NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028400010045-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National 1 ntel l ig~ence
Bulletin
Top Secret
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ecem ar 9, 1975
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National I ntel I igence Bul leti n
December 29, 19 75
CONTENTS
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CHINA-USSR: Manner of Soviet
airmen's release surprising
LEBANON: Lull in fighting
continues into weekend
1
3
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THAI LAND-LAOS: Bangkok
may reopen border
6
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 29, 1975
Amicable Chinese handling of the release on Saturday of three Soviet
helicopter crewmen is startling, given the hitherto sour state of Sino-Soviet relations
and the bitterness the helicopter incodent initially caused on both sides. The gesture
is the most conciliatory move Peking has made toward Moscow since Premier
Kosygin was briefly invited to China in 1969.
The Soviet crewmen had been held incommunicado since the helicopter went
down in northwestern China near the Soviet border in March 1974. Saturday's
announcement stated that Chinese investigators had concluded that the border
intrusion had been unintentional. Peking had initially charged that the Soviet crew
was engaged in an espionage mission.
Despite Soviet efforts to gain 'the crew's release through diplomatic pressure,
propaganda, and threats to retaliate, the Chinese maintained a stony silence in
public, while inspiring diplomatic rumors that the crewmen would be brought to
trial. The description in Saturday's announcement of the helicopter as an "armed
reconnaissance" model may have been designed to justify their lengthy detention.
In an especially telling gesture, a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official gave a
dinner for the Soviet airmen before their release. Peking had never before accorded
such treatment to foreign natianals who had been detained for any reason. This
appears to be an important symbolic act, but the reasons far its timing are not yet
clear. The long Chinese public silence on the helicopter affair suggests that handling
of the matter may have been a contentious issue which only now has been resolved.
There have been hints for nearly two years that some fairly important Chinese
leaders may have been arguing in favor of a less abrasive policy toward Moscow,
presumably on the grounds that China's current approach is too dangerous. There
have been no recent signs, however, that such a debate has come to a head, and in
fact exchanges between Peking and Moscow in the past six or eight months have
been particularly sharp.
In the past several months the Chinese have also indicated their concern that
the US has not been properly standing up to the Soviets. The implication is that
putative US passivity leaves the Chinese increasingly exposed. Recent action on
Angola by the US Senate undoubtedly has further heightened China's concern on
this matter. In addition, Peking's release of the airmen may be intended as a signal to
the US that Sino-US rapprochement does not indefinitely preclude some
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations; the Chinese may be particularly anxious to
make this point at a time when they perceive that their attacks on detente and
SALT seem to be having little or no effect on Washington.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 29, 1975
At a minimum the. Chinese probably also hope to complicate Soviet efforts to
use the anti-China theme in connection with Moscow's efforts to convene an
international communist conference in 1976. They may also hope to complicate
Secretary Kissinger's dialogue with Moscow.
The release of the helicopter crew removes an important irritant in Sino-Soviet
relations, but a host of others remain. A senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official
publicly revealed two weeks ago, for example, that the Chinese hold three other
citizens who he claimed had strayed across the border. Chinese propaganda,
moreover, immediately before and after the announcement of the release, has
continued to attack the USSR's "archcriminal" activities in Angola and
"expansionist" foreign policy.
Moscow, which from the beginning has maintained that the March 1974 border
violation was unintentional, has merely issued a Tass announcement reporting the
release of the "illegally detained" crewmen. According to another press report, the
Soviet ambassador in Peking described the Chinese action as a "complete mystery."
The Soviets undoubtedly calculate that as long as he lives, Chairman Mao is unlikely
to acquiesce for long in any Chinese move to significantly lower tensions with
Moscow.
2.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
December 29, 1975
The holiday lull in fighting continued into the weekend, in part because of
freezing rains and gale-force winds.
Sniping and occasional heavy exchanges of fire continued to make the streets
of Beirut unsafe, but Tripoli and Zahlah, where heavy fighting took place early last
week, were quiet.
Beirut ,radio announced on Saturday that Prime Minister Karami's supreme
coordination committee, which includes representatives of the various warring
factions as well as Lebanese security officials, had agreed on a timetable for
enforcing the current cease-fire over the next few days. The Lebanese news media
also continued their speculation that a political solution, approved by Syria, was
near and would grant at least some of the demands of the Muslim farces for reforms
in the present political system, which favors the Christians.
There is no indication as yet that the lat~:st agreement will be any more
effective than the other cease-fires worked out over the past eight months. The most
some observers are hoping for is the customary end-of-month "pay truce," allowing
people time to collect their monthly pay checks and stock up on food.
3
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National Intelligence Bulletin December 29, 1975
Bangkok may be preparing to reopen its border with Laos. The border was
closed on November 18 following a Lao attack on a Thai patrol boat in the Mekong
River.
A Thai Foreign Ministry official announced late last week that the border
would be "temporarily" opened so as to facilitate ~ transportation of essential goods
to foreign embassies in Vientiane. The official also indicated that he expected Thai
Prime Minister Khukrit to order the entire border reopened very shortly. The
announcement could be a trial balloon by the Foreign Ministry. Khukrit, for his
part, may well decide to withhold a final decision on reopening the entire border
until he has strong public support for such a move.
The Foreign Ministry official stated that the Lao government had recently
accepted an invitation from Thailand to participate in a festival in Bangkok late next
month, and that this gesture of "good will" on Vientiane's part may have been
responsible for a breakthrough on the border impasse. He implied that Lao Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Phoun Sipraseuth would represent Vientiane at
the festivities.
Phoun, however, recently ruled out any private talks until Thailand actually
reopens the border "and sincerely displays a friendly attitude of true
neighborliness." Phoun. did admit, however, that the border closure had caused
serious economic difficulties in Vientiane.
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The Vietnamese communists, meanwhile, have stepped up their propaganda
attacks against Bangkok's "unilateral" border closure and its "economic blockade"
of Laos. A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry statement on December 24 charged
that the Thai administration has "continuously colluded with US imperialists"
against the Lao people.
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