NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027900010042-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 25, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
July 25, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Struggle against
Goncalves continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JAPAN -SOUTH KOREA: Improved
tone in relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
THAI LAND-PHILIPPINES: Leaders favor
continued US role in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
THAI LAND-LAOS: Relations strained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHILE: Junta trying to improve
its international standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ARGENTINA: Status
of President Peron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ITALY: Squabble over Fanfani's
replacement threatens Moro coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Iraq-Kuwait: Border dispute
remains deadlocked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ANNEX: West German Armaments Industry
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Prime Minister Goncalves still has a mandate to form a government, largely
because the President has failed to ask for his resignation, according to the US
embassy in Lisbon.
Moderate members of the Revolutionary Council, however, are still engaged in
a determined, last-ditch effort to prevent him from remaining in power. Foreign
Minister Antunes, a member of the moderate faction, reportedly is prepared to
struggle to the end against the Prime Minister and is confident of the outcome.
The resolution of Goncalves' fate seems to be between the Revolutionary
Council, which reportedly has a strong majority against him, and the Armed Forces
General Assembly, in which radical leftists appear to predominate. If the issue comes
to a vote in the assembly, Goncalves probably will receive a vote of confidence. If,
on the other hand, the council moderates prevent a meeting of the assembly-which
has already been postponed twice-their efforts to get rid of the Prime Minister may
still succeed.
Contributing to the uncertainty is President Costa Gomes himself. Although he
has decided to allow Goncalves to try to form a cabinet,
e President may think onca ves will still tail to torm a government-or that
if he succeeds, he will later be brought down as a result of the country's
accumulating problems.
If Goncalves' power and influence are perpetuated in the proposed new
government framework, it would be interpreted in the country to mean a significant
consolidation of Communist power. There are good prospects for a strong reaction,
however, from those forces in Lisbon attempting to prevent a continuing move to
the left. Reaction among the Socialists and in the volatile north could be violent.
The moderates' hopes of unseating Goncalves were buoyed earlier this week by
a 56-1 vote against him in the infantry caucus which preceded an army assembly
meeting.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
In the past few days, allegations of US support of or involvement in the
autonomy and separatist movement in Azores have obviously become a more
important factor in the maneuvering in Lisbon. In a conversation with the US
defense attache earlier this week, for example, a member of the President's
household staff expressed the view that without the Azores, Portugal was of little
consequence to the US. But for the Azores, he added, the US might be willing to let
Portugal go Communist in order "to vaccinate Europe" as a whole.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 25, 1975
Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa's two-day trip to Seoul this week-in
doubt until the last moment-helped clear the troubled atmosphere surrounding
bilateral relations.
As a price for Miyazawa's trip, Tokyo had insisted that Seoul produce a verbal
note regarding the kidnaping of Kim Tae-chung by the South Korean CIA in Tokyo
two years ago-an event that stirred considerable resentment of the Pak regime in
Japan. At the last moment Seoul complied, while in return asking for future reports
on Tokyo's efforts to control pro - North Korean activities in Japan.
While in Seoul, Miyazawa indicated that the Kim Tae-chung affair was closed as
far as Tokyo was concerned. He also agreed to hold a formal ministerial meeting
with South Korea in September. Held up over a year and a half by the Kim incident,
this conference had taken on considerable symbolic importance for Seoul; it should
also help resolve a number of bilateral issues, including economic aid for South
Korea.
South Korean officials, aware that Miyazawa and Prime Minister Miki will be
discussing Korea in Washington next month, pressed their views on a wide range of
issues. President Pak strongly emphasized the need for trilateral US-Japanese-Korean
cooperation. Recognizing that more of a Japanese defense effort was not possible,
he urged closer political cooperation, to which Miyazawa agreed in principle.
More specifically, the South Koreans pressed the Japanese very hard for
support of South Korean membership in the UN; Seoul is considering making its
application next month, when Tokyo will be chairing the Security Council. The
South Koreans also urged Tokyo to back a UN strategy tacitly linking the
applications of the two Vietnams with the two Koreas.
Despite the improved tone in relations, sources of friction remain. Tokyo has
yet to make a current definitive statement on the linkage between Japanese and
South Korean security. Seoul will also continue to be sensitive about any increase in
economic and unofficial links between Tokyo and Pyongyang. 25X1
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 25, 175
The recently concluded talks between Prime Minister Khukrit and President
Marcos indicated that both leaders desire a continued US role in Southeast Asia and
greater regional cooperation. In the joint communique marking the end of Khukrit's
four-day visit, the two sides took note of the changed political situation in the area.
They agreed, among other things, that:
--"foreign" military bases in the region were "temporary in character";
--the major powers should contribute in a more positive way to the
development of the region;
--the SEATO organization, as opposed to the treaty itself, should "in principle"
be phased out;
--they were prepared to work with the countries of Indochina in helping with
their national development;
--the time had come to take steps toward regional economic integration,
including establishment of a free-trade area;
--there should be an enlargement of cooperation among states in the region,
regardless of their differences, and ASEAN should be the foundation for such
cooperation.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Tensions are increasing between Bangkok and the Pathet Lao - dominated
government in Vientiane.
A major irritant is the presence of several thousand former Royalist Army and
government personnel in Thailand, including some of General Vang Pao's irregular
forces. The Pathet Lao apparently are convinced that these personnel are preparing,
with Thai government support, to launch an attack to overthrow the
communist-dominated government.
At the same time, the Thai have increased their vigilance along the border
Although the likelihood of a major confrontation appears
remote at this time, tensions have increased somewhat and several clashes involving
Pathet Lao troops and Thai river patrol boats have been reported.
The Lao ambassador to Thailand was recalled on July 22, apparently for
consultations regarding recent border tensions and other problems.
Despite the squabbling, the Lao communists have continued to express a desire
to maintain good relations with Thailand and probably will attempt to work out
some sort of accommodation. Moreover, recent statements by Lao Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma suggest that normalization of relations between Bangkok and
Pekin has lessened his fears of Thai support for any incursion by Laotian forces in
exile.
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National Intelligence Bulletin July 25, 1975
The Chilean government is undertaking a broad diplomatic offensive to
improve its international standing.
By sponsoring a wide variety of visits of foreign officials and groups and by
dispatching missions abroad on trade and good-will trips, the Foreign Ministry
evidently hopes to cement ties with other nations, particularly in the Third World.
The primary purpose is to curry support in various regional and world forums, where
Chile has come under increasing criticism for its conduct in the field of human
rights, especially since President Pinochet's recent refusal to allow the visit of a UN
human rights investigating team.
The strongest bid will be in the Middle East and Africa, where Chilean envoys
are planning extensive good-will tours. An Egyptian mission concluded a successful
stay in Chile earlier this month. In Africa, Santiago hopes to open diplomatic
establishments in capitals where it does not have them.
To counter what the government charges is an "international Marxist-Leninist
propaganda campaign" against it, Santiago is seizing every opportunity to induce
foreign delegations to visit and observe for themselves whether there is repression
against dissidents. US and West German legislators are being encouraged to travel to
Chile, and an invitation has been extended to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn-presumably
to attract international attention to the junta's virulent anti-Soviet line.
Among other diplomatic efforts, Santiago is offering to host the sixth OAS
General Assembly, a session of the Special Latin American Coordinating
Commission, and the second meeting of Latin American arms limitation talks.
(Uruguayan
President Bordaberry is expected in Santiago this fall, and Pinochet will probably
follow up any other chances to demonstrate solidarity with leaders of other nations.
The best that Santiago can hope for is to make a few advances in strengthening
ties with the underdeveloped world. Unless the Chilean regime relaxes its
authoritarian rule and curbs the more flagrant abuses of human rights, it will remain
ostracized by the major nations and will have increasing difficulty altering its image
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Doctors have confined President Peron to her bed. This has touched off a new
round of speculation that she will request a leave of absence, possibly for as long as
two months.
She has recently been absent from her office a number of times with what press
aides have described as the flu. She is reported to be suffering from a severe case of
nerves and to be under frequent heavy sedation by her doctor.
A number of congressmen had demanded an official explanation of President
Peron's physical condition. The pressure for an explanation of her health stems from
a desire by the administration's detractors-evermore numerous-to force her to
choose either to assume the duties of office in earnest or hand them over. A
resignation for reasons of health might be the least painful way for all concerned to
put an end to an untenable situation.
The latest object, meanwhile, of the purge of Lopez Rega's supporters is
Chamber of Deputies president Raul Lastiri, number-two man in the Peronist party
and a relative of Lopez Rega, who was asked to resign his congressional posts. Lastiri
said yesterday that he may ask for a two-month leave of absence.
Labor earlier had declared its intention to seek a restructuring of the Peronist
movement, including selection of new leaders. Party politicians, anxious to avoid a
complete labor take-over and equally interested in ridding the country of Lopez
Rega's influence, joined in the effort against Lastiri.
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For the moment, the various groups ranged against the President still seem to
favor pressing her to resign, or to become a figurehead, rather than he onus
for her forcible removal.
Italy's Christian Democrats are finding it much harder to settle on a successor
to Amintore Fanfani than it was to reach agreement on his ouster. The party feud
over how to replace him is putting a strain on Prime Minister Moro's fragile
governing coalition.
Fanfani's fall was engineered through an agreement by centrist and leftist
factions to vote against him at the national council meeting on Tuesday. A split has
now developed between the left wingers and the party's largest centrist faction over
who should succeed him.
The centrist faction, which represents about a third of the party, is threatening
to bring down Moro's government by pulling out of his cabinet unless a faction
member gets the party leadership. Their candidate, Flaminio Piccoli, is unacceptable
to the 20 percent of the party represented by the left wingers. Piccoli has a
reputation as a conservative, but he has been courting the party's left wing since
Fanfani's power base began to unravel. The left has recently had complimentary
things to say about Piccoli, perhaps as a ploy to ensure cooperation from the
centrists in getting rid of Fanfani.
The left wingers say they want Moro as party leader. Moro would not have to
give up the prime minister's post to accept the party job, but he would have to reach
an accommodation with the center faction in order to accomplish much. He still
seems to favor "collegial" leadership until the party congress in the fall.
The Socialist Party refuses to join a center-left coalition until the Christian
Democrats shift their policies leftward. De Martino and other Socialist leaders began
at a central committee meeting yesterday to review their strategy. They will not
decide on their next moves until the Christian Democrats choose a new leader, but
De Martino has reiterated his call for an arrangement that would enable the
Communists to have some formalized government policy-making.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The Iraq-Kuwait border
dispute remains deadlocked,
despite mediation efforts by
other Arab countries over the
past few months. The Kuwaitis
are complaining about what they
see as Baghdad's intransigence,
and they are not hopeful about
prospects for an early settlement.
There were indications in
May that the good offices of
Egyptian President Sadat and
Algerian President Boumediene
had succeeded in moving the two
sides toward a compromise on
the central issue in the
quarrel: Baghdad's demand for
control of Warbah and Bubiyan,
two Kuwaiti islands that flank
July 25, 1975
the approaches to Iraq's Persian Gulf port of Umm Qasr. In a token gesture of
conciliation, the two sides pulled back ground units from positions they held near
Al-Samitah, a Kuwaiti border post seized by Iraq in March 1973. Iraqi forces,
nevertheless, continue to occupy a small strip of Kuwaiti territory.
Since May it has become clear that Baghdad and Kuwait are still far apart over
the disposition of the two islands. The Kuwaitis claim that each of their concessions
during the fitful course of negotiations has been met with a further Iraqi demand.
Arab mediators would appear to face an uphill battle in breaking the impasse.
Last month, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah publicly aired the squabble with Iraq
by laying the blame for the deadlock on Baghdad's "adamant" position. More
recently, Sabah, alluding to the Gulf states foreign ministers' recent talks in Jidda on
regional security, told the US ambassador that the littoral states could more
profitably spend their time working on regional problems Such as
border dispute.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
West German Armaments Industry
July 25, 1975
The recent debate by Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands over
whether to buy a US or a European fighter aircraft once again focused attention on
the prospects for a joint West European defense industry and the French role in it. A
healthy West European defense industry cannot be developed, however, without
involving West Germany, a leading proponent of joint defense undertakings.
Bonn views joint defense projects as a way to save money, to standardize
weapons, and to promote European and Atlantic cooperation. Most of its
armaments projects already are cooperative international undertakings. Since the
end of World War 11, Bonn has carefully avoided developing a strictly West German,
government-owned arms industry. In fact, despite the failure of several joint
projects, Bonn encourages companies to develop major arms projects in conjunction
with its allies.
West Germany places stringent controls on arms exports. All arms shipments
abroad must have specific government approval. In practice, this has limited sales of
major weapons largely to NATO members. These controls could be a problem when
partners want to export jointly produced items. The French already are eager to
export-particularly to the Middle East-several of the items they produce in
cooperation with West Germany.
Up From the Ashes
The postwar reconstitution of the West German arms industry began in the
1950s and involved maintaining and renovating equipment provided by the US, UK,
France, Italy, Belgium, and Turkey. Then, from the end of the 1950s to the
mid-1960s, the West Germans produced foreign-designed equipment under license.
The aircraft industry led the way with the production of airframes and engines for
planes designed in France, Italy, and the US. This kind of production under license
still accounts for the majority of military aircraft produced in Germany.
In the 1960s, the West Germans began to develop and produce arms jointly
with the US, France, and Italy. These joint projects resulted in a few successful
products, but there were also several spectacular failures. The most recent successful
joint project-with France-was the Roland mobile surface-to-air missile system. The
US decision to buy the system is viewed by some West Europeans as proof that joint
arms development in Europe can work.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Also in the 1960s, the West Germans began developing their own weapons
systems for the Bundeswehr. Two examples are the Leopard battle tank and the
gun-and-missile-armed tank destroyer.
Joint Aircraft Projects
The joint German-British-Italian multirole combat aircraft is Western Europe's
most ambitious-and extensive-military aircraft project ever. Assembly lines for the
aircraft are to be established in all three countries, with West Germany's largest
aerospace company, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm, doing about 40 percent of the
work. The Germans will produce the fuselage center sections, main landing gear, air
intake ducting, and gear boxes.
Canada, Australia, and Japan have officially discussed buying the aircraft, but
lingering problems with the engine have delayed a final decision to go ahead with the
plane.
Another joint aircraft project joins the West German firm Dornier with
France's Dassault-Breguet to produce the Alpha Jet. The Germans want the aircraft
primarily as a light tactical support weapon, and the French will use it as a trainer.
There will be two final assembly lines-one in each country-but Dornier will build
all wings and rear fuselages. The French would like to export it, ostensibly as a
trainer, but the plane can easily be equipped as a tactical support aircraft. This might
bring into play Bonn's export restrictions.
The West German tactical missile industry is small. Only one firm, Bolkow, has
experience in the design, development, and production of missiles. One of its
products, the Cobra, an antitank missile first produced in 1958 in cooperation with
the Swiss, has been successful. More than 150,000 Cobras have been built, with
production licensed in Brazil, Italy, Pakistan, and Turkey. Bolkow has designed an
updated version of the Cobra, but none has been produced.
The West Germans are now pursuing several joint tactical missile projects with
the French. One tactical missile, the Milan, is being issued to the Bundeswehr's
antitank units. The missile is assembled by the French company Aerospatiale;
Messerschmitt supplies many of its parts. Besides the French and Germans, eight
other countries have ordered the system, and the production rate is 1,000 missiles a
month; some 200,000 will be built.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Another missile jointly developed with the French, the Hot, is expected to go
into production by mid-1976. Like the Milan, the components will be supplied by
Germany and the missile will be assembled in France. France and Germany will buy
about 27,000 of the missiles. Two other countries have ordered the-system for their
helicopters and armored cars.
The Kormoran antiship missile is being developed for the German navy's
F-104G fighter-bomber. The missile can be fired by aircraft from altitudes below
radar detection. The navy has ordered 350 of the missiles. The system may also be
used on the multirole combat aircraft. The Germans have discussed developing
another antiship missile with the British Aircraft Corporation.
Naval Shipbuilding
Bonn in 1966 set up a private company-Marinetechnik
Planungsgesellschaft-as a central design bureau for surface warships. The company
has worked on some 50 different projects, including the S-143 large guided-missile
boat.
German fast patrol boats either have been or will be sold to Argentina, Spain,
Turkey, and Ecuador. Bonn has also licensed production of various types of fast
patrol boats in Spain, Turkey, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Singapore.
A relatively new aspect of Marinetechnik's activities is increased cooperation
with NATO working groups on multinational projects. The company has cooperated
in designing a NATO hydrofoil and is participating in the development of a new
frigate for NATO.
In the 1960s, the West Germans began to build small coastal defense
submarines armed with torpedoes; they built three different types of
submarines-types 205, 206, and 207-ranging from 350 to 500 tons. A larger
submarine of about 1,000-ton displacement-the Type 209-also was developed
during the late 1960s. Germany has sold Type 209 submarines to Greece, Turkey,
Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela; negotiations are under way for
sales to Iran, Greece, and Argentina. Another German company is designing a new
series of 850-ton submarines for the Norwegian and German navies.
Army Materiel
West Germany is self-sufficient in small arms and ammunition up to 40-mm.; it
could, but does not-now, produce its own larger caliber artillery ammunition as well.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
July 25, 1975
Armored vehicle production is concentrated on two families of vehicles. One is
based on the medium-tank chassis and includes the Leopard tank, a tank-recovery
vehicle, a combat-engineer vehicle, a bridge-laying vehicle, and the Gepard
antiaircraft system. The second series, built on a 90-mm.-tank-destroyer chassis,
includes the Roland antitank missile system and the Marder armored personnel
carrier.
The Leopard is one of the most effective tanks in the world. It has exceptional
mobility, a powerful and accurate gun, reliable components, and is easy to maintain
and operate. In addition to the Bundeswehr, it has been purchased by Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Norway, Australia, and the Netherlands. Exports would expand
rapidly if weapons deals did not require Bonn's approval. The Shah of Iran, for
example, tried unsuccessfully in 1969 to purchase 1,000 Leopards.
West German companies produce a wide range of military communications and
electronic gear, including sophisticated fire-control systems. Well over 100,000
domestically produced military vehicles-ranging from a quarter-ton jeep to an
80-ton prime mover-have been supplied to the Bundeswehr. Some 120,000
advanced transport vehicles are being built for West Germany's defense forces and
will keep these forces mobile into the 1980s.
West Germany also turns out all types of military engineer equipment:
quartermaster and medical supplies; optical, infrared, and photographic a ui ment;
mines; and defensive chemical and biological warfare products.
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