CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 12, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ton Secret
NSA review completed
State Dept. review completed
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 12, 1976
N?_ 678
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 12, 1976
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Moroccan forces
moving on town in Spanish Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA: Interagency
memorandum on Soviet and Cuban aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ZAIRE: Mobutu adjusting policies in
response to Popular Movement's success . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ITALY: New government
to be sworn in today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ANGOLA: Situation report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PORTUGAL: Possible delay in
presidential and legislative elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
PORTUGAL: Reduction of armed
forces may be forthcoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SPAIN-PORTUGAL: Foreign ministers
discuss mutual problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
TURKEY: Budget debate to culminate
opposition's attack on government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
EC-CANADA: Economic and
trade cooperation agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CYPRUS: New round of intercommunal
talks to begin next week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
WEST GERMANY - FRANCE: Exchange agreement . . . . . . . . 13
YUGOSLAVIA-ALBANIA: Relations
continue to deteriorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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 LISBON
PO 4 C; AL
r
Madeira Islands
(Port.)
Canary Islands
(Spain)
-I Ta l--- Tindouf
EL AAI9N
SPANISH
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 12, 1976
Moroccan forces are apparently moving on the Polisario stronghold of Mahbes
in Spanish Sahara.
Although Moroccan officials in Rabat initially told the US embassy that the
town had been occupied without opposition from Algerian forces on Tuesday night,
they were unsure by late yesterday that Moroccan troops had in fact entered the
town. Their uncertainty may indicate that the Moroccan column is deliberately
moving slowly or is encountering resistance either from the Polisario or from
Algerian forces.
The Rabat press, on the other hand, has for some days been hinting at the
possibility that the Algerians were withdrawing, and Rabat's initial assumption that
its troops had met no opposition may indlicate that it has reason to believe the
Algerians have pulled back or are in the process of doing so.
An Algerian withdrawal would significantly reduce the chances of a major clash
between Moroccan and Algerian forces in the Sahara. Algeria will almost certainly,
however, continue its policy of supporting Polisario guerrilla attacks against
Moroccan and Mauritanian forces in the territory.
Meanwhile, Algeria is continuing to push for a referendum on
self-determination for the people of Spanish Sahara. On February 6, Algiers sent a
lengthy memorandum to UN Secretary General Waldheim once again calling for
application of the principle of self-determination through a "free and genuine"
referendum.
The memorandum condemned the tripartite agreement last November turning
over control of the territory to Rabat and Nouakchott, declared Spain still
accountable to the UN as the legitimate, administering power of a non-self-governing
territory, and characterized the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover of the territory as a
blatant act of aggression affecting the peace and stability of the region.
The Algerian memo may be a prelude to an appeal to the Security Council to
discuss the matter. Given the inconclusive outcome of the General Assembly debate
last December-two contradictory resolutions were passed--an appeal to the Council
that the Sahara issue is a threat to international security is Algeria's only remaining
move at the UN.
Waldheim's personal envoy-Sweden's ambassador to the UN-arrived in the
Sahara February 7 on a fact-finding mission, after two days of consultations in
Madrid. He is expected to return home later this week without visiting Morocco,
Mauritania, or Algeria.
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National
ntelligence Bulletin
February 12, 1976
The Moroccans consider the Sahara dispute settled, and are orchestrating the
envoy's visit to support their claim that Saharans already have been consulted
through the territorial assembly. The Algerians are characterizing the UN mission as
evidence that the "Sahara file remains open."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 12, 1976
Following are the key points of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on
Soviet and Cuban aid to the Popular Movement in Angola during January.
The amount of military support provided the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola by the Soviet Union and Cuba increased markedly in January
1976.
Soviet military shipments in January increased somewhat over the late 1975
level. Since January 1, we have confirmed for the first time in Angola such
equipment as T-54 tanks, amphibious vehicles, and pontoon bridges.
We have continued to receive reports that MIG-type jet fighters are in Angola.
There is still a division of views within the US intelligence community, however, as
to whether MIGs are actually present incountry.
(Press photography received since
purports to show one MIG-17 at Luanda.)
the publication of this memorandum
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 12, 1976
President Mobutu is making policy and personnel adjustments in response to
the Popular Movement's increasing success in Angola and Zaire's steadily mounting
,olitical and economic problems.
Mobutu, who has supported the rival National
ront or more an ten years, is anxious to put Angola behind him by arranging an
.Accommodation with the Popular Movement.
Last month, Mobutu tried to get Mozambique President Machel to act as an
uitermediary in setting up such talks, but Machel refused. He reportedly told
i`M1obutu's representative that he would not attempt to mediate between Zaire and
site Popular Movement until both parties had made "conciliatory gestures."
Mobutu realized some time ago that the National Front was collapsing as an
"ifective military contender in Angola. Moreover, the poor showing by Zairian
orces sent to support the Front raised serious doubts in his mind about his army's
oOility to deal with any significant internal disturbances in Zaire. Mobutu is aware
that exiled Zairian dissidents are seeking the Popular Movement's support for an
=attempt to mount an insurgency from Angola aimed at overthrowing him.
Early this month, Mobutu signaled his intention to break with past policies by
carrying out a broad government reshuffle. He dropped his foreign minister and
chief defense adviser, reallocated economic responsibilities within his cabinet, and
lightened the structure of the official party's political bureau.
Changing foreign ministers gives Mobutu some flexibility to move away from
his hardline policy toward the Popular Movement. The change of defense advisers
may also be a signal to Neto that Mobutu is prepared to forgo any further military