NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Top Secret
National 1 ntel l igence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
25X1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010U3~A-4~ 6 9
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release 200
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
CONTENTS
SYRIA: UN officialsantic~pate
renewal of mandate
USSR-EGYPT: Debt rescheduling
talks to resume today 3
U K-EGYPT: No firm commitment
on arms made during Sadat's visit 4
THAI LAND: Bangkok resists Lao and
Vietnamese demands for US aircraft 5
PORTUGAL: Azevedo plans some
sub-cabinet level changes 6
MOROCCO: Hassan declares
victory in Spanish Sahara 10
PANAMA: Panamanians expect little
progress in negotiations 1 1
MEXICO-GUATEMALA: Mexico asserts
rights to Belizean territory 12
ICELAND-UK: Negotiations on
fishing rights stalemated 13
WEST GERMANY -USSR: West
Germans' visit a "modest success" 14
USSR: Gold sales of 75
metric tons confirmed 15
CHINA-BURMA: Peking pleased
with Ne Win's visit 16
FOR THE RECORD 17
Approved For Release 20 28300010030-4 25X1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
UN officials in charge of administering UN disengagement forces in the Middle
East believe that Syria will renew the mandate of the observer forces stationed on
the Golan Heights, due to expire on November 30.
Lieutenant General Silasvuo, the UN Coordinator of Midd a astern
Peacekeeping Operations, had come away from talks last week with Syrian Defense
Minister Talas and chief of staff Shihabi so convinced that Syria would extend the
mandate that he has advised Secretary General Waldheim that he need not make a
special visit to Damascus at this time.
A local journalist has informed the US embassy that she had learned the same
thing. She claimed that Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Rafai had said Baath Party
leaders had decided a week ago to renew the mandate. A Beirut newspaper also
reported last weekend that Syria would extend the mandate, but for only two
months.
President Asad and his advisers may privately have concluded now that Syria
has no alternative to renewing the mandate. Nevertheless, we are puzzled by these
reports, since we still expect the Syrians to withhold formal approval until the last
moment in hopes of obtaining some diplomatic quid pro quo from the US and
Israel.
Asad is on record as saying that the renewal of the mandate would have no
particular importance because Syrian forces would not hesitate to go right through
the UN observer forces if Syria decided to go to war. Such reasoning could be used
for domestic purposes as a rationale for extending the life of the mandate for up to
six months.
Meanwhile, the situation has been quiet along the disengagement line, and there
has been no further reporting on Syrian military movements or preparations for any
kind of military action.
Approved For Release 20 - 75A028300010030-4
25X1
DIA
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release 20
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
A Soviet delegation is scheduled to arrive in Cairo today to continue talks on
rescheduling Egypt's debt to the USSR. It seems unlikely, however, that a conclusive
agreement will be reached.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister I. T. Grishin will pick up the discussions
where they left otf in Moscow last summer. At that time, the Soviets had said they
would study Cairo's proposals. President Sadat has claimed that the total Egyptian
debt to the USSR is $4 billion.
The Egyptians want aten-year moratorium and the right to make future
payments in goods rather than in hard currency. The Soviets apparently will come
up with some counterproposals, but they probably will fall far short of meeting
Egyptian demands. The Soviet deputy chief of mission in Cairo, for example,
recently indirectly suggested to his US counterpart that Moscow might propose
rescheduling up to 50 percent of Egypt's economic debt, which totals at least $500
million; he would not talk about the larger debt on military purchases.
By continuing the debt discussions, Moscow hopes to suggest flexibility in its
position and to indicate that responsibility for any further deterioration in relations
rests with President Sadat. The Soviets seem intent on maintaining their economic
and military pressure on Cairo until Sadat makes some specific political gesture to
Moscow's liking.
3
Approved For Release 200 28300010030-4 25X1
 Approved For Releas
............. o~o,e i
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
US embassy officials in London report that no major arms deals were
concluded between the UK and Egypt during President Sadat's early November visit
Following the visit, both British and Egyptian officials have said that press
reports of a pending Egyptian purchase of 200 supersonic Jaguar fighters were
inaccurate. According to these sources, the press greatly exaggerated the immediate
likelihood of a Jaguar deaf as well as its size. US embassy officials believe the British
Defense Ministry is in favor of such a deal and is pushing the cabinet to authorize
further negotiations.
25X1
icia po icy wi apparently continue to one in w is eac sa a will
e reviewed individually to determine its potential effect on the military balance in
the Middle East.
This policy undoubtedly is of concern to Cairo, although the Egyptians appear
confident that they will obtain some sophisticated equipment from the UK. In any
case, the Egyptians do not want to become too heavily dependent on British arms
because they are worried that the UK may again cut off arms deliveries if there is
another Middle East flare-up.
The Egyptians may be more interested in package deals that include wea ons
assembly and local roduction under British licen
Egypt has been negotiating with Great Britain for some time to produce under
license the Hawk advanced jet trainer and the Anglo-French Lynx helicopter. The
Hawk would be a better initial choice than the Jaguar if the Egyptians are seriously
interested in producing an advanced fighter aircraft. The Hawk is an excellent trainer
with good ground-attack capabilities that could be built using less sophisticated
technology than that required to build the Anglo-French Jaguar. The Jaguar strike
fighter, however, would give Egypt a much greater military capability, but any
licensed production program for this highly sophisticated aircraft would require
considerably more direct Anglo-French assistance and for a longer period of time.
Approved For Release 2007/03/OF :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 200
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
Earlier this year, the British appeared close to concluding a Hawk deal with the
Egyptians, but in recent months the French have been pressing hard to sell Cairo the
Franco-German Alpha Jet, an aircraft similar to the Hawk. Sales competition for the
Arab dollar, especiallly between the UK and France, is intensifying, and Sadat
undoubtedly realizes that he is in a good bargaining position.
Thailand continues to resist demands by Laos and Vietnam for the return of
US aircraft flown to Thailand just before the communist take-overs in Vientiane and
Saigon.
A high-level Thai government official has privately assured the US embassy that
Foreign Minister Chatchai was not speaking for the Thai government two weeks ago,
when he claimed that Bangkok had decided to return US aircraft to Laos. Chatchai's
failure to raise the question subsequently is a further indication that he has been
overruled by Prime Minister Khukrit. Despite continuing communist pressure, the
Thai government so far still holds that the disposition of the aircraft is a matter for
bilateral settlement between the US and Laos and Vietnam.
The Vietnamese, perhaps judging that Bangkok is committed to a policy of
eventual accommodation with its communist neighbors, seem prepared to hold to
their uncompromising position until the Thai give in. In a November 13
commentary, Hanoi sharply attacked a recent statement by Prime Minister Khukrit
arguing that the aircraft issue not be made an obstacle to friendship between
Thailand and Vietnam.
Although Hanoi clearly at this time is making the aircraft issue the main point
of attack in this test of wills, the Vietnamese also seem to sense an opportunity to
pressure Bangkok to abandon its general policy of cooperation with the US on
security matters. The commentary listed a number of other obstacles flowing from
Bangkok's "US-serving policy," including the presence of a US radar hasp in
Thailand and U-2 flights from Thai territory.
5
Approved For Release 200 75A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP7~T00975A028300010030-4
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
Portuguese Prime Minister Azevedo is said to be preparing to make some
changes in his government, probably at the sub-cabinet level. He is apparently
reacting to the recent Communist-led anti-government demonstrations.
According to press reports yesterday, Azevedo discussed possible changes with
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares. An aide to Soares said earlier that a new cabinet
might be formed, excluding both the center-left Popular Democrats and the
Communists. Later reports indicate the changes being considered do not involve any
first-line officials.
Changes of sub-cabinet officials could be significant if they involve the
politically sensitive Labor or Social Communications ministries, which have borne
the brunt of the Communist offensive. The Communists have sought to halt the
attempt by Labor Minister Tomas Rosa to eliminate their influence and to assist
non-Communist labor leaders in wresting control of key labor unions from the
Communists.
An announcement issued yesterday by the Prime Minister's office could
foreshadow possible changes in Rosa's ministry. The announcement disavowed a
speech by Rosa at apro-government demonstration in Viseu on Sunday, in which he
implied that the government would not honor wage increases granted last week.
Rosa was substituting at the demonstration for Azevedo.
Attempts by the Social Communications Ministry to reduce Communist
influence in the media also are under attack. Two weeks ago, Communist-led
workers held a high Information Ministry official, Ferreira da Cunha, hostage
overnight to protest such reforms. Ferreira da Cunha may, in fact, be one of those
about to be replaced.
A reshuffle in these ministries might mollify the opposition temporarily and
possibly buy the authorities some time, but it would be unlikely to have any
sustained effect on the Communists' drive to gain greater representation in the
government and in the ruling Revolutionary Council.
Approved For Release 2007/0306 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Rely
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
In a low-key speech yesterday on the 20th anniversary of Morocco's
declaration of independence, King Hassan proclaimed a victory for Morocco in
Spanish Sahara.
Obviously appealing for support at home, Hassan repeatedly praised his
countrymen for participating in the green march and helping return Spanish Sahara..
to Morocco without bloodshed. He praised the heroism of the armed forces and said!
they would continue to play an important role in defending Moroccan gains.
In regard to Spanish Sahara, the King promised a major development effort
that would require investments above and beyond the revenues received from the
phosphate deposits. He did not provide further details, however, about the trilateral
agreement worked out last week with Spain and Mauritania. All three countries seem
to be withholding the terms of the agreement until the Spanish parliament acts on
decolonization.
Departing from the Saharan issue, Hassan referred-without mentioning a
date-to holding the national election in Morocco that he had postponed last March
pending resolution of the Saharan dispute.
Approved For R 1 - 9T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Releas
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
PANAMA
The US embassy reports that there is surface tranquility in Panama on the eve
of the next canal treaty negotiating round.
Panamanians obviously expect little if any substantive progress in the talks
before the 1976 US elections. The controlled press and public statements by
Panamanian negotiators have been increasingly blunt in this regard. The embassy
also reports that many of Panama's treaty advisers are privately discouraged about
maintaining a favorable negotiating climate for an extended period. Further
complicating the situation, hard-liners are vying with mare moderate treaty advisers
for Panamanian strongman Torrijos' ear, with the former recommending closer
relations with the socialist world and increased pressures on the US.
Despite the backstage jockeying, public signs of tension have abated in recent
weeks. Torrijos has bent considerable effort toward mending political fences with
the business community, encouraging officially sponsored dialogue, and sacking a
ll
y
labor minister with an anti-management reputation. Students, always potentia
have uieted since their stoning US embass in September.
The anamanian rea y pr posals presente in as ing on on
October re ected little movement toward the last US compromise positions.
The Panamanian consensus would appear to be tl~at, given US domestic
political considerations, little will be lost by digging in for the next year on the
substantive treaty matters most important to them. While for domestic political
reasons it will be important to provide for the semblance of ongoing talks-if not
substantive progress-building international support will be the primary focus over
the next year. Thus the advisers who counsel pillorying the US in international
forums anr~ ctrpnnthaninn socialist ties are likely to gain the upper hand over the
moderates.
Approved For Release 2
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP7~9T00975A028300010030-4
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 197!5
MEXICO-GUATEMALA
President Echeverria's assertion that Mexico has rights to Belizean territory
complicates the Belize issue for Guatemala.
Echeverria made the statement during his three-day visit to Guatemala late last
week. Instead of reiterating his remarks of last month in support of Guatemala's
claim, Echeverria surprised his hosts by referring to an old treaty staking out a
Mexican claim to a portion of northern Belize. The Mexican leader said his country
does not propose to fight for its claim, but will present it "upon resolution of
Guatemala's problem with Belize."
Guatemala probably does not expect that Mexico would intervene militarily if
Guatemala went to war over Belize. It probably suspects, however, that Mexico
would lodge its claim in connection with any negotiations with Britain involving
Belizean territorial concessions.
Guatemalan reaction to the British reinforcements dispatched to Belize early
this month has thus far been restrained, although the Guatemalans are concerned that
incidents with British forces patrolling the border could occur and lead to a serious
clash. British forces in Belize, numbering about 1,100 troops plus six Harrier attack
aircraft-which are vastly superior to any Guatemalan aircraft-can defend all but
remote jungle areas of Belize.
Faced with the strong probability that a military action with even a limited
objective would fail, the Guatemalans are seeking a solution through negotiations
with the UK. The Guatemalans are looking for some British gesture indicating that
meaningful negotiations are a distinct possibility.
If the British do not offer aface-saving device, the risk of a military conflict
will increase. Over the weekend, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina was quoted by
the press as saying his government does not exclude the possibility of armed
conflict.
The Belize resolution sponsored by the UK and Caribbean nations should come
to a vote at the committee level in the UN this week, possibly today. Guatemala
expects the resolution to pass by a large margin.
Approved For Release 2007/006:CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release 2Q
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
The third round of negotiations on a new fishing agreement ended in a
stalemate on November 17, and no further talks have been scheduled.
Both countries tried first to resolve their differences aver the size of the
allowable catch. Last weekend, Iceland officially offered for the first time to raise
the limit of the annual catch from 50,000 to 65,000 tons. The UK, however,
proposed to reduce its catch only to 110,000 tons from the 130,000 tons allowed
under the two-year agreement that expired on November 13. Following secret talks
earlier last week, an Icelandic official appeared hopeful that the British might accept
a limit of 80,000 tons, but his superiors later rejected this figure as too large.
The Icelandic coast guard reportedly will only gradually enforce the nation's
unilaterally declared 200-mile fishing limit. Icelandic authorities estimated that
about 50 British trawlers were fishing "illegally" as of November 14, and coast guard
patrols ordered many out of the area. The first incidents since the expiration of the
old pact occurred on November 15, when patrol boats cut the lines of two trawlers
fishing within the old 50-mile limit.
There is strong opposition within Iceland to conciliatory moves by the
coalition to permit foreign fishermen to operate within the 50-mile limit, which
includes the richest fishing grounds. Two editorials last week in the official organ of
the Prime Minister's own party, however, began to try to prepare the public for a
compromise in the negotiations with the UK, West Germany, and others. The
editorials noted that Iceland lacks the strength to enfarce its claims, and argued that
experience had demonstrated that more was to be gained through bargaining than by
intransigence.
Approved For Release 20 1 A028300010030-4 25X1
 Approved For Rel ase 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79 00975A028300010030-4
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
West German officials describe the visit by President Scheel and Foreign
Minister Genscher to the Soviet Union last week as a "modest success" for both
sides.
Neither Bonn nor Moscow anticipated substantive breakthroughs, and
apparently little progress was made toward resolving outstanding bilateral issues. The
West Germans appear content that no controversies arose and that the Soviets were
friendly and relaxed throughout.
The highlight of the visit was a meeting on November 11 between Soviet party
leader Brezhnev and the two West German officials. Brezhnev told them that the
25th Soviet party congress in February will confirm that Moscow intends to
continue to pursue detente. This is the first time that Brezhnev has given such an
assurance regarding the party congress. His remarks were clearly meant to quiet
speculation that major changes in Soviet foreign policy will come out of the
congress. The West Germans found Brezhnev appearing to be in good health.
The two sides discussed bilateral problems, particularly concerning West
Berlin's inclusion in three pending agreements, but did not resolve their differences.
Bonn had taken care beforehand not to raise hopes that marked progress would be
made toward solving outstanding problems. On his return from the Soviet Union,
Scheel stressed that West German -Soviet relations must be viewed from the
long-term rather than the short-term prospective.
Scheel raised the topic of implementing the understandings reached at the
summit of the European security conference, particularly those involving
humanitarian measures such as reuniting divided families. Pravda did not publish
Sch-eel's public comments on this issue, but neither did the Soviets publicly rebut
him, in contrast to the handling of similar remarks by French President Giscard
during his visit in October.
The Soviets launched an extensive discussion of the Middle East. President
Podgorny reportedly said that Moscow is not opposed in principle to partial steps
toward resolving problems, but expressed the fear that Syria and Egypt would
become impatient and that this might lead to renewed conflict. The Soviets
' "
requested the West Germans to permit the Palest
an office in Bonn, but the West Germans refused.
Approved For Release 2007/031/$6 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Relea
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
Soviet gold sales of 75 metric tons during the first seven months of 1975 have
just been confirmed. They were made on the Swiss market and earned Moscow some
$400 million. For the year as a whole, Moscow may earn $1 billion from the sale of
about 200 tons of gold.
Rumored sales of some 50 tons of gold at midyear directly to Middle East
buyers have not been confirmed, although a spokesman of the Soviet-owned
Moscow Narodny Bank in London admitted to "some" sales there. If true, they
could have earned Moscow an additional $265 million.
Gold sales were particularly heavy in June and July, when 26 and 33 tons were
sold respectively. It is likely that comparably heavy sales continued into August,
when prices remained high. By then, Soviet hard-currency requirements were well
known because of a looming record trade deficit. August sales could have earned
Moscow another $100 million.
There are unconfirmed reports of small gold sales in early September by the
USSR, in spite of declining prices following the International Monetary Fund's
decision to sell some of its gold holdings. Any sales probably would have been very
small, and it is likely that the Soviet Union got out of the market when prices
continued to plunge.
Moscow probably reentered the market in October when gold prices recovered
and appeared to stabilize at around $145 per troy ounce. Sales of about 20 tons per
month through the end of the year-a reasonable estimate based on past Soviet sales
and assuming stability in the gold market-could earn Moscow another $275 million.
If the market allows, Moscow will sell even more.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : L~IA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release 2Q
National Intelligence Bulletin November 18, 1975
The Chinese appear to be highly satisfied with Burmese President Ne Win's visit
to Peking last week, his first since 1971.
In a joint communique issued Saturday, the Burmese added their name to the
growing list of Asian countries that support Peking's dark view of Soviet intentions
in the area. Rangoon agreed not to participate in "any military alliance" directed
against the Chinese, an obvious reference to Moscow's proposed Asian collective
security pact. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, in a welcoming speech for Ne Win
earlier in the week, had connected the callective security scheme with Moscow's
"wild ambitions" in the region.
More important, Ne Win also expressed opposition to countries that seek
"hegemony" in any part of the world, a formulation that is directed against the
Soviets.
What the Burmese received in return for these gestures is not entirely clear.
Chinese support to the communist insurgents in northeastern Burma is the one
bilateral issue Rangoon seems most anxious to resolve, and Ne Win clearly planned
to discuss the matter in Peking. In recent months, the Burmese have taken a number
of steps that seem designed to signal their good intentions to Peking, probably
hoping that these gestures would engender a more conciliatory Ghinese response on
the insurgency question. For example, Burma switched its position on the Korea
question in the UN and voted for the Chinese-supported pro-Pyongyang resolution
last month. The Burmese also cracked down recently on pro-Taipei organizations in
Burma.
The communique includes a statement that neither side will "carry out acts of
aggression" against the other, but it is doubtful that the Chinese made any specific
promises to reduce current levels of support to the insurgency, an activity the
Chinese have always insisted was nonofficial and outside the sphere of state-to-state
talks.
It seems reasonable that Peking, as part of its effort to get an identity of views
on Soviet "expansionism" in Southeast Asia, would attempt to satisfy Ne Win's
minimum requests on the insurgency question. The Chinese may have used a
formulation similar to the one recently used with other Asian leaders-a generalized
promise not to meddle in Burma's internal affairs.
The Chinese also agreed during the Ne Win visit to expand trade and technical
coo eration with Burma. No details of the agreement have been released.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : ~A-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
November 18, 1975
CHINA -NORTH KOREA: The Chinese have made clear their unhappiness
with the heavy-handedness of the North Koreans in suspending diplomatic relations
with Australia. As the Australians prepared to leave Pyongyang, the Chinese
ambassador approached the Australian group and in full view of disapproving
Korean officials shook hands with each of them. The Chinese also made a special
effort to facilitate issuance of Chinese visas to the Australians, who traveled through
Peking on their way back to Australia. Although Peking will not make a major issue
of the incident with Pyongyang, the Chinese almost certainly hope to make it clear
to the Australians-and probably other countries-that they la ed no art in
Pon an 's over reaction and, in fact, disapproved.
Approved For Rele
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
 'r'~pA~~for Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :CIA-RDP79T00975A028300010030-4