NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010044-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: February 27, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
February 27, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
PORTUGAL: Agreement to
return to civilian rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ROMANIA: Ceausescu asserts
independence in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
BOLIVIA: Rumbles
of discontent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ASEAN: Gains at
recent summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ALBANIA: Concentration
camp atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SPANISH SAHARA: Spain to transfer
administrative control tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
UK-RHODESIA: British interest in
peaceful settlement of majority rule issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ANNEX: Castro and Cuba's Foreign Policy
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 27, 1976
Political parties and military leaders yesterday signed an agreement to return
the country to civilian rule after nearly two years of military domination.
The final agreement is a victory for the non-communist political parties, which
last year were forced to consent to military control over politics for at least three
years. The new pact, under debate since December, confirms the shift to the right
that has taken place since a leftist military uprising was put down by conservative
officers on November 25.
The last-minute delay over the addition of a preamble that non-communist
party leaders rejected as "Marxist" was resolved on Wednesday when military
authorities agreed to strike the entire passage.
Negotiations had earlier snagged on the centrist Popular Democrats' insistence
that presidential elections follow closely on legislative elections. The final draft
specifies that a new president will be chosen by direct popular election not less than
two months after the national assembly is selected. The assembly will be elected on
April 25, which means the presidential election could take place in late June.
The complete text of the document. is not yet available, but preliminary reports
indicate that the president will be given wide-reaching powers to oversee the
parliamentary system of government. Several political parties are expected to
support the candidacy of a military officer to prevent dissension among the parties
and to smooth the transition to a completely civilian government.
The only political responsibilities left to the military will be to advise the
president and to guarantee the operation of the elected government. The
Revolutionary Council, which has been the top decision-making body for nearly a
year, will be limited to questioning the constitutionality of laws, advising the
president if he decides to dissolve the legislature, and authorizing declarations of
war. The Council will, however, retain chief jurisdiction over internal military
affairs.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 27, 1976
President Ceausescu's markedly independent speech to the Soviet party
congress yesterday, together with his general behavior in Moscow and his abrupt
return to Bucharest later in the day, will almost certainly heighten tensions in
Soviet-Romanian relations.
In a sharp departure from the tone set by speeches of the other ruling party
first secretaries, Ceausescu insisted that equality of rights and mutual advantage
should govern relations between communist countries. He thus relegated
"proletarian internationalism"-the codeword for Soviet leadership of international
communism-to second place.
In addition. Ceausescu failed to mention anti-Sovietism and Maoism and called
for the establishment of truly new relations of equality among nations
"everywhere." He said solidarity in the world movement must be based on the
Observance of each party's right to develop its political line independently.
he
Romanian leader planned to return to Bucharest to attend to business. He will
reportedly stay home until March 3, when he will return for the final days of the
congress. Other members of the Romanian delegation, however, remain in Moscow.
This highly unusual departure from a Soviet party congress by a ruling party
leader suggests Ceausescu's deep dissatisfaction with Moscow. It could also indicate
that he encountered stiffer criticism from his Soviet hosts than he had expected.
his departure suggests
instead a knowledge of events with which he does not want to be associated. For
example, he may fear concerted attacks by Moscow's loyalist allies on Maoism and
on the "independent" parties. In addition, he may be chafing under pressure to join
in a coordinated approach to detente and for a discrediting of Western attacks on
Moscow's poor performance in human rights.
Ceausescu has steadfastly avoided Moscow's call to castigate anti-Sovietism. He
may also wish to be absent when Premier Kosygin addresses the question of
economic integration within CEMA.
Ceausescu's displeasure with the congress proceedings first became evident on
Wednesday, when he chose to tour a factory in Moscow instead of attending the
congress. Should Soviet-sponsored rhetoric get hotter, Romania's other delegates
ilso may choose to see the sights of the Soviet capital rather than sit on their hands
,it the congress.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
In a further show of independence on Wednesday, Ceausescu met in the
Romanian embassy with the entire Yugoslav delegation, headed by Stane Dolanc,
President Tito's number-two man in the party. Belgrade described the talks as a
"warm, friendly, and cordial" discussion on bilateral and international topics. The
two delegations probably used this meeting to coordinate their opposition to several
aspects of current Soviet policy, ranging from Moscow's message for a European
communist party conference to its criticism of independent parties at the congress.
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Recent actions by President Ban2:er's government against alleged coup plotters,
coupled with agitation in the universities and labor sector, suggest that the relative
tranquility of the past year is ending.
Since late January, hundreds have been arrested on charges of subversive
activity. Several unionists, university students, and former army officers have been
exiled to Paraguay and Chile. Student protests have led to clashes with police and
the closing of at least four universities.
To demonstrate displeasure over the first closure and as a gesture supporting
the students, several thousand miners staged a strike on February 21. The university
scene had become quieter yesterday with many students returning to classes, but
pockets of discontent remain that could spark recurrent clashes with authorities.
These developments are bound to encourage further plotting among the exiles
and will quite likely raise new rumors of such activity inside Bolivia. Banzer is far
from popular, but he still controls the military, thereby ensuring his continued
tenure for at least the immediate future.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
At the recently concluded summit meeting of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, the chiefs of state of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and
the Philippines were able to sidestep conflicting national outlooks and personal
animosities and produce a joint communique, a declaration of concord, and a treaty
of amity and cooperation.
All three documents call for greater intra-regional economic and cultural
cooperation, but none of them spells out any concrete proposals.
The closest the ASEAN heads of state came to agreeing on a specific course of
action was in the economic arena. The five countries agreed to explore cooperative
means for increasing food production, to provide priority access to oil and other
commodities, and to establish complementary industrial projects in each country.
Efforts to implement these agreements will be attempted at a "mini-summit" of
economic ministers to be held in Malaysia in early March.
The summit was careful not to project ASEAN as a military or security pact.
The declaration of concord calls on each nation to take steps to assure that the area
will become a "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" and calls on each nation to
cooperate on security matters "on a non-ASEAN basis" through bilateral
agreements.
The summit called for the creation of mediation machinery to negotiate
disputes between member states. This machinery, however, can be brought into
play only through the agreement of the disputants themselves-an arrangement
necessitated by Malaysia's concern that the Philippines could use the new amity
treaty to resurrect its claim to Malaysia's north Borneo state of Sabah. Until this
condition was agreed to at the last minute, the summit itself, according to some
reports, was in jeopardy of being canceled.
The ASEAN members, still uneasy over the consequences of the communist
rake-overs in Indochina, did not take up the issue of expanding ASEAN's
membership. They attempted to avoid any impression of hostility to the
Indochinese states, however, by inviting other states of Southeast Asia to sign the
amity treaty.
Vietnam has been quick to react to this gesture. Echoing the themes of
Vietnamese pre-summit commentary, a Hanoi broadcast on February 26 declared
that if the ASEAN states truly want to improve relations with other countries in
`southeast Asia, they must "escape from the influence of the US imperialists,
dismantle US military bases...and adopt a truly cooperative and friendly attitude."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
During the past few weeks the situation in Albania has deteriorated to the
point where diplomats in Tirana say the country resembles a concentration camp.
The massive purges of recent months, the increasing stridency of Tirana's
propaganda, and the regime's drive to tighten ideological controls at home have all
combined to raise the ever-present xenophobia to what may be an all-time high.
Ordinary citizens are reportedly afraid even to exchange greetings with foreigners.
In addition, the normally secretive Albanians are hastily building bomb shelters
and antiaircraft bunkers around the capital, and are making no effort to camouflage
their activities. They have even requested embassies to build bomb shelters in their
compounds. The French ambassador has noted that Albania is also in the midst of a
"frenzied" attempt to build a chain of bunkers along the Adriatic coast.
These frenetic preparations bear the unmistakable stamp of party boss Enver
Hoxha; they may well be designed to ensure the survival of his policies once he is
gone.
In recent months, there have been recurring rumors--to which diplomatic
observers in Tirana have lent substance-that both Hoxha and his second-in-
command, Premier Mehmut Shehu, are in poor health. In fact, some Western
diplomats doubt that the 67-year-old Hoxha will be around much longer.
Purging the ranks may have been the first step in his preparations for the
eventual transfer of power to his successors. The process began a year and a half ago,
and between the summer of 1974 and the spring of 1975, the top men in the
Ministry of Defense were removed. There is still no reliable information on the
causes for this action, and no official explanation has ever been provided by Tirana.
Subsequently, three top economic ministers were fired, two of whom had also
been long-standing members of the Politburo. It now seems clear that all these
officials were caught up in the first wave of a massive onslaught against
"bureaucracy." The burden of this attack appears to have centered on the
proliferation of administrative staffs in the ministries, local government, and other
institutions such as the mass media.
Another critical aspect of the purges was the corresponding endorsement of
"rotation of cadres" as an important remedy for the ills of bureaucracy. The net
effect, of course, is to create a kind of permanent instability in the bureaucracy in
which it would be very difficult for any kind of opposition to coalesce.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 27, 1976
The distrust of bureaucracy, the dislike of any other departures from a
one-class society composed of rotating nonspecialists, and the unsophisticated
doctrine of self-reliance in the economy are all dear to Hoxha. While dismissals in
the military, economic, and cultural fields indicate that dissenting views exist, the
evidence also strongly suggests that all newcomers must come from the party
apparatus and that they must be personally loyal to Hoxha.
The subsequent steps in the process-tightening control at home and
deliberately fostering the impression of imminent foreign intervention-seem
ultimately aimed at Moscow.
It seems evident that Tirana continues to have an almost paranoid fear of the
Soviet Union-a fear that has increased sharply since 1974, when pro-Soviet
cominformists were discovered in neighboring Yugoslavia. Tirana continues to reject
Soviet overtures for closer bilateral ties, although it is fairly certain that Moscow
would be willing to extend substantial aid to Albania in order to improve relations.
The Soviet Union has several reasons for desiring to reestablish its influence in
Albania. There would be important strategic ramifications if the USSR were to
regain the use of port facilities on the Adriatic that it has been denied since 1960.
Moscow would also have the satisfaction of dealing a blow-albeit hardly a major
one-to Peking, which has been able to exploit Albanian hostility toward the Soviet
Union. More important, Moscow would also obtain another pressure point that
could be applied to Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.
To what extent any policies and doctrines will change in a post-Hoxha regime is
still unclear, but it is doubtful they would remain the same. China's relative
indifference to Albania's economic plight may have contributed to Tirana's
increasingly isolationist stance, but a new Albanian leadership is hardly likely to do
an abrupt about-face and accept tutelage under the Yugoslavs or even the more
distant Soviet Union.
It is quite possible, however, that there could be a reconciliation with the rest
of Communist Europe that could change the political contours of the Balkans and
cause concern in Belgrade and Bucharest. This would also mean that the Warsaw
Pact would be closer to having an outlet on the Adriatic.
In the meantime, in the midst of the uproar he has created, Hoxha seems intent
on projecting an image of renewed unity within the party leadership. In
mid-January, the entire hierarchy turned out at the Chinese embassy to offer
condolences on the death of Chou En-lai, and again in mid-February the hierarchy
was in attendance for the Albanian People's Assembly session on the state plan and
budget.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
Spain's role as co-administrator of Spanish Sahara under the tripartite
agreement it concluded with Morocco and Mauritania formally ends tomorrow.
The legal status of the territory will remain contentious, however, because
Spain insists that its transfer of administrative control does not resolve the question
of sovereignty. Algeria, which has rejected the tripartite agreement, still demands a
referendum on self-determination and continues to support Polisario Front guerrillas
seeking independence for the territory.
Madrid has consistently maintained that the sovereignty issue can only be
decided in "consultation" with the people of Spanish Sahara. Although the tripartite
agreement provided for such consultations through the territorial general assembly, a
Spanish official recently indicated Madrid no longer supports this approach. The
official attributed the change to the lack of provision for a UN role and to Rabat's
selection of tribal leaders loyal to Morocco to replace the considerable number of
assembly members who joined the Polisarlo Front. Algerian pressure on Spain
apparently was largely responsible for Madrid's second thoughts on the consultation
process.
The Moroccans, who had argued that the Saharans were consulted via the
territorial assembly last November, nonetheless convened a special meeting of the
assembly yesterday to "express the will of the people." According to a Moroccan
radio broadcast, the assembly "unanimously approved" the tripartite agreement.
Rabat says the session met the requirements for consultations called for in the
resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly last December that in effect
endorsed the tripartite accord. The Moroccans asked UN Secretary General
Waldheim to send an observer and invited territorial assembly members who
defected to the Front to participate in the session.
This latest gambit by Rabat to dispose of the troublesome consultation
provision will satisfy no one but the Moroccans. Waldheim declined to send an
observer, saying that Spain, as the administering power and as a member of the
interim administration under the tripartite agreement, had not been informed of
Morocco's request. A Spanish radio broadcast yesterday indicated Spain was
withdrawing immediately to avoid any association with the Moroccan scheme.
The Algerians, for their part, are working to keep the issue alive at the UN and
hold off international recognition of the Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over. Algiers
will try to exploit the report of a UN envoy who visited Sahara recently on a
fact-finding mission to push again for a referendum on self-determination. At the
same time, the Boumediene government is striving in every available forum to
enhance the political standing of the Polisario Front; this week it was lobbying
at the OAU ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
Arab League Secretary General Riad has ended his mediation mission. He left
Nouakchott yesterday after visits to Algiers and Rabat. Algerian press reports
following Riad's departure from Algeria claimed he had met with Polisario
representatives; if true, he is likely to have received a cold shoulder in Morocco and
Mauritania.
A special British envoy is in Rhodesia to determine if Prime Minister Smith is
prepared to advance quickly toward majority rule. Foreign Secretary Callaghan has
also sent a personal message to black nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo to try to
reassure him that London has no intention of striking a deal with Smith that would
undermine the nationalists' position.
There have been some indications that London would be willing to provide
financial assistance to ease the transition to majority rule if a breakthrough occurred
in the stalled talks between Smith and Nkomo.
The Wilson government would like to see a peaceful settlement, if for no other
reason than to avoid a situation in the future in which it would be under pressure
from some members of the opposition and the media in Britain to aid a repressive
Rhodesian government struggling with a strong guerrilla movement.
Earlier this week, Prime Minister Wilson made clear that London would do
nothing to prop up "a semi-fascist regime" in Salisbury. He did say, however, that
Britain would help "refugees" if the situation in Rhodesia deteriorated sharply.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 27, 1976
USSR: The first known visit by Soviet naval units to a Turkish port is taking
place this week. Two Moma-class hydrographic research ships arrived at Antalya in
southern Turkey on Monday and are expected to stay until tomorrow. US and other
NATO military attaches in Turkey apparently had no advance word of the port call.
Since late 1975 the Soviets have been involved in low key efforts-including a visit
oy Premier Kosygin and an invitation to Turkish officers to observe Soviet military
maneuvers in the Caucasus-to exploit Turkish-US frictions stemming from the US
bases problem. The Turks have been receptive to the Soviet overtures, motivated in
;part by the growing acceptability of detente and in part by a desire to remind the
US that it cannot take Turkey for gran':ed. There is little to suggest that these
developments portend a major change in Turkey's strong ties to the West.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 27, 1976
CASTRO AND CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Cuba's Fidel Castro is a commanding figure among communist party leaders
gathered in Moscow this week. His credentials are strong not only with his
communist counterparts but with the heads of Third World governments and
revolutionary groups.
In Moscow, and later in Eastern Europe, Castro will seek to exploit his new
prestige to win support for his increasingly expansive foreign policy.
On visits to the USSR in the past, Castro was an underprivileged client seeking
Soviet aid. This time, he will consult with Soviet leaders from a position of greater
strength. The Cuban Revolution is more secure and successful. Cuban victories with
the Popular Movement in Angola have underscored the wisdom of his audacious
decision to send a Cuban expeditionary force to Africa.
Castro's credibility in Moscow is probably enhanced by the steps he recently
has taken to accept Soviet orthodoxy. The first congress of the Cuban Communist
Party last December was a major step in the institutionalization of the Cuban
Revolution along lines recommended by Moscow.
In recent weeks, moreover, Havana has abandoned ten years of silence in the
Sino-Soviet dispute by loosing a vicious propaganda barrage against Peking.
Castro's success in improving his position both as a communist and as a Third
World leader will better enable him to carry out his more ambitious foreign policy.
He wants to act as a bridge between the communists and the Third World. Castro is
proud of the diversity of the Cuban populace and its cultural and linguistic affinities
with a number of less developed nations. He seems to believe that in this manner he
can forge a greater convergence of interests between the communists and the Third
World and once again become a major player on the world stage.
Prime Minister Castro is encouraged to undertake a more aggressive foreign
policy because he believes the balance of power has shifted during the last few years.
In public statements during the past year or so, he has used the US failure in
Southeast Asia, the Watergate affair, and revelations about and investigations of the
US intelligence community, to argue that "imperialism" is in eclipse and that
communist and Third World forces have gained the upper hand. Cuban successes in
Angola have strongly reinforced his attitude.
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February 27, 1976
Castro is encouraged by the increasing compatability of Cuban and Soviet
objectives and methods in the Third World. The economic, technical, and security
assistance that Cuban advisers provide the governments of several countries,
including Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia, contributes directly to the fulfillment of both
Cuban and Soviet objectives.
The heightened degree of mutual trust has resulted in increased Soviet
willingness to delegate to the Cubans immediate responsibility for advancing the
objectives of both countries in certain Caribbean and African countries.
Castro appears determined to capitalize on Cuban success in Angola by
continuing to be a major power broker in Africa. At least 12,000 Cuban troops are
believed to be still in Angola, although the fighting has all but ended. Castro may be
keeping them there as a reminder that he is committed to support wars of national
liberation in southern Africa.
The extent of the support Cuba eventually will provide to guerrilla movements
in southern Africa will depend largely on how much of a commitment Castro can
win from the Soviets. The subject will be one of the central topics in his discussions
with Soviet leaders during his stay in Moscow. Osmani Cienfuegos, Cuba's senior
troubleshooter in Africa and the Middle East, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the
regime's top foreign policy official, are in Moscow with Fidel.
Castro will probably seek Soviet backing to begin providing material support
and training to the faction of the African National Council that supports Joshua
Nkomo in his efforts to negotiate a settlement with the Smith government in
Rhodesia. Moscow has long aided the Nkomo faction and may agree to funnel arms
and money through the Cubans.
If there is any truth in reports that Cuban military personnel and Soviet
military equipment have been sent to Mozambique from Angola, then such a
decision may already have been made. Cuban efforts will be hampered, however, by
the poor organization and small size of the group and by the fact that Peking
supports another faction of the Council that is militarily stronger and more active
than Nkomo's.
Initially, the Cubans are likely to confine their efforts on behalf of the
Rhodesian guerrillas to training and organizational areas while seeking to build up
the group's capability. A small number of Cuban advisers may become involved in
guerrilla operations, but it is not likely that regular Cuban troops will enter the
conflict without strong endorsements from Moscow and major African nations.
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Cuba is likely to provide training and material support to the South-West
African People's Organization in concert with the Angolan Popular Movement. The
Cuban assistance would depend here, as in Rhodesia, on a variety of external factors.
On balance, it seems unlikely that in 1-.he next few months Cuban personnel will
become involved other than as advisers with guerrilla units.
Cuban support of the Katangan secessionists who oppose the Mobutu
government in Zaire is possible but less likely than Cuban help in Rhodesia or
South-West Africa. Despite his antipathy for Mobutu-against whom Che Guevara
fought a guerrilla action in 1965-Castro would support a struggle against a
legitimate black African government only in the unlikely event that its opponents
had the overwhelming support of other African countries.
In the longer term, Cuba can be expected to expend considerable energy-both
diplomatic and subversive-against white minority rule in South Africa. The
possibilities for Cuban meddling are more limited there than elsewhere in southern
Africa, but Havana may try to establish and support a guerrilla force-perhaps from
bases in Mozambique.
Despite the triumphant mood of Castro and most of his military commanders
following the success in Angola, few of them have illusions about how much more
difficult and costly a conventional war with South Africa would be.
During 1976 a growing number of Cuban guerrilla advisers are likely to be
assigned to African liberation groups; diverse Cuban aid programs probably will be
expanded; and large numbers of Cuban advisers will work in Angola to help develop
a system modeled on Cuba's. Unless the Neto government objects, a Cuban military
contingent of at least several thousand is likely to remain in Angola both as a
defensive force and to unsettle nearby white minority governments.
In concert with these efforts, Cuban officials and the media will concentrate on
a theme that Castro broached late last year: "Cuba is not just a Latin American
country, but also a Latin African country. African blood flows abundantly in our
veins."
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