NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028900010050-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: May 29, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975A028900 0050,.-16
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday May 29, 1976 CI NIDC 76-L23C
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday May 29, 1976.
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The NID Cable is for the purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam traveled to Libya yes-
er ay, apparently to discuss a final version of a political
agreement the Libyans want to arrange with Syria, Iraq, and Al-
geria. Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat
is also in Tripoli, and presumably would also sign such an ac-
cord.
I I Serious negotiations began when Libyan Prime Minister
Ja u went to Syria and Iraq two weeks ago. Jallud was seeking
to mediate Syria's disputes with Libyan-backed leftist forces
in Lebanon and with the rival Baathist government in Iraq.
Damascus recently has been trying to counter radical
Arab criticism of its policies by portraying its actions in Leb-
anon as defending Palestinian interests. Khaddam would probably
endorse an accord pledging the support of the four states to the
Palestinian cause, or to generalities about Arab cooperation
against Israel.
Syria would hope such an accord would keep Arafat from
moving closer to Egypt, and help elicit substantial Libyan fi-
nancial aid apparently promised during Jallud's visit.
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We believe, however, that Damascus is not prepared to
alter its position on basic issues such as those involved in
Middle East peace negotiations. As a result any agreement reached
with the radical Arabs is likely to dissolve quickly, and is un-
likely to solve Syria's financial or foreign policy problems.
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The foreign ministers of the 17 nonaligned countries
that function as the executive body of the nonaligned movement
open a 4-day meeting in Algiers Sunday.
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The ministers will complete work on an agenda for the
August nonaligned summit in Colombo and discuss the political
and economic statements to be issued there.
Algeria will undoubtedly use the meeting in Algiers
to try to assure that its own generally radical orientation
continues to dominate nonaligned positions. It has been the
leader of the nonaligned states since the last summit, in Al-
giers in September 1973. Algeria theoretically will hand over
this role to Sri Lanka at the August meeting.
Colombo, as host, has been the principal drafter of
the declarations to be submitted to the summit in August. Al-
though these documents are reported to be relatively moderate
in tone, the Sri Lankans have no authority to refuse to in-
clude extreme resolutions in the final declaration.
The more radical nonaligned states--such as Algeria,
Cuba, and Iraq--have already indicated they intend to push in
Algiers for including certain controversial issues on the sum-
mit agenda, even though this is likely to lead to sharp debate.
I IPuerto Rico and Panama are among the radicals' prime
targets. The Cubans, in particular, have pushed for strong non-
aligned resolutions on Puerto Rico's status. Most nonaligned
states are reluctant to get involved in these issues but few
are likely to oppose resolutions calling for the right of self-
determination for all "states."
I I A resolution calling for the expulsion of Israel from
the UN failed to gain wide support at a nonaligned meeting
last year. Bolstered by the recent Islamic foreign ministers'
call for expulsion, however, the radicals in Algiers--especially
Iraq and the Palestine Liberation organization--will push for
inclusion of such a recommendation in the Colombo declaration.
The nonaligned movement has traditionally taken a
position on the Korean issue and the North Koreans are mounting
a major campaign again this year to gain nonaligned support at
the UN. Although nonaligned recommendations cannot go much be-
yond earlier ones, North Korea is lobbying to gain a seat on
the coordinating committee. That could assure Pyongyang greater
prominence in future nonaligned gatherings.
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The foreign ministers will also discuss organizational
problems which are likely to be as troublesome as the political
issues.
Some Arab nonaligned states--Iraq, in particular--are
pushing for the establishment of a permanent nonaligned secre-
tariat. Many other members feel, however, that nonalignment is
a "concept" and should not be encumbered with a bureaucratic
structure.
Opposing countries, moreover, fear that the country
hosting the secretariat would gain a disproportionate influence
in formulating nonaligned policies.
Pressures for admission to the nonaligned movement
from countries such as the Philippines and Romania are forcing
a reconsideration of the criteria--never strictly applied--for
membership. The Indians and Cubans, in particular, are attempt-
ing to use the review to prevent the admission of countries po-
litically unacceptable to them.
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Lebanese leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt is not expected
to meet with president-elect Sarkis until next week at the ear-
liest as a result of the murder of his sister on Thursday.
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I iFighting in Beirut flared up after the news of her
murder spread, but had apparently begun to subside again late
yesterday.
Sarkis has been continuing his consultations. In the
past two days he has met with most of the key leaders of the
Yesterday he conferred with the leaders of the prin-
cipal Muslim sects, Lebanese Arab Army commander Khatib, Fatah
second-in-command Salah Khalaf, Saiqa chief Zuhayr Muhsin, and
a representative of Syrian President Asad.
Sarkis is trying through these contacts to promote his
proposals for ending the Lebanese civil war and presumably to
cool tempers in the wake of the killing.
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Eritrean insurgents in Ethiopia have attacked at least
two of the peasant units being assembled along the southern bor-
der of Eritrea Province for the government's planned offensive.
I he US defense attache reports that Addis Ababa has
not yet received large supplies of arms and ammunition purchased
for use in the offensive.
I The government has
Inclue no or to provide the peasants with sufficient food sup-
plies. Numerous incidents have resulted from the peasants' at-
tempts to live off the local population.
Despite these and problems of desertions, the ruling
military council is going ahead with plans for the offensive,
and new recruits are being transported to the Eritrean border.
The council may be waiting for a definitive reply from the in-
surgents to recent government peace feelers, but time is running
short because the rainy season begins next month.
I The guerrillas have so far shown no inclination to
begin negotiations.
The predominantly Muslim insurgents are seekin
Arab
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diplomatic intervention to halt the peasant offensive. The
leader of one of the two main rebel groups appealed for Arab in-
tervention at the Islamic foreign minister's conference in mid-
May.
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Damascus this week to request Syrian support, and was scheduled
to make a similar plea in Jidda. 25X1
I ddis Ababa is attempting to convince Arab states
that it is genuinely seeking a peaceful solution to the Eritrean
conflict.
Ahmed Nasser, the leader of the other faction, visited
The Ethiopians may have gotten a sympathetic hearing
from the South Yemenis. Aden has strengthened relations with
Ethiopia's socialist regime in recent months
I
The other Arabs will most likely denounce the planned
offensive and urge Addis Ababa to offer more concessions in its
peace proposals.
Sudanese President Numayri is concerned that the Eri-
trean offensive will spill over and lead to clashes between Su-
danese and Ethiopian forces. He recently appealed to Addis Ababa
and the insurgents to begin immediate negotiations,
The OPEC oil ministers concluded the second and last
day of their Bali meeting yesterday by agreeing to continue the
oil price freeze that was to expire on June 30.
Saudi Arabia and countries that support its moderate
view evidently won the day by preventing the unanimity that
would have been essential on any substantive decision, including
a price change. Last September, the Saudis yielded to the pres-
sure of other cartel members to achieve a consensus; the result
was a 10-percent price hike on benchmark crude.
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I I The Saudis want to continue the price freeze until
the end of the year 25X1
In any case, the OPEC price level cannot be changed until the
ministers meet again.
The next regular OPEC conference is scheduled to be
held in Qatar on December 15, but a majority of countries can
convene an extraordinary meeting at any time.
The oil ministers approved a temporary scheme for
crude oil price differentials, but we do not know the precise
timing and the method of implementing the new system. This plan
probably will lead to price adjustments; the price of some heavy
crudes is expected to decline and that of some light crudes may
rise.
I The meeting did not resolve the issue of moving the
cartel s headquarters from Vienna. Nor did the final communique
make any reference to Mexican membership.
Four candidates of national stature met the filing
deadline yesterday for Portugal's presidential election on June
27, but the campaign is likely to be primarily a personality
contest between Prime Minister Azevedo and army chief General
Eanes.
I lEanes is the early favorite by virtue of the endorse-
ments he has received from the three major political parties--
the Socialists, the centrist Popular Democrats, and the conserv-
ative Social Democratic Center--as well as from two groups on
the far left. He is also counting on support from much of the
military.
Eanes' initial public appearances have raised some
concern, however, that his reticence and austere appearance may
severely limit his popular appeal.
Prime Minister Azevedo, in contrast, moves easily
among the people and is widely credited with repulsing Communist-
backed bids for power last year.
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I I Although Azevedo is not supported by any party organ-
ization, he hopes to capitalize on Eanes' ineffectiveness pub-
licly and on his own reputation in rural areas, where the popu-
lation tends not to vote for a candidate simply because he is
backed by a certain party.
To beat Eanes, however, Azevedo must overcome the
left-leaning Marxist image ascribed to him since more conserva-
tive officers, led by General Eanes, gained ascendancy after
crushing the leftist military rebellion last November. Azevedo's
candidacy was rumored to have been encouraged by Communist sym-
pathizers, but this has not been substantiated and he has pub-
licly rejected Communist support.
I Azevedo is openly challenging Eanes for the centrist
and conservative vote and, in statements earlier this week, has
taken a harder position than his opponent against admitting Com-
munists into his government.
I I To further his cause, Azevedo is apparently trying to
identify himself with the US and the NATO alliance, telling one
interviewer that he would not allow Communist participation in
any future government so long as the US opposed it.
I lEanes, on the other hand, said this week that while
the Communists could not enter the government now, they might
be able to do so later on. The army chief was also less than
whole-hearted in his support of NATO, insisting that Portugal
would remain a loyal ally, but adopting the rhetoric of leftist
military officers in suggesting that both military blocs should
and would disappear.
Former security chief Otelo de Carvalho is expected
to appeal primarily to the far left, which represents no more
than 5 percent of the voters. Carvalho, currently on conditional
liberty pending trial for his role in the abortive uprising in
November, was granted special permission by the army to engage
in political activities until the supreme court rules on his
presidential eligibility.
The Communist Party candidate, Octavio Pato, will
probably take the vote of his party, assorted front organizations,
and of leftists who want a civilian president. Pato is not in
the race to win, but to serve as a bargaining chip with which
the Communists hope to gain a position in the new government.
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Pato probably would have withdrawn from the race if
the Communists had been able to convince President Costa Gomes
to run. If a runoff vote appears unlikely, Pato may still pull
out of the competition and throw Communist votes to whichever
candidate the party decides will be most sympathetic to its in-
terests.
The successive visits of Soviet army General Yepishev
and Communist Party secretary Katushev to Romania are the latest
signs that Moscow is putting heavy political and economic pres-
sure on Bucharest.
I IThe visits follow Romanian President Ceausescu's in-
ense y nationalistic campaign in late April and early May
challenging the Soviets publicly on "proletarian international-
ism."
The Soviets first initiated a series of talks with
the Romanians in an apparent effort to place Ceausescu under the
gun. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the Soviet party's in-
ternational department, unexpectedly visited Bucharest on April
29 and 30. He met with Stefan Andrei, Romanian party secretary
for foreign relations.
Also on April 29, Ceausescu received the Soviet ambas-
sador at the latter's request, reportedly to discuss economic
subjects. Diplomats in Bucharest speculated that the Soviets
were offering "economic sweeteners" to obtain Romania's backing
for the long-delayed conference of European parties.
On May 19, Romania's ambassador in Moscow was called
in by Katushev, who probably reiterated the Kremlin's dissatis-
faction with Bucharest's recalcitrant stance.
The next day, the Romanians urgently called in a Span-
ish diplomat to inform him that relations with Madrid could not
be established next month as planned. The Romanians reportedly
said that the decision was "beyond our control"--a formulation
strongly suggesting Soviet disapproval.
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Four days later, General Yepishev, who is chief of
the Soviet armed forces' main political directorate, arrived
in Bucharest for talks with Defense Minister Ionita and army
Chief of Staff Coman. Yepishev left on May 28, and Katushev
arrived the same day for a "friendly visit" at the invitation
of the Romanian party central committee.
An invitation from the central committee is highly
unusual, and suggests that Ceausescu is staging a show of unity
in the face of Soviet pressure--and of collective accountability
in case he has to yield.
Since early this month, Ceausescu has generally main-
tained a low profile, perhaps in order to avoid further annoying
Moscow, although he did use the unannounced mobilization and
alert exercise in mid-month to show Romania's determination.
I IThe Romanians have recently become somewhat defensive
about preparations for the European party conference.
Bucharest will try to avoid giving its independent
friends--particularly the Yugoslavs--the idea that it has "caved
in" on essential matters of substance. Until the Soviet pressure
eases, however, Ceausescu will probably have to rely on the
other independents to fight his battles. 25X1
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Chile last week received its first medium-term commer-
cial bank credit since the military took power in September
1973. The $125-million, three-and-a-half year loan to the cen-
tral bank from a consortium of 16 US, Canadian, and Latin Ameri-
can banks will give Chile a psychological boost, close this
year's foreign payments gap, and help stimulate economic recov-
ery.
The general-purpose loan was granted despite the con-
tinuing allegations of human rights abuses. Adverse foreign re-
action to the allegations, together with plummeting world copper
prices last year, sharply reduced Chile's receipts of foreign
capital.
The new loan, plus receipts from higher copper prices,
will more than cover the balance-of-payments deficit that Santi-
ago had earlier projected for this year. Santiago will now be
able to increase needed industrial imports later this year and
still meet nearly $800 million in scheduled debt service pay-
ments.
Despite the improved outlook, real gross national prod-
uct should increase by only 2 to 4 percent over last year's ex-
tremely depressed level. 25X1
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