NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010040-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 25, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 25, 1976
CONTENTS
WESTERN EUROPE -AFRICA: Common
EC policy announced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ICELAND: Vote of confidence for
Prime Minister Hallgrimsson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
UK: Leftists attack proposed cuts
in public spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHINA: No measurable changes
in foreign policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
BANGLADESH-INDIA: Water diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CUBA: Military personnel
reported in Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ARGENTINA: President resists
demands for cabinet change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ANNEX: Brezhnev's Speech at Party Congress
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 25, 1976
WESTERN EUROPE - AFRICA
The EC foreign ministers have announced a common EC policy toward
southern Africa. It is implicit in the declaration earlier this week condemning foreign
military intervention in Angola.
The declaration, clearly aimed at Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola,
condemned "any form of action by any state aimed at the creation of a sphere of
influence in Africa." The statement, which a British representative called one of the
strongest ever agreed upon by the Nine, upheld the right of black Rhodesians and
Namibians to independence and self-determination, condemned apartheid in South
Africa, and reaffirmed support for actions taken by the Organization of African
Unity in southern Africa.
The ministers agreed that Angola is eligible to join the Lome trade and aid
accord, which now links 46 developing states to the EC. The Italian and West
German foreign ministers have publicly invited the Angolans to apply for
membership.
Paris agreed to the foreign ministers' declaration despite initial reservations. It
recognized that any footdragging, following the disarray provoked in the EC last
week by France's early recognition of Angola, would bring loud outcries from the
Dutch, the Danes, and the West Germans.
Before the meeting of the EC foreign ministers this week, the UK, Ireland,
Luxembourg, and Norway had expressed an interest in increasing EC assistance to
Zambia and Zaire, but no new commitments were made. The Community has
already allocated about $120 million to Zaire and $50 million to Zambia, but these
funds are not expected to begin to flow until the end of this year.
The question of providing additional EC assistance was referred to an experts
committee, and a concrete proposal is expected later this spring.
Several EC members are considering bilateral aid to Angola, Zaire, and Zambia.
Over $30 million in bilateral assistance for Zambia has already been scheduled this
year by West Germany, the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands. Bilateral assistance to
Zaire, the bulk of which has come from France and Belgium, has been less
substantial
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 25, 1976
The Icelandic Parliament voted 41 to 18 yesterday in support of Prime Minister
Hallgrimsson's handling of the cod war issue with the UK. The vote apparently split
along government-opposition lines, indicating that Hallgrimsson had the backing of
both parties in the ruling coalition.
The opposition-which includes the Communist-dorninated People's
Alliance-favors stronger measures, including pulling out of NATO.
The vote of confidence very likely was the result of Hallgrimsson's tough
attitude toward the British so far. The governing coalition parties may be divided
over the next step, but by winning parliamentary approval, Hallgrimsson may now
be inclined to resume negotiations with the British, who have offered to modify
their position.
Iceland, however, is unlikely to conclude an agreement that is for more than a
few months duration, certainly not much beyond the UN Law of the Sea
Conference this spring, which is expected to approve in principle a 200-mile limit for
coastal states.
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The British government's proposed cuts in public spending, primarily in social
programs, are drawing the heavy criticism expected from left-wing Laborites. The
leftists will carry their attack to the House of Commons, but it is unlikely they will
defeat the proposals.
Members of the left wing call the reductions a repudiation of the party's
election manifesto. Joan Lestor, a junior minister in the education department, has
resigned in protest, and at least one prominent left-wing member of Parliament has
threatened not to support the government when the spending issue comes to a vote.
Other members of the left reportedly are urging the party's leftist-dominated
National Executive Committee to schedule a special party conference to debate the
proposed budget cuts.
Despite their anger with Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey's proposals, the
leftists probably will not try to bring clown the government. Labor, with 315 votes,
has a razor-thin majority in the House. One leftist declared that he did not intend to
do anything that would help Margaret Thatcher become prime minister.
Even if it chooses an openly rebellious course, the left will need the complete
support of the conservative party to topple Prime Minister Wilson. The Tories have
adopted more aggressive tactics recently, but they still seem reluctant to bring down
the government.
Wilson's position may be more seriously threatened if the leftists are able to
exploit the bitterness felt by public sector union members, who face large-scale
layoffs if all the government's proposals are implemented. These unions, plus
construction workers who are also affected, represent about one-fifth of the Trades
Union Congress' membership, and their anger could be translated into trouble for
the government.
Despite labor's unhappiness with some of Wilson's policies, the Prime Minister
continues to enjoy the general support of leaders of the Trades Union Congress. The
government will be under growing union pressure, however, to soften its relatively
stringent economic policies as unemployment continues to rise
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 25, 1976
Neither Hua Kuo-feng's appointment as acting premier nor the recent attacks
on high government officials has had any measurable impact on Chinese foreign
policy as yet.
During his first official meetings with foreign delegations, Hua said that there
would be no changes in foreign policy. He also said China intended to continue its
struggle against the USSR. Chinese media have reflected this, denouncing the USSR
for its involvement in Angola, its continued arms buildup, and its so-called
hegemonic aspirations in Europe.
Moscow was cautiously optimistic about Hua's appointment because he is not a
prominent anti-Soviet spokesman. Hua's speech at the banquet honoring former
president Nixon, however, praised relations with the US and characterized the
Soviets as "imperialists." Nixon's invitation to visit China on the eve of the 25th
Soviet party congress serves as a signal to Moscow that the Chinese
leadership-including Hua-values its relations with Washington.
Since Chairman Mao has established China's basic foreign policy line and
long-term goals, these are unlikely to change as long as he remains influential. So far,
the anti-rightist campaign inside China has been directed solely at domestic policies
associated with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and not his foreign policy goals.
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Farakka Barrage-A Growing Issue
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Dacca's concern over a water diversion project by India is emerging as an issue
potentially more serious than New Delhi's alleged complicity in dissident attacks
into Bangladesh.
Dacca has delivered a series of diplomatic notes to New Delhi dealing with the
adverse effects of the Farakka Barrage water diversion project being carried out in
India's West Bengal state. The $200-million plus project was begun in the 1960s and
is designed to flush siltation from the Hooghly River by diverting water from the
Ganges. Former president Mujibur Rahman's government reached an interim
agreement with New Delhi in 1974 on the division of the water, but this has lapsed.
Bangalese officials contend that India's projects threaten crops and navigation
along their portion of the river and could eventually create a serious salinity
problem. Dacca wants the project halted before starting talks on the issue as
suggested by New Delhi in a note on February 11. India has rejected the condition
as unacceptable.
At issue is the division of the Ganges water during the dry season, which New
Delhi maintains is traditionally between mid-March and mid-May. Dacca disagrees.
The Bengalee foreign secretary told the US ambassador on February 24 that the
project has, in effect, artificially induced a longer-November to May-"lean"
period. India has suggested aiding the flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh with a water
diversion project involving the flow from the Brahmaputra River, but Dacca
considers this solution impractical.
Both sides-first India and Pakistan, then India and Bangladesh-have
postponed establishing a formula for the division of the waters for a variety of
reasons since the project started. New Delhi is not likely to endanger the success of
the project now by giving in to demands for more water than it thinks the Bengalees
need. Bilateral discussion of the issue might not even occur unless Dacca moderates
its call for a halt to the diversion, but there are signs that it will.
Recent talks between Indian and Bengalee border security officials ended with
New Delhi's representatives denying Dacca's charges of complicity in late January
dissident attacks into Bangladesh. Bengalee officials feel that the real test of the
discussions will be whether incidents on the border cease.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 25, 1976
Reports concerning the presence of Cuban military personnel in Mozambique
suggest an eventual Cuban role against white-ruled Rhodesia.
he US defense attache in
Malawi, quoting a usually reliable source, indicated that a Cuban military force had
arrived in Mozambique to provide security for the governmental leadership, but a
later role might be in support of Rhodesian nationalists attempting to topple the
Smith government. Mozambique's minister of information, en route to the 25th
Soviet party congress in Moscow, however, has denied there are Cubans in
Mozambique.
Should Havana, with Moscow's backing, eventually consider action against the
Smith government in Rhodesia, Mozambique's territory would probably have to be
used as a staging area. As in Angola, however, the Cubans and Soviets would have to
invest considerable time, materiel and leadership to build a force capable of
challenging the Smith re ime.
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President Peron is resisting pressure from within her party for more cabinet
changes and the removal of her controversial advisers. Many Peronist leaders have
now joined other civilian groups in believing that only by purging her administration
can Peron avert a military coup that could well eliminate civilian participation in the
top ranks of the government.
Peron late Monday underscored her resistance by refusing to accept
resignations offered by her entire cabinet and reiterating her confidence in them.
the move came shortly after Peronist leaders had met with the President to demand
the removal of her advisers and the adoption of new economic policies.
The Peronist national council-the central organ of the party-supported the
demands, but only after a bitter debate that resulted in the resignation of six
members loyal to the President. The six accused their colleagues of betraying Peron
and advocating "deceitful questioning of the cabinet and government policies." The
council's action is a particularly serious blow, coming on the heels of a resolution by
the leaders of organized labor which limited their public support to the institution
of the presidency, rather than to defend the incumbent by name as they had done
before.
Despite Peron's refusal so far to give in, it is unlikely that she can long
-withstand the combined pressure of labor, politicians, and now her own party.
Indeed, the President only narrowly headed off a congressional move last week to
declare her "unable" to discharge her duties. Congress is scheduled to reconvene
today to consider such a declaration again.
At least a token concesssion to her opponents, such as the sacrifice of one or
more cabinet ministers, appears inevitable if Peron is to avoid being forced into
temporary or permanent retirement.
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National Intelligence Builletin
February 25, 1976
JAPAN-PLO: The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will announce next
month the opening of an information office in Tokyo. Negotiations with the
Japanese government have been under way for some time, but agreement was
reached only after the PLO dropped its insistence on quasi-diplomatic status. Among
important Western nations, the PLO currently has information offices in France and
Sweden, as well as spokesmen attached to Arab diplomatic missions and Arab
League delegations in other West European capitals.
USSR-ANGOLA: The first official Soviet military reception to be held on
Angolan soil reportedly occurred in Luanda on Monday. According to a Western
press report citing the Journal de Angola, Soviet officers in Luanda held the affair in
honor of the 58th anniversary of the founding of the Red Army. Representatives
from the Cuban armed forces were in attendance, along with most of the officials of
the Peoples Republic of Angola. Its President Neto, in a speech to the gathering,
noted that this was the first opportunity to publicly thank the Soviet army and the
Soviet people for their assistance, which "we shall not forget neither now nor in the
future." He also expressed appreciation for the aid provided by Cuba, Guinea-Bissau,
and Guinea.
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National. Intelligence Bulletin
February 25, 1976
General Secretary Brezhnev gave an impressive performance delivering his
report to the Soviet party congress yesterday. His stamina, enunciation, and aura of
command seemed better than at any time during the last two years, according to the
US embassy. Brezhnev spoke for more than five hours and gave unusual attention to
foreign policy. He showed the most emotion in delivering the passages on the "crisis
of capitalism" and the international Communist movement.
The foreign policy portion of Brezhnev's report was realistic and tough-minded.
Its essential theme was one of continuity, that the USSR's detente policy has been
successful and will continue into the future. Thus, Brezhnev pointed to the
"everlasting significance" of the Soviet "peace program" over the past five years,
expressed satisfaction with the communist camp's strengthened position and
characterized detente-despite its problems-as the leading trend in world affairs.
The report also gave evidence, however, of current Soviet preoccupations,
particularly the difficulty detente has run into in the West. Brezhnev pulled few
punches regarding the "complications" of Soviet policy. He did not dwell on the
forces opposing detente, but there were few aspects of Soviet policy that he
addressed in which he did not mention the negative side of the ledger.
Brezhnev offered a measured assessment of relations with the US, balancing the
bilateral agreements, exchanges, and cooperative endeavors of the past five years
with reminders of problems clouding prospects for the future.
The Soviet party chief cited a reduced danger of nuclear war as the "main
outcome" of the "generally positive" development of relations in recent years,
acknowledging in this regard the importance of past summit meetings with
Presidents Nixon and Ford. He rated the prospects for further bilateral progress,
"provided realism prevails," as good.
Brezhnev repeated the familiar Soviet complaint that "influential forces" in the
US are seeking to hamper detente, and derided the notion of a Soviet threat to the
US. The General Secretary gave no ground on Angola and even argued that it was US
"intervention" there that had strained US-Soviet relations. He directed his sharpest
criticism at "discriminatory" US trade measures.
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On SALT, Brezhnev pressed for implementing the Vladivostok agreement of
late 1974 but made no prediction as to the outcome of the current negotiations. He
attempted to portray the US as being not fully committed to arms control because it
rejected Soviet proposals to ban Trident, the B-1, and similar, unspecified Soviet
systems. In like vein, he invited the US to join the USSR in not establishing military
bases in the Indian Ocean.
Brezhnev spoke at considerable length about MBFR, providing substantial
details of the reduction proposal presented privately by the Warsaw Pact on
February 17. While expressing continued interest in reaching an agreement, he gave
no hint of any willingness to modify the basic Warsaw Pact negotiating approach.
Brezhnev's treatment of Peking was short and tough. He said almost nothing
about bilateral relations, and even omitted standard references to an eventual
rapprochement. He went a step further in etching the apostasy of Maoism, saying
that it was no longer just "incompatible" with Marxism-Leninism, but was now
"hostile" to it.
Brezhnev made no effort to send a signal that the USSR would be reasonable if
more sympathetic leaders came to power in Peking. On the contrary, he implied that
the Chinese would have to make all the concessions.
With respect to the rest of Asia, Brezhnev said the usual positive things about
the "victory" in Indochina, had many good words for India, and suggested that
China has replaced the US as the main obstacle to better Soviet-Japanese relations.
Brezhnev also gave no hint of compromise on the Northern Territories issue that
long has plagued Soviet-Japanese relations. He again floated the Asian security
scheme, but in a muted way.
Western Europe
Brezhnev's assessment of relations with the West European countries was
generally positive, but far from euphoric. Favorable mention was made of bilateral
relations with France, West Germany, and the UK, which had been under something
of a cloud in Soviet eyes. Brezhnev also spoke of positive developments in Portugal,
Greece, and Spain.
The Soviet party chief spoke at some length about the contributions of the
European security agreement, but without great enthusiasm. He pledged Soviet
efforts to implement the agreement but alleged that the West is using the agreement
to make mischief in the "socialist" community.
Brezhnev had good things to say about the contribution of the West in placing
West Berlin on the back burner, but he also gave voice to continuing Soviet
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 25, 1976
unhappiness over Bonn's efforts to strengthen its ties with the city. Additional
dissatisfaction with the Schmidt government was evident when Brezhnev
embellished his otherwise standard criticism of revanchist and anti-detente forces by
saying that these elements seem to be influencing certain aspects of West German
policy.
In discussing the Middle East, Brezhnev introduced two new themes in an
otherwise standard litany:
--He said a way should be found to end the arms race in the region, adding,
however, that discussions on arms limitations could not precede a general
settlement.
--He said the UK and France could join the US and USSR as guarantors of any
Middle East settlement. This may be an attempt to prevent any effort to have
all of the UN Security Council members, including China, involved as
guarantors.
Brezhnev was restrained on Israel, saying several times that Moscow wants to
ensure the security of all Middle East states and asserting that the USSR has no
prejudices against any of them. He touched briefly on the Kremlin's problems with
Egyptian President Sadat, singling out for attack "certain forces" who are
undermining Moscow-Cairo ties, but reaffirming Soviet interest in good relations
with Egypt.
Brezhnev gave considerable emphasis to "proletarian internationalism," a
phrase that connotes Soviet leadership of the Communist world. This clearly was
meant as a retort to the French, Italian, and other parties that have been making
increasing efforts to emphasize their "independence" of Moscow. Brezhnev also
stated unequivocally that there can be no compromise on views that contradict
Communist ideology. This is probably a reference to the French party's abjuring the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" canon.
Brezhnev referred to regional party conferences indicating that Moscow intends
to press ahead on the long-delayed European communist party conference. He even
raised the idea of another world communist party conference.
On the controversial question of proper Communist tactics, Brezhnev's
treatment of Portugal and Chile suggested that he was attempting to keep both the
hard and soft lines happy. Thus, he said that the "tragedy" in Chile should not be
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National Intelligence BUilletin February 25, 1976
interpreted to mean that the peaceful route to revolution is not appropriate if
conditions permit. Chile did demonstrate, however, that a revolution must know
how to defend itself.
Brezhnev referred to the "contradictory" picture in Portugal but also expressed
"warm solidarity" with the Communists there. The tilt seemed to be toward the
hard line; perhaps it is no coincidence that Portuguese Communist leader Cunhal and
Fidel Castro received the biggest ovations among the foreign dignataries at the
congress.
Eastern Europe
Brezhnev's treatment of Eastern Europe was standard Soviet fare. He did make
the unusual statement that Soviet Politburo sessions invariably have dealt, in one
way or another, with questions involving the "fraternal countries." Brezhnev
evidently was laboring to make the point that Eastern Europe is important and is
receiving considerable attention; actually, his report said less about Eastern Europe
than had the one in 1971, when Czechoslovakia was still a prime political issue.
Brezhnev reasserted past domestic policies, lauded leadership successes, and was
low-key in defending traditional ideological positions. Some of his remarks seemed
intended to counter the effects of Western criticism.
Brezhnev's review of economic performance and plans stressed the same themes
outlined to the USSR Supreme Soviet in December-a general disappointment in last
year's results, especially in the agricultural and consumer sectors, and a promise to
do better in the current five-year plan period (1976-80). There was no evidence of
new initiatives or changing priorities. Rather, he re-emphasized:
--investment in the re-equipment of plants rather than new construction;
--giving close attention to improving the quality of consumer goods;
--improving management and planning, emphasizing territorial development and
inter-industry ties;
--continuation of the "Leninist" agricultuarl policy;
--speeding the introduction of science and technology;
--expansion of foreign trade-exports to emphasize industrial goods content and
imports to contribute directly to improved economic efficiency.
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Brezhnev went into unusual detail about the activity of the Politburo and the
party secretariat, focusing on difficult situations in which he had triumphed. In
discussing the Central Committee plenum meeting of May 1972, which approved
former president Nixon's visit despite the course of the war in Vietnam, Brezhnev
hinted that there was opposition at this "turning point" and noted how correct the
decision proved to be. He also mentioned the agricultural difficulties that year and
his role and that of the party in overcoming many of them.
In the ideological sphere, Brezhnev as usual adopted a centrist line. He said
detente requires more ideological work and vigilance, and he praised the secret
police, especially in countering hostile intelligence services. He also noted that
detente provides better conditions for spreading "socialist" ideas abroad. He avoided
criticism of the artistic intelligentsia, praised their accomplishments, and warned
against using administrative methods to deal with problems in this sphere.
Brezhnev rebutted attacks on Soviet violations of democratic rights, labeling
harmful anything that would weaken Soviet society. On the other hand, he made a
rare reference to the 20th party congress of 1956, the de-Stalinization congress.
Finally, Brezhnev referred to the long-term plan (1976-90) and the new
constitution, which he had earlier promised for the Congress. He said work was
continuing on both, but did not say when they would be ready. As he has in the
past, he also mentioned the urgency of reorganizing economic management, but
again indicated that plans have still not been agreed upon or worked out.
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