NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 7, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 7, 1976
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Foreign Minister
Allon begins talks here today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHINA-ANGOLA: Peking's reaction
to Third World support of MPLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
JAPAN-USSR: Foreign Minister
Gromyko's trip to Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ITALY: Socialist Party's threat
to bring down the Moro government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SPAIN: Series of illegal strikes testing
the government's image of restraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1F
PORTUGAL: Land reform policies
agreed on by three major parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
GREECE: Another cabinet
shuffle may occur later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHILE: President Pinochet
tightens his grip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Nationa
ntelligence Bulletin January 7, 1976
According to the US embassy in Tel Aviv, Prime Minister Rabin has narrowly
restricted Foreign Minister Allon's mandate for his talks in Washington that begin
today to a discussion of tactics for next week's debate in the UN Security Council
on the Middle East problem. Despite Allon's desire to broach other topics, Rabin has
made it clear that he is reserving the broader foreign policy issues for his own visit to
the US later this month.
Israel's prime concern is to forestall any action by the Council that would
enhance the status of the Palestinians as potential participants in future peace talks.
The Israelis take it for granted that the US would veto any effort to change the
essentials of Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which Israel maintains are the sole
basis for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
The Israelis are much less confident that Washington would block an attempt
bby the Arabs-considered likely by Israel's leaders-to pass a moderately worded
Council resolution calling for consideration of the rights of the Palestinians. The
Israelis contend that such a statement would significantly modify Resolutions 242
and 338, which explicitly treat the Palestinian issue as a refugee problem. They fear
that it might open a door allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization to be
brought into Arab-Israeli negotiating at some later date. The Israelis insist the
Palestinian issue can be only dealt with in peace negotiations with Jordan.
Allon, in his Washington talks can be expected to press hard for assurances
that the US will also oppose any such Arab maneuver. The Israeli minister will
-suggest that the US support Israel`s recent call for a resumption of the Geneva
conference to consider the Palestinian and other issues. The Palestine Liberation
Organization, with which Tel Aviv refuses to negotiate, is not a party to the
conTerence.
Rabin orobably has some misgivings about sending Allon to Washington to
argue Israel's hard-line position, particularly on the Palestinian question. Allon
considers it :-o be the central issue in peace negotiations with the Arabs and makes
no secret of his advocacy of a mere flexible approach. In recent weeks this has
openly put him at odds with Rabin, who insists that this is not the time to alter
Israel's long-held position. Along with most Israeli leaders, Rabin considers the
Arabs' refusal to recognize the existence of Israel as the root cause of the Middle
East conflict.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
January 7, 1976
Allon, however, is not able to initiate major foreign policy shifts. In the cabinet
he ranks well below Rabin and Defense Minister Peres in influence. In the key areas
of LIS-Israeli relations and Arab-Israeli negotiations Prime Minister Rabin is in reality
his own foreign minister.
Moreover, Allon represents the less hard-line elements in a cabinet and a
parliament in which the conservatives have the decisive voice. Allon and his
supporters lack the political clout of conservatives such as Peres. Allon's limited
influence in part is dictated by the relatively small size of the faction he heads
within the ruling Labor Party., The faction controls only 8 of the party's 46 Knesset
seats and 2 of the 21 cabinet posts.
Alton is clearly frustrated by his limited influence and by the Prime Minister's
penchant for personally handling the most important aspects of Israeli foreign
relations. A major but not dominant national leader, he remains a team player who
is not prepared to carry his differences with Rabin to the point of precipitating a
governmental crisis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin January 7, 1976
Peking has registered disappointment with some Third World supporters of the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement, but has apparently not attempted to bring any
major diplomatic pressure to bear on the Angolan situation. Within the past month
Chinese officials have:
--differed publicly over Angola with visiting President da Costa of Sao Tome
and Principe, whose government officially recognizes the Popular Movement;
--walked out on a reception for Popular Movement representatives hosted by
Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham;
The Chinese, however, appear to have stopped short of any real arm-twisting.
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Da Costa, for example, signed economic agreements
several days after the two clashed verbally at Da Costa's welcoming banquet.
Guyana is the only
Latin American country with an active inese assistance gram. There is no
evidence that the Chinese have made any significant efforts to use this leverage
either to persuade Burnharn'c ongpirnimpi-it to stop refuelinci Cuban aircraft involved
in the airlift to Angola
Despite China's continued public stance of neutrality toward Angola, most
Third World countries are aware of past Chinese assistance to the Popular
Movement's opponents, the National Front: and the National Union. Peking realizes
that any heavy-handed efforts on its part to affect developments in Angola not only
would antagonize individual governments but would facilitate Moscow's efforts to
depict Peking as colluding with the US and South Africa in Angola.
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January 7, 1976
Tokyo and Moscow probably view Foreign Minister Gromyko's five-day
trip to Japan on Friday as a holding action, with no real improvement in relations
likely.
As part of a series of periodic consultations, Gromyko's visit has been in the
works for some time. It was apparently delayed by Soviet concern that Japan would
accept Peking's terms for signing a peace and friendship treaty. The Soviets now
seem satisfied that agreement on the treaty is not imminent, and both Moscow and
Tokyo consider it in their interest to maintain the semblance of a dialogue.
In an effort to keep the onus for stal;mated political relations on the Soviets,
the Japanese will continue to press for the return of the Northern Territories-four
islands off eastern Hokkaido seized by the USSR in 1945-thereby clearing the way
for a peace treaty formally ending World War II. They will emphasize the
Brezhnev-Tanaka understanding in 1973 that the territories are subject to
negotiation, and will probably question Gromyko about authoritative Soviet
statements implying that the territorial issue has been settled. The Japanese will also
want to discuss the sharp increase in Soviet trawlers plying Japanese coastal waters, a
development that has generated some domestic pressure for adopting a 12-mile
territorial limit.
Moscow's reversion to a tougher stance on the territorial issue almost certainly
is aimed at impressing upon the Japanese the negative consequences of moving ahead
on a peace treaty with Peking. The Soviets probably are not prepared to go beyond
their earlier offer to return only the two southernmost islands; this is still
unacceptable to the Japanese..
Gromyko doubtless will be probing for evidence of Japanese intentions
regarding the Sino-Japanese treaty. The Soviets are not at all optimistic about their
prospects of preventing a treaty eventually. In order to dilute its impact, he
probably will again press for Japanese agreement to some sort of interim friendship
pact with the USSR. The Japanese rejected the proposal when the Soviets first made
it last January, and doubtless will do so again.
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January 7, 1976
The Italian Socialist Party directorate is meeting today and tomorrow to decide
whether to bring down the Moro government by withdrawing the party's crucial
parliamentary support. While a compromise to avoid a government collapse is still
possible, most evidence suggests that the Socialists will follow through on their
threat to topple Moro.
The Socialist line has become more rigid in the week since party leader De
Martino made his threat. De Martino's initial statement was phrased conditionally
and in a way that left ample room for compromise. An editorial in the Socialist press
over the weekend, however, portrayed Moro's fall as a virtual certainty and advised
the other parties to start thinking of ways to replace his government.
Meanwhile, pleas from the other parties-including the Communists-for the
Socialists to reconsider appear to have had little effect. I
The other
parties had based their appeals tote Socialists mainly on the argument that an
effort to replace Moro in the present unsettled circumstances would halt efforts to
deal with the country's economic problems and might lead to early and divisive
parliamentary elections.
If the Socialists' resolve holds, they will have to reconcile internal differences
over how best to profit from the ensuing search for a new government. Some
Socialists-they appear to be a minority at this stage-want to push for early
elections, on the theory that only the Christian Democrats and Communists will
benefit if the legislature completes its full term that expires in 1977. Other Socialist
leaders seem inclined to press for a new caretaker government-an all - Christian
Democratic cabinet, for example-that would be pledged to give more weight to
Socialist views. Socialists who favor that line of approach argue that it would pave
the way for an expanded Socialist role in the event the party resumes full
participation in the government after the next elections.
The Socialists are likely to insist also that any new government consult more
openly with the Communist Party in order to limit the latter's ability to profit
electorally from its opposition status.
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January 7, 1976
The new Spanish government's carefully nurtured image of restraint in dealing
with leftist strikes and demonstrations is being tested by a series of illegal strikes.
The continuing work stoppage by subway workers, which has tied up Madrid since
Monday, threatens to be the most disruptive so far.
Yesterday evening, following an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the government
issued a communique warning that it could be forced to intervene if the situation
deteriorated. No deadline was set, however, and it seems unlikely that the
government would commit itself to strong action as long as there was a possibility
that the ongoing negotiations between subway workers and management could
break the deadlock.
On Monday police used tear gas to evict some 1,800 striking subway workers
from a terminal building occupied earlier in the day, although no arrests or violence
were reported. About 300 of the dispersed strikers barricaded themselves in a
church; their ranks had increased to about 2,000 yesterday. Late yesterday, police
cleared the church.
The subway workers are demanding higher pay and an immediate bonus of
$250. They were probably encouraged by the recent strike of taxi drivers in Madrid
and Barcelona, where the government conceded fare increases.
Most strikes carried out in Spain are still illegal, although a decree law of last
May did grant workers a carefully limited right to strike. A "legal" strike can be
called only after various prescribed mediation and conciliation steps have been
exhausted and five days' notice given.
Following the metalworkers' strikes of December 10-12, there has been a series
of scattered illegal strikes throughout Spain. Police intervention, though frequent,
has been significantly more restrained than in the past.
Labor agitation and strike activity are expected to gather momentum during
the next few months as workers in many industries strive for pay increases in new
collective bargaining contracts currently under negotiation. Prime Minister Arias'
government is pledged to oppose large pay hikes as part of its program to curb the
country's high inflation rate. Nevertheless, in order to avoid a serious confrontation
with labor, the government may take steps to ensure that compulsory arbitration
settlements favor the workers' economic demands. The government might also
consider modifying the current ceiling on wage increases and initiating reforms in
the govern ment-controlled Syndical Organization-Spain's only legal labor
organization.
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Spanish authorities, meanwhile, continue to tolerate leftist demonstrations.
Police did not intervene on Monday when about 5,000 people demonstrated in
Pamplona demanding amnesty for political prisoners. In other recent rallies in
Barcelona and in the Basque provinces demonstrators have gone so far as to applaud
the police for their restraint.
The man directly responsible for reining in the police is Minister of the Interior
Fraga Iribarne. Soon after taking office last month, Fraga made a clear distinction
between "peaceful" opposition, which would be tolerated, and violent opposition,
which would not. He warned that he would not hesitate to crack down on
"freelance vigilantes"-violence-prone extremists like the far-right Guerrillas of
Christ the King. On Monday Fraga issued an unprecedented public condemnation of
a right-wing terrorist act, and on the same day two men implicated in recent
right-wing activity were arrested in Barcelona.
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Agreement by Portugal's three major parties on the implementation of land
reform policies appears to have cleared the way for Prime Minister Azevedo to
complete the reorganizatio } of his government.
Following a meeting of President Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Azevedo, and
party leaders on Monday it was announced that the parties had agreed to the
following principles which would now govern the agrarian reform program:
--Acceptance of most farm seizures in the fertile agricultural south as valid,
with the proviso that the most blatant examples of illegal expropriation will be
corrected.
--A guarantee that agrarian reform will not be carried out in the north.
--A promise that all illegal land seizures in the south will cease and that small
farms will be protected.
--Strict observance of existing decree laws governing expropriation and
nationalization of privately owred farmland.
Land reform has been a serious bone of contention for the present government,
with conservative farmer groups attemptinc, to take advantage of the weakened
position of the left since the abortive November 25 uprising to reverse the process
and the Communists seeking to protect their gains. The Communist Party is
especially anxious to maintain its in`luence in the south, where Communist led farm
workers have seized vast areas of private farmland since last summer.
Many of the land seizures have been in violation of existing statutes-which
specify that only large landholdings may be seized---arid have created fears among
small farmers, particularly in the north, that their plots would also be confiscated.
In exchange for the Communists' endorsement of the new approach to land
reform, the Socialists agreed to allow the Communists to retain the important post
of secretary of state for agrarian reform under the Socialist agriculture minister. The
incumbent secretary of state, Antonio Bica, will probably be replaced by another
Communist more to the Socialist:' liking, and an additional Socialist will he
appointed under secretary at the ministry, presumably to help keep a tight rein on
the new Communist appointee.
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The Communists have also agreed to drop their demand for a subcabinet post
'slat would oversee tourism-an appointment which has been strongly opposed by
the hard-hit tourism industry.
Party leaders have stressed that final details of the government reorganization
.ire vet to be worked out, but filling the subcabinet posts in agriculture and tourism
were the main impediments to completing the reorganization that was initiated
sollowing the shift in the political balance on November 25.
The cabinet changes announced by the Greek government on Monday were
mited to the public order and education portfolios, but a Greek official has
indicated that a more extensive reshuffle may occur by mid-year, following a
-alignment of ministerial jurisdictions.
The appointment of the deputy/ speaker of the Parliament, George Stamatis, to
replace the ailing Solon Gikas as minister of public order severed the Caramanlis
qovernment's only remaining tie with the former junta. Gikas had serves! under the
unta in the same capacity and was probably retained initially by Caramanlis to
-eassure the military, a move which provoked considerable criticism from the
+olitical opposition.
The dismissal of Education Minister Panagiotis Zepos and the transfer of the
portfolio to Minister to the Prime Minister George Rallis seem to reflect growing
.:on ern over the poor state of Greek education and leftist gains among high school
nd university students. Leftists and communists swept the recent university-level
student elections. Rallis is one of Caramanlis' most able colleagues and often
mentioned as a potential successor to the prime minister. He is directing the present
ffort to reorganize the cabinet, and will retain his portfolio as Minister to the Prime
Minister, at least for the time being.
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January 7, 1976
President Pinochet has tightened his grip on power by eliminating an important
rival within the army.
After months of friction with Pinochet, General Arellano, chief of the national
defense staff and the probable successor to Pinochet as army command="r, resigned
on January 2. Pinochet had attempted to get rid of Arellano in October ny packing
him off to an ambassadorial post in Spain. Arellano was a leading planner in the
move against Allende, and Pinochet may have feared that Arellano was now plotting
against him. Despite growing criticism of Pinochet among senior military officials,
there is no evidence that such was the case.
The move has nevertheless stirred widespread speculation in Santiago that
Pinochet is in trouble. A British paper has alleged the existence of a letter by ten
Chilean generals demanding that Pinochet step down. This sto:-y appears ir:probable,
and may have been planted by political elements-perhaps the Christian
Democrats-in hopes of weakening and emharrassinn the nnvPrnmPnt
Strains have grown within the junta recently, but they Jo not appear to have
reached the point where Pinochet is immediately threatened. Grumbling is likely to
continue among navy, air force, and carabineros leaders about Pinochet's
overbearing manner and tendency to arrogate authority to himself but it will have
little impact as long as the army su or s the President- I
The longer range threat to Pinochet will hinge on his performance in dealing
with Chile's serious economic problems and its deteriorating international image.
Chile's isolation, in turn, appears to be damaging efforts to brighten the economic
picture and relieve the hardships caused by current austerity measures. If Pinochet is
unable to turn things around on the economic front or misjudges the extent to
which he can impose a personal dictatorship, he may then face greater defiance from
within the armed forces.
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