NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 9, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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Noun-M
MWOMOP
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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Fe ruary 9, 1976
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AGENCY ARCHIVES
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
CHINA: Hua's appointment
major setback for Teng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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LEBANON: Syrians pledge to enforce
past Lebanese- Palestinian accords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Egyptian
mediation efforts unsuccessful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ICELAND-UK: Reykjavik decides not
to break diplomatic relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
Beyond a brief and almost casual acknowledgment of the appointment of Hua
Kuo-feng as acting premier, the Chinese have thus far made no attempt to explain
the move. The acknowledgment was made by listing Hua's new title in a routine
report by the Chinese news agency noting that he had met with a foreign delegation.
Hua has been virtually the only member of the Politburo to engage in such public
functions in the past few weeks.
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earlier than planned once the story broke in a Hong Kong newspaper Saturday
morning.
Peking may have felt it necessary to make news ot the appointment otticial s ig y
The move is obviously a major setback for Teng Hsiao-ping, China's first
deputy premier, who has been acting for Chou En-lai for over a year. Nearly all
Chinese officials in and out of China had long predicted that Teng would succeed
Chou; these predictions were continuing after Chou's death and up through last
week.
Teng's rapid rise to prominence over the past three years rom e poweriess
obscurity of a purged victim of the Cultural Revolution attested to the careful
planning that had gone into the succession arrangements. Each step in Teng's return
to power had the full endorsement of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Teng has not appeared in public since he delivered the eulogy at Chou's funeral
on January 15. The dela in naming him premier suggested that the appointment
had run into trouble
vicious and only thinly vei ed attack on eng
appearing last Friday's People s Daily indicated that the trouble was serious.
The tone of this attack, which was reminiscent of the polemics that
characterized the Cultural Revolution, strongly suggests that the party's left wing,
which was responsible for Terig's initial purge and which has clearly resented his
return to prominence, still retains something of a veto over major appointments-at
least when persons of the symbolic importance of Teng are involved.
We have no indication that Teng has again been purged. Chinese officials
abroad are apparently claiming that Teng remains first deputy premier, and he
presumably retains his posts as armed forces chief of staff, as a member of the
Politburo standing committee, and as vice chairman of the party.
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
The designation of Hua Kuo-feng as "acting" premier indicates that the
problem of the succession to Chou is by no means fully settled. Teng might
eventually get the post on a permanent basis when the National People's
Conference-the body that formally passes on such appointments-next meets. As it
is now constituted, the body is relatively conservative. The odds against Teng's
appointment, however, are now quite long. It may be some time, moreover, before
the conference convenes. Prior to January 1975, the conference had not met for a
decade, largely because of deep-seated quarrels within the party.
It is evident that these quarrels, in large measure a legacy of the Cultural
Revolution, have not been resolved. The residual power of the party's left wing, in
slow decline since 1969, appeared to have been broken in the course of the
anti-Confucius campaign of 1974, which in large measure was designed to pave the
way for Teng's succession to the premiership. The leftists, however, appear to have
seized on the issue of proposed changes in the educational system in the weeks
immediately preceding Chou's death to reopen debate on a series of basic issues, in
particular the succession itself.
Mao doubtless endorsed Hua's appointment as acting premier. This point was
made explicitly in the Hong Kong newspaper story that broke the news of the
appointment. The Chairman may never have been fully comfortable with Teng, with
whom he had major differences in the early 1960s. Mao's explicit backing of Teng at
each step in his return to power, nevertheless, closely associated the Chairman with
the deputy premier, and Mao's image will be further tarnished. If Teng does not
recoup, he would appear to be the latest in the long string of "wrong horses" the
Chairman has backed in China's drawn-out succession struggle.
Although the left will take comfort in the current setback to Teng, the
appointment of Hua is far from a leftist: "victory." Hua entered high-level politics in
Peking in the wake of the fall of former defense minister Lin Piao-a moment when
the left was reeling-and he was denounced in the anti-Confucius campaign for
"suppressing the masses."
Hua was given formal authority in iinternal security matters through his
appointment in January 1975 as minister of security. Hua is capable and affable, but
lacks the wide experience of Teng Hsiao-ping-much less that of Chou En-Iai. He has
no background in foreign affairs, although foreigners who have held discussions with
him have found him generally conversant with major international issues.
The new acting premier ranks with second vice premier Chang Chun-chiao as
the most important of the "middle generation" of China's leaders due to succeed the
old guard who formed the Chinese Communist Party and who are now dying off. He
rose to power as an important provincial figure during the Cultural Revolution. He is
therefore probably more acceptable to the leftists than the old-line party bosses of
whom Teng is the primary symbol.
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin February 9, 1976
Hua's current politics and the fact that hhe is not associated with the excesses of
the Cultural Revolution make him acceptable to the more conservative party
members. He is thus obviously a "compromise candidate," and his position in the
middle of the political spectrum presumably was the primary recommendation for
his appointment.
No major changes in China's domestic policies are expected to result from
Hua's accession as acting premier, although presumably the proposed changes in
educational practices are now in abeyance. Hua has been closely associated with the
recent efforts to upgrade China's agricultural output in preparation for further
modernization of the country's industrial plant; he will doubtless continue to press
this program, which was also closely associated with Teng Hsiao-ping.
Hua is also unlikely to initiate any major changes in China's foreign policy,
particularly while the succession issue remains in doubt. Foreign policy issues,
nevertheless, may well have played a part-albeit subordinate-in the struggle that
led to his appointment. The announcement, only one day before Hua's appointment
as acting premier was revealed, of Richard Nixon's impending visit to China suggests
that the issue of relations with Washington was discussed in the meetings that
followed Chou's funeral.
The unusual handling of the release of the Soviet helicopter crew late in
December may also have been an outgrowth of the backstage maneuvering over the
premiership.
fact that Chou's arrangements for the succession to the office he held for so long did
not hold up for even a month suggests that Mao's arrangements for his own
Although immediate changes in domestic and foreign policies are probably not
in the cards, China's party members are likely to be unsettled by Hua's sudden and
unexpected appointment. This new evidence of instability and division in the upper
ranks of the party will almost certainly have an adverse affect on morale. Indeed, the
succession are likely to be fragile at best:.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
In a communique following Lebanese President Franjiyah's visit to Damascus
on Saturday, Syrian President Asad affirmed that Syria will guarantee Palestinian
respect for past Lebanese-Palestinian agreements restricting fedayeen freedoms in
Lebanon.
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wou pre Ter Mat the past agreements be disregarded completely, but they are
heavily dependent on Syrian support and have been apprehensive that Damascus
would implement more pervasive controls to win a peace settlement in Lebanon.
Damascus probably will follow through on its pledge by continuing its recent
efforts to move units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army into areas
where the fedayeen and the Lebanese Christian militias most often clash. Liberation
Army forces in Beirut probably will try to restrict armed fedayeen to the refugee
camps.
These actions will help to preserve the cease-fire and facilitate political
negotiations at no long-term cost to the fedayeen military position in Lebanon.
They could be easily reversed should Syrian policy toward Lebanon change in the
future.
Asad's promise to control the fedayeen may lead to an early announcement of
a political agreement between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. The Christians, who
have been demanding that the Palestinian question must be settled before any
political reforms can be implemented, now have little excuse for delay.
A Lebanese newspaper reported yesterday that Franjiyah and Asad on
Saturday signed a wide-ranging secret agreement that will be made public after it is
approved by the Lebanese cabinet this week. The accord reportedly provides for a
revised and written national charter to replace the existing unwritten national
covenant, the scheduled withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Army troops from
Lebanon, and the formation of a new cabinet under Prime Minister Karami.
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Arafat and other independent fedayeen leaders
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
Khaddam did tell
newsmen on ri ay tnat Asad and ran,liya , even be tore their meeting in
Damascus, had reached agreement on a political settlement covering "all aspects" of
the Lebanese dispute.
Franjiyah presumably will use the agreement on the Palestinian question in a
final attempt to elicit the backing of all Christian factions for the comprehensive
political settlement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak apparently was unsuccessful in his effort last
week to mediate the dispute between Morocco and Algeria over Spanish Sahara.
Neither Rabat nor Algiers seemed disposed to make concessions. A senior
Moroccan Foreign Ministry official indicated on February 4 that Rabat will resist
any effort that allows Algiers a substantive role in the Sahara issue. The Moroccans
have been insisting on recognition of their sovereignty over Sahara and withdrawal
of Algerian forces, probably meant to include the Polisario guerrillas, as a condition
for any negotiations.
Algeria may have been equally inflexible in presenting unacceptable proposals
through Mubarak for settling the dispute.
Morocco's decision to continue its gradual military sweep in Spanish Sahara
while Egyptian mediation efforts were still going on also contributed to Mubarak's
lack of success. Rabat announced that Moroccan forces occupied the Saharan town
of Tifariti without opposition on February 4.
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 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 9, 1976
Iceland decided on Friday not to break diplomatic relations with Britain.
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson apparently was able to convince his cabinet that a
break would destroy chances for serious negotiations to end the fishing dispute. The
cabinet probably also was influenced by a second offer by NATO Secretary General
i .uns to try to find a solution to the cod war. Luns was instrumental in bringing the
+rwo sides to the negotiating table last month.
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Meanwhile, British trawlermen reportedly have voted by radio to sail into a
fonservation area off the northeast coast of Iceland. The move brought Icelandic
protests that Britain had earlier agreed to stay out of the area between February and
.June. London has acknowledged that the area should be protected, but beginning in
April instead of February.
Although the Icelandic cabinet did not follow through on its threat to break
ti~lations with London, Reykjavik is still under heavy pressure to respond to the
return of the British frigates. The British decision to fish in the conservation area
and
another incident at sea on Saturday have further angered the Icelanders.
Additional incidents at sea could force the cabinet to reconsider its decision.
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