NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028900010016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 10, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Department review completed
Top Secret
May 10, 1976
N2 699
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 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
LEBANON: Sarkis' unanimous
election is setback for Jumblatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NAMIBIA: New security
measures announced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ITALY: Party leaders beginning
to plot campaign strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGENTINA: Junta decrees
15-percent wage hike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Signs
of improvement in relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
Ilyas Sarkis was elected president by parliament on Saturday, despite
last-minute efforts by leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt to impede the vote. Sarkis, who
had strong backing from Syria and conservative Christians and Muslims, received the
votes of 66 of the 69 deputies who attended the session.
If Sarkis is able to assume office and the cease-fire does not collapse, his
leadership will provide significant new impetus toward a political solution to the
crisis in Lebanon. He will give added strength to Phalanges leader Pierre Jumayyil,
who in the past often capitulated to the less-flexible positions of President Franjiyah
and Interior Minister Shamun. Sarkis is respected in broader Christian circles and,
unlike most Lebanese politicians, he has few enemies within either the Christian or
Muslim establishments.
The outcome of the balloting in parliament was a major political setback for
Jumblatt, who was able to keep only 29 deputies of the 98-member assembly from
participating in the election. Jumblatt's own choice for the presidency, Raymond
Edde, received no votes.
The US embassy in Beirut has expressed concern that Jumblatt is becoming
increasingly irrational in his campaign to thwart Syrian influence in Lebanon and
that he may be prepared to press his fight on the ground. The fierce fighting in
Beirut on Saturday near Sarkis' hotel and parliament's temporary headquarters,
however, has died down. Several of Jumblatt's aides are frustrated by their inability
to influence him with appeals for moderation. One has described him as capable of
acting without any consideration for the consequences.
Sarkis' victory has given a much-needed boost to Syrian policy in Lebanon and
should strengthen Damascus' hand in dealing with Jumblatt. Over the past month,
Syria had become increasingly frustrated by the elusiveness of a political settlement
and less willing to incur the risks of imposing a solution by sending more of its
troops into Lebanon.
Statements of support for Sarkis by Raymond Edde and the leftist-leaning
Beirut radio just after the election indicate that some of Jumblatt's sympathizers are
prepared to cooperate with Sarkis, if not with Damascus. The support the Syrians
received from Palestinian chief Yasir Arafat in efforts aimed at holding the election
will almost certainly have a sobering effect on Jumblatt's more militant allies, many
of whom rely heavily on the Palestinians for arms and financial support.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
Sarkis has also had frequent personal contacts with Jumblatt over the past
several weeks, apparently in an attempt to arrange further talks. His understanding
of Jumblatt's position and willingness to deal with him directly could be important
ingredients in a formula for a reconciliation.
The Syrians still face many hazards in Lebanon, the most pressing of which is
the smooth transfer of power to Sarkis.
Sarkis contacted Franjiyah immediately after his victory, presumably to discuss
arrangements for the President's resignation. Sarkis' mandate from parliament and
endorsement from Phalanges leader Pierre Jumayyil and other important Christians
should overcome any lingering reluctance on Franjiyah's part to step down. Most
Lebanese expect the transfer of power to take place early this week. They fear it will
be the occasion for a final effort by Jumblatt to block Sarkis.
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NAMIBIA
(SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)
ANGOLA
WALVIS BAYYWalvis Bay
(SOUTH AFRICA)
SOUTH\
AFRICA `
250 Miles
T-J
250 Kilometers
O* Pretoria
1 Maputo
baba e
SWAZILAND
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
South African authorities have announced that a security buffer zone one
kilometer in depth is being established along part of Namibia's border with Angola.
The buffer zone, which is to parallel the border of the Ovamboland homeland, is
intended to help counter sporadic cross-border incursions by guerrillas of the
South-West African People's Organization operating from Angola.
According to Pretoria, all people living in the buffer zone will be resettled. The
South Africans say the new security measures were requested by Ovambo tribal
authorities.
The South Africans will require all those who enter Namibia from Angola to
come through the town of Oshikango. Personnel connected with the Cunene River
project in southern Angola will be permitted to cross at two other points.
The South African government reportedly first considered establishing a
security zone early last fall but decided against it. Since then, however, there have
been a series of small-scale terrorist attacks in northern Namibia that South Africa
blames on the SWAPO guerrillas. The US embassy reports that since late 1975, at
least 17 Ovambo tribesmen have been killed, 21 more abducted, and 10 shops
robbed in the territory.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
Italian party leaders are beginning to plot campaign strategy following the
collapse two weeks ago of the Moro government and President Leone's decision to
dissolve parliament and hold a national election on June 20 and 21. Moro resigned
on April 30, but will stay on in a caretaker status during the campaign.
The Christian Democrats are divided and disoriented. They continue to disagree
among themselves on the question that will be at the center of campaign debate-the
future role of the Communist Party.
No Christian Democrat is calling for actual Communist membership in the
government, but party secretary Zaccagnini and his allies seemed willing, during the
maneuvering prior to the collapse of Prime Minister Moro's government, to grant the
Communists an indirect role in national policy-making. Christian Democratic
conservatives, led by party president Fanfani, will push, however, for a tough
anti-Communist line in the campaign. The Lockheed scandal continues to be a major
problem for the Christian Democrats and overshadows most political issues in the
media.
The campaigns of the Socialists and the Communists have already begun to
take shape. While they will be competing with each other, both are likely to
emphasize that the Christian Democrats are worn out, corrupt, and unresponsive to
the country's needs after more than 30 years in power.
Three of the smaller parties-the Social Democratic, Republican, and
Liberal-are wary of losing seats to the three major parties and have taken tentative
steps toward presenting joint lists of candidates in some constituencies.
Fundamental and persistent differences, however, will make it difficult for them to
maintain a united front through the campaign.
The campaign is almost certain to produce more politically motivated violence
by left- and right-wing extremists operating outside the regular political parties. The
Communists, who seem to be viewed by an increasing number of Italians as the only
party capable of restoring order, appear to be in the best position to benefit
politically if there should be an upsurge of violence during the campaign
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
In an effort to head off trouble from organized labor, Argentina's military
junta has decreed an across-the-board 15-percent pay hike, effective June 1st. The
government has also arrested a number of businessmen accused of price gouging.
The pay increase will be augmented by increases in family allowances. Even so,
workers will not be able to keep pace with inflation, which is running at 30 to 35
percent a month.
The arrest of businessmen is designed to give substance to the junta's earlier
promise to punish anyone who tries to take unfair advantage of its decision to lift
price controls. One of the government's early acts was to remove such controls in an
effort to avert shortages of consumer goods. Among those detained is the local head
of a US-owned firm. The arrests may also be a gesture toward organized labor at a
time when much of the junta's economic policy most directly benefits business.
Although the junta has moved to deprive labor of the political and economic
power it held during the Peron regimes, the government cannot afford to alienate
workers. Even though the unions are now under close government supervision, they
have the potential to be politically disruptive. A highly restive work force would be
difficult, if not impossible, to keep in line without recourse to the repressive tactics
the junta has thus far successfully avoided.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
May 10, 1976
Afghanistan's decision to invite Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto to visit Kabul
is a sign of improvement in relations between the two countries. Relations have been
poor since Mohammed Daoud came to power in Kabul in 1973 and then sharply
increased Afghan agitation on the Pushtunistan issue, a long-standing territorial
dispute between the two countries.
The Pakistanis late last month pledged some $1 million in food and other relief
assistance for victims of a recent earthquake and flooding in Afghanistan. Pakistani
propaganda against Afghanistan has ceased, and, according to the US embassy in
Kabul, the Afghan government appears to have responded by suspending its regular
program of anti-Pakistan radio propaganda on the Pushtunistan issue.
These developments followed a Pakistani initiative to ease tensions with India,
Pakistan's other adversary in the region and a supporter of the Daoud regime.
Bhutto's apparent interest in reducing tensions with his Indian and Afghan
neighbors may have been stimulated by recent signs of a modest improvement in
India's relationship with China, which Pakistan has long viewed as its primary
big-power supporter. Daoud, for his part, may believe that indications of a thaw
between India and Pakistan increase Afghanistan's interest in attempting to reduce
friction with Pakistan, which is stronger militarily.
There has, nonetheless, been no evidence that either side is prepared to make
concessions on the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan has maintained its position that
the two Pakistani border provinces inhabited by the Pushtun and Baluchi ethnic
groups should be granted self-determination or greater autonomy by Islamabad; the
Pakistanis reject this view
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