harvest, and little crop
information has been made available by Peking. The poor weather that affected
much of southern China earlier in the year, however, has limited plant growth. As a
consequence, the early rice harvest is likely to fall short of the exceptionally -good
crop in 1974.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 24, 1975
CUBA-PANAMA: The Cuban national airline is inaugurating a regularly
scheduled weekly flight between Havana and Panama City today; reciprocal service
by a Panamanian airline has not yet been scheduled. Travelers between Cuba and
Panama previously had to depend on occasional, specially chartered flights or go via
Lima or Mexico City. The new Cuban flight will simplify the shipment of
propaganda materials to Panama and the delivery of goods such as electronic and
automotive equipment purchased in the Colon Free Zone.
OAS: The Cuba sanctions issue will probably be addressed by the OAS
meeting now in progress in San Jose, Costa Rica. Amendments to the Rio
Treaty-the official business of the conference-should be completed within a few
days. Mexico then hopes to present a resolution designed to allow OAS members
"freedom of action" on relations with Cuba, a proposal most of the delegates wish
to approve as soon as possible. A final decision has not yet been made to deal with
the Cuba problem at San Jose, but Mexico appears to have the votes to push the
matter through. The conference as now constituted is not empowered to handle the
issue, but the delegates can "reconvene" as an Organ of Consultation immediately
after the current session ends. Although a few governments prefer further delay, the
mood at San Jose favors rapid movement.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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