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December 20, 2016
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September 6, 2006
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October 25, 1975
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Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 ' Top Secret 25X1 National Intelligence Bulletin State Dept. review completed DIA review(s) completed. Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A0282d 10(qq- 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Approved For Releas4 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010011-6 National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 SPAIN: Transfer of power delayed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PORTUGAL: Military forces placed on alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 LEBANON: Beirut remains tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 SPANISH SAHARA: Morocco's mass march postponed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 CAMBODIA-THAILAND: Talks in Bangkok next week . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ANNEX: Egyptian President Sadat's Position in the Arab World Approved For Releas CIA-RDR 9T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Releas 9T00975A028200010011-6 National Intelligence Bulletin SPAIN October 25, 1975 Moves toward the transfer of political power in Spain to Prince Juan Carlos appear to have stalled yesterday, as General Franco suffered yet another heart attack. he new hesitancy about declaring Franco incapacitated is a ri u a e to u that the move would be approved by the necessary two-thirds vote of the legislature. Few Spanish officials seem ready to risk any initiative on the issue when Franco's death could quickly make it unnecessary. The cabinet meeting scheduled for yesterday was canceled. A cabinet officer told the US embassy that "all the decisions that could be taken have been taken." Madrid remains calm. Armed guards have been increased at several locations, including the US and Portuguese embassies. Military leaves have been canceled this weekend. The communist-dominated Democratic Junta, a coalition of several Spanish opposition groups in exile, issued a declaration in Paris yesterday opposing the succession of Juan Carlos. It called on the Spanish people to prepare for "democratic action" to prevent the formation of a new dictatorship after Franco's death. 1 Approved For Releas - T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Release 007/03/09 : CIA-RDP7 T00975A028200010011-6 National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 The armed forces were placed on "simple alert" Friday in response to a series of bombings attributed to the rightists. A military spokesman said the alert and the summoning of Lisbon's military commanders was also in anticipation of a possible coup attempt. The explosions caused only minor property damage. Although there is widespread speculation in Lisbon that a coup is imminent, there is no evidence to support the rumors. If an attempt is made, the US embassy believes it would most likely come from the right. Northern Military Region commander General Pires Veloso may be using the alert to bolster his forces in the event of a renewed confrontation with leftist troops. Members of Soldiers United Will Win believe Veloso has not lived up to the agreement ending the rebellion in Porto on October 14. Prime Minister Azevedo will visit Porto today to review the political-military situation with Veloso and local civil authorities. The Socialist and Popular Democratic parties are planning demonstrations of support for the Prime Minister during his visit. If there are any further government reactions to the bombings and impending coup rumors, they would be relatively mild. Any move by the Azevedo administration will likely be calculated to avoid confrontation and bloodshed while maintaining at least a modicum of control. Approved For Release) 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP719T00975A028200010011-6 National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 LEBANON Reinforcement of security forces in Beirut and the imposition of a 24-hour curfew in some sections of the city have helped decrease the fighting, but the capital remains extremely tense. Lebanese army units have been given new police duties at strategic points in and around the city in an effort to alleviate the overburdened security forces. The decision to use the army units on a limited scale reportedly was worked out late Thursday by Prime Minister Karami and Palestinian leaders and was probably coupled with an agreement to supplement security forces with 700 Palestinian military police. In a speech to the Lebanese parliament yesterday, however, Karami reiterated his opposition to using the Christian-officered army in a broad security role. He has come under heavy fire recently from right-wing Christians for not fully utilizing the army. Use of the army on a dramatic scale would inflame sectarian feelings and would be viewed by both leftists and the less radical Palestinians as an effort to shore up the Christians. On the political front, movement has been painstaking and generally overshadowed by controversy over the proper forum for resolving the crisis. The political subcommittee of the national dialogue committee resumed its deliberations yesterday on an agenda worked out earlier in the week. The agenda includes consideration of such controversial issues as: readjustment of religious representation in government institutions, the restructuring of powers and prerogatives of all three branches of government, and reorganization of the army. Neither Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil nor his major antagonist, leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt, were present for debate on the agenda yesterday, but both were represented by stand-ins. Acceptance of the agenda is a conspicuous setback for Jumayyil. He opposes consideration of a reform program before security is restored and issues relating to internal unity are resolved-especially the status of Palestinians. According to one press account, the subcommittee has authorized the preparation of a study on sectarianism in Lebanon. The subcommittee's small step forward has been hampered by growing debate over the usefulness of the "national dialogue" concept and its legality in the face of parliament's constitutional authority. Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : t IA-RDP79T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Release NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Approved For Relea - 79T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Releas National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 SPANISH SAHARA There are new signs Morocco will postpone its planned mass march into Spanish Sahara. According to press reports from Marrakech, Moroccan officials said yesterday that the march-expected to begin early next week-may be delayed several days. Volunteers from the Rabat area have been told by local officials that their departure for the border has been delayed. Logistic problems are a factor, and some discontent over the lack of food and tents has developed among the marchers who have already reached the assembly point near the borde At the same time, Moroccan spokesmen have declared that nothing will stop the march. They have denied reports that Rabat has already reached a tentative agreement with Spain on Spanish Sahara. King Hassan is probably allowing time for the talks now under way with Spain to produce results. He may also recognize that Spanish officials are reluctant to make any policy initiative until Franco's death or power is transferred to Prince Juan Carlos. Hassan is also awaiting the arrival on Sunday of UN Secretary General Waldheim. Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki met with his Spanish counterpart in Madrid yesterday. Spanish press reports, citing sources close to Moroccan diplomats, claim that in return for recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the territory, Rabat has offered Spain military bases in the Sahara, joint exploitation of the territory's rich phosphate deposits, and a moratorium on Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla along Morocco's northern Mediterranean coast. Morocco, in fact, has made similar offers in the past. Spain, however, has hitherto been unwilling to accept them, and thus ignore Algeria's position that the Saharan people should be allowed to choose their own future, including independence if they wish. The pro-independence Polisario Front, a Saharan political group supported by Algeria, has announced that if such an agreement has been struck, the front will go underground and continue to fight against both the Spanish and Moroccans. Algeria would almost certainly provide arms to the front for a sustained insurgency effort, and possibly some "volunteers" to help out. 5 Approved For Releas 9T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 Press sources in Madrid indicate that Spanish authorities in the Sahara recommended Wednesday that European civilians and families of the armed forces leave El Aaiun. The charged atmosphere created by Hassan's proposed march has prompted Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, noted for his policies of moderation, to dispatch his foreign minister, Habib Chatti, to. Rabat and Algiers with a message for the two countries' leaders to exercise restraint. 6 Approved For Release T00975A028200010011-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Approved For Relea National Intelligence Bulletin Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs leng Sary will travel to Bangkok next Tuesday for talks with Thai officials. The Cambodians almost certainly want to regularize border trade with Thailand, especially in rice and petroleum products, and will probably be interested in any economic concessions Thailand may offer. The trip to Bangkok will also afford leng Sary the opportunity for a first-hand appraisal of the Thai leadership and its views on relations with its other communist neighbors. I Bangkok will offer Cambodia some humanitarian assistance and believes that the' opening of government-authorized trade with the Cambodians would be an appropriate step toward normalizing relations. The Thai are also interested in arranging the visit of a diplomatic delegation to Phnom Penh, but the Cambodian communists may be reluctant to permit non-communist observers to view conditions in Phnom Penh in the near future. The Thai, who are eager to establish diplomatic relations and have been pressing for high-level talks in either Bangkok or Phnom Penh since this summer, apparently attach a high priority to the Cambodian leader's visit. Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai has postponed a trip to the US, presumably in order to be on hand for leng Sary. If the upcoming talks in Bangkok should founder, it would most likely be over the question of the disposition of Cambodian refugees and former Cambodian military equipment now in Thailand. Thai leaders have 0 taken the position that Bangkok is unwilling to return Cambodian refugees against their will. Bangkok would also be reluctant to accede to a Khmer communist request for the return of aircraft moved into Thailand during last spring's communist take-over, since they are still resisting similar demands from the Vietnamese. Phnom Penh broadcasts, however, have not focused on either the refugees or the equipment, and the Thai are hopeful that leng Sary will continue to sidestep these questions in order to obtain the trade and other economic concessions that Phnom Penh wants. Approved For Releas October 25, 1975 9T00975A028200010011-6 ~ .... ........... ..~. 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Approved For Release12007/03/09 : CIA-RDP7pT00975A028200010011-6 National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 Egyptian President Sadat's Position in the Arab World President Sadat's position of leadership in the Arab world is hanging in the balance as a result of the second Sinai disengagement agreement. His position within Egypt is sound, but there too he is vulnerable over the longer term. His best and virtually his only real friend at the moment is the US. He will use his visit here next week to seek further tangible expressions of that friendship in order to buttress Egypt against isolation in the Arab world and to reassure his domestic constituents that his foreign policy has not bankrupted the country. Egypt's leadership of the Arab world has always been basically a state of mind. Egypt is not the birthplace of Arab nationalism. Syria, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia can lay better claim to this title. Egypt lacks the natural resources to give it the economic importance of Saudi Arabia and has too many political constraints to make it, like Lebanon, a commercial center of the Arab world. Its people are regarded, by themselves and by other Arabs, as a breed apart. Egyptian leadership in the Arab world has depended on essentially ephemeral factors. These factors are not working to Sadat's advantage as they worked to Nasir's; as a result, Sadat could lose his ability to influence and guide the other Arabs. Egypt has been the largest and militarily the strongest state bordering Israel, whose existence is the only thing that has ever unified the modern Arab world. It has been a basic tenet of Arab doctrine that there can be no war against Israel without Egypt, and Egypt has been able to command the deference of the other Arabs by exploiting their fear of the consequences if it signed a separate peace accord with Israel. By signing the second Sinai agreement, Sadat has let slip a part of his hold on the Arabs. Although he does not regard the agreement as a final peace, the other Arabs are not sure Egypt will take a further part in the struggle for the return of the occupied territories. Without Egypt, Arabs have less leverage with Israel, but they do get freedom to plan their moves without regard to Egypt's interests. Nasir was able to use the tide of anti-colonialism at mid-century, plus an electric personality and a crusading zeal, to put himself at the head of a resurgent Arab nationalism. He and Egypt seized the leadership of the Arab political world when other Arab states, because of internal instability or simple default, were unable to compete. Approved For Release 2007/03/09A6IA-RDP79T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 Sadat is no Nasir. Even though Sadat's practical accomplishments actually exceed his predecessor's, he is not able to inspire the Arabs as Nasir did. Sadat must instead produce solid results and the prospect for more, not merely for Egypt but for all Arabs. He has not fully accomplished this. Memory has faded of the war that gained the first return of Egyptian and Syrian territory, that enabled the Arab oil states to flex their muscles through the embargo, and that led to international recognition for the Palestinians. The memory that it was Sadat who launched these successes has also faded. Sadat's standing as a leader has suffered subsequently, because he has sought to achieve Arab goals by gradual steps. A policy featuring moderation and negotiation is suspect in Arab eyes because it is both unfamiliar and uncomfortable. Nasir's standing depended as much on his ability to shift with popular opinion as on an ability actually to lead and to influence. He never appeared less radical than the most radical of the Arabs. He was the number-one Arab, not because he produced results either for the other Arabs or for Egypt, but because his radicalism, his emotional speeches, and his bold strokes of policy were familiar and comfortable for the Arabs. Sadat has done little to adjust his policy or his goals to this Arab mainstream. He has, in fact, rejected the rhetoric and the emotionalism that have long been the badge of the proper Arab and, with them, he has rejected the rigidity and inflexibility that have characterized the Arabs' dealings with the non-Arab world and attitude toward Israel. Moderation stood him in good stead when he was able to demonstrate to the Arabs that compromise, even with the Israeli enemy, accomplished more for Egypt and even for Syria than radicalism ever had. He has lately been unable, however, to show that accommodation is producing further results, either for Syria or for the Palestinians. The second Sinai accord is regarded among other Arabs as having produced too little, even for Egypt, to have been worth the price. A Residual Recognition Sadat has not lost, entirely and forever, his ability to lead the Arabs. There is enough residual recognition of the leading role Cairo has played to make the Arabs shun, almost as a reflex action, any move to turn away completely from Egypt. Many Arabs also hope that Egypt has not permanently abandoned the Arab struggle and will in a few years be back playing the leading role. Approved For Release 2007/03/0942CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010011-6 Approved For Release National Intelligence Bulletin October 25, 1975 Jordan has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to mediate Egypt's differences with Syria over the disengagement, for no better reason than that Egypt is the principal Arab state and must not be allowed to isolate itself from its neighbors. Saudi Arabia, tan s with Sadat. Less radical Palestinians have not cut their ties, because they recognize that Egypt's support is vital if they are ever to gain anything by negotiation. Syria, historically Egypt's main rival for pan-Arab leadership, is feeling unfulfilled, and it is on Syria's attitude that Sadat's rise or fall as an Arab leader could depend in the last analysis. Few Arab leaders, no matter what their' basic attitude toward Egypt, are pleased by the second Sinai accord; most are sympathetic with Syria's frustration over the lack of progress toward another Golan disengagement. As has been demonstrated time and again, few Arabs are willing to speak out for moderation when one of their number remains vocally dissatisfied. The general Arab silence on the disengagement has not to this point helped Syria, but it has also not helped Egypt. Silence in this case does not imply consent and, if ever forced to a choice between support for Egypt's position or support for Syria's and the Palestinians', few Arabs would back Egypt. A3 Approved For Release T00975A028200010011-6 25X1 25X1 Top Se%j ved For Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6 Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28200010011-6